USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

ORIGINAL

CV45/A9-4
Serial: 028

29 January 1952

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NAVHISTDIVINST 5500.1
By: OP-09B92C

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division FIVE
(2) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, FAR EAST
(5) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 7 Dec 1951 through 19 Jan 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV Instruction 3480.5 dated 1 July 1951

Encl: (1) Commander, CATG ONE conf ltr ser 01 of 19 Jan 1952 p. 22

1. In accordance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period of 7 Dec 1951 through 19 Jan 1952 is hereby submitted:

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

Complying with ComAirPac Confidential Dispatch 091943Z of October 1951, the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), CAPTAIN OSCAR PEDERSON Commanding, departed San Diego, California, for Hawaiian waters. After a period of training, the USS VALLEY FORGE left Pearl Harbor, T.H. 26 November 1951 for Yokosuka, Japan, in accordance with ComCarDiv FIVE Operation Order 1-51 of 25 November 1951 with REAR ADMIRAL F.W. MC MAHON, ComCarDiv FIVE embarked. After voyage repairs in Yokosuka departed for the Operating Area in accordance with ComFltAct Yokosuka Dispatch 060800Z on 7 December 1951.

On 11 December 1951 joined Task Force 77 close to the 38th Parallel on the East Coast of Korea. The Task Force was commanded by REAR ADMIRAL JOHN PERRY, ComCarDiv ONE aboard the USS ESSEX (CV-9) and operated under Task Force 77 Operation Order 22-51 (1st Revision). It was composed of USS ESSEX (CV-9), USS ANTIETAM (CV-36), USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), USS ST PAUL (CA-73), USS MANCHESTER (CL-83), USS WISCONSIN (BB-64), USS WILTSIE (DD-716), USS FLETCHER (DD-445), USS CHANDLER (DD-717), USS O'BANNON (DDE-450), USS CHEVALIER (DDR-805), USS RADFORD (DDE-446), USS KYES (DD-787), USS WALKER (DDE-517), USS SHIELDS (DD-596), USS TWINING (DD-540), and USS CALAHON (DD-685).

On 17 January 1952 the USS VALLEY FORGE departed Task Force 77 for Yokosuka, Japan for a period of maintenance and upkeep and arrived on 19 January 1952.

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(2) Provide air cover for replenishment ships and other friendly naval surface forces when necessary.

(3) Protect the force against air, surface and subsurface attacks.

(4) Provide air spot to bombardment forces when directed.

(5) Conduct photo and visual reconnaissance as required.

(6) Coordinate air operations with the 5th Air Force through JOC, Korea.

(7) Exchange intelligence information with friendly naval forces engaged in surface interdiction operations on the east coast of Korea.

The Commanding Officer of Carrier Air Group ONE is CDR C. H. CRABILL, Jr., USN, with the following complement of pilots and number of aircraft at the beginning of flight operations on 22 October 1951.

SQUADRON	NO. OF PILOTS	NO. OF AIRCRAFT
VF 52	22	16 F9F-2
VF 111	25	16 F9F-2
VF 194	27	5 AD-3 11 AD-2
VF 653	30	2 F4U-4 16 F4U-4B
VC 3	5	4 F4U-5NL
VC 11	6	3 AD-4W
VC 35	7	2 AD-2Q 4 AD-4NL
VC 61	5	3 F9F-2P
HU 1	2	1 HO3S

PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

USS VALLEY FORGE, with Air Task Group ONE embarked, arrived in Yokosuka, Japan on 4 December 1951 for a 3 day availability. Personnel from the ship and each squadron went aboard the USS BON HOMME RICHARD for a conference with Air Group 101 pilots. On 5 December one member of each squadron was given TAD orders to the USS ESSEX to fly combat missions for training and familiarzation. In addition, at the same time, one ship's officer was sent to the USS ESSEX on TAD orders for familiarization with the ship's operating procedures.

12-7-51: Underway for operating area, no air operations.

12-8-51: Conducted refresher air operations in Area TARE. A mid-air collision cost the lives of two (2) VF 653 pilots. LT J. T. POTERFIELD and LT D. E. LONDON collided while engaged in squadron tactics.

12-10-51: Refresher air operations continued in Area TARE.

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lost to enemy flak. LTJG H. E. ETTINGER, pilot, and two crewmen are listed as missing.

12-14-51: Continued our attacks on Northeastern Korean Rail Net and flew armed reconnaissance. One F4U and one AD were forced to land at K-18 due to flak damage. Photo coverage was flown over the area of the downed heckler. Results were negative.

12-15-51: 64 offensive sorties, 22 defensive sorties were flown by ATG-1 pilots. Targets were Korean main supply routes.

12-16-51: Replenishment as sea, replenishment was difficult due to heavy weather and was discontinued.

12-17-51: Continued replenishment in morning, resumed flight operation early afternoon by launching a total of 33 sorties against the enemy.

12-18-51: Interdiction of enemy supply routes continued. Also, attacked concentrations of small boats in Wonsan Harbor damaging approximately 33 boats. LCDR B. T. PUGH, executive officer VF 194 was lost when he was forced to ditch his AD just north of Wonsan.

12-19-51: Mounting a total of 76 sorties we continued our rail interdiction program and attacked other targets of opportunity.

12-20-51: 28 rail cuts were scored by 58 offensive sorties. Planes from the USS VALLEY FORGE also attacked other targets of opportunity.

12-21-51: Replenishment at sea.

12-22-51: Continued to carry out our mission of rail interdiction, launching a total of 81 sorties. LT R.L. SOBEY of VF 653 was hit by flak causing him to crash with no chance of survival. LT SOBEY is listed as killed in action.

12-23-51: A total of 81 sorties were flown against the enemy as we continued our rail interdiction mission.

12-24-51: Air Operations as before, a total of 80 sorties being flown.

12-25-51: Replenishment at sea.

12-26-51: Weather cancelled all air operations.

12-27-51: Only 4 CAP sorties flown, weather continued bad.

12-28-51: A total of 84 sorties were flown, The primary mission continued to be rail interdiction. LTJG D. F. TATUM ditched his F9F within the task force screen when it flamed out on his approach. He was recovered by our helicopter with no difficulty.

12-29-51: Continuing our interdiction program 59 offensive

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1-2-52: LT CARTER, flying a dawn heckler mission, landed his F4U-5N at K-18 as a result of automatic weapon flak damage received near Yonghung. The Task Force Commander sent a "Well Done" to a morning launch prop strike this date. 70 of the 86 sorties flown were offensive.

1-3-52: 78 tons of bombs were delivered by 67 offensive missions to Northeastern Korea. ENSIGN E.L. RIEMERS effected a water landing in Songjin Harbor after being hit badly in the starboard wing root section approximately 60 miles inland from Songjin. The USS ENDICOTT completed the rescue in eight minutes. Pilot suffered minor shock effect from exposure and the actual landing.

1-4-52: The force replenished at sea.

1-5-52: Bad weather forced the cancellation of the afternoon portion of scheduled operations, however, 56 sorties were flown and 38 tons of bombs were delivered.

1-6-52: Excellent results were realized against rail lines and bridges. Total bridge destruction - 4 RR bridges and a RR by-pass destroyed, 3 damaged and unusable. 84 missions were launched during the day.

1-7-52: The force replenished at sea.

1-8-52: In an exceptionally effective mission a prop strike accounted for 7 RR bridges and 3 RR by-passes. This performance earned a "Well Done" from the Task Force Commander. LTJG A. A. PETERSON was force to ditch his plane in Wonsan Harbor, as a result of being hit by small arms fire north of Hungnam. The helicopter from LST-802 picked him out of his raft 45 minutes after ditching. Pilot was recovered in good condition. One Corsair of VF 653 was forced to land at K-18 due to flak damage.

1-9-52: A total of 81 sorties were launched today against enemy lines of Communication. Flak over all the area was active. In the vicinity of Kowan LT W.M. FRANKOVITCH of VF 653 became seperated from his wingman, a few minutes later he reported loss of oil pressure and was thereafter not heard from. It is presumed he crashed into the sea as an oil slick was found in the area. LT FRANKOVITCH is listed as missing.

1-10-52: Replenished at sea. In the early afternoon, 2 Corsairs were launched to search the area for LT FRANKOVITCH, negative results were obtained.

1-11-52: Bad weather delayed flight operation until afternoon. One F9F was lost over the side as the ship took a violent roll. 38 sorties were scored in the half-days operation.

1-12-52: Operation "Moonlight Sonata" was carried out with gratifying results. The operation took full advantage of the moon to hit Communist night activity. At least 2 locomotives and 18 rail cars were destroyed. A total of 76 sorties were flown.

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1-15-52: Again our planes struck rail and road supply routes. A total of 56 rail cuts were made, a record for the VALLEY FORGE todate.

1-16-52: We again flew the "Moonlight Sonata" with very good results. A total of 3 bridges were effectively destroyed by today's strikes.

1-17-52: Replenished at sea, departed for 10 days availability at Yokosuka, Japan.

PART III

PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

A. Ammunition Expended.

2,000# G.P. Bombs	27
1,000# G.P. Bombs	950
500# G.P. Bombs	626
250# G.P. Bombs	4732
100# G.P. Bombs	1874
260# Frag Bombs	376
5" HVAR Rockets	340
6.5 ATAR Rockets	177
Incediary Clusters	18
Napalm Bombs	33
Parachute Flares Mk 5	78
20mm Ammunition	271,213
.50 Cal. Ammunition	116,210
Incendiary Clusters	18

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Damage to ship:

None.

B. Damage to Aircraft:

No. of planes	Types	Causes
16	F9F-2	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
16	F4U-4(4B)	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
2	F4U-5NL	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
14	AD-2(3)	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
3	AD-4NL	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.

C. Loss of Aircraft:

Date	Squadron	Type	Bu.No.	Causes
12-9	VF 653	F4U-4	97496	Mid air collision
12-9	VF 653	F4U-4B	97314	Mid air collision

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D. Damage Inflicted on Enemy:

Targets	Destroyed	Damaged
Tanks	1	0
Trucks	139	28
Locomotives	4	7
Oxcarts	111	14
Highway bridges	3	10
Supply Dumps	3	6
Fuel Dumps	2	0
Factories	0	4
Barracks & Buildings	75	33
Warehouses	5	6
Gun Emplacements	12	22
Lumber piles	0	4
Wagons	1	0
Villages	0	1
Boats	19	62
Radar Installations	0	5
Bunkers	0	1
M/Y Yards	0	6
RR Cars	87	94
RR Bridges	37	10
RR By-passes	11	14
Roundhouses	0	1
Bulldozer	1	0
Rail Cuts	743	
Highway Cuts	2	
Troops Killed	584	

The above mentioned table represents a conservative estimate of the actual damage inflicted on the enemy during this operational period. Only those instances where the damage could be assessed by the pilot were used in compiling this table. There were many attacks where the results were obscured and could not be assessed and are not included. There was no close air support flown during this period.

PART V

PERSONNEL

A. Performance:

Personnel performance has been excellent during the period of this report. Morale remained high.

Difficulties have been encountered in operating with an average on board count of 1933 which is below the recommended allowance of 1969. The influx of enlisted personnel is not sufficient to offset losses through the continued transfers of personnel for separation and to shore duty assignments; therfore the petty officer situation is critical, especially in the key ratings of electronics, engineering, gunnery, and communications. If the ship is to continue operating satisfactorily under almost constant

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The length of time consumed from the time replacement personnel are ordered until the time they report for duty appears excessive. It is strongly recommended that faster transportation from CONUS be made available. If time spent awaiting transportation at the RecSta SFRAN could be reduced it would help tremendously. A survey reveals that an average of 18.5 man days is spent at RecSta SFRAN awaiting transportation. This added to the time spent enroute exceeds one month per man in practically every case.

During the operation the ship had a Protestant Chaplain aboard, but was without the services of a Catholic Chaplain. In order to provide services for Catholic personnel Chaplains traded services, using helicopters for transportation. Due to weather and operations this was not always possible. In the interests of morale each deployed CV should have both a Protestant and Catholic Chaplain aboard.

The Chaplain found that a tape recorder has been of significant value in connection with broadcasts to the fleet and aboard the ship. It is recommended that each CV have one available for such use. The Cor-Web Recorder with a supply of two dozen fifteen minute tapes and one dozen thirty minute tapes is adequate.

The Chaplain believes the brief (two to four minutes) evening prayer broadcast over the 1MC immediately after tattoo is of greater morale value than any other service he performs aboard the ship. It is highly recommended for adoption by other units.

B. RECREATION

Movies - Movies were shown daily in five different places. In two of these the program was repeated. During the operation fifty different programs were shown for a total of 270 times. On replenishment days there was a showing in a ready room for those men (plane check personnel) whose duty prevented them from attending the regular schedules. It was estimated that 800 officers and men attended each night.

A broadcasting station was established using the R.B.O. In addition to disc-jockey programs on regular schedules, recorded programs of the Ship's Band and a "Western Band" were featured. Each day a brief interview with a pilot, ship's officer or key enlisted man was conducted. Summary of the news and strike news was a daily feature.

The response to these broadcasts indicate that their morale value is high.

The Hobby Shop was well patronized. The limitation on its usage was the availability of supplies. Four times as much material was sold as in any previous month of the shop's operation. The crafts supplied were leather, copper, plastic, models, painting. The space occupied by the shop is quite small so that little work was actually done there. It was primarily for the sale of materials and issue of tools. On the basis of tools issued and materials sold, it is estimated that

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C. Casualities:

LT Donald Earl LONDON, 355201/1315, USNR. On 9 December 1951, while flying an F4U, purpose 1B1, cause ABLE, off South Korea collided in the air with LT James Theas PORTERFIELD, Jr., 347037/1315, USNR also flying an F4U-4B. Both officers were killed. Both attached to VF 653. Remains not recovered.

LTJG Harry E. ETTINGER, 504133/1315, USNR (VF 194); Jess R. MCMELROY, 357 84 22, USNR (VF 194); Julian H. GILLILAND, 837 59 86, AT2, USN (VF 194). On 13 December 1951, Wonsan Area, Korea, above personnel flying in AD, purpose 3T1, cause XRAY. Plane last seen in controlled flight with engine smoking - two parachutes seen to open. Plane carried crew of three. The plane was not seen to land or strike the ground because of approaching darkness. All three are reported missing.

LCDR Benjamin Thomas PUGH, 165757/1310, USN (VF 194). On 18 December 1951, off Wonsan Bay, Korea, flying an AD, purpose 1T1 cause CHARLIE. LCDR PUGH successfully ditched aircraft after probably receiving own bomb blast damage. He was observed to abandon aircraft without pararaft. He was dead upon arrival of rescue craft after one hour ten minutes in water, probably from exhaustion and cold.

LT Robert Leroy SOBEY, 368995/1315, USNR (VF 653), On 22 December 1951, one-half mile east of Yonghung, Korea, while flying F4U, purpose 1T1, cause UNIT, plane disintegrated in air during intense AA fire. Remains not recovered.

LT William Mark FRANKOVICH, 437217/1315, USNR (VF 653). On 9 January 1952, 20 miles NW of Yodo-Ri, Korea, while flying in F4U, purpose 1T1, cause TARE, was last seen trying to land on the water off the coast because of engine trouble. Landing or bailout net observed. Reported missing in action.

PART VI

GENERAL COMMENTS

A. AIR DEPARTMENT

1. Aircraft Servicing

Introduction of lube oil into avgas for use in jet aircraft is somewhat of a problem. While the proportioner (FB-100-A) itself operates very satisfactorily, it materially reduces the overall fueling rate and requires that lube oil pumps be operated at high pressure over rather long periods of time. VALLEY FORGE rest spd ltr ser 101 dtd 13 January 1952 outlined two alternate possibilities for introduction of lube oil into the avgas. It is recommended that some activity with the facilities pursue the venturi idea which seems to be the most promising.

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This ship has experienced many of the problems inherent in the use of Mk55 bomb racks. Generally speaking, it is a satisfactory rack for use with prop aircraft. With jet aircraft a better, more positive rack is required. Hung bombs on jets during arrested landings carry away more than 50% of the time. These bombs coming off the Mk55 rack travel up the deck at a high speed usually tumbling end on end. The fuzes are always damaged and in many cases the fuzes have become at least partially armed. While all this is already known it is reiterated again for the benefit of present and future planning, and the necessity for designing bomb racks that will accommodate new type aircraft with their high speeds both in flight and on landing.

2. Aircraft Maintenance

The Sperry Engine Analyzer on board for evaluation has been used enough to justify its inclusion in the Section G allowance list at this time. It is, of course, readily adaptable for use with AD type aircraft but underway the general feeling among the mechanics is that it is simply more trouble to hook up and use that its worth. While the Analyzer is not recommended for carrier use at this time it is recommended that an AD squadron be issued the Analyzer early during the squadron's training period in the states. It is felt that if the mechanics were more familiar with the operation of the Analyzer and more aware of its inherent capabilities they would use it more than enough to justify its being included in the Section G allowance.

3. Aircraft Handling

No new or unusual problems were encountered in aircraft handling. Respotting of jet aircraft is somewhat complicated by the fact that only four gasoline fueling stations can deliver the avgas-lub oil mixture required in the J-42 engine. Close coordination by the Aircraft Handling, Maintenance and Service Officers has solved the problem and made up for inherent deficiencies of the proportioners (FB-100-A) now in use.

The jet barricade has presented no problems and a complete resume of its minor deficiencies and attendant local fixes was covered in detail in VALLEY FORGE rest. ltr ser 68 dtd. 12 January 1952.

Previous to this cruise this ship did not have jet blast deflectors. Consequently most of flight deck personnel were well checked out in the launching and handling of jets. Yet on the one occassion when one blast deflector was out of commission it was obvious that these people who were not familiar with operating procedures without blast deflectors made many mistakes. It is recommended launching jets without the use of a blast deflector or deflectors be made a standard training exercise for inclusion in USF 49 and that this exercise be conducted as part of all Operational Readiness Inspections.

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Temperature: Air: Maximum---59 F
Minimum---25 F
Average---41 F
Water: (30 Foot depth)
Maximum---62 F
Minimum---39 F
Average---50 F

Cloud Cover: Clear 26% of observations
Scattered 22% of observations
Broken 23% of observations
Overcast 29% of observations

The predominate cloud form was stratocumulus with bases at 2000-3000 feet.

Visibility: Over 6 miles, 98% of observations.

Precipitation: Precipitation occured on 17 of the 36 days in the period. The most frequent form was snow showers which occurred on 13 days.

During this period the Asiatic high cell is fully developed giving a northerly wind flow over Eastern Asia. This air mass is very cold and dry and as it passes southward over Sea of Japan it becomes unstable, giving scattered snow showers.

With a northerly flow over North Korea, the North Korean highlands cause the wind to divide into a northeasterly flow off Northeast Korean coast, and a westnorthwesterly flow off the East coast between 38th and 40th parallel; A shear line or instability line is formed where these winds rejoin offshore. This shear line has many characteristics of a front with frequent to continuous snow showers, very low ceilings and visibilities. The mean position of the shear line is to the northeast of the operating area, but when a northeasterly flow predominates it moves southwestward to the Korean Coast.

On a few occassions it was necessary to reduce the bomb load carried on the jets due to light winds at launching time.

2. Communications

(a) Facsimile (Aerology Laboratory)

Attempts were made several times daily to copy surface, 700 MB, and Korean briefing charts, transmitted by NDT (Radio Photo Unit #5, Tokyo) and AIF-JPNZ (Tokyo blind weather broadcast).

Good reception was rarely obtained, with poor reception to none prevailing. Poor reception during the day is caused mainly by CW interference and at night by atmospheric interference.

(b) Radioteletype (Radio 1)

On the average, reception was only fair. Interference generally was given as cause for failures, with a few reported instances of mechanical failure. Copy was almost illegible at times due to faulty ribbons.

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Pneumatic tube should be installed between main communications and the aerology laboratory to reduce delays and save man-hours in the handling of the multitude of weather messages.

Direct communications between CIC and the aerology laboratory should be installed.

3. Equipment and Supplies

(a) Radiosonde

The radiosonde was temporarily inoperative frequently due to mechanical trouble and local interference. Interference from the tractors on flight deck frequently cut the sounding out entirely.

(b) Other aerological equipment operated satisfactorily.

(c) At present we have 25 full bottles of helium aboard. The normal daily consumption when operating is 2.5 bottles. Re-supply in the forward area is indefinite. Recommendations contained in the Supply Department comments of Part VI are applicable and pertinent.

C. COMBAT INFORMATION

1. Radars

(a) General: All radars operated normally during this period and satisfactory results were obtained. Failures encountered are not considered excessive, but it is felt that most of them were due largely to continued operation. The slave antenna system for Mark V whidh is installed was originally designed for field operations and is not considered entirely suitable for shipboard use. Transformers and Relays were burned out early in this period due to constant overload from heavy winds and since there were no spare parts aboard or in the area there was a resultant loss of the use of Mark V in conjunction with SX radar. This proved to be a real handicap at the time because there was no means of obtaining range rings for air control when utilizing SPS-6B on SX consoles. However, our Electronics Officers had been working on a unit for that purpose and had it completed and operating within a few hours. The results have been excellent, but in case of failure of SPS-6B radar under present arrangement there would be no means of utilizing Mark V without major adjustments.

(b) Specific:

(1) SX was the most dependable all around radar. The CIC experienced considerable interference from same radar on other CV's and some from APS-2Q and ASP planes. Average dependable range for jets closing at altitudes from 10,000 - 25,000 is 40 to 50 miles with 2 or more planes flying together. It is most affected by weather and is good for locating fronts and turbulent type clouds.

(2) SPS-6B was best radar for long range air search having an average dependable range of 70 to 80 [illegible]

(4) SG-7 was determined to be good for short range surface search except for blind spot on starboard bow which is due to position of antenna relative to superstructure of ship.

2. Communications

(a) Cross talk was the most noticeable hindrance to good communications. The Strike Control, ASP control and CAP control frequencies frequently block each other completely and invariably if transmissions were being made simultaneously over two of the above mentioned circuit they were garbled. Enough of the above circuits fed-over into screen common to cause complaint by Flag and ships conn, so a trap was built which eliminated difficulty. It is believed, however, that the cross-talk in Strike, ASP and CAP channels can only be eliminated by use of frequencies more widely separated. It was consistently found that for reliable communications with returning strike planes the best arrangement was the utilization of the TDQ for transmitting and the AN/ARC for receiving. Using this combination, it was possible to establish and maintain communications at eighty miles. It is believed that the sensitivity of the RCKs could be increased if suppressors were installed on all the automotive equipment aboard.

3. Flag Operations

(a) CIC functioned as the Flag CIC for Task Force 77 in the absence of the ESSEX and was able to perform its duties in a satisfactory manner after making several changes in arrangement of speakers and status boards.

4. Recommendations

(a) Most recommendations have been made in the foregoing. However, one need, which has been mentioned in action reports of other ships, and is considered worthy of being mentioned again, is that for more communication equipment.

D. ENGINEERING

After the first heavy weather encountered after leaving Yokosuka, an inspection was made of the ship and the following damage was discovered, which is presumed to have been caused by the heavy weather:

a. A crack, about 45" long, was found in the skin of the ship at Frame 41 port under the gun sponson. This crack extends through two welded plates. It will be repaired by welding during availability.

b. A longitudinal support member at frame 27 starboard, in stateroom 201, is cracked through the web. This longitudinal is not a main strength member. It will be repaired by welding during availibility.

c. A 3" crack in welded seam, Frame 29 starboard, in deck of compartment A-704-A which is immediately above fuel tank A-902-F. This was repaired by welding.

E. INTELLIGENCE

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urged that the full support of the Air Group embarked, be the primary duty of the Photographic Interpretor assigned to the ship. Close cooperation of the Intelligence section and the Photographic Interpretation section is necessary to produce photographic material for briefing purposes.

2. Operations

Upon arriving in the operating area, there were certain inadequacies apparent that should be noted. Difficulty was experienced in gathering current operational information in time to prepare briefs for the initial combat flights. Comprehensive briefs to new Intelligence teams should be scheduled so that information can be properly prepared for the first days of operation.

Personnel and physical space problems that were encountered at the outset of operations have gradually been overcome. Briefing and debriefing spaces in each ready room should be completed before deployment.

The major portion of briefing is concentrated on accurate flak information in assigned target areas. Due to the increase in the volume and accuracy of anti-aircraft fire this section of the briefing becomes increasingly important. Plotting flak on 1:50,000 scale maps and pointing out surrounding terrain features is standard practice. The use of current annotated mosaics for briefing purposes and for actual pilot use is preferable. It is suggested that debrief flak, FEAF flak reports, Air Force flak reports and current photographic flak analysis be compiled on a system of 1:50,000 scale maps with a careful system of maintenance by type and date. Additional information of each position can be carried in a Flak Log.

3. Search and Rescue:

During the period of this operation we had six pilots who ditched in the water and none that elected to ditch on the beach. Of these six, four were successfully rescued, one is believed to have spun in, and the other remained in the water without his life raft one hour and ten minutes, a period much longer than usually required to effect a rescue.

It is expected that the new Mark III exposure suit, currently available through ComFairJap, will greatly increase the pilots ability to successfully resist exposure until rescue facilities arrive.

The present facilities of helicopters and ships along the East Coast for SAR purposes generally form an accepted minimum of rescue facilities in this area. The optimum distribution is, one at the bombline, one in Wonsan Harbor, one at either Hungnam or Songjin for a total of three. These facilities, together with Air Force helicopters available at or near the bombline, form a great morale boost for all pilots flying in the area.

The establishment of Dumbo facilities along the East Coast is considered highly desirable.

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4. Evasion and Escape

Due to the classified nature of information on this subject it is considered that the Escape and Evasion Officer, Staff ComNavFE, should disseminate this intelligence. He is prepared to come aboard any carrier in Yokosuka, Japan for lectures, or, he may proceed with the ship to the operating area and give his lectures enroute. Usually he is accompanied by two or more members of the Air Force who have recently been rescued from behind enemy lines. It is strongly urged that he be contacted for information on current escape and evasion methods.

Headquarters, Far East Air Force makes available, through the regular Navy Distribution list, current written reports on the debriefing of all personnel that have escaped or evaded. It is suggested that these publications be given wide pilot dissemination.

5. Reports

Reports are submitted in accordance with pertinent instructions contained in the NAVAL AIR WARFARE REPORTING MANUAL (OPNAV Instr. 3480.1) and CTF 77 Operations Order #22-51 Revised.

F. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION

1. Ships Photo Interpretation Staff

One experienced photographic interpreter (LCDR) and one trained enlisted man (QM2) are assigned to the ship for photographic interpretation duties. The volume of aerial photography necessitated the assignment of two additional officers to aid in the photographic interpretation work. Neither officer had training in photo interpretation but have shown great aptitude in carrying out their assigned duties. Additional aid in photographic interpretation of great value was obtained from the Photographic Detachment, VC-61 H.

2. The space assigned to the ships photo interpreter is in the ship's Air Intelligence Office and proves inadequate for the volume of work assigned. Additional spaces were used as conditions permitted. The VC-61 H photo detachment utilized the ozlid room for much of their interpretation work, primarily that of flak analysis and target search.

3. Photographic Interpretation Duties

Flash Report: All aerial photography assigned to the ship must be studied as promptly as possible to send out the necessary flash report on damage assessment, condition of enemy A/F and

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rail routes were prepared in a form easily carried by the pilots. Studies of flak positions were double checked in all cases.

Target Search: The constant desire for suitable dump targets and targets for strike purposes constantly required the attention of the photo interpreters. All such targets were reported in the flash report and annotated photographs and mosaics were prepared as often as possible. The photo detachment, VC-61 H, aided the ship's P.I. and devoted a considerable amount of their time to target search.

Damage Assessment Photography: Damage assessments on all bridges, RR and other strike targets was reported by dispatch when photography was available. The largest number of aerial photographs examined have been for the purpose of making damage assessment reports.

Additional Photography: Flash interpretation of all photography was made and reported by dispatch. Photos have been taken and studied for search and rescue.

K-25 Strike Photography: The utilization of K-25 photos for strike damage assessment has been hindered by the availability of only 2 pods that were usable during this period, the small scale of the photos and the lack of clarity in the prints. This and other problems have been ironed out in part.

4. Conclusions

The volume of aerial photography has posed numerous problems. Personnel and space inadequacies have been solved in part by improvision. Due to the excessive volume of production of aerial reconnaissance photography, the varying quality of photographic paper, and other difficulties encountered by the photo lab, the quality of aerial prints did not always meet the standard necessary for much of the work done. The problems of photo interpretation for the ship were considerably increased due to the extensive support required in furnishing prints to ships along the east coast of Korea.

It is recommended as a solution to the problems that an Interpron Unit in daily contact with the fleet be established to carry out much of the photographic and interpretation work now carried on by carriers in the force.

G. PHOTOGRAPHIC LABORATORY

1. General:

No provision had been made for the large increase of Aerial Reconnaissance Photography since the ship last operated in the Korean Theater.

Additional space was needed to identify and annotate the film as well as equipment to process and dry it. The allowance of 4 developing outfits (S/N E18D163-120) was not enough to overcome

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The copying, by photography, of maps and charts for pilot use has assumed a major role in the present operations. An average of 10 copy negatives and 281 prints from these maps are made on each operating day with a peak works load of 33 negatives and 1303 8x10" prints in 24 hours.

In addition to the K-17 reconnaissance work, the Photo Lab also handles the K-25 strike photography on an average of 3 rolls per day. A flash print (Sonne) is made and delivered to the Photo Officer of the respective Squadron concerned. The co-ordinate numbers are marked on the flash print, the print is then delivered to the Ship's PI Officer who selects prints to be made for distribution. The K-25 negatives are marked as per Manual of Photography instructions and 10 8.10" SWG enlargements are made from each negative selected for distribution.

2. Peak Work Load Information

The exposed film is delivered to the Photo Lab upon landing.

The film is processed, washed, and dried.

One flash Sonne Print is made and sent to ship's P.I. Officer for checking.

After the print is checked, the film is then marked by the VC-61 Unit with all necessary annotation and returned to the Photo Lab for printing.

From each roll of marked film, 10 Sonne Prints are made and three additional on all surface interdiction targets.

Processing Time Test Chart

The time schedule below is for a "peak work day".

Number of exposures - 227

Time received in Photo Lab	1145
Entered Developing Room	1145
Left Developing Room	1230
Entered Dryer	1231
Left Dryer	1250
Entered Print Room	1250
Delivered to A. I.	1340

Roll No.	Time Rec'd in Lab	Flash Print to PI	Neg to Photo Unit	Neg retur.	Smooth prints	No. expos.	Total No.

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3. Work Accomplished During Present Operating Period:

K-17 film rolls developed	80
9½x9½" aerial prints made	106,777
8x10" prints from K-25 negatives	847
Prints, assorted sizes, from ro tine negatives such as Flight Deck Operations, copies, RUDM, PIO, etc.	8,467
Total Prints	116,091
Film transparencies (4x5" to 1?x22")	1,110
Gun camera film processed	22,000 ft.

H. SUPPLY DEPARTMENT

1. Aviation Supply

This ship deployed with about 98% of aviation items per applicable allowance lists on board. Non-critical and non-insurance items were stocked to 180 days with applied wartime conversion factor. Critical and insurance items were stocked to 90 days with no wartime conversion factor. Only two AOG's were experienced because of shortage of outfitting items as per basic allowance list. One casual item was F4U-4 wings; the other, HO3S-1 main rotor assembly. The first item was not obtainable in WestPac, the second is apparently not readily available in the system. More AOG's for this cause were prevented by maximum effort and improvisation by Air Task Group ONE maintenance personnel.

The balance of AOG's were caused by (1) non-allowance list items and (2) usage above allowance list quantities. About 10 AOG's were in the first category and about 8 in the second. Usage above allowance quantities arises from (1) heavier operating schedules than those anticipated at the time allowances were prepared, (2) anti-aircraft fire damage not anticipated by present allowance lists, (3) use of aircraft on advanced service tours, (4) too exacting an interpretation of the "Insurance" item concept to deployment outfittings, and (5) cold weather operations. It is expected that the new reporting system just inaugurated by ComAirPac and AMO Oakland will result in consideration of these factors in allowance lists. It is also expected that the new reporting system will highlight the need for flexibility in application of allowance lists upon outfitting in order that the outfit will be conformed to anticipated actual operating conditions, such as those outlined above, to the extent possible.

During the short period experience, COD delivery of urgently required spares has been disappointing. The few AOG items specifically requested for delivery by COD averaged eight days from time of submission of dispatch until the time items were received aboard. No recommendation is possible by the ship on this point since the reasons for delay are not apparent.

Intra-force emergency support in all categories of material, including aviation spares, has left almost nothing to be desired

2. GSK

Usage of helium for aerological soundings is high and variable. Consequently, although this ship carries sixty-six cylinders, because of the usage and the importance of aerological reports to a CV's operations it is highly desirable to replenish helium stocks at every opportunity and necessary to replenish those stocks at least once during a thirty to forty day period at sea. During the recent period it was possible to obtain 8 cylinders at one replenishment. During other replenishments, tanker loadings were such that only 2 or 3 cylinders were available. It is recommended that standard tanker loadings be reviewed and that, if other considerations permit, sufficient stocks of helium be put aboard tankers so that ten cylinders per CV are available at each replenishment.

For the information of CV's deploying in the future, allowances of special winter clothing are inconsistent with cold weather needs in this area. Separate report in reply to ComAirPac Supply Support Questionaire is being made on this subject. The allowances for trousers, winter underwear and face masks are excessive. Only personnel continuously and directly exposed to launching and landing wind draw these items. As a consequence, a considerable storage problem arises. On the other hand, almost everyone periodically requires an N-1 Jacket for wear on replenishment working parties, etc. When this requirement is combined with a sizing problem, the 75% allowance is inadequate. A 100% allowance is recommended for jackets.

3. Disbursing

Under restrictions as to currency used in NavFE area, one dollar MPC certificates and U.S. nickels tend to disappear from Ship's Store change. A beginning inventory of 4000 MPC ones and $800 in nickles, if a CV uses nickels in Ship's Store operations is recommended.

4. Ship's Store

The following are recommended items to be stocked in quantities sufficient for the whole cruise before deploying:

a. Items of minor operational spares, such as spare parts for Tailor Shop sewing machine and for patching machine in the Cobbler Shop.

b. Repair parts for Barber Shop's electric clippers.

c. Spare mangle aprons and an extra bleach crock for laundry.

d. Laundry supplies, to extent permitted by space.

4. Three extra hand irons for laundry finishing work.

5. Clothing and Small Stores.

The demand for underclothing has been two to three times that

soup available for unrestricted issue around the clock. It has been found that, while operating, the availability of soup at all hours has resulted in a 20% reduction in meat consumption at noon meals.

For the information of supply officers without experience in the operating area, provisioning at sea is very efficient. For use in estimating time requirements for provision loading, a good factor for first experience is 1.2 minutes per ton of provisions to be transferred.

In preparing provision requisitions, the ship has considerable difficulty anticipating what items will be available. If practicable, it is recommended that the replenishing task element send out, prior to the time requisitions from the task force are requested, a dispatch detailing items of provisions which will be available at replenishment. Confining this dispatch to fresh and frozen items would probably suffice.

Related to the above, there has been some experience of "forced issues" by provisiong ships. The need for moving stocks off provision ships is appreciated. In view of the fact that directives require that ships provision to capacity, forced issued of chilled or frozen items could result in an impossible storage problem for the provisioning ship. It is believed that the recommendation under above is a solution to this problem as well.

There has been considerable delay in receipt of invoices after receipt of the related provisions at sea. Unit prices and confirmation of quanitities are desirable for record purposes as early as possible, at any time, and particularly at the end of an accounting period. It is requested that provision ships emphasize timely preparation of invoices and guard mail delivery after at sea delivery of provisions.

On at least one occasion of at sea provisioning, this ship was not issued fresh fruits which had been requisitioned and stocks of which were broken out on topside of the provisioning ship. In order to avoid misunderstanding, it is recommended that task force ships be advised of the basis for rationing of desirable provision items as between ships of a force or as between ships at different locations.

I. COMMUNICATIONS

1. Radio:

During the period covered by this report the radio facilities handled approximately 13,000 messages, exclusive of service messages and relays. The volume of radio communications during the portion of this period when this vessel was the flagship of Commander Task Force 77 taxed the capacity of available personnel and equipment. During such time, the personnel on duty in Radio I were required to stand watches in Condition TWO in order to cover all designated circuits. In the main, the communications personnel performed excellently, and rapid communications were conducted satisfactorily. However, towards the end of the period the operators were beginning to become overtired and listless from

The assignment of the full complement of communications personnel is necessary to enable this command to fulfill its requirements satisfactorily when serving as the Task Force flagship. It is highly desirable to enable radio personnel to maintain Condition THREE in order to avoid an increase in the ratio of errors and diminishing reliability of communications resulting from excess fatigue and listlessness from sustained watch standing in Condition ONE. The training program being conducted will relieve the personnel situation in time provided adequate numbers of non-rated personnel with aptitude are assigned to communications duty.

The shortage of radio transmitters caused traffic to be delayed on numerous occasions. Excessive sparking from planes on the forward portion of the flight deck by reason of the radiated field from the TBA transmitter on frequencies around 10 megacycles forced the securing of this transmitter pending field-strength investigations. After obtaining rough data on field strengths at various levels of power outputs, it was determined that this transmitter might be safely operated with reduced power output pending the procurement of complete data on field strengths. The four TCA transmitters located in Radio II and Radio III proved unsatisfactory for long range communications and for CW transmission.

Unless field strength tests dictate otherwise, it is recommended that a radio room to house the TBA transmitter be built on the 07 level just forward of the stacks and that this transmitter be removed to that location. It is further recommended that the TCS transmitters be replaced by TDE, TBL, or TBM transmitters.

The two TDQ and RCK equipments installed in Radio II proved unreliable by reason of the whips which must be lowered to a horizontal position beneath the flight deck level during air operations. Accordingly, it is recommended that these equipments be removed to the island and that the antennae therefore be located on the mast structure. Moreover, under existing operating conditions in a Carrier Task Force, three additional VHF equipments are desired.

By separate correspondence, this command has pointed out the added need for three additional UHF equipment. The three complete UHF equipments (TDZ/RDZ) now installed were augmented by setting up a model MAR equipment in Radio VII. One of the three RDZ antennas was used with the latter equipment. All existing TDZ/RDZ equipments were operated continuously on three different frequencies, and the MAR was held in immediate readiness on the most important of these frequencies. Failures of the TDZ transmitters necessitated the use of the MAR with acceptable results. However, it is believed that more satisfactory performance would be obtained from additional TDZ or TED (preferably TED) equipment than can be expected from the MAR.

2. Visual:

Visual communications were conducted satisfactorily. At times screening ships were extremely slow in hoisting signals transmitted by the OTC using flag hoist. It is probable that such delays were occasioned by shortages of signal personnel precluding continuous guard on OTC or responsible relay ship and

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that use of the 24MC system is preferable to sound-powered telephone. However, the advisability of installing voice tubes between these spaces should receive further consideration as a possibly more satisfactory channel.

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