U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
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NAVHISTDIVINST 5500.1
By: OP-09B92C

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
Commander Naval Forces Far East
Commander SEVENTH Fleet
Commander Carrier Division THREE

Subj: Action Report for period 4 through 21 August 1950

Ref: (a) CNO ltr op 345 res ser 1197 P34 of 3 August 1950

Encl: (1) CVG-5 conf ltr ser 067-50 dtd 24 August 1950, Action Report for period 4 through 21 August 1950

1. In accordance with reference (a), the action report for the period 4 through 21 August 1950 is submitted.

PART I: Composition of Own Forces and Mission

The VALLEY FORGE with Carrier Air Group FIVE embarked in company with the PHILIPPINE SEA and other units of Task Force 77 departed Buckner Bay, Okinawa, on 4 August 1950 for Korean waters to attack enemy troops and previously selected targets as coordinated with FEAF in order to furnish support for the United Nations Forces in Korea in accordance with Commander SEVENTH Fleet secret oporder 13-50 of 3 August 1950.

PART II: Chronological Order of Events

About 1800, 4 August 1950, the VALLEY FORGE departed Buckner Bay, Okinawa, sortied with elements of the SEVENTH Fleet, and proceeded northward for Korean waters. After the sortie was completed, AA firing practice with other units of the task force was conducted on sleeves towed by JD type aircraft furnished by UTRON 7 detachment based at Kadena, Okinawa. The task force arrived off the south coast of Korea early in the afternoon on the 5th at which time the carriers launched strikes against the enemy. The planes from the VALLEY FORGE were launched as close air support for United Nations Forces in southeastern Korea and those from the PHILIPPINE SEA were launched for specific targets in southwestern Korea. After completion of air operations for the day, the task force proceeded westward taking position in the Yellow Sea where strikes against the enemy along the west coast of central and southern Korea were launched on the 6th and 7th. The task force retired from the area upon completion of air

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operations on the 7th and proceeded southward to rendezvous with the logistic group for the purpose of refueling aviation gasoline and fuel oil. The rendezvous was made on the morning of the 8th and the remainder of the day was spent refueling the task force. That night the task force returned to a position in the Yellow Sea where strikes were launched on the 9th and 10th as before. The task force retired from the area during the night of the 10th and rendezvoused with the logistic group on the morning of the 11th to refuel. Upon completion of refueling, the task force proceeded to a position in the Yellow Sea where strikes were conducted on the 12th against the enemy along the west coast of central Korea and on the 13th along the west coast of Korea north of the 38th parallel. That night the task force retired from the area and headed for Sasebo, Japan, to refuel and rearm, arriving at Sasebo about 0930 on the 14th. After refueling and rearming, the task force left Sasebo about 1800 on the 15th and proceeded northward into the Sea of Japan where strikes were launched against the enemy on the east coast of central Korea on the 16th. At 1115 at the request of the FIFTH Air Force, Advanced, in Korea, all strikes were diverted to cover the evacuation of the Third ROK Division at Yondok. The remaining strikes of the day were launched against a concentration of enemy troops which threatened the evacuation. That night the task force headed further north where strikes against the enemy on the east coast as far north as the 42nd parallel were launched on the 17th. The task force retired southward during the night, passed through Tsushima Strait, and rendezvoused with the logistic group. After refueling and rearming during the day on the 18th, the task force proceeded westward that night taking position off the west coast of central Korea where strikes were launched on the 19th. That night the task force worked northward and on the 20th launched strikes against the enemy along the west coast north of the 38th parallel. Upon completion of air operations for the day, the task force proceeded for Sasebo, Japan, arriving at Sasebo about 1400 on the 21st.

PART III: Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

No comment.

PART IV: Resume of Battle Damage - Own and Enemy

The ship sustained no battle damage. For damage inflicted upon the enemy see Enclosure (1).

PART V: Comments

A. Air Department

1. Aviation Gasoline Fueling

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a. Considerable delay in fueling operations can be remedied by anticipating the following problems:

(1) Aircraft carrier receiving fuel should have on hand at the fueling station both the male and female ends of the quick disconnect coupling in anticipation of the tanker sending over the wrong end and/or an end which will not fit.

(2) Gasoline filling lines should be tested for blown gaskets prior to fueling and in sufficient time to allow for replacement of faulty gaskets.

(3) If a flowmeter is installed at the fueling station, a simple by-pass should be constructed around the flowmeter. This will make disconnecting the flowmeter unnecessary in the event of failure or clogging and will not stop fueling operations while the meter is being disconnected.

2. Bomb and Rocket Disposal

a. Hung bombs and rockets brought aboard by returning strikes must be anticipated. A good percentage of hung armament will leave the aircraft on landing. Provision must be made for qualified personnel to defuse and jettison this armament with a maximum of safety and minimum of interference to flight deck operations.

3. Jet Aircraft Turn-up

a. When turning up jet aircraft on the flight deck with tails pointed over the side, care must be exercised that 20mm shipboard gunsights are not in line with the blast. The 20mm shipboard gunsight is rendered inoperative by the apparent vibration of the jet blast. The heat effect does not appear to be a problem.

PART VI: Personnel, Performance and Casualties

Operations during this period were conducted with 79% of the wartime complement on board. The personnel shortage was somewhat aggravated by severe unbalances in some rating groups and the shortage of non-rated personnel. The performance of personnel has been excellent, and they have stood up well under long hours at duty stations and hard work. Personnel have been ordered to the ship to build the on board figure up to about 85% of wartime complement which will relieve the situation considerably.

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