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U. S.S. KEARSARGE (CV 33)
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division FIVE
(2) Commander Seventh Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the Period 14 September 1952 to 20 October 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4

Encl: (1) Carrier Air Group 101 Action Report for the period 14 September 1952 to 20 October 1952.

1. In accordance with reference (a), the action report for the period 14 September 1952 to 20 October 1952 is herein submitted.

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

(a) During the period of this report the U.S.S. KEARSARGE operated in company with the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 37), U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV 31), the U.S.S. ESSEX (CV 9) and with various heavy support and screening ships. The composition of carriers in the force varied from two (2) to four (4) carriers.

(b) During the subject period the U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CV 33) operated off the East coast of Korea in accordance with CTF 77 Operation Order 22-51, second revision, plus supplemental plans and orders issued during the period.

(c) The assigned mission of the force, in support of the United Nations conflict with North Korea, was interdiction of supply and transportation facilities and close air support of United Nations troops.

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

14 Sep: 0552 Underway from Yokosuka, Japan, for Operating Area in accordance with COMCARDIV 5 dispatch 080616Z of September 1952 and COMSEVENTH FLT dispatch 100136Z of September 1952.

15 Sep: Proceeding to operating area. 1315 Conducted AA "Uncle" firing exercise. 1512 Refueled U.S.S. KIDD (DD-661).

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PART II (Continued)

16 Sep: Conducted refresher air operations. 1622 Refueled USS KIDD (DD-661). 2322 Joined TF 77. OTC RADM H. E. REGAN, USN, CTF 77 and COMCAR DIV 1, in the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31).

17 Sep: Conducted Air Operations. 1844 Refueled U.S.S. HUBBARD (DD 748). 2140 U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37) departed the Task Force.

18 Sep: Conducted air operations. 0942 U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA 133) joined Task Force.

19 Sep: Task Force replenished.

20 Sep: Conducted air operations. 1045 U.S.S. ESSEX (CV 9) joined Task Force. 1852 Refueled U.S.S. WEDDERBURN (DD 684).

21 Sep: Conducted air operations. 1850 RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5, in this ship, relieved RADM H. E. REGAN, USN, COMCARDIV 1, in the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31), as CTF 77. 1904 Refueled U.S.S. HOPEWELL (DD 681). 2030 U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA-133) departed the Task Force.

22 Sep: Conducted air operations. 1245 U.S.S. HELENA (CA 75) joined Task Force.

23 Sep: Task Force replenished. 0745 U.S.S. HELENA (CA 75) departed Task Force. 1757 U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9) departed Task Force.

24 Sep: Conducted air operations. 0500 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) joined Task Force. 0830 General Mark CLARK, Commander, United Nations Forces Far East, VADM R. P. BRISCOE, COMNAVFE, and VADM J. J. CLARK, COMSEVENTHFLT, came on board via helicopter from the U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) for an official visit. 1253 the above visiting officers returned to U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) via helicopter. 1305 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) departed Task Force.

25 Sep: Air operations cancelled due to weather. 0702 U.S.S. JUNEAU (CLAA 119) joined Task Force, 2000 U.S.S. JUNEAU (CLAA 119) departed Task Force.

26 Sep: Conducted air operations. 0525 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) joined Task Force.

27 Sep: Conducted air operations. 0711 U.S.S. JUNEAU (CLAA 119) joined Task Force. 1008 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) departed Task Force.

28 Sep: Task Force replenished. 0559 U.S.S. ESSEX (CV 9) joined Task Force. 1320 U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31) departed Task Force. 1419 Conducted AA gunnery exercise. 2125 U.S.S. JUNEAU (CLAA 119) departed Task Force.

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PART II (Continued)

29 Sep: Conducted air operations.

30 Sep: Conducted air operations. 1515 LTJG J. W. SHOOK, 521443/1310, in F4U Bureau Number 81277, crashed in water near Songjin. Probable cause unknown, wingman reports no survivors. 1650 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) joined Task Force.

1 Oct: Conducted air operations. 0825 VADM J. J. CLARK, COMSEVENTHFLT, came on board via helicopter from U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) for conference with CTF 77. 0940 VADM CLARK departed via helicopter. 0945 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) departed Task Force.

2 Oct: Task Force replenished. 1447 Conducted AA firing exercise.

3 Oct: Conducted Air operations.

4 Oct: Conducted air operations. 0930 U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV 37) joined Task Force. 1015 LT., E. F. JOHNSON, 305780/1305, USNR, in aircraft F4U, Bureau Number 80798, while on scheduled combat mission, was shot down by MIG aircraft near WONSAN, NORTH KOREA. Pilot presumed killed. 1945 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) joined Task Force.

5 Oct: Conducted air operations. 1110 VADM J. J. CLARK, COMSEVENTHFLT, came on board via helicopter. 1404 VADM CLARK departed the ship via helicopter. 1747 AD Bureau Number 125712 crashed into water due to failure of catapult sling on take-off. Pilot and crew member recovered, uninjured. 1824 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) departed Task Force.

6 Oct: Task Force replenished. 1558 Conducted AA firing exercise.

7 Oct: Conducted air operations. 1101 F4U Bureau Number 96769, Ensign Lloyd F. TROUTMAN, 109355/1315, USNR, landed with wheels up due to mechanical failure of landing gear. No personnel injured. 1512 AD Bureau Number 123993, Lieutenant C. Q. MURPHY, 419504/1315, USNR, crashed in water off WONSAN HARBOR, NORTH KOREA, due to engine failure. Pilot rescued uninjured.

8 Oct: Conducted air operations. 0901 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) joined Task Force. 0935 VADM J. J. CLARK, COMSEVENTHFLT, came on board via helicopter. 1041 VADM CLARK departed via helicopter. 1133 VADM CLARK returned on board. 1259 VADM CLARK departed via helicopter. 1545 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) departed Task Force.

9 Oct: Conducted air operations. 1010 U.S.S. JUNEAU (CLAA 119) joined Task Force.

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PART II (Continued)

10 Oct: Task Force replenished. 0645 U.S.S. HELENA (CA-75) joined Task Force. 1130 RADM W. G. SCHINDLER, CTG 77.1 and COMCARDIV 3, came on board via helicopter. 1340 RADM SCHINDLER departed via helicopter. 1539 Conducted AA firing exercise.

11 Oct: Morning air operations cancelled due to weather. Flew 8 sorties during afternoon. 0845 U.S.S. HELENA (CA 75) departed Task Force.

12 Oct: Conducted air operations. 0704 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) joined Task Force. 0839 ADM A. W. RADFORD, CINCPACFLT, VADM R. P. BRISCOE, COMNAVFE, VADM J. J. CLARK, COMSEVENTHFLT, AND RADM J. E. GINGRICH, CTF 95, came on board via helicopter on official visit. 1109 U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31) joined Task Force. 1130 RADM H. E. REGAN, COMCARDIV 1, came on board via helicopter. 1301 the above visiting officers departed via helicopter. 1339 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) departed Task Force.

13 Oct: Conducted air operations. 1115 U.S.S. ESSEX (CV 9) and U.S.S. JUNEAU (CLAA 119) departed Task Force to replenish. 1404 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) joined Task Force. 1408 VADM J. J. CLARK, COMSEVENTH-FLT, came on board via helicopter for conference. 1700 U.S.S. JUNEAU (CLAA 119) joined Task Force. 1825 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) departed Task Force. U.S.S. ESSEX (CV 9) joined Task Force.

14 Oct: Conducted air operations during morning. 0400 U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37) departed Task Force to replenish. 0937 RADM H. E. REGAN, USN, COMCARDIV 1, assumed Tactical Command of Task Force 77. 0940 RADM R. F. HICKEY, COMCARDIV 5, departed this ship for the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31) via helicopter. 1045 U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CV 33) departed Task Force to replenish. 1740 RADM HICKEY returned on board via helicopter. 2312 Rejoined Task Force 77. 2318 RADM HICKEY, in this ship assumed Tactical Command of Task Force 77.

15 Oct: Conducted air operations.

16 Oct: Conducted air operations. 0940 AD Bureau Number 123962, pilot Commander B. T. SIMONDS, 100250, crashed while making deck launch. Pilot was not recovered. 1210 U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV 37) departed Task Force.

17 Oct: Conducted air operations. 0328 U.S.S. BON HOMME RICH RD (CV 31) departed Task Force to replenish. 1010 U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31) rejoined Task Force. 1145 U.S.S. LOS ANGELES (CA 135) joined Task Force.

18 Oct: Task Force replenished. 1345 RADM H. E. REGAN COMCARDIV 1, assumed Tactical Command of Task Force 77. 1400 U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CV 33) took departure from Task Force 77. proceeding to YOKOSUKA, JAPAN, with COMCARDIV 5 embarked.

19 Oct: Enroute to YOKOSUKA, JAPAN

20 Oct: Arrived YOKOSUKA, JAPAN for rest, recreation, and yard availability.

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PART III

PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

(a) Expenditure and performance of Air Ordnance is contained in enclosure (1).

(b) Expenditure of Ship's Ordnance.

The following ammunition was expended during transit periods and replenishment day firing exercises:

5"/38

Projectile	Powder
74 AAC	74 Non Flashless
5 VT Frag.	5 Non Flashless

3"/50

262 VT Frag.	Non Flashless Powder
36 VT Non Frag.	Non Flashless Powder

(c) Performance of Ship's Ordnance

(1) The ordnance casualties on the 5"/38 caliber battery were: (1) Failure of the train brake switch on mount 56. (2) Break down of the installation of the wires on the firing circuit on all port guns, the port battery has the original guns installed. These casualties are considered of a minor nature and were corrected by the ships force.

(2) Ordnance casualties incurred on the 3"/50 caliber battery were of a minor nature which usually consisted of; (1) Damaged shear pins in the loader mechanisms due to improper loading by personnel. (2) Damaged stud pins, slide bar and gate operating cam levers for the front gate, operating mechanisms due to the rear gate being out of adjustment. These mechanisms were repaired by the ship's force.

(3) Fire control equipment casualties incurred in the Mk 37 GFCS were of a minor nature.

a. The first casualty consisted of the failure of the stop pawl (NO. Z956-197014-3) in the fuze Setter Indicator Regulator MK 8 Mod 9. This is fourth casualty of this type onboard this ship since comissioning.

b. The second casulty consisted of the failure of the dowel pins in the spiral gear (No. Z951-209854-3) in the Mk 1A Mod 13 computer. New dowels were installed but did not hold. A new shaft collar was manufactured, press fit and doweled to the Spiral gear. This apparently has corrected this casualty.

(4) Fire control equipment casualties incurred in the Mk 56 GFCS were of a major nature:

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PART III (continued)

a. The first casualty consisted of an open spiral connection in the elevation torque motor in the Gyroscope unit for director 32. Replacement has not been obtained, this director is out of commission.

b. The second casualty consisted of an open Zs pick off coil in the Gyroscope unit for director 33. Replacement has not been obtained, this director is out of commission.

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

(a) Ship.

The ship sustained no battle damage.

(b) Damage inflicted on the enemy by ship's aircraft is contained in enclosure (1).

(c) Damage inflicted on ship's aircraft is contained in enclosure (1).

PART V

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

(a) Performance.

(1) Personnel

Personnel performance and morale has been excellent during the period of this report. During this period the average on board count of navy enlisted personnel was 2072 including marines. During the period of this report, thirteen (13) enlisted men were transferred and six (6) received.

(2) Legal

Legal assistance work for this period has consisted of drafting powers of attorney, special instruments, and various letters on subjects ranging from adoption to naturalization of aliens.

(3) Education

Despite the intensified schedule of operations necessitated by duty with TF-77, the personnel on board the KEARSARGE have demonstrated a keen interest in educational advancement, twenty one (21) GED tests have been administered on board since leaving Yokosuka. Twenty six (26) men have applied for USAFI correspondence courses while ninty eight (98) others have checked out educational manuals for self-study and improvement. Eighty (80) men have taken advantage of Navy Correspondence Courses in order to improve themselves professionally and better prepare for advancement in rating. A total of two hundred fifteen (215) counselling periods have been held in an effort to assist individuals to profitably plan their educational program.

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The records of all enlisted personnel have been screened, one hundred forty seven (147) men with a GCT score of thirty five (35) or less have been enrolled in an elementary reading and arithmetic program. These one hundred forty seven (147) men are presently taking a series of USAFI Placement Tests so that they may be placed in the proper grade level.

(4) Divine Services

The religious program on board has been increased since reporting to the line. The schedule totals twenty six (26) Divine Services held each week. Three (3) Catholic Masses are said each Sunday; three (3) Protestant Divine Services, and a service for Latter Day Saints are also conducted each Sunday. Jewish services are conducted on Friday night, and the Jewish High Holidays were observed by special services for New Year and Yom Kippur. Daily Protestant Devotions are held. A daily Mass is said and a Rosary Service is conducted each evening for Catholic men. Protestant Bible class is held each Wednesday and Latter Day Saints class each Thursday.

(5) Welfare and Recreation

Motion pictures constituted the main form of recreation along with reading and small games. On the average twenty one (21) showings of movies per week are held. The library was extensively used, issuing on the average forty (40) books per day. Pocket books were circulated without accountability in great numbers. Sub-libraries in the various messes like the Wardroom, Warrant Officers Mess and Chief Petty Officers Mess furnished much reading matter on which statistics are not available. Daily press news and a bi-weekly ship's paper were published. Approximately three hundred twenty three (323) copies of magazines are distributed on board monthly. A small games tournament including chess, checkers, acey ducey, etc., is now in progress.

Disc jockey programs were instituted as soon as the facilities were completed, and for several weeks volunteers have conducted programs from 1130 to 1300 and from 1600 to 2030 each day. A program at 1900 of ship's news, operational, task force and world news has become very popular.

Arrangements were made to send one hundred ninety (190) officers, principally pilots, and up to forty (40) per cent of enlisted men to Rest and Recuperation Camps.

(6) Work has begun on a Cruise Book, which the ship expects to have ready for distribution and sale by the time the Far Eastern Cruise is completed.

(7) The hobby shop store was opened officially 1 October 1952. A large selection of model airplanes, ships and boats was displayed with the entire stock being sold within two weeks. Near the end of the period leather was made available and numerous belt, billfold and purse kits were purchased by the men. A work shop was opened and leather working tools were made available to be checked out. The present plan is to open the work shop daily from 1600 to 2100 and the store three nights a week from 1800 to 2100.

(b) Casualties.

See Part VI, paragraph (f) (6).

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PART VI

COMMENTS

(a) Air Department

(1) Flight Deck Landing Problems. No bad barrier crashes or flight deck fires were experienced during this period on the line. However, a serious accident occured when the helicopter overturned as it was being respotted with its rotors turning. This accident resulted in major damage to the helicopter and four men being killed plus several others injured.

Due to the long deck take off run required for AD-4 type aircraft under minimum wind conditions while carrying a large bomb load it is necessary to spot AD-4's across the flight deck. Outboard wing stubs must be loaded before they are placed into the final respot position.

Carriers with Banshee type aircraft should equip their tractors and tow-bars for towing aft. This can be accomplished by turning the towing lugs on the universal tow-bar 90 degrees, and equiping the tractors with a padded "T" frame to keep the tail from injuring the driver. It is also considered desirable to tow F9F's backwards, especially under high wind conditions, and a tow-bar for that purpose is being manufactured.

(2) Arresting Gear. During the period of this report, the total number of landings was 2132. The number of barrier engagements was four, and a total of twenty-two cross deck pendants were replaced. No barricade engagements (i.e. complete engagements) resulted, although the upper shear pins were sheared in one instance, dropping the webbing on the aircraft.

A more detailed account of the care given the barricade might possibly prove of some value. Difficulty was experienced at first in keeping the lower loading straps in the ramp. While other means are available, it was found that the pieces of barrier adaptor lifter straps including the six snap fasteners could readily be modified to serve as securing straps in this instance. A hole was cut through the center of the strap, an eyelet inserted and a large wood screw used to secure the strap to the deck between the forward and after section of the ramp. Excellent results were obtained.

It was further found that the tape used to secure the two sets of upper loading straps together was rapidly being cracked and dried out due to deck traffic and heat from jet exhausts. Since it requires about eight rolls of tape to completely assemble a double barricade installation, and several more to repair and replace torn tape, it was found that supplies of tape were rapidly being depleted. Accordingly, a substitute was sought and marlin was found to be the answer. Not only is it sufficiently strong, but it seems to have good wearing qualities as well. It certainly is cheaper and plenty is available. Three or four turns of marlin are enough, except towards the center engaging straps where deck traffic during launches and recoveries is extremely high.

The life of bungee straps is quite low, a total of approximately one hundred bungees being used during this operating period. Not only is the

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bungee itself crimped and stretched by deck traffic, but the snap fasteners (especially the spring snaps themselves) are constantly being broken so that the bungees are falling off the "D" rings as the barricade is raised. No solution has been found as yet, but a modification in manufacture of bungee hold-downs to include "D" rings with an insertable piece would be advantageous in that bungees would not have to be replaced nearly so often - except of course when they are stretched or crimped so that the elastic limit is exceeded.

At this time no excessive stanchion deflection has been noticed in the barricade installation.

With constant attention and barring any engagement, it has been found that the operating life of a barricade is approximately one month. At the end of this time, it has been found that the center engaging straps have been thoroughly darkened by jet exhaust fumes and deck traffic has caused the seams of the straps to become torn.

(3) Catapults. During this period, a total of 1168 catapult shots were fired; 614 aircraft were launched from the Port Catapult and 554 from the Starboard Catapult. No major difficulties were experienced with the equipment during these operations.

One AD was lost during a launch from the Starboard Catapult. The Catapult functioned perfectly. Possible cause was a faulty bridle or plane catapult hook causing the bridle to come apart and the plane to drop over the bow into the water with little or no assistance from the catapult.

During this operational period it was noticed that launching of aircraft would be facilitated by having the forward end of the holdback and release unit track open as well as the after end. This would allow either end to be used for placing or removing holdback units and would speed up the launching interval time between different types of aircraft. U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33) alteration request number 5-52 regarding subject change is now being prepared.

(4) Maintenance. During the period of this report the following aircraft engine changes were accomplished:

CHANGES	TYPE
2	3350
3	2800
6	J-34

Some difficulty was experienced in that QEC units obtained at San Diego were in many instances incomplete. The QEC unit for 3350 engines was not obtained until just prior to leaving Yokosuka, and was also incomplete.

Four starter Jeeps were assigned to the Air Group by COMAIRPAC, and VC-11 Detachment brought an additional one. At one time during the operating period, two Jeeps were out of commission due to mechanical difficulties. The resulting shortage caused some delay in operations.

A speed-letter was originated to COMFAIRJAP requesting two additional Jeeps to fill allowance. It is considered necessary that the full allowance of starter Jeeps be provided ships that have Banshee Squadrons aboard. The Banshee takes much longer to start than the F9F, and when it is required to launch about 20 jets at one time, at least 4 Jeeps are required to keep up with the catapults and not have too long a turn up on deck.

The deck edge jet starting units were not used due to the time element involved in rigging extension cords for different type receptacles, and the additional man power required to keep two systems manned. The units were only used as emergency starting equipment.

(5) Ordnance Handling Equipment. Considerable difficulty was experienced with the commercial load binder used in conjunction with the Mark 4 Mod 0 Adapter and the Mark 1 Modl Bomb Skid. These binders are unsatisfactory for sustained usage due to their structural weakness. After twenty days of operation, ninety percent of the 130 new binders were bent or broken. A RUDAOE has been submitted on these binders.

(6) Gasoline and Lube Oil Expenditures.

DATE	GASOLINE	OIL
10-30 Sept	578,880 (gal.)	2,758 (gal.)
1-17 Oct	666,421 (gal.)	2,968 (gal.)

(7) Oxygen-Nitrogen Plant. Operation of the oxygen-nitrogen plants during this period was satisfactory. However, it was necessary to stop production once in each plant to effect repairs. Total production for the period 10-30 September was 36,142.36 cubic feet and for the period 1-17 October 47,489.32 cubic feet. Sixty-six 220 cubic feet bottles were filled and transferred to the supply ship for use by other carriers operating in the area.

Considerable difficulty was experienced in handling the flexible oxygen service hose during operations. All of the service outlets are on the port side of the ship, and in order to service planes on the starboard side the use of a 200 foot length of hose is necessary. Handling this much hose, with planes, tractors and bomb skids moving about the deck, is difficult and dangerous. Extreme caution is necessary to prevent damaging the hose.

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(b) ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

(1) Main Propulsion

There were no major casualties and all steaming requirements were met without difficulty. The only problems encountered were in boiler maintenance. The operational requirement for full boiler power, combined with the wide range of boiler power used, results in a larger number of econimizer header hand hole and superheater hand hole leaks, than normally experienced. These are corrected at night when boilers can be cooled down, and during replenishment days.

(2) Electrical

No major casualties were experienced in the electrical equipment. Continuous maintenance and minor repairs were conducted without difficulty.

(3) Auxiliaries

Considerable difficulty has been experienced with the C.H. WHEELER Electro-Hydraulic Rearming at Sea Winches. This has been reported on Material Data Reports, serials: 1-52, 2-52 and 3-52 and by letter CO, USS KEARSARGE (CV 33) CV33/S20 Ser: 1267 of 9 Oct 1952, to type commander and interested activities. It was discussed with RADM J.B. PEARSON, JR., USN Force Material Maintenance Officer, COMAIRPAC, and CAPT. A.K. ROMBERG, USN, Ships Material Officer on COMAIRPAC's staff during their visit to the Task Force Sept 12-16. CAPT. ROMBERG, moreover, observed the operation of the winches during the replenishment on 14 Oct 1952, and is familiar with the details of the repairs affected, and the actual winch performance when rearming.

(4) Damage Control

This vessel is experiencing growing difficulty with maintenance of a watertight flight deck. It is a combination of two factors. Jet blast is melting the marine glue, and blowing loose the oakum permitting water to workbelow the wooden deck. Repair facilities at Yokosuka have been requested to recaulk and pitch the wooden flight deck during the forthcoming availability period. The second problem, and the more serious factor, is the apparent thinness of the steel decking below the wood. Wherever the leakage on the 02 level overhead was serious enough to justify tearing out glass insulation to stop leaks by welding, it has been observed that the wood deck securing studs are shot through or close to through the steel, that movement of the deck under heavy aircraft causes the stud to work and leaks develop.

This is particularly true in the area of the catapult flash plating. A more complete study of this problem will be made after observation of the successfulness of curtailing leaks by new caulking and some experience with the deck under winter conditions. At that time a letter report will be forwarded to the type commander if it appears that availability at a west coast shipyard will be required upon return to CONUS.

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(5) Electronics

a. General

No major difficulties have been experienced with the electronic equipment. During replenishment days, every effort has been made to bring preventative maintenance schedules up to date, and correct all potential failures noted during operations on line. Equipments are retuned and "peaked-up" before placing equipment in operational status.

Maintenance and technical difficulties have been normal. The following comments are given:

b. Radar. SG-6B The antenna slows and labors considerably in winds of approximately 45 knots or better. It has not stalled or windmilled.

AN/SPS-6B No antenna rotational difficulties have been experienced to date. The AFC unit intermittently dropped out of tune, over a 4/5 day period about once a day. Simple retuning would correct the discrepancy. Complete failure of unit occured when suppressor grid bypass capacitor, C835, permanently shorted, causing filter choke L804 to draw excessive current, and open. It is assumed the intermittent shorting of C835 prior to final breakdown was cause of preceding AFC difficulties.

Considerable interference from similar radars in the force necessitated retuning of equipment. It is recommended that frequency assignments be closely supervised.

Side lobes, 30-40 degrees wide and at 150 and 230 degrees relative to antenna head, were of sufficient strength to smear land targets at a range of approximately 25 miles. No side lobe echoes have been observed at greater or lesser ranges.

Radar was tuned to 1318 MCS. Retuning to a frequency 20 MCS away eliminated all traces of side lobes.

c. Radio.

Considerable intra-ship radio interference has been experienced on the VHF radio nets. This interference has been definitely established as "spill-Over" and crossmodulation. Shifting antennae, and adjustment of transmitter power output, and receiver silencer bias have reduced the interference to an acceptable level. A thorough inspection of antenna insulators, and cable bonding should further reduce interference to the minimum. This will be accomplished during next upkeep period. The RCK receiver has proved very unreliable for long range communications (35 miles plus) with aircraft.

d. Miscellaneous.

It is recommended that a remote start/stop switch for the AN/CPN-6 RACON equipment be located in Air Operations in order to provide for the immediate energizing of the RACON in times of emergency.

(c) Gunnery department

(1) Ammunition re-supply.

(a) Replenishment was accomplished three times during the period 17 to 30 September and five times during the period 1 to 20 October as follows:

DATE	FROM	TONNAGE	AVERAGE TON PER HR.
9-19-52	USS MR BAKER (AE-4)	147	66.8
9-23-52	USS MT BAKER (AE-4)	239.8	79.95
9-28-52	USS MT BAKER (AE-4)	163.3	45.15
10-2-52	USS CHARA (AKA-58)	206.5	77.6
10-6-52	USS CHARA (AKA-58)	239.6	108.9
10-10-52	USS CHARA (AKA-58)	250.5	125.9
10-14-52	USS PARICUTIN (AE-18)	207.5	81.5
10-18-52	USS MT BAKER (AE-4)	160	81

(2) Ammunition Handling Problems

(a) During the month of September and the first week in October this ship experienced considerable difficulty in burtoning ammunition due to the inoperative status of one or both of the interim winches used in the burtoning operation. Through the continued efforts of the Engineering Force, the winches were repaired and operated satisfactorily except during the replenishment from the U.S.S. PARICUTIN (AE-18) on 14 October 1952. The forward winch was temporarily out of commission on two occasions due to blown gaskets during this operation. The wire straps and the beckets on the cargo nets were of such length that the PARICUTIN winch operator was required to hold a strain, and the KEARSARGE winch operator was required to haul against this strain to raise the cargo nets high enough to clear the ships side. This put an overload on this ships winches, which resulted in the blown gaskets. The interim winches installed on board this ship were not designed to take this overload. The gaskets were renewed and loading operations were continued. It has been observed that the presently installed winches operate at a much slower speed than the cargo winches installed on the vessels replenishing this ship.

(3) Recommendations

The interim winches should be replaced by the winches designed for use at the burtoning points, on board this ship, at the first opportunity.

(d) Operations Department

(1) Combat Information Center

a. Operating Procedures. CIC functioned as Flag CIC during the period of this report. Coordination was very effective in the

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performance of ship's CIC functions, Flag functions, and air control. The excellent teamwork which developed was due to a high degree of cooperation between ship and flag watch officers, the type of watches employed for enlisted men, and an effective use of a Radar Control Officer. The ship and flag watch officers worked closely together in the control of all CIC functions regardless of whether any particular function was for the primary support of the force, the ship, or Flag Plot itself. The combined efforts of both the flag and ship watch officers were often required on particular evolutions when operations were heavy.

The enlisted men were divided into three watch sections, two heavy sections of 24 men each and one light section of 14 men. The two heavy sections alternated in manning CIC from 0300 until 2100 and the light section was on from 2100 until 0300. One heavy section worked from 0300 until 0600 and from 1200 until 1800, and the other from 0600 until 1200 and from 1800 until 2100. This arrangement worked excellently. It had the following advantages: The largest number of men were on duty during air operations when the need for them was greatest. Continuity of operations was maintained since watches changed when air operations were at a low level. The watches conformed to meal times as well as peak loads of air activity. This system required no special meal arrangements. Hours were long for the day sections, but sufficient rest was obtained since each man standing day watches had a full night's sleep. Late sleeping privileges were required only for the fourteen men in the night section. The system permitted the establishment of stable and quasi-permanent air control and surface control teams within the sections. The two heavy sections were rotated every two weeks. All the men in the night section will be rotated into day sections every six weeks.

Each section had one Watch Officer and one Surface Control Officer. Three air controllers rotated throughout each day while air operations were in progress.

The primary air control function was in strike control. It was necessary that each returning flight be indentified by flight number as soon as it left the beach or appeared on radar. Air control was accomplished on the VK-3 repeaters facing the Vertical Plot. The use of SX consoles for air control was impractical since the air controller was blocked off from use of the Vertical Plot. His use of the Vertical Plot was absolutely essential due to the large number of returning flights under surveilliance at one time. It was found that the air controller, the Radar Control Officer, the two watch officers, and supporting personnel around the Vertical Plot, Raid Tote Board, and the Air Status Board all concentrated around the bank of scopes near the Vertical Plot formed the most effective team for both strike control and CAP control.

The control of jets would have been impossible without Mk 10 IFF. Jets would fail to show on all radars more often than not, and it was usually with IFF that positive control could be maintained with CAP or returning jet strikes. Detection of enemy jet aircraft

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could not be depended upon reliably. Upon one occasion MIG-15's were tracked over the beach at a distance of 120 miles, but this was rare. On another day the MIG's came within sighting distance of the force without being detected by radar.

Air defense exercises were held periodically using returning strike flights as simulated bogeys. The average intercept was made by CAP at about thirty miles. The primary difficulty in interceptions was always in altitude determination. The present equipment is inadequate since it was impossible to obtain reliable altitude determination outside of about 30 miles.

The use of a Radar Control Officer, placed on a VK repeater with IFF near the Watch Officer, has greatly improved the quality of presentation of the Vertical Plot. There was an inadequacy of IFF installation, there being only one VK repeater and one SX console with IFF installed. Air control functions were greatly limited thereby because so much dependence had to be placed on IFF. The problem has been solved temporarily by putting IFF into all scopes through an unused radar switch position from the Radar Switch Board, with a central control box on the VK repeater as originally installed.

b. Equipment Performance. Generally the SPS will pick up a target at a longer range than the SX. However, the SPS will not hold the target every sweep until the target closes to about 60 miles for prop planes and about 30 to 40 miles for jets. The SX will hold a target on the majority of sweeps. The SPS requires more frequent tuning and adjustment than the SX to obtain maximum performance.

The SX radar is highly susceptable to interference from other radars in the force. The only serious interference in the SPS is the abnormally large side lobes inherent in this equipment. When operating close to land this side lobing can render a large portion of the scope unusuable.

The SPS radar has been in constant use except when shut down for routine maintenance, and much greater dependence and use has been made of it than the SX radar. The SX has been kept in a standby condition as much as possible when its use was not required, so as to reduce operating time and maintenance difficulties.

c. Communications. The overall operation and adequacy of communications in CIC during this period were average to below a good workable level. The maximim reliable range of the TDQ transmitter was found to be 90 miles. This is considered to be satisfactory for air control. This ship is seriously limited, however, in VHF communications flexibility because of there being a total of only six TDQ VHF transmitters installed and only one AN/ARC-1 available to CIC. At least three additional VHF transmitters and receivers are needed for present operations beyond those permitted by current configuration.

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The RCK receivers were very limited in range reliability and it was necessary to use the AN/ARC-1 and URD-2 receivers for strike control in order to receive the planes' transmissions beyond 45-50 miles. A split headset was used for air control with good results. A Western Electric headset type AU 52 was adapted so that the TDQ/RCK combination could be used with the major component and the AN/ARC-1 or URD-2 audio input coupled to the second earpiece, which was joined to the major component (AU 52) by a common headband. The Western Electric headset is considered to be an excellent piece of equipment for both air control and general CIC usage.

Since there were an inadequate number of VHF transmitters available and since the RCK receivers were undependable, a second AN/ARC-1 unit was piped into CIC from the CCA room. In addition, the audio from three additional AN/ARC-1 receivers was piped into the RRS radio system through the patch board panel in Air Operations. This has improved communications, although still not to an acceptable level.

There was an excessive cross-talk and feedover between antennas on most of the VHF circuits which made air control very difficult.

Communication equipment and frequency assignments were inadequate when more than two carriers were operating or when participation was attempted in any large coordinated operation with the Air Force or with ground facilities. The ship does not have sufficient VHF equipment. Frequencies available were very limited as to number. Such circuits as were available were overloaded and circuit discipline was poor. Upon several occasions the GUARD channel of VHF was used so excessively for routine communications that it was virtually worthless in an emergency.

d. Recommendations: The ultimate IFF installation according to design plans for this ship provides four complete units which is considered adequate at this time. No further recommendations concerning IFF equipment is made, other than local temporary employment mentioned above, pending availability of equipment and the subsequent issue of the ultimate Ship ALT by BUSHIPS.

CincPacFlt Instruction 02810.1 has established an early target date for employment of UHF vice VHF in Pacific Fleet aircraft. This ship has ample UHF transmitters and receivers. It is therefore not desired to recommend permanent alterations in VHF equipment installation. It is felt that temporary local alterations to meet present operations will suffice until the ultimate program is achieved. It is probable that one additional AN/ARC-1 control unit may be piped into CIC from CCA for that purpose, since CCA equipment has been unavailable to this ship.

The Western Electric head set type AV-52 is highly recommended as standard equipment for CIC air control use. It is light in weight and permits the controller the use of both hands for radar manipulation and tracking of targets.

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(2) Communications

a. Shortages of experienced rated personnel continue to act as the greatest threat to rapid communications. With the high volume of traffic extent in this area, errors in technique become especially onerous and time-consuming in rectification. The Communication Unit has been operating below 50% of rated Petty Officer allowance. A vigorous training program is improving on that figure in spite of continued losses engendered by expiration of enlistment and termination of period of obligated service.

b. The Main Communication Station handles approximately 265 messages per day addressed to or sent from the Embarked staff or ship while operating as part of TF 77. About 50% of this traffic is classified, requiring encryption. It has been found necessary to maintain a continuous officer watch of two persons which is augmented by one or two additional officers as required during peak hours, for cryptocenter operations.

c. Material difficulties of importance occurred in two particulars:

1. Feed-over in CIC between UHF circuits continued through the operating period. Strike, land-launch, and secondary tactical nets were involved.

2. Complete loss of communications was experienced nightly on NDT-CTF 77 duplex RATT circuit, throwing a workload on ComNavFe Command Net (Circuit C18) for which this CW circuit is not designed. Aspects of improper tuning of the TBM radio transmitter utilized, complete check of the transmitter, and alertness on the part of the receiving activity are being investigated.

d. Non-delivery of action and information messages is increasing. Most cases have been traced to NDT, which activity has been found to be in the process of relocation.

e. Interference on ComSEVENTHFlt Command Net (Circuit C16) continues. The TF 77, Joint Operation Center Korea Voice net is similarly subject to annoying but ineffective jamming.

f. The Nancy method of visual signalling is often misused for the transmission of lengthy messages, sometimes of questionable import.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) That increased numbers of communications strikers be provided. Where schooling facilities are sufficient to permit, it is recommended that RMSA and TESA be allocated to afloat commands. Where schooling facilities will not permit, it is recommended that seamen who have in-

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indicated an aptitude for communications be earmarked for duty in that field by classification centers. If is considered that, given a nucleus crew, operating vessels are in an excellent position to train and rate young men in communication specialties. The experience of this command points to the paucity of promising strikers assigned to communication duties.

(b) That increased emphasis and continuing attention be directed to the necessity of sending messages by electronic means. Mail should be employed whenever possible. Attention of dispatch originators should be directed to the daily guard mail trip throughout the task force. The concepts of dual precedence and information addressees receiving copies by mail should by thoroughly disseminated.

(c) That nancy method of visual communications be employed sparingly and most judiciously in the case of encrypted traffic.

(3) Photographic Laboratory

During this period seventy seven photographic sorties were flown, shooting a total of 135 rolls of reconnaissance film.

The photographic laboratory delivered 34,Ø67 prints of reconnaissance negatives, 174 plot sheet negatives, 2,715 prints of plot sheet negatives, 234 negatives of mosaics, and 2,Ø19 prints from negatives of mosaics. To accomplish this work it was sometimes necessary to delay Public Information photographs, R.U.D.M. photographs and other photographic work orders, in addition to the photographic quarterly report.

Equipment failure was held to a minimum, but two K-20 cameras, two 16 MM cine' magazine cameras, four K-17 camera magazines, one K-17, 24" lens cone and one A-8, modified magazine proved to be mechanically inadequate.

The amount and quality of photographic work produced during this period was greatly hampered due to a shortage of rated personnel, only six of the 10 allowed rating being on board. In addition to the rated men on board, the photographic laboratory has twelve non-rated men. At present two of these are full time assistants to the Photographic Interpreter. The photographic laboratory must operate on two (2) twelve (12) hour shifts in order to complete all the work orders received. The first shift works from 0800 to 2000 and utilizes nine men; the second shift works from 2000 to 0800 and utilizes six men.

The ship at present does not have a camera repairman. It is recommended that one rated photographer assigned to each carrier, be a camera repair school graduate.

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(4) Photo Interpretation

During this operating period 77 photographic sorties were interpreted, consisting of target searches, route surveillances, flak studies, and a limited number of damage assessments and call missions. Because of the de-emphasis of rail interdiction, only 4 touraids were produced. An estimated 25 target studies were prepared and reproduced for dissemination to strike squadrons.

The job of photo interpretation has been handicapped to some degree by a shortage of proper facilities and equipment; but the largest impediment has been the lack of adequate training and experience on the part of both the P.I. Officer and the two enlisted assistants. The unique problem presented by Korean photography renders standardized training inadequate on many points, and indicates a definite need for instruction in the operational area. Also the importance of experience under the conditions imposed by an operating carrier cannot be overstressed. Thus it would be more than desirable that personnel be given the advantage of at least one tour on the line under the guidance of a trained interpreter before assuming unsupervised duty.

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(5) AIR INTELLIGENCE

This ship's Air Intelligence Office has operated on the assumption that squadron AIO's are able to do a more efficient job when they have first-hand access to all latest Air Intelligence information. In putting this idea to practice it has been found that its success depends to a large degree on the physical set-up of the office. Sufficient maps must be prepared with latest information plotted thereon, all latest dispatches must be readily accessible, familiarity with all publications is essential, and squadron AIO's must keep a continuous check on all sources of information which are collected for them in the AI Office. The facilities of the AI Office have been arranged with the primary aim of accomplishing this end.

Flak is plotted on 1:50,000 maps. These maps are available for briefing purposes; a large reproduction of the Air Plan is kept current with the latest changes indicated; sliding map panels are utilized to prepare charts for target information, general situation etc.; dispatches are posted on appropriately marked boards as soon as they are received and read; a "read and initial" system is maintained for all publications. All important information is posted along with dispatches. In short, an attempt is made to assure that by checking the AI Office immediately before each briefing, squadron AIO's will be aware of all the latest intelligence information available to the ship, and will be able to pass it on to their pilots.

During this initial operating period much time has been spent in establishing and ironing out flaws in this system. Its worth has been demonstrated throughout the period, especially in the elaborate preparation for, and execution of, the amphibious training exercise.

During the evening, prior to each operating day, a briefing conference for the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer and all heads of departments was conducted by the ship's AI Officer. This program has served its purpose well in keeping the ships officers informed of the progress of operations and has led to better coordination of ships activities. All information regarding operations is dessiminated on a "need to know" basis.

(6) PUBLIC INFORMATION

The task of attempting to do justice to the many directives regarding Public Information continues to be a major one. Inexperienced personnel, working space, and time present the greatest problems. All are at a very high premium. The ships PIO has a well organized unit of reporters and photographers that are just now becoming experienced enough to start routine production of good PI material.

During the period of this report the following material was produced:

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24 Navy News dispatches.
656 Fleet Hometown News stories
2 Feature stories
59 Still pictures released
85 Tape recorded Hometown interviews.

It is highly recommended that if continuing emphasis is to be placed on public information, (and this command believes it should be) experienced personnel should be made available to units of this size engaged in combat activities. The recent visit of CINCPAC's PIO representative served its purpose well in stimulating interest and presenting new ideas but did little to alleviate the difficulties mentioned above, i.e.: inexperienced personnel, working space, and demands on time from other pressing duties.

(e) Supply Department

Aviation Stores

(1) Availability

a. 4,973 items requested.

b. 4,544 items furnished from stock which was 91% of the items requested. Of the 429 items not in stock, approximately 70% represented normal replenishment for items issued on a shop store basis.

(2) AOG Requests

AOG requests totaled 27. CV's on the line supplied 18 of the items; 14 of them in less than 24 hours; four within 48 hours.

The principal causes of the AOG's were in order of importance:

a. Non receipt of initial allowance.

b. Items not listed in allowance.

c. Items peculiary to particular Bureau Number series.

(3) On 3 October the main aviation structures storeroom was flooded with ten inches of salt water by the fire sprinkler system. Cause unknown. Fast action by crews from Supply and Maintenance in uncrating, washing all aluminum material with fresh water and oiling all steel surfaces, resulted in negligable loss.

(4) Recommendations

a. Plane types and Bureau Number series should be firm sufficiently in advance of deployment to insure time to acquire a full allowance for the types concerned. On the Kearsarge the F9F-4 & 5 aircraft on board were

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replaced by F9F-2 and F2H-2 with insufficient time to acquire a full allowance for the F9F-2 or F2H-2 prior to deployment.

b. Allowance lists should be brought up to date and current usage. The allowance lists proved particularly inadequate for F4U-4 engine seals and gaskets. The VC detachments with a zero allowance for many items operated with an allowance handicap. It is suggested that the allowance for VC squadrons consider the total number of each plane type operating on all CVA's in a given area.

c. Squadrons should be screened prior to deployment to assure that all aircraft inventory logs, flight log books, and squadron allowances are complete.

(f) Medical Department

(1) Medical Department supplies and equipment were adequate. No significant equipment breakdown or supply shortages occurred during this period. Fore-sight in procuring several items of supplies and equipment in excess of allowance and others not listed as initial allowance paid dividends. Due to the great variety of casualties and illnesses and because ships of this type function also as hospital ships, it is strongly recommended that all CVA's be prepared and equipped to handle medical problems of all categories while in the operating area.

(2) Medical Department personnel shortage continues to be an acute problem. The authorized allowance of 25 men is considered adequate but the present on board count of 19 is considered insufficient to properly accomplish the prescribed mission of the department. Additional losses, by reason of discharge, that will occur in the near future will seriously handicap the overall performance of the remaining personnel and the efficiency of the department.

(3) Medical Evaluation of Air Group and Ship's company

a. For the first 3 weeks of this operating period the general morale and physical well being of both the Air Group and Ship's Company remained good. During the remaining two weeks of this period, it was noted that personnel, particularly those directly associated with air operations, tended to show moderate signs of stress. Some tenseness became apparent and early signs of fatigue began to partially encroach upon the physical vigor previously demonstrated. There was no significant morale problem, individually or collectively, which required specific attention.

b. Although this was the first period of such operations, for this ship, certain personnel developements tend to indicate that repeated operations prolonged over a period of 3 weeks, may well result in physical and morale problems which will merit future consideration.

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PART VI (Continued)

(4) Medical Statistical Summary Air Group and Ship's company

a. Admitted to sick list.....156
b. Total sick days out of 112850 possible works days.....296
c. Officers admitted to sick list.....2
d. Total patient visits to sick call.....3812
e. Total medical treatments.....6244
f. Patients received from other ships.....5
g. Patients transferred to hospital.....7
h. Number minor injuries treated.....56
i. Number major injuries treated.....14
j. Number shipboard injuries resulting in death.....4
k. Minor surgical procedures.....106
l. Major surgical procedures.....12
m. Venereal disease cases and Non-specific Urethritis total..69
   1. Gonorrhea 35, Chancroid 12
   2. Non-specific Urethritis following sexual exposure 22
n. Penicillin tablets issued last in port period.....2516

(5) Medical Statistical Summary Air Group Pilots and Crewmen

a. Planes lost, enemy action, pilot killed, not recovered.1
   Planes lost, operational, pilot not recovered.....1
   Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered, minor injuries 1
   Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered, uninjured...1
   Planes lost, operational, crewman recovered uninjured..1
   Planes damaged, enemy action, crewman injured.....1
   Planes damaged, enemy action, pilot injured.....1

b. Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons.....13
   Pilots permanently grounded pending medical evaluation.1
   Average number days pilots grounded.....3.7
   Crewmen grounded for medical reasons.....1

(6) Casualties

a. On 17 September an AD-4N was hit by enemy ground fire which entered the after compartment, struck the radar scope, splattered metal and glass fragments through the compartment. The crewman sustained a fractured skull at the site of entry of several fragments in the left temporal bone. X-rays revealed retained foreign bodies about the left orbit. General condition was good. Transferred to Naval Hospital, Yokosuka, Japan.

b. On 18 September a hung rocket broke loose from an F2H2, skidded forward on the flight deck and struck two men. One sustained a fracture of the left femur plus a compound comminuted fracture of the tibia and fibula which necessitated amputation of the left lower leg. The other sustained a very severe compound comminuted fracture of the left tibia and fibula which required open reduction with bone plates and screws. Both were transferred to the Naval Hospital, Yokosuka after the above treatment on board.

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c. On 30 September LTJG. J.W. SHOOK, while flying an F4U in a strafing and bombing mission off the coast of Korea was seen to go into a sudden inverted dive position following a strafing run. He failed to recover from this position and crashed into the water. Survival was not considered possible and he was reported as killed in action.

d. On 4 October LT. E. F. JOHNSON while flying a combat mission in an F4U was attacked by enemy jet aircraft near the coast of Korea. His plane crashed into the water in a steep dive and survival was not considered possible. He was reported as killed in action.

e. On 5 October LT. F. C. ANDERSON and crewman in an AD4N crashed into the water after a catapult launch. Both LT ANDERSON and crewman were recovered, by helicopter, very shortly after ditching. No injuries of significance were sustained.

f. On 7 October LT. C. O. MURPHY, while flying an AD4 in a bombing mission over Yongpo, developed engine fire and failure after a run. It was not determined whether the engine trouble developed as a result of enemy ground fire. He was forced to ditch his plane, but was recovered and returned to the ship with only minor abrasions and contusions.

g. On 11 October the ship's helicopter, while being parked on deck edge elevator with rotors engaged, suddenly tipped over. Three men were killed instantly due to injuries, multiple extreme and one died 2 hours and 44 minutes after the accident. One man sustained 8 fractured ribs with hemo-pneumothorax, bilateral fracture of the pelvis and kidney and kidney and bladder damage. Six others sustained minor injuries, 3 of whom required prolonged in-patient care. The report of the Board of Investigation, convened immediately after the accident, is now being prepared.

h. On 16 October CDR. B. T. SIMONDS, Commanding Officer of VA-702, while flying an AD4, crashed into the water immediately after an apparently normal deck launch. He was seen floating free of the plane, apparently alive, along the port side of the ship. Observers state that his life vest appeared inflated, but that his parachute was still strapped to his chest. Helicopters and a destroyer were on the scene immediately, but for some unexplained reason did not sight CDR. SIMONDS. A prolonged search was continued, but no recovery was made and CDR. SIMONDS was reported missing.

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USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45)
USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47)
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USS BAIROKA (CVE-115)
USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)
USS SICILY (CVE-118)
USS GILBERT ISLANDS (CVE-107)
USS POINT CRUZ (CVE-119)
USS TRIPOLI (CVE-64)
Carrier Air Group TWO
Carrier Air Group FIVE
Carrier Air Group SEVEN
Carrier Air Group NINE
Carrier Air Group ELEVEN
Carrier Air Group FIFTEEN
Carrier Air Group NINTEEN
Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE
Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO
Carrier Air Task Group ONE
Carrier Air Task Group TWO
CO,FAIRBETUPAC (2)
CO, Composit Squadron THREE
CO, Composit Squadron ELEVEN
CO, Composit Squadron THIRTY FIVE
CO, Composit Squadron SIXTY ONE
USS YORKTOWN (CVA-10)
USS RANDOLPH (CVA-15)
USS HANCOCK (CVA-19)

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