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CV37/A16-13
Serial: 0148

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

12 JUL 1952

From: Commanding Officer, USS PRINCETON (CV-37)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN (2)
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 2 June 1952 through 28 June 1952

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.4
(b) CVG-19 conf ltr ser 023 of 28 June 1952 (Air Attack Reports for period 4 June through 25 June 1952)

1. In accordance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period 2 June 1952 through 28 June 1952 is hereby submitted.

PART I Composition of Own Forces

Pursuant to CTF 77 Restricted dispatch 291054Z of May 1952, the USS PRINCETON (CV-37), with Carrier Air Group NINETEEN embarked, departed Yokosuka, Honshu, Japan and proceeded to the operating area. On 4 June the PRINCETON rendezvoused with TASK FORCE 77.

TASK FORCE 77 was composed of four aircraft carriers, the USS PRINCETON (CV-37), the USS BOXER (CV-21), the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47), and the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), along with various heavy support and screening ships. The USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) relieved the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) midway in the operating period.

MISSION:

The mission of this force, as set forth in Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN Operation Order No. 22-51 (2nd Revision), was to conduct a systematic program of air and surface interdiction, provide close air support of ground operations, assist in maintaining control of vital sea areas and operate as a fast carrier task force when directed, in order to support UN Forces in Korea and to support the policy of the United States in the Far East.

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PART II Chronological Order of Events.

2-3 June

Departed Yokosuka, Honshu, Japan and proceeded to the operating area and TASK FORCE 77.

4-6 June

Conducted air operations off Northeastern Korea. Attacks were made from Wonsan to Chongjin. Two hundred ninety five sorties were flown during the period.

On 4 June one AD-4 of VA-195 spun in due to low speed and high rate of turn while approaching the Carrier for landing. The pilot, LT W. T. DAKIN, was recovered immediately by helicopter.

On 6 June one AD-4 piloted by LT D. J. TENNYSON of VA-195 on a rail interdiction strike was hit by enemy fire while in a bombing run. The plane crashed, exploded and burned, leaving no chance for survival.

7 June

Replenished at sea.

8-10 June

Conducted air operations off Northeastern Korea. Attacks were made from Wonsan to Songjin. Two hundred thirty two sorties were flown during the period.

On 8 June one AD-4NL of VC-35 crashed into the sea while returning from a combat weather reconnaissance mission; the cause of the crash is undetermined. The pilot, LT R. E. GARVER and the crewman, A. E. RUDDELL, AT3, were given no chance for survival.

One F4U-4 of VF-192 experienced engine failure while entering the groove for a landing. A normal water landing was effected and the pilot, LCDR G. G. STRUCEL, was recovered uninjured by helicopter.

One F4U-4 piloted by LTJG E. M. CROW of VF-193 crashed into the sea on take-off; the crash apparently was due to power failure. The ship's helicopter was unsuccessful in rescue due to the pilot's injuries. LTJG CROW was picked up by the USS GURKE (DD-783) and was transferred to the Naval Dispensary, Fleet Activities, Sasebo, for treatment.

On 9 June one AD-4 piloted by ENS F. L. LOFTON of VA-195 was hit by enemy ground fire while on a combat mission. The resulting engine failure forced the pilot to ditch in the vicinity of Wonsan. ENS LOFTON was rescued uninjured by the helicopter from LST 799.

One F4U-4 of VF-192 presumably was hit by enemy ground fire while in a bombing run causing engine failure. The pilot, LT G. W. NICHOLS, ditched the aircraft off Mayang-do and was rescued uninjured by the helicopter from the USS IOWA (BB-61).

10 June one F4U-4 of VF-192 presumably was hit by enemy ground fire while in a bombing run and lost power. The pilot, ENS R. N. HANSON, made a water landing south of Hungnam and was picked up uninjured by the helicopter from LST 799.

11 June

Replenished at sea.

12-14 June

Conducted air operations off Northeastern Korea. Attacks were made from Wonsan to Songjin. Three hundred five sorties were flown during the period.

On 12 June one AD-4 of VA-195, piloted by LT R. L. JACKSON was hit by enemy ground fire while in a bombing run on a rail interdiction strike. The aircraft crashed leaving no chance for survival.

On 13 June one F4U-5N of VC-3 was hit by enemy ground fire while on a night armed reconnaissance mission. The pilot, LT R. J. HUMPHREY, bailed out of the aircraft over land after it was observed burning. The helicopter crew of LST 799 observed the aircraft wreckage, an open parachute and what appeared to be a body under the parachute. Rescue attempts were prevented by intense small arms fire. LT HUMPHREY is listed as missing in action.

One F4U-4 of VF-193 was hit by enemy ground fire while in a bombing run on a rail interdiction mission. The pilot, LTJG C. K. ALFORD, bailed out over land after the aircraft caught fire. He was picked up by the helicopter from LST 799. LTJG ALFORD sustained minor burns and a leg injury.

A second F4U-4 of VF-193 was hit by enemy ground fire while in a bombing run on the same interdiction mission. The aircraft caught fire and the pilot, LTJG W. F. MOORE, was forced to ditch in Wonsan harbor. He was rescued uninjured by the helicopter from LST 799.

On 14 June one F9F-2 of VF-191, piloted by LTJG R. CROSS, was hit by enemy ground fire in a bombing run on a rail interdiction mission. The aircraft continued in its dive and exploded on impact, leaving no chance for survival.

15 June

Replenished at sea.

16-17 June

Conducted air operations off Northeastern Korea. Attacks were made from Kilchu to Wonsan. Three hundred thirty one sorties were flown during the period.

On 16 June while in a bombing run on Kowon, one AD-4 piloted by LTJG W. A. BUTTLAR of VA-195 was damaged by a close air burst from an enemy ground battery. The pilot was forced to ditch north of Wonsan due to engine failure. Rescue was effected by the helicopter from LST 799. LTJG BUTTLAR received lacerations of the face from a shattered canopy.

19 June

Replenished at sea.

20-21 June

Conducted air operations off Northeastern Korea. Attacks were made from Hamhung to Anbyon. Two hundred thirty nine sorties were flown during the period.

On 20 June one F9F-2 of VF-191, piloted by CDR J. SWEENY was ditched on take-off due to malfunction of the electric trim-tab control. The pilot was recovered uninjured by the ship's helicopter.

22 June

Replenished at sea.

23 June

Conducted air operations off Northeastern Korea.

On 23 June TASK FORCE 77 in coordination with the FIFTH AIR FORCE began a series of attacks upon the major hydroelectric plants in North Korea. CDR N. A. MacKINNON led twelve AD-4's from VA-195 and CDR J. SWEENY led twelve F9F-2's from VF-191 in an attack upon the Suiho hydroelectric plant on the Yalu River. The attack was made in coordination with AD's and F9F-2's from the USS BOXER (CV-21) and USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47), and was followed by attacks made by the FIFTH AIR FORCE. The target was reported as destroyed.

At the same time the Suiho plant was being attacked, CDR W. DENTON, Commander Air Group NINETEEN, led three AD-4's from VA-195, twenty-four F4U-4's from VF-192 and VF-193 and a flight of F9F-2's from the BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) in an attack on the Kyosen Number Three hydroelectric plant. The target was reported as heavily damaged.

A total of 69 sorties was flown during the day.

24 June

Conducted air operations off Northeastern Korea.

Continuing the attacks upon the North Korean power plants, CDR N.A. MacKINNON led fifteen AD-4's from VA-195 and fourteen F4U-4's from VF-193 in an attack on Fusen Number One hydroelectric plant, damaging the target severely. LCDR J.H. DINNEEN led fourteen F4U-4's from VF-192 and ten F9F-2's from VF-191 and inflicted minor damage on Fusen Number Two hydroelectric plant. LCDR DINNEEN also led the same F4U-4's in an attack which damaged Fusen Number Three hydroelectric plant.

CDR. E.A. PARKER led seventeen F4U-4's from VF-192 and VF-193 in an attack on Kyosen Number Three hydroelectric plant. The target received minor damage. CDR William DENTON led twelve AD-4's from VA-195 and seven F9F-2's from VF-191 in an attack upon Fusen Number One hydroelectric plant, destroying the target.

A total of 125 sorties was flown during the day.

The box score results for the two day period were two plants destroyed, two heavily damaged, and three lightly damaged.

On 24 June one F4U-4 piloted by LT H.S. BARBOUR of VF-192 was hit by enemy ground fire while on a strike mission. Engine failure resulted and the pilot made a water landing off Chaho (DV (5465). LT BARBOUR was rescued uninjured by the helicopter from the USS HELENA (CA-75).

25 June

Conducted air operations off Northeastern Korea. Attacks were made from Wonsan to Anbyon. Sixty-seven sorties were flown during the period.

26-28 June

Upon completion of replenishment 26 June, departed TASK FORCE 77 and proceeded to Yokosuka, Honshu, Japan for scheduled availability and recreation.

PART III Ordnance

A. Performance

1. Ship:

The only casualty experienced during this period was to the forward main battery fire control director MK 37, which was inoperative for one week. The director was out of commission due to a faulty train pinion gear. It was determined that a star locking washer had not been properly crimped into place causing the locking nut at the coupling end of the worm gear to

come loose. Repairs to this casualty were made by lapping the worm and bronze meshing gear. Twelve hours of machine shop time and approximately 200 man hours were expended in the repair work.

2. Aviation:

At the begining of the period, premature release of 250 pound bombs from MK 55 bomb racks was experienced during catapult launches of the F9F-2. This fault was climinated by filing down the cut in the release trigger arm assembly to a ninety degree angle.

Catapulting of F4U-4's loaded with a 1000 pound bomb on the MK 8 Mod 2 shackle has resulted in a disfiguration of the shackles and a difficulty in releasing the bomb. It is recommended that a 500 pound bomb be the maximum load on the MK 8 Mod 2 shackle for catapult launch of the F4U-4.

Of the 7,148 bombs carried only fifty-six or 0.78 percent were hangups.

Hung Ordnance Report:

Type Ordnance	Aero 14A	MK8 MOD2	MK 51	MK 55	Doug. Bomb Ejector	Totals
100#	8			1		9
Frags	6					6
250#	13			3		16
500#		9	2			11
1000#		3	1			4
2000#					1	1
INCEN	9					9
	36	12	3	4	1	56

Disposition of Hung Ordnance:

Type Ordnance	Later Manual Release	Releases by Jerking	Remaining on Racks	Drop Offs on Landing	Totals
100#		4	5		9
Frags		4	2		6
250#		7	5	4	16
500#	11				11
1000#	4				4
2000#	1				1
INCEN		9			9
	16	24	12	4	56

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B. Aviation Ordnance Expenditure:

QUANTITY	CODE	DESCRIPTION
123	K1	2000# GP, Complete
697	K2	1000# GP, Complete
698	K3	500# GP, Complete
3127	K4	250# GP, Complete
1116	K5	100# GP, Complete
2	K8	350# DB, Complete
696	K9	220/260# Frag.
590	K12	100# INC Cluster
4	K14	Cluster Adapter
24	K19	AN-M103A1; Fuze
302	K20	AN-M139A1; Fuze
116	K21	AN-M140A1, Fuze
52	K23	AN-M146, Fuze
617	K28	AN-M166 (T51E1)
434	K29	AN M168 (T91E1)
1415	K30	Fuze AN-M 219
3795	K35	AN-M100A2 (ND)
705	K36	AN-M101A2 (.025)
770	K37	AN-M102A2 (.025)
7	K38A	M115 (4-5)
5	K39A	M116 (4-5)
7	K42D	AN-M124 (12 hr)
8	K42E	AN-M124 (24 hr)
17	K43F	M125 (36 hr)
3453	K49D	Primer Detonator M14 (0.01)
5570	K51	Arming Wire MK1 (Single)
12690	K52	Arming Wire MK2 (Double)
18	L1	3.5" Solid Rocket; Complete Rd.
54	L6	Anti-tank Rocket, A/C 65"(ATAR)
42269	M1	20MM HEI; M97
42266	M2	20MM INC, M96
38570	M3	20MM AP-T, M95
134125	M4	Link, 20MM M8/M8E1
169540	M6	Cal. .50 API; M8
169540	M7	Cal. .50 INC, M1
84770	M8	Cal. .50 API-T, M20
424400	M9	Link, Cal. .50 A/C M2
1811	N1	Napalm. Type 1 or M3
47	N2	Igniter; WP M15/M215
47	N4	Igniter, WP M16/M216
75	N6	Fuze, M157
68	N7	Gas Tank, F51 Type
110	N10	Xylenol
67	P7	Flare, A/C AN-M26
20	P9	Light Float, A/C AN-MK6
5	P2	Flare, A/C MK 5 Mod 9
234	P38	Bomb Ejtr. Ctg. MK1

PART IV Battle Damage

A. Own

The ship sustained no battle damage. See reference (b), Air Attack Reports 67-52 through 161-52, for the battle damage sustained by PRINCETON aircraft.

B. Enemy

See reference (b), Air Attack Reports 67-52 through 161-52, for damage inflicted upon the enemy.

PART V Personnel

A. Personnel Count:

During the operating period the average on-board count was as follows:

	Officer	Enlisted	Total
Ship's Company	114	1952	2066
Marine Detachment	2	61	63
Air Group	145	638	783
	261	2651	2912

There continued to be a shortage of petty officers in the following ratings: QM, GM, TE, RM, PN, MM, BT, EM, IC, FP and HM.

The following rates in excess of allowance were made available to COMAIRPAC for transfer: five AD1, ten AD3, one PR1, two AM1, five AM3 and six PM3. Of these, three AD1, six AD3, one AM1 and three AM3 are scheduled for transfer to Carrier Air Group NINETEEN, currently embarked, upon reporting of non-rated reliefs.

B. Personnel Performance:

Ship's company and Air Group personnel performance for this period was excellent. Pilots exhibited the highest degree of flying proficiency as evidenced by the fact that there were a minimum of barrier accidents, no major flight deck accidents and keen competition for all flights. Ordnance, maintenance and aircraft crews continued their past outstanding performances.

The following dispatches concerning the performance of TASK FORCE 77 and the PRINCETON were received during the action period:

(1) FROM: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
TO: CTF 77/ CG 1st MARAIR WING

"IT WAS WITH GREAT PRIDE THAT I READ THE DISPATCH AND NEWS REPORTS OF THE MAGNIFICENT ACCOMPLISHMENT OF YOUR FORCES IN THE SUPERB

ATTACKS UPON THE NORTH KOREAN POWER INSTALLATIONS X THE EXCELLENT PERFORMANCE OF DUTY AND HIGH COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS DEMONSTRATED BY

YOUR FORCES AND PARTICULARLY THE PILOTS INVOLVED IN THE ACTUAL COMBAT ARE DESERVING OF THE HIGHEST PRAISE AND INSPIRATION TO OUR

OWN PEOPLE AND A WARNING TO THE ENEMY OF HIS INEVITABLE DEFEAT X WELL DONE"

(2) FROM: CTF 77
TO: TF 77

"FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM CINCPACFLT X MY CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR SUCCESSFUL STRIKES ON THE NORTH KOREAN POWER COMPLEX X THEY

DEMONSTRATE WHAT DETERMINED AND WELL TRAINED SQUADRONS CAN DO IN A COORDINATED INTERSERVICE EFFORT WHICH HAS BEEN PRECEDED BY

CAREFUL PLANNING X WELL DONE TO NAVY AIR FORCE AND MARINE UNITS WHO PARTICIPATED WITH A PARTICULAR PAT ON THE BACK TO THE AD PILOTS

WHO DELIVERED THE INITIAL BLOW THE SUIHO PLANT WHO WERE PREPARED TO FACE HEAVY MIG OPPOSITION X TO WHICH COMSEVENTHFLT REPLIED QUOTE

X ON BEHALF OF ALL NAVY AND MARINE PARTICIPANTS IN POWER COMPLEX STRIKES YOUR 250201Z IS ACKNOWLEDGED WITH DEEP GRATITUDE X RADM

SOUERK AND PILOTS JOIN ME IN ASKING ONLY FOR MORE TARGETS X SIGNED CLARK"

(3) FROM: COMNAVFE
TO: COM7THFLEET/CTF 77

"IT IS WITH THE UTMOST PLEASURE THAT I PASS ALONG THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM CINCFE FOR PUBLICATION TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF

ALL UNITS PARTICIPATING X QUOTE I WISH TO EXPRESS MY DEEP ADMIRATION AND TO EXTEND MY FULLEST CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU FOR THE HIGH

DEGREE OF PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE EXHIBITED BY ALL ELEMENTS OF YOUR COMMAND IN THE ATTACK ON THE NORTH KOREAN HYDROELECTRIC

SYSTEM X THE RESULT OF THE ATTACK CONTRIBUTED MATERIALLY TO THE REDUCTION OF THE ENEMYS WAR MAKING POTENTIAL X THE COOPERATION

AND COORDINATION BETWEEN NAVAL MARINE AND AIR FORCES LEFT NOTHING TO BE DESIRED AND PERMITTED OF A MOST SUCCESSFUL OPERATION IN

SPITE OF LAST MINUTE CHANGES IN TIME OF ATTACK X PARA X IT GIVES ME GREAT PLEASURE TO COMMEND SUCH A COMPETENT AND DEPENDABLE NAVAL

COMPONENT WHICH HAS CONTRIBUTED SO MUCH TO THE SUCCESSFUL ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND AND WHICH INSURES

SUCCESSFUL ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ALL ASSIGNED MISSIONS IN THE FUTURE X PARA X I REQUEST THAT MY DEEP APPRECIATION FOR THE SPLENDID MANNER

IN WHICH ATTACK ON THE HYDROELECTRIC SYSTEM WAS CONDUCTED BE CONVEYED TO ALL MEMBERS OF YOUR COMMAND X UNQUOTE X PARA X I SHALL

LIKE TO ADD THAT MY HEART SWELLS WITH PRIDE IN YOUR SUPERB PERFORMANCE X TO ALL HANDS A MUCH DESERVED WELL DONE X VICE

ADMIRAL R. P. BRISCOE"

(4) FROM: CTF 77
TO: TF 77

"PERSONAL FOR ADMIRALS BRISCOE, CLARK AND SOUCEK FROM LT GEN WEYLAND PRELIMINARY REPORTS INDICATE THAT YESTERDAYS INITIAL AIR

ATTACKS ON OTHER NORTH KOREA HYDROELECTRIC POWER COMPLEXES ACHIEVED COMPLETE SUPRISE AND SUCCESS IN THE FACE OF A HIGHLY DANGEROUS

COMMUNIST DEFENSIVE POTENTIAL X I FEEL SURE THAT TODAYS AIR ATTACKS WILL COMPLETE THE DESTRUCTION OF THEIR VITAL TARGETS X THIS

CONSTITUTES A FITTING CLIMAX TO TWO YEARS OF COORDINATED AND APPLIED AIR POWER AND MAY BE TAKEN AS A GENTLE HINT OF MORE TO

COME IF THE COMMIES WANT IT THAT WAY X THE PLANNING, COORDINATION AND INTEGRATED EXCEPTION WHICH WENT INTO YESTERDAYS OPERATION IS

AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF INTER-SERVICE TEAM PLAY X PLEASE ACCEPT ME HEARTIEST CONGRATULATION AND SINCERE THANKS FOR THE PART DONE

BY THE MAGNIFICENT AIR CREWS OF TF 77 X I FEEL THAT THE AIRBOYS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE SUIHO SHOW WITH THE DISTINCT POSSIBILITY

OF HEAVY MIG OPPOSITION DESERVE SPECIAL CREDIT"

(5) FROM: CTF 77
TO: PRINCETON (CV-37)

"YOUR SHIP AND AIR GROUP HAVE PERFORMED LIKE THE VETERANS THEY ARE DURING THEIR PAST TWO DAYS X I AM PROUD OF THEM X ALSO I AM

PROUD OF THE OFFICERS AND MEN ON DECK AND THE ENGINE ROOM IN THE SUPPLY AND MEDICAL DEPARTMENTS AND ALL DEPARTMENTS IN THE SHIP"

(6) FROM: CTF 77
TO: PRINCETON/BOXER

"MY REGARDS FOR BOXER AND PRINCETON AND THEIR AIR GROUPS HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY HIGH X PAST TWO DAYS PERFORMANCE RAISES THAT OPINION

FROM EXCELLENT TO OUTSTANDING X OUR LOSSES HAVE BEEN GREAT BUT THESE SACRIFICES ARE ENDURABLE IN VIEW OF THE GAIN WE ARE MAKING

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TOWARD ULTIMATE VICTORY X THE EFFORTS OF ALL PERSONNEL IN EVERY PART OF THE SHIP ARE CUSTOMARILY COMMENDABLE BUT TODAY I SALUTE

THOSE SPLENDID PILOTS WHO CARRY OUT THESE HAZARDOUS MISSION OVER HOSTILE TERRITORY"

C. Morale

Morale of both Ship's Company and Air Group Personnel continued to be high. The delivery of mail this period compared with that of the last operating period has been very poor. The reason for the decrease in deliveries is not known; replenishment has taken place regularly throughout the period.

The Ship's Company and Carrier Air Group NINETEEN Personnel have contributed $2,941.00 to Navy Relief. This figure represents slightly more than one dollar per man for the average complement.

D. Casualties

Ship's company Personnel suffered no casualties during the period. The following casualties were incurred by Air Group NINETEEN personnel:

6 June 1952: LT D. J. TENNYSON, 455330/1310 USN, VA-195, was reported killed in action when his AD-4 crashed and burned while on a rail interdiction strike. Cause of the crash was enemy ground fire.

8 June 1952: LT R. E. GARVER, 471255/1310 USN, VC-35 and A. E. RUDDELL, AT3 631-99-52 USN, VC-35, were reported killed in action when the AD-4NL in which they were flying crashed into the sea while returning from a combat mission. The cause of the crash is undetermined.

12 June 1952: LT R. L. JACKSON, 390291/1315 USNR, VA-195, was reported killed in action when his AD-4 was hit by enemy ground fire and crashed while on a rail interdiction strike.

13 June 1952: LT R. J. HUMPHREY, 347094/1315 USNR, VC-3, was reported missing in action after he bailed out of his F4U-5N while on a night combat mission. His aircraft was hit by enemy ground fire.

14 June 1952: LTJG R. CROSS, 508342/1310 USN, VF-191, was reported killed in action when his F9F-2 was hit by enemy ground fire and crashed while on a rail interdiction strike.

Three pilots were grounded and three were hospitalized for short periods of time, primarily for minor contusions inourred during ditchings and bail-outs.

A summary of Air Group NINETEEN's casualties for the operating period is as follows:

Killed in Action	Pilots	4
Killed in Action	Crewmen	1
Missing in Action	Pilots	1
Psychological		2
Injury		6
Disposition Board		0
Total		14

PART VI Special Comments

A. Aerology

Summer monsoon prevailed for the entire period. Flying conditions were average to good, except for one day (15 June) when fog persisted throughout the afternoon. Haze occured on the 7th, 8th, 15th, 16th, 21st, and 22nd, but visibility was never less than five miles.

B. Air Group NINETEEN

1. Operations

From 3 June through 25 June 1952, Carrier Air Group NINETEEN flew 1,589 sorties for a total of 3,957 hours during seventeen operational days. All assigned commitments were met.

Operations during the first half of the period from 4 June to 14 June were entirely of a rail interdiction nature, with rail bridges, fills, tracks and rolling stock being the primary targets.

During the second half of the period from 14 June to 26 June strike tactics were altered. The size of strike groups was increased with deck load strikes being launched in lieu of the smaller elements previously used. The emphasis on rail interdiction decreased with supply areas, troop concentrations and storage areas along the rail routes becoming the primary target.

It was noted that, although the rail strikes during the first part of the period were productive of results and many rail cuts were made, repairs were effected almost immediately and that the desired result, interdiction of the enemy supply lines, was probably not too successful. In addition, the important rail centers and marshalling yards were protected by increasing amounts of AA with corresponding increases in damage to and loss of aircraft. A pattern of operation had been established which must have enabled the enemy to predict with fair accuracy the hours and days of operations. This type of operation did not take advantage of the effect of surprise and mobility inherent in a carrier task force. During the latter part of the operating period a change in operational pace was instituted. Selected targets were attacked with larger groups of aircraft and schedules were changed to avoid setting a pattern. The outstanding example of this change in operations was of course the

series of attacks on the North Korean power plant complexes. Carrier Air Group NINETEEN took part in this operation as indicated in the table below:

Date and Time	Aircraft	Target	Results
231600I	3 AD-4 24 F4U-4	Kyosen Number Three hydroelectric plant DV 775952	Heavily damaged
231800I	12 AD-4 12 F9F-2	Suiho hydroelectric plant XE 663797	Destroyed
240930I	15 AD-4 14 F4U-4	Fusen Number One hydroelectric plant CV 779670	Heavily damaged
240930I	14 F4U-4 10 F9F-2	Fusen Number Two hydroelectric plant CV 806621	Minor damage
240930I	14 F4U-4	Fusen Number Three hydroelectric plant CV 8056	Damaged
241630I	17 F4U-4	Kyosen Number Three hydroelectric plant DV 775952	Minor damage
241630I	12 AD-4 7 F9F-2	Fusen Number One hydroelectric plant CV 779670	Destroyed

It is considered that the attacks listed above by Air Group NINETEEN were outstanding in that each attack was successful and resulted in considerable damage to the target. Although all the targets attacked were extremely important and were protected by concentrations of AA, aircraft losses were minimized due largely, it is believed, to the element of surprise. In the two days operations by four carrier air groups only two aircraft were damaged sufficiently to cause forced landings, and the two pilots were recovered. It is recommended that attacks of this nature and pattern of operations be conducted when feasible. The effect on pilot morale and the enthusiasm for the attacks on the North Korean power plants were most noticeable.

The "Insomnia" Operation is another type of operation which achieved surprise and success. It is recommended that this operation be repeated at irregular intervals when conditions are favorable for success.

The air group rendezvous doctrine was changed slightly during this period with excellent results in expediting the rendezvous and departure of the strike group for the target area. All aircraft participating in the strike rendezvoused at one altitude in the assigned sector. Each aircraft followed the one ahead and rendezvoused with the lead plane at which time a separation, slightly back and outboard, was made between squadrons. This helped pilots who were launched later to locate their own strike element quickly. It was found that this method, as compared to that of assigning different altitudes for each squadron, saved five to ten minutes on rendezvous time.

Minor changes to the USF-4 break-up doctrine were also incorporated in that the squadron circle of 800 feet was done away with. Also, a right-hand orbiting turn was made when the air group had the starboard sector. Instead of making the break of divisions away from the force and feeding in singly, a full division was brought in along the starboard side of the carrier and the break was made up wind, with the option of the division leader to break two or four aircraft as the pattern required.

Tactics used on targets that required flak suppressi[illegible] and coordinated attacks by type aircraft were changed with very beneficial results. The tactics adopted were to assign each squadron specific targets, direction of dive and pull-out. Jet aircraft were assigned the initial run, followed by the prop VF loaded with VT and flak suppression bombs. All hit targets known or suspected to contain AA gun positions and control stations. Subsequent runs by VF and VA aircraft, in that order, hit the primary target. A division of prop VF was sometimes left at altitude over the target to spot and suppress any AA batteries not previously pin-pointed and to assess target damage. Standard release and pull-out altitudes were followed on all attacks.

During all strikes in the target area short color code radio calls were used for intra-group communication and identification. Each plane was identified by its squadron color and a number, because standard tactical calls were found to be too long for rapid identification and communication during the time attacks were developing and in progress.

ASP gator missions were flown by VF, VFN, and AD aircraft during this operating period. VF and VFN were used at times when a strike mission would have been short its assigned number of attack planes.

Briefing was normally held one and one-half hours prior to launch time. However, for special strikes involving coordination of jets, prop VF and VA with special and/or multiple targets assigned, the strike leader conducted a briefing of the

strike element leaders the evening before, if a dawn launch, or three hours prior to launch time if the strike were scheduled later in the day. Strike tactics and target assignments were decided in this general brief. Detailed operational and intelligence briefings were then conducted by the element leaders in their respective ready rooms.

Use of the K-25 camera for damage assessment was discontinued, primarily because of the high vulnerability of the camera plane during the low altitude runs necessary for good pictures. Target damage assessment using the K-17 camera has been tried at a higher altitude. However, only a fair quality of pictures has been obtained. Evaluation of the F-56 camera is being contemplated for the next operating period.

2. Maintenance

Aircraft availability has been outstanding. No unusual maintenance problems were encountered.

All squadrons have suffered from a shortage of Section B allowance list items of high usage. Very few priority A and AOG items have been received while in the forward area.

It is recommended that new RB 19R-2 spark plugs be supplied in the combat area in lieu of overhauled plugs. The overhauled spark plugs require changing every sixty hours and a large percentage are unfit for installation when received. RUDM's are being prepared.

3. Survival

The following recommendations have been made by downed pilots upon their return:

a. Each pilot should be provided with a survival radio. Air Force usage thus far has proved that they are an invaluable aid in effecting rescue of downed pilots.

b. Signal mirrors should be attached to the Mae West life jacket as a standard piece of equipment to insure that they are available to the pilot should he be unable to float his life raft.

c. Smelling salts or ammonia capsules carried in the helicopter would be a welcomed relief for dazed pilots after rescue. Ammonia Inhalant, Aromatic 1/3cc, Stock No. 1-060-875 has been found satisfactory for such use.

d. Helicopters have been found extremely difficult to sight from above. Vivid markings would aid the friendly RESCAP in directing the helicopter and decrease the hazard of inadvertent strafing due to poor visibility.

This command has lost sixteen aircraft, five pilots and one crewman during the tour just completed. Five of these personnel losses offered no chance for survival. Recovery of downed personnel was made possible by excellent ditching or bail-out procedure, well-coordinated RESCAP procedures and the outstanding efforts of helicopter crews.

C. Air Department

1. Arresting Gear

Number of Landings since recommissioning.	17,830
Total Number of Landings.	34,604
Number of Landings this operating period.	1,655
Number of deck pendants used.	13
Number of barrier cables used	None

Barricade Crash of 9 June 1952: at 1508I on 9 June 1952, F9F-2, Bureau Number 123031, piloted by LT. Charles H.M[redacted], made what appeared to be a normal approach. He then received what appeared to be a late wave-off, and, in trying to take it, mushed toward the port side of the flight deck. The plane then dived for the barrier area, tore out the Davis webbings of barriers two and three without actuating these barriers and engaged the barricade at approximately a forty-five degree angle. In the course of the engagement the plane swung around to an athwartship's position due to the port tip tank striking the port barricade stanchion. Slack take-up of the barricade was about twenty-five feet and actual runout about fifty feet. The port stanchion was rendered temporarily inoperative. Repairs were effected by ship's force in two days. The barricade webbing was surveyed. A barricade and deck arresting landing was effected.

2. Catapult

Number of Catapult shots this quarter...1361

Starboard Catapult...600
Port Catapult.....761

One "no cut-off" shot was made due to the shearing of the cut-off linkage pin; the machine was thoroughly inspected and the pin replaced. No other damage was apparent.

Two oil-gear pumps are being replaced on the starboard catapult. One pump has a frozen bearing and the other pump has a very low output.

No visible damage to the jet blast deflectors is apparent at the end of this quarter and series of shots.

At 0537I on 20 June 1952, an F9F-2, Bureau Number 127140, piloted by CDR J. (n) SWEENY, crashed into the water upon take-off from the port catapult. The accident was caused by improper functioning of an electric trim-tab control and not the fault of the catapult shot.

D. Combat Information Center

1. Radar

The performance of both the SX and SPS-6b was excellent. Both were in operation continuously except for short periods required for preventative maintenance.

The SX was used for CAP control. Inasmuch as jet intercepts were made within fifty miles, the SX was satisfactory.

The SPS-6b has been detecting returning jets ten miles farther out than SX, although neither radar could be relied on for more than sixty percent pick up of two F9F's beyond forty-five miles.

For tracking returning strikes, an SPS-6b (MK-2) operator tracked actual radar contacts, while a Mark V IFF operator used an SX console to cover any returning group not detected by the SPS-6b operator. The RCO coordinated the plotting on the main air display.

Use of the field change which tilts the SX patt rn indicated the follewing: a one to two degree tilt will result in a marked improvement in the detection of aircraft during periods of heavy trapping; some improvement was noted in tracking very high aircraft.

2. Training

Formal training, exclusive of on-the-job training, was scheduled regularly, but only one subject or teaching unit could be covered thoroughly each week. The only means of obtaining complete attendance was to schedule one CIC watch section each instruction period. Formal class room instruction was required to complete or improve the on-the-job training.

c. Communications

Communications for the second tour of combat duty were satisfactory but some problems continue to exist.

First, the acute shortage of personnel continues to curtail the maximum efficiency of the communication section. Qualified circuit operators are few and their tasks many. Non-rated strikers are used in a constant state of training and schooling but they lack necessary experience. Maintenance personnel are still, of necessity, used on the watch bill and their repair work effected during off-watch hours. Personnel are at an absolute minimum to meet present communication commitments, and several qualified personnel will be leaving the ship during the next two months. Some replacements are, therefore, mandatory for continued combat operations.

Numerous frequency shifts during the period on circuit D-188 have been necessitated by enemy interference, but this station has been able to maintain satisfactory communications. There were an estimated seventy-five shifts requiring approximately five minutes each to regain contact with other stations.

The traffic load passing through main communications has been relatively normal for a carrier without a staff embarked. During this period, there were 873 outgoing messages and 1536 incoming, making a total of 2409, excluding relay traffic.

It was noted that during the latter part of the period the "George Fox" broadcast from Radio Guam slowed to eighteen to twenty words per minute. This has been a great help to our station, for relatively "green" operators are able to copy the schedule. The slow-down has noticeably reduced the number of requests for repetitions from smaller units and operators previously burdened with such requests are now able to keep the traffic moving at a faster rate on crowded circuits.

The four-carrier operations during the latter part of the period naturally boosted traffic loads, especially on circuit T6 (Ultra High Radio Teletype). Lack of circuit discipline caused some delay, but this condition corrected itself with time and a large volume of traffic was handled expeditiously.

A definite need exists for a qualified crypto machine repair man. This ship has had crypto machine failures the last two times on the line, and on one occasion, no classified traffic could be handled for two days. If it is impracticable

to assign one qualified crypto repair man to each CV type carrier, it is recommended that each carrier division staff have assigned as part of their permanent allowance, one qualified crypto repair man. This would insure that ships operating on the line would always have a crypto repair man readily available.

F. Gunnery Department

Replenishments during the period covered by this report have been characterized by the further development of the cargo handling station at frame 72, starboard side, hangar deck. The modified house-fall rig was used on this station four times for ammunition, and once for provisions. On two occasions, the USS RAINIER (AE-5) was unable to rig in the house-fall manner and a manila high line and trolley rig were used. Light, bulky material was handled in an efficient manner; the additional station is proving itself of material benefit in expediting the replenishment operation.

Fueling at sea evolutions have been uneventful. The Elwood method of fueling rig has been used exclusively.

G. Intelligence

1. Combat Reports

It is recommended that all forms used in the combat area be made up in a stencil form such as the air attack report and mission log. Under present conditions entirely too much time is being consumed in retyping reports which require a large number of copies. The work load on the yeoman could be greatly reduced by the use of these stencil forms. The reports that at present are consuming the most time in preparation are: Aircraft and Crew Survival Report (OpNav Form 3480.6); Aircraft Vulnerability Report (OpNav Form 3480.5); and the Aircraft Availability Report (OpNav Form 3480.2). It is recommended that these three report forms be the first to be made into stencils, to be followed by the remainder of the forms used in combat.

2. Charts and Maps

During the past two operating periods, the AMS Series L751 map (scale 1:50,000) has been used extensively for flak briefings and for cockpit charts for division leaders assigned to pin-point targets. The contours and vivid colors of these maps make them preferable in many cases to photographic mosaics. It is recommended that a large supply of these maps be maintained at all times.

The predominant system used by the pilots in preparing cockpit charts has been to choose two 1:250,000 Aeronautical Approach Charts in an acetate folder. The acetate used is 1/32 inch thick and each folder is divided into four parts (eight panels) to provide easy handling in the plane. Small acetate templates with properly scaled UTM Grid are used to procure a six digit coordinate. This system is highly recommended.

3. Training

It has been found that there is a deficiency in pilot training in "Seeing from Aircraft" and in the detection of camouflage. In Korea every target of value is extensively camouflaged and it has been found that it takes a considerable amount of time and experience before an untrained pilot can detect camouflaged targets. It is felt that a well supervised course of study in "Seeing from Aircraft" and camouflage detection should be incorporated into the pre-deployment pilot training syllabus. Such a training course would reap great profits in the combat area. A course of this type could well be fitted into the close air support training course to a more extensive degree than it is at present, and should be followed up by constant training under the supervision of the squadron and air group intelligence officers.

4. Photo Interpretation

During this period of operation, the program of r[illegible] cutting was reduced in favor of pin point demolition of lucrative targets such as transportation facilities, mining areas, and supply depots. This shift required the preparation of photographic mosaics both for bricfing purposes and for target identification; the resultant was a tremendous increase in the work load of the PI Team, and a taxing of PI facilities to the maximum.

The inadequate space and shortage of personnel presents a real problem. Photo interpretation work in the Air Intelligence Office is constantly interrupted by the demands of intelligence. Space is not available to utilize the enlisted assistants as fully as they might be and therefore there is a considerable amount of time wasted. It is felt that minimum facilities should include two large chart tables, four four-drawer file cabinets, and approximately 150 cubic feet of storage space for supplies. Special attention should be paid to lighting, using overhead fluorescent lights and adjustable draftsmen's desk lamps.

The K-25 strike camera was abandoned during the period in favor of a K-17 camera with a twenty-four inch focal length lens. It was hoped that the increased focal length and negative size would produce better results at less danger to the pilot since they would not be required to fly as low. However, the system of installation and mounting of the K-17 allows camera vibrations causing image movement resulting in poor picture definition thereby nullifying any advantages gained.

H. Medical

The health of the crew has remained at a high level. There were 113 Venereal Disease admissions to the Sick List during the subject period.

PAUL D. STROOP

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CO, Composit Squadron 3
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CO, Composit Squadron 61