

7 August 1952

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CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

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From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander, Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN  
(2) Commander, SEVENTH Fleet  
(3) Commander, Naval Forces FAR EAST  
(4) Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

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Subj: Action Report for the period 2 July through 4 August 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4 dated 1 July 1951

Encl: (1) Commander, Carrier Air Group SEVEN letter dated 6 August 1952

1. In compliance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period 2 July through 4 August 1952 is hereby submitted.

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

In accordance with Confidential dispatch 300606Z of June 1952, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31), CAPTAIN PAUL W. WATSON, USN, Commanding, with Staff ComCarDiv ONE and Carrier Air Group SEVEN embarked, departed Sasebo, Japan for the operating area on 2 July 1952.

At 0525I, 3 July 1952 the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) joined Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN in SUGAR AREA, in the Sea of Japan near the Thirty eighth Parallel and ComCarDiv ONE, Rear Admiral Herbert E. REGAN, USN, embarked and broke his flag. The Task Force was commanded by ComCarDiv THREE, Rear Admiral A. SOUCEK, USN, aboard the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21). In addition to the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21) the Task Force was composed of the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47), U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) and various heavy support and screening ships.

On 7 July 1952 ComCarDiv THREE departed the Task Force in the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21) for Yokosuka, Japan. Command of Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN was assumed by Rear Admiral Herbert E. REGAN, USN, ComCarDiv ONE, aboard this ship.

On 4 August ComCarDiv THREE arrived on the U.S.S. BOXER and assumed command of Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN. The U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) with ComCarDiv ONE and CVG SEVEN embarked departed Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN in accordance with CTF 77 Confidential dispatch 030114Z for scheduled period of upkeep at Yokosuka, to arrive on 7 August 1952.

The mission of Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN is in accordance with CTF 77's Operation Order 22-51 (2nd revision).

Carrier Air Group SEVEN is commanded by Commander G. B. BROWN, USN and consisted of the following complement of pilots and number of aircraft:

UNIT	ALLOW. & TYPE A/C	OPERATIONAL A/C			PILOTS		
		7/2	7/31	8/4	7/2	7/31	8/4
COMCVG-7 CDR Gaylord B. Brown					6*	6	6
VF-71 CDR John S. Hill	16 F9F-2	16	14	14	25	25	25
VF-72 LCDR Archibald W. Curtis	16 F9F-2	16	15	15	24	24	24
VF-74 CDR Charles Fonvielle Jr.	16 F4U-4	14	16	16	24	24	24

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UNIT	ALLOW. & TYPE A/C	OPERATIONAL A/C			PILOTS		
		7/2	7/13	8/4	7/2	7/31	8/4
VA-75 CDR. Holbert K. Evans	16 AD-4	15	15	15	25	25	25
VC-4 Det 41 LCDR E.S. Ogle OinC	4 F4U-5N	4	4	4	5	5	5
VE-12 Det 41 LCDR C.H. Blanchard OinC	3 AD-4W	3	3	3	6	6	6
VC-33 Det 41 LCDR R. Hoffmeister OinC	4 AD-4NL	4	5	5	7	6	6
	1 AD-3Q	1	0	0			
VC-61 Det Nan Lt. G.N. Yeagle OinC	3 F9F-2P	3	3	3	4	4	4

\* Staff pilots fly with CVG-7 squadrons, and are assigned as follows:

VF-71 2  
VF-72 2  
VA-75 4

CAG and Staff Operations Officer's fly both AD's and F9F's

PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

7/2/52: The USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31) left Sasebo after six days in a Ready Carrier status, and proceeded to the Operating area to commence her first full tour of duty on the line since leaving San Diego on 20 May.

7/3/52: Jets and props launched from the deck of the BHR, attacked Kyosen #1 and Kyosen #2 hydro-electric plants, part of the power complex raided in late June by the four-carrier Task Force, which included the BHR. Kyosen #1 received a direct, 500 pound bomb, hit on its transformer yard and the rupturing of two penstocks. Two hits on the power house and one on the transformer yard of Kyosen #2 caused smoke and dust to obscure the targets, thereby preventing any assessment of damage to that target. The purpose of these and subsequent attacks were part of a program to totally destroy power plant complexes in North Korea. AA defenses were silenced during the attack.

7/4/52: This National Holiday was another working day for the ship and her air group. A half-ton bomb hit on a railroad bridge was followed in quick succession by rail cutting, armed recco, a combined prop and jet strike on troop concentrations, supplies, and a truck park in the Wonsan Valley. 50 loaded boxcars in the marshalling yard north of the center of Wonsan were attacked by BHR planes, resulting in 3 being blown completely into the air and heavy damage to the others.

7/5/52: The CHARLIE UNCLE sector south of Wonsan again offered the Air Group lucrative targets in supply dumps and a troop concentration area. Many fires were observed and at least 3 buildings within the target area were destroyed. Secondary explosions rocked buildings nearby, resulting in major damage to several. Flak suppression was very effective, a 10 gun heavy battery and many smaller positions being silenced.

7/6/52: The day was spent in replenishing the Task Force. Flight operations were not conducted.

7/7/52: The first event of the day was a jet strike on a storage area in the DOG VICTOR sector of North Korea. One large warehouse was completely demolished, and eight others were left burning. Props diverted to rail strikes by weather conditions were successful in cutting rails in 2 places and dropping a span of a railroad bridge. 2 F9F-2's, called to assist a destroyer under fire from the beach, expended 1100 rounds of ammunition on and silenced a coastal gun. There were no further attacks on the surface craft. Again the troop concentration south of Wonsan was hit, the planes attacking an estimated 100 buildings housing troops, leaving in their wake 2 huge fires that were visible for more than 15 miles.

7/8/52: Kyosen #2, one of the hydro-electric plants in the power complex, was the principal target for this day. The AD's and F4U's scored 2 direct hits on the power house and cut 4 penstocks, the pipe line that carries the water from the surge tank to the turbine. A total of 17 rail cuts, a new high for the air group, made the day a success despite foul weather throughout most of North Korea.

7/9/52: The morning hecklers started the day off by damaging 6 sampans, burning 3 box cars, and cutting rails in 2 places. A repeat performance was made on the supply area south of Wonsan, the AD's and F4U's completely destroying 2 of the principal targets. The remainder of the day was taken up with rail-cutting, CAP, and ASP. At 0455 this date, an AD-4 flown by LCDR G. C. BUHRER, 123697/1310, was launched and ditched ahead of the carrier. The ship's helicopter picked the pilot out of the water and returned him, uninjured, to the carrier.

7/10/52: Flight operations were not scheduled this date, all efforts being devoted to replenishment.

7/11/52: The big event of the current operating period to date was the combined Armed Forces bombing of Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea. Faced by extremely intense fire from an estimated 48 heavy AA guns and numerous automatic weapons, the jets and props of this carrier joined with those of the Princeton to suppress flak and attack pre-selected targets in the Communist North Korean Capital. These strikes were followed by attacks on other targets by planes of the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Marines, the Australian Air Force and Her Majesties Royal Navy. According to photographic reports following the single attack BHR planes destroyed a railroad roundtable, 2 locomotives, 5 large vantage trucks, 5 other vehicles and heavily damaged a roundhouse, 3 other large buildings and 3 vehicles. Flak suppression by the jets was reported to be very effective and the assigned gun positions were bombed and strafed effectively. However, one AD-3Q piloted by Lt. E. P. Cummings # 484892/1315 and carrying aircrewman L. L. Tooker, ATL, 748 19 08, USN, was shot down over the target area. The pilot and aircrewman are officially listed as missing in action.

The Pyongyang Operation was conducted under adverse weather conditions. Although the target area was clear, weather in the Sea of Japan and the Eastern inland sectors of Korea was marginal. Jets returning from the strike landed at friendly fields in Korea under a ceiling of 200-400 feet. The props returning to the ship landed under a ceiling of 500 feet and poor visibility conditions. Subsequent strikes scheduled for Pyongyang were cancelled because of these conditions. At 0920I an F9F-2 piloted by LTJG E. B. Conrad, 505750 failed to maintain power after being catapulted and was ditched within the Task Force. The pilot was recovered by the ship's helicopter and landed aboard the Princeton because of visibility conditions but returned later in the day to the BHR.

7/12/52: A day of relative quiet after the action of July 11, the BHR launched only morning hecklers in addition to the usual CAP and ASP. The hecklers napalmed buildings in the Fusen power complex area, damaging eight. All other scheduled operations were cancelled because of bad weather over the coastal area.

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7/13/52: Scattering lumber piles, cutting rails, and strafing sampans were only a part of the day's work. A new mission for CVG-7, close air support, was given a 90% coverage by the TACP and killed an estimated 60 Red troops. Marlin, the TACP said "Very effective and well done". On a strike diverted to cutting rails, one F4U-4, piloted by ENSIGN D.W. LONGWORTH, 541044/1325, was struck by medium flak, forcing the pilot to ditch in the Sea of Japan, approximately 4 miles off shore. Within an hour he was picked up, uninjured by the United States Destroyer HOLLISTER.

7/14/52: There were no flight operations conducted this date due to replenishment.

7/15/52: The usual wet July weather for the Sea of Japan was with the BHR today. Low ceiling, poor visibility, and generally unfavorable flying conditions prevented any but CAP and ASP from accomplishing their missions. A special RESCAP was launched to assist in the attempted rescue of a downed Princeton pilot; however, he was not contacted due to an inaccurate May-Day fix.

7/16/52: The same poor flying conditions prevailed as on the 15th. An early morning RESCAP was sent out, but was diverted to a weather recco flight when notified of the successful pickup of the Princeton pilot by the helicopter of the USS IOWA. All other events were cancelled.

7/17/52: A combination of bad weather and the anticipated visit of the Chief of Naval Operations directed that replenishment of the force take place this date. No flight operations were conducted.

7/18/52: Fog in "SUGAR" area prevented the launching of any aircraft.

7/19/52: Aboard to witness air operations were the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William M. Fechteler, Vice Admiral Robert O. Briscoe, Commander, Naval Forces, Far East, and Rear Admiral Tom B. Hill, Chief of Staff, CINCPACFLT. Unfortunately there was little respite in the poor flying conditions that had plagued the Task Force since July 15. Only one strike was launched, this against Chosen #3 power plant. Five direct hits were scored on the transformer yard of this plant.

7/20/52: The one strike launched was unusually successful. 35 F4U's, AD's and F9F-2's heavily damaged 6 bridges north of Wonsan, destroyed 4 and damaged 20 buildings in the same area before the ceiling dropped to non-operational level.

7/21/52: Replenishment and drills were the order of the day.

7/22/52: The first good flying weather in a week found the BHR unleash destruction upon many assorted targets in North Korea. The principal targets, a roundhouse and a locomotive repair shop in Wonsan, were thoroughly "clobbered" by BHR planes. Flak suppression was most effective, resulting in the silencing of 5 gun positions. No planes were hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire. A frustrated close air support mission, diverted from the bomblines by unfavorable weather, turned northward and expended its ordnance on 15 loaded railroad cars in a marshalling yard. All cars were damaged and 5 were blown completely off the track. The jet recco rocketed and destroyed the control house of a radar station in Songjin. Night hecklers destroyed 3 trucks and damaged 13. An F9F-2 BuNo 127117 piloted by LCDR Gordon C Buhrer, 123697/1310 was ditched because of fuel depletion while in the groove for landing. The pilot was recovered by the ship's helicopter.

7/23/52: Armed recco was only incidental to the big strikes of the day. "Blown sky high and leveled" was the official estimate of damage inflicted upon a Thermal Electric Plant at Wonsan. Photographs showed this target completely destroyed by the attack. 35 good boxcars seen by the same flight called for a special event to follow-up. The AD's destroyed 20, blowing 8 completely off the rails and damaged 15. A large 3 story warehouse in the vicinity of the boxcars came in for heavy punishment and total destruction, the resulting large secondary explosions testifying to the probable storage of ammunition or other explosives. The night hecklers, surprising a convoy of trucks damaged 15, leaving a path of flame and rubble in their wake. General Glenn O. Barcus, CG 5th AF in Korea came on board this date to observe flight operations

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7/24/52: Today was one of the most successful in the current operating period for the pilots of Air Group SEVEN. The major strike of the day, against bridges and rail repair facilities in the Hamhung area, was an outstanding success. The primary targets, 2 railroad bridges and a railroad repair shop, were completely destroyed, as was the secondary target, a transformer station. Three other bridges were damaged. The hecklers as usual had their choice of targets, sighting at least 200 trucks within a 30 mile radius of Wonsan. Final tabulated results showed at least 3 definitely destroyed and 21 damaged. Close Air Support, striking the 68th Division of the CCF, rocketed and strafed artillery positions and troops with excellent results.

7/25/52: The efforts of the ship were directed toward replenishment and general drills.

7/26/52: Damage to 4 bridges and 13 railcuts were the results of today's interdiction operations. The attacks on power plants continued, with Puryong #3 bearing the brunt of the day's raids. Two direct hits on the power house and one out on a penstock caused additional damage to the already badly shattered hydro-electric plant.

7/27/52: The morning hecklers opened the day's operations with a well coordinated attack on a locomotive and three cars ten miles northeast of Tanchon. Closing a tunnel entrance behind the train and cutting the rails ahead, the BHR planes bombed and rocketed it, destroying a boxcar with a direct hit which set off a heavy secondary explosion, and severely damaged the locomotive. The train, stopped dead in its tracks, was finished off by a destroyer dispatched to the scene. Later in the morning the power plant at Puryong #2 was given a terrific pounding which left only one wall of the power house remaining. At Puryong #2 the power house and two other buildings were damaged and cuts were made in the penstocks, in three places. A strategic zinc and lead plant located 25 miles north of Tanchon was the final target for the day. Flak suppression was effective, accurate bombing and strafing taking its toll in communist gun positions. The AD's dropped all their bombs in the target area, destroying or badly damaging the main plant and heavily damaging the transformer and other buildings in the vicinity.

7/28/52: Again the hecklers trapped a locomotive and 3 cars. Following prescribed doctrine, the rails were cut and the train attacked. Direct hits on the boiler stopped the engine leaving it stalled for a later Princeton flight to destroy. Later in the morning a string of boxcars was rocketed and strafed in a routine maneuver, but a tremendous secondary explosion, probably from a load of ammunition completely destroyed all 5 cars. The remainder of the day was gainfully spent in attacks on supply storage areas, bridges and targets of opportunity over North Korea.

7/29/52: All efforts were devoted to replenishment. No flight operations were conducted.

7/30/52: Unfavorable flying conditions over the operating area caused the cancellation of all flights.

7/31/52: With two days of rest, the BHR pilots went out after a variety of targets. Ox carts, boxcars and trucks were available targets for the jets, while the props went after the hydro-electric power plants at Kojo #3 and a hitherto undamaged one north of the Changjin Reservoir. Many direct hits were observed in the area of the power plants, but an accurate assessment of damage was impossible due to smoke and dust. On the second launch of the day, an F9F2 of VF 71 piloted by Ensign B. L. McBride, Jr., 394626/1325, was catapulted from this ship. The jet failed to become airborne and was ditched ahead of the carrier. The pilot was recovered by a helicopter and brought back to the ship. Upon admission to sick bay his injuries were diagnosed as a compressed fracture of the fifth vertebrae.

8/1/52: With the morning spent in replenishing the Task Force, 5 events were launched later in the day by the BHR. The first strike was against the hydro-electric power plant at Chosen #1. Flak suppression was effective, destroying or silencing 8 heavy and medium gun positions. Because of the location of the power plant at the base of a mountain, and intense anti-aircraft fire surrounding the plant, the flak evasive tactics required to be used resulted in negligible observed damage. The night hecklers reported destruction of 11 and damage to 15 trucks in the Wonsan area.

8/2/52: The well-planned three carrier strike against strategic targets at Chongjin was launched at 0500I, with planes from the Princeton and Essex leading off. By 0800I, before the first scheduled event of the BHR, weather over North Korea was non-operational, forcing the cancellation of this ship's offensive sorties. Only six planes were launched, two weather reconnaissance and four anti-submarine patrol.

8/3/52: This, the final day of flight operations in the operating period, was one of great satisfaction to the air group and the ship. The power plant at Kyosen #2, one of three Bon Homme Richard targets in the late June strike on North Korean power complexes, was delivered the coup de grace by the props and jets of Air Group SEVEN. The previously damaged transformer and switch yard were completely destroyed, the power plant was heavily damaged, as was a warehouse in the area. Four (4) cuts in the penstocks were final testimony to the accuracy of Navy bombing. In the CHARLIE UNCLE area 2 F4U's on naval gunfire spot destroyed 3 buildings and damaged 2 identified as steam plants. The hecklers, in their last night of flying for this period, found choice targets in trucks in the Wonsan area. Bombing and strafing vehicles pinpointed by flares, the night flyers destroyed at least 9 and damaged 25 trucks. The final blows of the evening were direct bomb hits which severely damaged a highway bridge and exploded an ammo dump.

8/4/52: At 0500I the Task Force rendezvoused with the replenishment force, and at approximately 1400I, in accordance with CTF 77 confidential dispatch 030114Z, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD departed the Task Force and proceeded toward Yokosuka, Japan via Tsugaru Strait.

PART III

ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. Material

(a) Numerous casualties occurred to ordnance and Fire Control equipment. All were of a minor nature and well within capacity of ship's force to correct expeditiously. Hydraulic seals and gaskets continue to be the greatest source of trouble.

(b) Five one ton carrier type chain falls have been rendered unservicable in the 2000 lb bomb magazines due to the fact that the mono-rail is a five inch "I" beam instead of standard seven inch mono-rail. Work requests for correction of this condition were urgently requested prior to and during the last availability in Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. These requests were disapproved. Additional safety measures have had to be taken to safe guard personnel working in these magazines to minimize possibility of injury.

2. Armuniton Expended

<u>BOMBS</u>		<u>ROCKETS</u>	
170	2000# G.P.	34	3.5
433	1000# G.P.	1260	ATAR
516	500# G.P.	57	HVAR
1490	250# G.P.		
965	100# G.P.		<u>GUN AMMO</u>
856	260# Frag.		
4	350# D.B.	232,357	20MM
160	100# Incen.	167,560	.50 Cal.
19	500# Butterfly Cluster		
123	Fire Bombs Mk. 78-0	271	Parachute Flares

3. Deck Evolutions - Replenishment

(a) During this period, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD was alongside 22 replenishing ships for fuel, ammunition, provisions, etc and received alongside 50 destroyers for refueling, guard mail, passengers, freight, etc., without mishap.

(b) The cargo handling capacity at station No. 3 has been increased by adding fittings which will accomodate a wire or manila highline or a midified house fall rig. To accomplish this, a one inch padeye fitted with a 1" X 8" "U" shackle was welded to the auxiliary director wiring trunk even with top

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of hangar deck curtain frame 72. This station is extremely helpful but a little slow due to location of 5" ammunition hoist, wiring trunk and exhaust blower which allows only seven and one half feet space to clear loading area.

4. Personnel - Gunnery Department

(a) Critical shortage of first and second class petty officers in Fire Control, Gunners Mate and Boatswains Mate ratings precludes proper supervision of maintenance and repair work. This lack of petty officers is seriously handicapping the effort to train and instruct new and inexperienced men in the practical phases of their duties and to qualify them for advancement in rating.

(b) The overall shortage of personnel permits the manning of essential primary battle stations only. Auxiliary directors and emergency telephone circuits cannot be manned and are used only during special drills.

PART IV

OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Damage to Ship

None

B. Damage to Aircraft

35 planes were hit and damaged by flak and bomb bursts. For details concerning this see enclosure (1).

C. Loss of Aircraft

<u>Date</u>	<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Bu. No.</u>	<u>Cause</u>
7/9/52	VA-75	AD-4	128969	Deck launch - Pilot technique (Insufficient flying speed)
7/11/52	VC-33	AD3C	122863	Enemy Anti-aircraft fire
7/11/52	VF-72	F9F-2	123398	Catapult shot - Loss of power
7/13/52	VF-74	F4U-4	97201	Enemy Anti-aircraft fire
7/21/52	VF-72	F9F-2	127117	Fuel exhaustion
7/31/52	VF-71	F9F-2	127091	Catapult shot - violent swerve on leaving catapult resulting left wing tip stall

D. Damage Inflicted on the Enemy

<u>Target</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Factories	1	5
Warehouses	1	13
Barracks	4	7
Buildings (other)	31	85
Locomotives	0	3
Railroad cars	47	159
Boats	2	47
Bridges (highway)	10	13
Bridges (railroad)	8	11
Oxcarts	4	7
Vehicles	39	134
Tunnels	0	4
Gun positions	15	29
Fuel Dumps	0	2
Power houses (hydro-electric)	2	16
Transformers	4	7
Penstocks	2	16
Surge Tanks	0	1
Control house (dam)	1	2
Power line towers	0	3
Observation Posts	0	1
Round Houses	0	3

<u>Target</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Switch Yards	2	1
Water Towers	0	1
Supply Storage Areas	0	2
Piers	0	1
Lumber Piles	0	7
Truck Parking Areas	0	1
Rail Cuts	191	0
Troops Killed	88	0
Bunkers	8	0
Dam	0	2
Radar Station	0	1

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E. The foregoing represents a conservative estimate of the damage inflicted on the enemy. Only when photographic interpretation clearly showed the damage to the target, or in those instances when the pilots could definitely assess the damage, is it reflected in this tabulation. In many attacks weather, flak or shortage of fuel prevented pilots from inspecting the damage. Results of numerous strafings, fires and bombings obviously may never be known.

#### PART V

#### PERFORMANCE OF PERSONNEL AND CASUALTIES

##### A. Performance

The overall performance of personnel from the very beginning has been highly satisfactory and showed steady improvement with operating experience. At the commencement of this action period, a major portion of the crew and air group had only three days of prior actual combat operating experience. A certain amount of confusion and inefficiency was therefore to be expected. But, in the course of thirty days the green and inexperienced joined with their more seasoned shipmates in welding the Bon Homme Richard into a highly efficient and effective fighting unit.

Despite the necessity of operating under adverse weather conditions and against heavily defended enemy targets, combat damage and losses were surprisingly low for such a relatively extensive operating period. These factors coupled with the destruction inflicted on the enemy is a certain indication of the high operating proficiency and combat readiness of the Air Group.

The improvement in the morale of the crew has been noteworthy since the ship departed from Pearl Harbor. There has been a noticeable decrease in Mast cases for non-rated personnel both during "in port" and "at sea" periods. During the final days of this operating period the operating efficiency and morale of all hands, especially for the Air Group has reached a very high level.

One discouraging element which tends to effect morale has been the poor mail delivery service. Mail has arrived at irregular intervals and in small amounts. In general, deliveries have been far below ordinary expectations and on one occasion seven bags of mail arrived in a soaked and generally unreadable condition.

##### B. Casualties

LIEUTENANT E.P. CUMMINGS, 485892/1315, USN: The AD30, piloted by Lt. CUMMINGS, was hit by flak during his dive on a target at Pyongyang, Capital of North Korea, on 11 July. Part of the tail surface was blown off and the plane was seen to crash about a mile from the target. Lt. CUMMINGS is listed as "missing in action".

L.L. TOOKER, ATL, 748 19 08, USN: TOOKER was a crewman aboard the plane flown by Lt. Cummings. He is listed as "missing in action".

ENSIGN B.L. McBRIDE, 294626/1325: On 31 July Ensign McBride was catapulted but ditched ahead of the ship. He was recovered by helicopter and admitted to sickbay with a diagnosis of fracture compression vertebrae, lumbar fifth.

A. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

1. Recreation

Due to operations it was not always possible to show movies on the hangar deck. To offset this, double features were shown on nights of replenishment. Movies were also shown in the Flag Mess, Wardroom, Ready Room Four, Warrant Officers' Mess, and the CPO Mess.

Publication of the weekly ship's paper, which had been discontinued while in the United States, was resumed. A daily press news was also published. Plans are now being made for the publication of a cruise book which is to be printed in Japan.

Since there is no crew's lounge, the Library was kept open until 2130 each night and was crowded to such an extent that men sat on the deck. Reading was one of the major recreations. Thirty-six hundred paper bound books have been distributed since leaving the United States. Magazines in bulk were purchased when last in port and distributed during this operating period.

The Hobby Shop continued to provide a popular form of recreation, an estimated 10% of the personnel on board making use of this facility. Purchases were unusually heavy so that little is now in stock, pending receipt of orders that have been placed some time ago.

Reservations for rest hotels in Japan were requested and obtained. One hundred and two officers requested reservations, one hundred were obtained. Five hundred and eighty-three enlisted reservations were requested, one hundred and forty-three were obtained.

Extensive plans for in-port recreation and athletics have been made. Fifteen beach parties are scheduled, two vaudeville shows, and several sight-seeing parties. Athletics will include competition with the USS PRINCETON in baseball, softball, tennis, bowling, golf, and horseshoes. Softball will be the major intramural sport, with 20 teams participating. An Athletic Council was formed to promote the Athletic Program.

2. Religious Services

Sixteen religious services were held each week, including Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Christian Science, and Latter Day Saints. A Novena Service was started during this period and a Protestant Choir was organized. Prayers are said each night over the loudspeaker system at Taps, the Catholic and Protestant Chaplains alternating. Graces is said before meals in the wardroom.

B. NAVIGATION DEPARTMENT

1. The Navigation Department desires to note its appreciation for the two new loran stations 2H0 and 2H1 located on the Japanese Islands of Hokkaido and Honshu. They were invaluable as a means of rapidly determining an accurate position at any time of the day or night during this period (the Monsoon Season) when the opportunity for celestial observations were few and far between.

2. As the tables for these stations have not been published it is necessary to utilize loran chart No. VL30-17R (1st edition February 1952). This ship found it very advantageous to transfer the lines of position from the loran chart to the chart used on the DRT, chart No. 3320 (Consec N A6763). After this transfer was completed, it was only a matter of three or four minutes to take a loran reading on the two stations, mark the position of the bug on the DRT, plot in the loran lines of position with the aid of an interpolator (H.O. Misc 11, 691), figure set and drift, and correct the bug. When it was possible to check the accuracy of these loran fixes by celestial or visual means, they were never found to be in error more than a mile or two. This method of determining position while operating with Task Force 77 in the Japan Sea is highly recommended.

1. Air Intelligence

a. Intelligence Spaces

On the advent of Carrier Division ONE aboard, the intelligence units of the ship and staff were shifted. The ship intelligence office was assigned to the flag and the ship's office re-established in space 02-122-1 on the O2 deck, formerly occupied by the Photographic Interpretation and Photographic detachment. The latter were moved to new spaces on the 2nd deck.

Enclosed racks had previously been built on the O-2 deck for the stowage of unclassified maps and charts. Cabinet space existed in the new AI office for stowage of classified and ready issue materials. Target Dossiers and Air Target Folders were placed in the custody of the Registered Publications Office, where ample space existed for their stowage.

Lack of adequate display space was overcome with the construction of sliding panels in the new AI office, which increased display surface to 300 square feet. With this notable addition, the space and facilities provided Air Intelligence are considered very satisfactory.

The excessive and almost unbearable heat in the AI office, located immediately beneath the flight deck, constitutes a health hazard that should be considered in any future plans for modification.

b. Dissemination of Information

The Air Intelligence Office is operated on the principle that useful information is useless unless properly disseminated. Charts and overlays on every phase of activity are maintained in the air intelligence office. These are copied or distributed to squadron AI's for separate briefings in each ready room.

An eleven page current Information Bulletin composed of instructions orders and procedures applicable to Korean Operations was compiled and distributed as a basis for briefing. This bulletin covers pertinent information on Search and Rescue, SAR Facilities, Evasion and Escape, Flak Intelligence, Communications, Bombing and Attack Restrictions and Precautions, Ordnance, Undersea Warfare, Heckler Missions and Weather, Close Air Support and other mission procedures. Changes to this basic information are disseminated in the Daily Intelligence Brief, generally a four or five page document, which is mimeographed and distributed to all AI's and key officers of the ship. This brief is comprehensive enough to encompass all missions scheduled in the daily Air Plan for the day. Annotated charts, photographs and city plans pertaining to strikes supplement the brief.

From time to time training notes and material are distributed with the view of improving the briefing and debriefing process. An intelligence summary is prepared and distributed periodically to keep AI's and other officers abreast of all current developments.

c. Flak

The heavy concentration of AA defenses along the principal rail routes and around target complexes/coupled with the enemy's ability to quickly shift defenses gave ominous warning that an extensive flak intelligence program must be pursued if operations were to be conducted successfully and with reasonable safety. The flak problem was, therefore, approached from many angles and every available source of information was sifted and analyzed to present a complete and current flak picture at each briefing.

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At the start of operations, pilots were carefully lectured on enemy AA tactics and practices and impressed with the fact that flak is a danger inherent in every mission over Korea. They, therefore, became flak conscious and eager to receive any information that might be helpful in detecting, evading or suppressing it.

The following methods were used in presenting flak data:

- (1) Whenever possible and as early as practical before flights, annotated 1:50,000 maps, photographic and target mosaics were distributed to each pilot for recognition and orientation purposes and to present the location, types and strength of weapons for planning the best approach to the target and the intricacies of the attack.
- (2) A plot of flak along the principal rail lines was maintained on 1:50,000 charts. The starting point of this plot was the touraides. These were supplemented by later photographic reconnaissance reports, pilot observations and the Carrier Division Flak Supplements. Each night the flak was replotted on an overlay and used in briefing the following day's rail strikes. Touraides were brought up to date and passed out to each pilot.
- (3) A "deck to overhead" plot on a 1:250,000 chart was maintained, pinpointing the location, type, strength and disposition of AA defenses and the accuracy and relative strength of air defenses in a particular area. This plot was intended primarily for the briefing of reconnaissance and heckler missions and the required portions were copied by the AI's for briefing purposes, when necessary.
- (4) For attacks on target complexes a 1:50,000 overlay was prepared and copied by the squadron AI's for briefing. In addition the flak was plotted on City Plans, when these were available, for orientation and planning purposes.
- (5) Known GLR positions were maintained on a special chart for briefing hecklers, coordinating the electronic reconnaissance program and making the final identification and location of electronic sites.

The sources of the aforementioned plots were as follows:

- (1) Photographic Interpretation Reports and flak studies made by the Navy and the U.S. Air Force.
- (2) Pilot observations taken from the flash reports of the Bon Homme Richard and other carriers.
- (3) The Carrier Division Flak Reports, Supplements and Touraides.
- (4) Flak reports published in the Far Eastern Air Force and Fifth Air Force Intelligence Summaries.
- (5) Various POW interrogation and intelligence reports.

d. Touraides

On arrival of the ship in the operating area, the touraides provided were outdated, some of them by as much as three months. None of the information available gave an accurate picture of the current flak situation. It is felt that the benefits derived from the use of touraides is greatly offset by the burdens imposed in their preparation and distribution and in keeping them current. As an outgrowth of study by the BHR, a far superior system appears to be a mosaic of each route size 16" X 20" scale 1:12,000 and

gridded but not annotated, with flak information provided by frequent photographic coverage and flak studies. These would be supplemented by pilot observations. It is recommended that such a system be established to replace the system of touraides.

e. Target Selection

The major portion of targets selected and assigned on this tour had a noticeably gratifying effect on the morale of the pilots. Targets were generally diverse and selected to inflict maximum damage on the enemy. Several targets, however, were of an unappealing nature, particularly some of those in the Wonsan Valley. These were so carefully concealed they were difficult to attack, so small they were left unscathed by the best bombing of a whole flight, so heavily damaged beforehand that they could only be broken up into smaller pieces, or so scattered or vaguely described that it is doubtful if they were hit at all. The consequences of attacks on targets of this kind must inevitably tend toward careless bombing, particularly when the targets are in heavy flak areas.

There are known to be important targets in comparatively flak free areas, in North Korea. Destruction of these would be a severe blow to the enemy and should be accomplished before the enemy has an opportunity to strongly defend them. It is recommended that attacks not be made in heavily defended areas except when the results expected are commensurate with the risks involved.

f. Enlisted Personnel

A.I. Operations commenced with two yeoman 3/c and a yeoman striker. A fourth man, a seaman apprentice recently was added to this group. Unfortunately, only one man, a yeoman 3/c had the benefit of the air intelligence training course conducted by FAIRALAMEDA. It was necessary, then, to train the remainder "on the job"; and a comprehensive training program was instituted to qualify all men as intelligence specialists with the secondary job code assignment of 9926. Since the training is conducted under actual combat conditions rather than with simulated problems, it is hoped they may be fully qualified for this code assignment in the very near future.

Yeoman and strikers assigned to intelligence are, in many respects, placed at a distinct disadvantage. While their experience and capabilities along intelligence lines are broadened, they are limited in preparing for advancement in their primary rate by the long tedious hours spent on the job over extended periods of time. Moreover, the men assigned to intelligence are isolated, in a large degree, from the duties involved in their primary rate and the diversified experiences of intelligence work are of negligible, if any value, to them in preparing for advancement. Generally, the men assigned to intelligence are a select group, who through application and training gain a specialized capability which enhance their value to the Navy in a particular field. To further interest in the field, and to give it recognition, it is recommended that a primary rate for intelligence specialists be established; that the training in intelligence for specialists be continuous and that advancement be based on knowledge of the intelligence field exclusively.

g. Evasion and Escape

As might naturally be expected, ~~keen~~ interest has been shown in search and rescue procedures and evasion and escape techniques. With the institution of positive means of recognizing friendly assistance, much of the skepticism concerning this phase of activity which previously prevailed amongst pilots has been removed and pilots are more assured of evasion and escape with a better than an even chance of ultimate rescue.

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Search and Rescue procedures and information on SAR facilities are, of course, of great importance to pilots; who are always anxious to have the very latest word on this subject as well as the latest equipment. With respect to SAR, it is recommended that a standard set of air to ground and ground to air signals be devised for joint and allied use; and, that the AN- CRC-7 radio be provided to all units operating in the combat zone.

h. Photographic Interpretation

77 Photographic sorties of a scheduled 138 were flown during this period. The balance 61, were cancelled primarily because of bad weather. The missions consisted of rail reconnaissance, target search, damage assessment, airfield surveillance, coastal search and photo mapping for the surface bombardment groups. In good weather photo planes averaged 6 sorties per day. The photography resulting from these missions required analysis of an average of 800 photographs daily.

Many important targets, previously unnoticed by visual reconnaissance, were discovered through the free lance photography of pilots when the primary or secondary targets were weathered. These were pointed out in the daily photographic interpretation report for future attack. Other interesting and worth while bits of information were gleaned and among these were the following:

- (1) Many new storage areas along the North-South Coastal rail lines were detected. These were generally in valleys approximately one and one half miles from the coast at points which would escape the photographing of rail lines for touraid's purposes.
- (2) In the see-saw battle of destruction and reconstruction of rail lines, cuts are being restored at most within 36 hours.
- (3) The concealment and camouflage techniques employed have been intriguing. Storage buildings and barracks have been moved or built in gullies so that the configurate blends in with the surrounding terrain. Pill boxes, ammo storage dumps and gun emplacements are cleverly "planted" with bushes and grass. Shelters have been built over machinery within factory buildings of which only the framework is standing so as to make the impression on pilots overhead that the building is demolished and not worth attacking. Much activity was noted around buildings of this kind.

The demand for photography in the combat area has ascended to an all time high. Only providential bad weather enabled the heavily overworked photographic interpretation unit composed on one officer and one striker assistant to keep abreast of the work load during this period. Had all photographic missions been fulfilled, the minimum personnel required to carry the work load efficiently and expeditiously would be two officers and four enlisted assistants. One trained petty officer is due to report aboard in the near future to join the PI unit. An additional two enlisted men, preferably men who have been trained in photographic interpretation will be required to carry the contemplated work load during the fall months and throughout the balance of this tour. It is therefore recommended that the PI units of all CV's be staffed with 2 officers and 4 enlisted assistants when assigned to the West Pac area.

The use of K-25 strike photography for intelligence purposes is nil. The obscuration of the target area by dust and smoke generally prevents an accurate assessment of damages and frequently gives a false impressiion of the results of the attack. Such photography is seemingly excellent for publicity purposes because of the large demand made for photographs of this kind. It may be desirable then under certain conditions to carry the camera for this purpose.