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U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
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CV45/A16-3/aej
Serial: 051

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2 April 1951

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NAVHISTDIVINST 5500.1
By: OP-09B92C

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces FAR EAST
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 31 January 1951 through 26 March 1951

Ref: (a) CWO rest ltr Op-345/aa ser 1197P34 dtd 3 Aug 1950

Encl: (1) Pilot Briefing Form
(2) Pilot Debriefing Form
(3) ACI Organization Chart

1. In accordance with reference (a) the Action Report for the period 31 January 1951 through 26 March 1951 is hereby submitted:

PART I: Composition of Own Forces and Mission

Complying with ComSEVENTHFLT secret despatch 260138Z of January 1951, the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) with Carrier Air Group TWO embarked got underway enroute from Sasebo, Japan to the operating area in company with the USS OZBOURN (DD-846), USS MCCAFFERY (DD-860) and DesDiv 52 on the morning of 31 January 1951 and joined CTF 77 (ComCardiv ONE) embarked in the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) and other units of TF 77 on 1 February 1951. After 16 days of operating the USS VALLEY FORGE returned to the port of Yokosuka, Japan on 26 February 1951 for a period of maintenance and upkeep. By order of ComSEVENTHFLT secret despatch 060556Z of March 1951 the VALLEY FORGE, with Carrier Air Group TWO and ComCardiv ONE embarked, again returned to the operating area in company with the USS MISSOURI (BB-63), USS BOLE (DD-755), and USS LOFBERG (DD-759) on the morning of 11 March 1951 and joined TF 77 consisting of the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47), USS PRINCETON (CV-37), and other units on 13 March 1951.

Commanding Officer of Carrier Air Group TWO was R. W. RYND, CDR, USN, with the following complement of pilots and number of aircraft at the beginning of flight operations:

<u>SQUADRON</u>	<u>NO. OF PILOTS</u>	<u>NO. OF AIRCRAFT</u>
VF-24	29	17 F4U-4
VF-63	27	17 F4U-4
VF-64	26	17 F4U-4
VA-65	28	18 AD-2, 2 AD-4, 2 AD-4Q
VC-35	6	3 AD-4N
VC-3	4	3 F4U-5N
VC-11	5	3 AD-4W
VC-61	5	3 F4U-4P
CVG-2 & Staff	10	- - - - -

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PART II: Chronological Order of Events

- (A) 1/31/51: Underway enroute from Sasebo, Japan to operating area in company with destroyer escort. Launched ferry flight to Itazuke, Japan and landed courier planes from Itazuke. Conducted AA firing practice.
- 2/1/51: Rendezvoused with TF 77 in the early morning. Launched close air support strikes and photo missions over North-eastern Korea with 58 sorties for the day.
- 2/2/51: Launched close air support, bridge strikes, photo missions and night hecklers. Several hundred troop casualties were inflicted. 31 sorties were flown.
- 2/3/51: Air attacks consisted of close air support and bridge strikes taking a toll of several hundred enemy troop casualties, 30 houses containing troops, and damaging two RR bridges. 60 sorties were flown.
- 2/4/51: Rendezvoused with replenishment group and received 329,070 gallons of fuel oil, 65,000 gallons of aviation gasoline and 76.7 tons of ammunition.
- 2/5/51: Conducted close air support, bridge strikes, photo missions and night heckler attacks. Dropped two spans on RR bridge. 53 sorties were flown.
- 2/6/51: Flight operations were limited to defensive sorties due to low ceiling and icing conditions. Six sorties were flown. The USS CUNNINGHAM (DD-752) and the USS EVANS (DD-754) came alongside and received 68,010 and 54,504 gallons of fuel oil respectively.
- 2/7/51: Weather conditions delayed flight operations until late morning. Close air support, bridge strikes, and photo missions were conducted in two events totaling 47 sorties for the day. Two F4U aircraft were lost, one on catapult take-off in which Ensign G. A. MARTIN, 0505344, USN was not recovered and the other on landing approach in which Ensign G. W. STINNETT, Jr., 0507800, USN was recovered by helicopter.
- 2/8/51: Rendezvoused with replenishment group and received 298,956 gallons of fuel oil, 38,830 gallons of aviation gasoline and 141.2 tons of ammunition.
- 2/9/51: Launched early morning hecklers only. Further flight operations were prevented by snow and icing conditions. Eight trucks were destroyed in five sorties for the day.
- 2/10/51: Close air support, bridge strikes, photo missions and night heckler attacks were conducted in 57 sorties which accounted for damage to two RR bridges and one highway bridge.
- 2/11/51: Conducted close air support, bridge strikes and photo missions in 85 sorties which inflicted approximately 100 enemy troop casualties.

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2/24/51: Poor weather prevented flight operations.

2/25/51: Rendezvoused with replenishment group and received 227,976 gallons of fuel oil, 59,050 gallons of aviation gasoline, and 116.3 tons of ammunition.

2/26/51: Departed from operating area in the morning for Yokosuka, Japan.

2/27/51 - 3/2/51: Enroute from the operating area to Yokosuka, Japan.

3/2/51 - 3/10/51: Moored to Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka, Japan for maintenance and upkeep.

3/11/51: Underway enroute from Yokosuka, Japan to the operating area in company with destroyer escort. The USS MISSOURI (BB-63) joined the formation in the afternoon and all ships conducted AA firing practice.

3/12/51: Proceeding from Yokosuka, Japan to the operating area. Conducted AA firing practice enroute.

3/13/51: Rendezvoused with TF 77 and replenishment group in the early afternoon and received 274,974 gallons of fuel oil.

3/14/51: Conducted close air support, special strikes, naval gunfire spotting, and photo missions in 71 sorties for the day. Three (3) highway bridges and a locomotive were damaged.

3/15/51: Flight operations consisted of early morning hecklers, bridge strikes, naval gunfire spotting and photo missions in 57 sorties. Five (5) railroad bridges and one highway bridge were damaged.

3/16/51: Launched early morning hecklers, bridge strikes, railroad seeder, laying long delay fused bombs along tracks, and lumber destroyer special strikes, naval gunfire spotting and photo missions. Five (5) railroad bridges, railroad tracks and lumber piles were damaged. 60 sorties were flown.

3/17/51: Conducted close air support, early morning hecklers, bridge strikes, railroad seeder and lumber destroyer special strikes, naval gunfire spotting, and photo missions. Two (2) highway and six (6) railroad bridges were damaged in 111 sorties for the day.

3/18/51: Rendezvoused with replenishment group and received 234,822 gallons of fuel oil, 92,500 gallons of aviation gasoline, and 294.2 tons of ammunition.

3/19/51: Conducted close air support, bridge strikes, naval gunfire spotting, lumber destroyer, railroad seeder, and lumber breaker special strikes, and photo missions in 111 sorties for the day.

2/14/51: Poor weather conditions prevented flight operations with the exception of a special search mission. 35,585 gallons of fuel oil were transferred to the USS CUNNINGHAM (DD-752), 41,792 gallons to the USS HOLLISTER (DD-788), 46,008 gallons to the USS KNOW (DD-742) and 44,218 gallons to the USS FISKE (DD-842).

2/15/51: Conducted close air support, bridge strikes, and photo missions in 105 sorties damaging three highway bridges, destroying seven trucks, and inflicting 350 enemy troop casualties. A successful wheels up landing in an ADN aircraft was completed by LTJG R. C. MAXWELL, 0478219, USN. J. V. BRICE, Jr., AN, 302 31 02, USN, was injured in the foot by a 20MM shell fired from one of the guns of the plane during this landing.

2/16/51: Conducted close air support, special strikes, and a photo and early morning heckler mission. Bad weather prevented afternoon flight. 42 sorties were flown.

2/17/51: Rendezvoused with replenishment group and received 476,826 gallons of fuel oil, 79,000 gallons of aviation gasoline, and 166.2 tons of ammunition.

2/18/51: Flight operations were delayed until the afternoon and close air support, armed reconnaissance, special strikes and a photo and search mission were launched in 47 sorties. Ensign R. M. TVEDE, 0508284, USN, after an engine failure in his F4U aircraft went down at sea in a mine field. He was rescued by a small boat from the USS OZBOURN (DD 846).

2/19/51: Conducted close air support, special strikes, naval gunfire spotting, and a photo and search mission in the morning launch, delayed due to poor visibility and bad weather. One RR bridge was damaged and a tank and junk destroyed. 47 sorties were flown.

2/20/51: A full days flight operations were conducted with close air support, special strikes, naval gunfire spotting, and heckler and photo missions. Six barracks and two trucks were destroyed. An F4U flown by LTJG B. F. MCDERMOTT, 0299564, USN, was hit by anti-aircraft fire on a photo mission and ditched at sea. He was rescued by a small boat put out from the USS WALLACE L. LIND (DD-708). 72 sorties were flown.

2/21/51: Rendezvoused with replenishment group and received 241,290 gallons of fuel oil, 53,800 gallons of aviation gasoline, and 104.4 tons of ammunition.

2/22/51: Conducted close air support, special strikes, naval gunfire spotting, and photo missions in 92 sorties for the day. Severely damaged a RR bridge and destroyed 4 barracks, 26 buildings, and 22 houses containing enemy troops.

3/20/51: Launched close air support, bridge struck, naval gunfire spotting, lumber destroyer, railroad seeder and breaker special strikes, and photo missions. Four (4) highway bridges and two railroad bridges were damaged in 88 sorties for the day.

3/21/51: Conducted close air support, bridge strikes, photo missions, and night heckler attacks. Ensign R. R. BEAGLUND, 0496938, USN, in his AD-4Q aircraft, received AA fire over the bomblines and crash landed his plane at Seoul Airfield without injury to himself or passenger. E. H. HANLEY, AN, 719 23 71, USN, received serious chest injuries in a plane handling accident on the flight deck. 81 sorties were flown for the day.

3/22/51: Rendezvoused with replenishment group and received 157,246 gallons of fuel oil, 77,400 gallons of aviation gasoline, 155.3 tons of ammunition, and 55 tons of provisions.

3/23/51: Launched early morning hecklers, railroad breakers, naval gunfire spotting, bridge strikes and a photo mission in 65 sorties for the day. Two highway and three railroad bridges were damaged and a fully loaded ammunition train was destroyed in a tunnel.

3/24/51: Launched early morning hecklers, close air support, railroad breakers, naval gunfire spotting and a photo mission. Ensign W. G. CLANEY, 0508122, USN, barrier crashed his F4U-4 to an extent beyond repair but without injury to himself. Four bridges were damaged and railroad tracks were broken at 23 locations. 71 sorties were flown.

3/25/51: Poor visibility prevented flight operations on this Easter Day.

3/26/51: Departed the operating area enroute to Yokosuka, Japan.

(B) Summary of Sorties

	F4U	AD	TOTAL
Offensive	790	471	1261
Defensive	131	94	225
Photo Reconnaissance	103	--	103

PART III: Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

(A) Ammunition Expenditure:

	TYPE	QUANTITY
Bombs:	100# G.P.	523
	220# Frags.	608

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- (B) Performance of Ordnance Equipment:
 (See Special Comments, PART VI)

PART IV: Battle Damage

- (A) Damage to Ship: None
 (B) Damage to Aircraft:

	<u>COMBAT</u>		<u>OPERATIONAL</u>		
	<u>F4U</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>F4U</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>Total</u>
Lost	4	0	3	0	7
Damaged	0	3	2	2	7

- (C) Damage Inflicted on Enemy:

<u>Targets</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Tanks	4	16
Trucks	34	39
Command Cars	4	0
Locomotives	0	1
Ammunition Trains	1	1
Carts	59	15
Wagons	0	3
RR Bridges	0	47
Hwy Bridges	0	49
RR Yards	0	4
RR Turn Tables	1	0
RR Track Hits	0	99
Tunnels	0	17
RR Cars	35	117
Supply Dumps	4	7
Ammo Dumps	0	1
Oil Dumps	1	2
Oil Refinery	1	0
Warehouses	30	21
Barracks	23	11
Houses	313	300
Buildings	264	305
Gun Emplacements	5	1
Huts	84	12
Airfield Runways	0	1
Mortar Positions	3	0
Command Posts	1	0
Fuel Tanks	7	0
Steel Mill	0	1
Lumber Piles	6	4
Aqueducts	4	0
Radio Installations	0	1
Horses	13	0
Oxen	11	0
Sampans	3	1
Troops (Estimated 3,145 casualties. Not confirmed)		

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- (B) Casualties: G. A. MARTIN, ENS., 0505344/1310, USN.
Killed in Action.
D. A. McCOSKRIE, LTJG, 0485391/1310, USN.
Missing in Action.
J. V. PRICE, Jr., AN, 302 31 02, USN.
Injured in foot from accidental 20MM shell
fire on flight deck during plane landing.
R. C. LOOMER, ENS., 0507201/1310, USN.
Missing in Action.
E. H. HANLEY, AN, 719 23 71, USN.
Injured in the chest after fall under
wheel of plane during plane towing on the
flight deck.

PART VI: Special Comments

(A) Air Group Composition:

The five squadron air group is considered undesirable under wartime conditions. Although only four squadrons have been embarked during this period a further consolidation is believed desirable for operation on the CV-9 class carrier. It is recommended that groups be composed of three squadrons only. Administration and tactical organization would be simplified and the severe congestion caused by two squadrons operating from one ready room would be alleviated.

(B) Aircraft Handling:

(1) Aircraft complement - Much has been written on the ideal or desirable complement of the CV-9 class carriers. During this period the ship operated 85 aircraft which is considerably less than the total that could be operated. However, the proficiency with which the 85 aircraft were handled as compared with the loss of efficiency when operating at maximum complement of 95 or 96 aircraft was amply demonstrated. It was possible at all times to spot the flight and hangar deck before receiving the air plan and always have aircraft available for the first event in the number and types required. However, replacement of aircraft imposed a very small problem in this operating area. In areas where replacement of aircraft is expected to be a difficult problem the maximum complement is of greater importance.

Maintenance of aircraft benefitted greatly by operating this "ideal" complement. Maintenance and its end result, availability, were enhanced by the simple fact that portions of the hangar deck could be spotted loosely thereby permitting the rapid movement of planes to and from the hangar deck maintenance areas.

Proficiency in ordnance loading was greatly facilitated by this "ideal" complement. It permitted the deck to be spotted to alleviate ordnance loading difficulties such as sufficient room between planes; sufficient room to load outboard wings and racks of aircraft along the deck edge; spreading of wings on

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(2) Catapulting - Considerably more catapulting than was absolutely necessary was done. It would have been possible to spot the deck, at times, to permit flyaway takeoffs. However, there are two distinct benefits derived from constant catapulting. First, the machinery is exercised and the crews get more practice. In this way both are able to maintain a "keen" edge. Secondly, pilots get very proficient at taxiing on the catapults. The net result is that when the occasion arises which calls for catapulting considerable numbers of prop aircraft, an interval of 25 to 27 seconds can be realized for the entire launch.

(3) Flight Deck Shoes - The present type flight deck shoe can be greatly improved. The type now in use has two distinct deficiencies. It is not waterproof or even water repellent and it does not give enough support to the foot. A shoe built on the order of the field shoe would give the necessary support. The leather should be treated to make it waterproof and then kept in that condition by the application of neatsfoot oil or any other water repellent. The soles and heels could be improved by making them thicker. Differently constructed soles should be experimented with to find a better gripper.

(4) Sound Power Phone Talker Helmet - There is a definite need for a specially constructed helmet to accommodate sound power earphones for talkers on the flight deck. The high noise level, particularly with jets aboard, make the talkers almost useless. A helmet with properly designed ear cups would enhance the value of phone talkers considerably.

(C) Aircraft Maintenance:

Considerable credit must be given to the embarked squadron for their willingness to work on "down" aircraft on the flight deck. There is a tendency among most air groups to do the minimum amount of maintenance on the flight deck and this is readily understandable. Air Group TWO has been doing a maximum amount of maintenance on the flight deck. This has resulted in a higher availability and has, of course, lessened the handling problem. Their attitude and willingness in this matter is commendable.

(D) Landing Signal Officers:

During this period five Landing Signal Officers were assigned. While it is realized that training for LSO's is needed, five is simply too many on one ship. The amount of work they can do individually is very small. The constant shifting of LSO's to give each an opportunity for practice does not particularly enhance operations. It is recommended that not more than three (3) be assigned to a CV.

(E) Aviation Ordnance:

The need for much improved ordnance handling equipment and better napalm mixing facilities has been recommended in the past. The need is an urgent one.

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(F) Engineering:

This ship has benefitted greatly as the result of two availability periods since its return to the combat area. The first of these was a ten day period in Sasebo Harbor during the latter part of January and the second for eight days at Yokosuka during the first part of March. A ten day availability for every thirty days of operations is considered adequate to maintain this class of vessel in excellent state of operational readiness and reliability. Changing the location of the availability from Sasebo to Yokosuka has also proven very beneficial since the ship can take advantage of the Naval Base ship repair facilities and the base supply depot for spare parts at Yokosuka.

During the entire period that the VALLEY FORGE has operated in WesPac the question of boiler power when flying jet aircraft has continually arisen. This vessel has concluded that eight boiler operation is the only guarantee against marked decreases in wind intensity which demand higher ship speed. A good prediction might be made for a particular area but if the vessel shifts to a new operating area the prediction may no longer hold and whereas the wind might have been sixteen knots in the morning it might be only three knots in the late afternoon.

Eight boiler operation allows for maximum speed if demanded easier operation of boilers by fireroom personnel, and "split plant" operation (both main and auxiliary steam piping systems). The last feature is very important in case the ship is attacked. Operating on six boilers has a singular advantage in that the ship is able to reduce speed to as low as ten knots and still maintain flow through the boiler superheaters. It is not more economical and it imposes boiler operating problems on fireroom personnel when speed is increased or decreased radically. Nor does it permit good smoke control. With six boiler operations the main and auxiliary steam lines are completely open. This is not good engineering damage control when operating in waters where the ship could be attacked and where thirty knots is frequently demanded. If a ship should be ready for twenty eight knots then it should be ready for maximum speed.

Replenishment days present excellent opportunities for boiler and fireroom maintenance. If boilers are periodically hydrostatically tested and all opportunities taken advantage of to perform minor repair work, eight boiler operation between dawn and dusk should be no problem. Operating a CV-9 class carrier at thirty knots on six boilers means that the ship is at maximum speed and the failure of forced draft blowers or pumps means a decrease in speed if an engineering casualty is to be averted. In other words no reserve power is available.

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(G) Electronics:

With regard to electronics, the work performed on the SX fighter-director radar during the last two availability periods has markedly increased its performance. Bogies have been picked up at ranges of 60, 70, and 80 miles depending on the type of aircraft and number of planes in the raid. All other radars have been operating very efficiently. Radio communications over-all have been excellent; some difficulty has been experienced on teletype reception, but this was mainly due to the time of day and atmospheric conditions. CCA was operated during March with excellent results. This equipment has been maintained in good operating condition in case of emergency.

With the exception of a failure in the antenna pedestal of the Mk 5 IFF all electronic equipment at present is in full operating condition. The Mk 5 IFF was originally installed in February 1949, as an experimental model on the VALLEY FORGE. It was tested with aircraft at San Diego during February 1950 with excellent results. The equipment was not put to operational use until the return of this vessel to WasPac. Since then it has been in constant use until recent failure occurred in the antenna pedestal. Until the failure, results obtained from this equipment were excellent. Jet aircraft (F9F) were easily controlled and used as CAP to intercept other aircraft which appeared on the PPI scope as bogies when the jets could not be seen using normal radar return information. Jet aircraft (F9F) were tracked solidly out to 150 miles using Mk 5 IFF. The maximum range that these aircraft could be tracked, using this IFF was not determined but it is believed that good return signals could be expected out to 200 miles. The various modes (IFF, FI, PI) proved very useful in identifying different flights.

The antenna assembly AN/JPA-11(SN-21), for Mk 5 IFF is considered unsatisfactory for shipboard use. During high winds the antenna was slowed or speeded up and sometimes even stopped due to the sail effect of the large surface area of the antenna and the fact that the drive motor is only 1/8 H.P. It is believed that because of the strain on the antenna by high winds a clutch arrangement between the antenna drive motor and the main antenna drive gear was worn out causing a constant slipping between the drive motor and the antenna. The Bureau of Ships has been advised of this failure and steps are being taken to procure a new antenna pedestal which will be installed by ship's force during the forthcoming naval shipyard availability.

The AN/URD-2 has been operating well with a minimum of required maintenance. Its present location on the towing light mast creates a null area directly astern. This area exists at altitudes below the line of sight from the antenna elements to the stack. Operation will be optimum when the antenna array is installed above the YE radio homing beacon on the stub mast. It is recommended that the presently installed fibre glass insulators be replaced with porcelain insulators. It has been found through experience on board this vessel that the fibre

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(H) Communications:

During the period concerned there were no particular problems concerning communications. Through what appeared to be a decrease in the traffic handled over fleet broadcast circuits (JIG FOX) traffic with a precedence as low as "DEFERRED" was frequently received on the day originated. During the period July-December, 1950, even traffic with a precedence as high as "OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE" often appeared on broadcast schedules as long as four days after its origination.

It was noted that certain intelligence information was often duplicated by various commanders. It is believed that, where practicable, a screening of intelligence by some joint agency, which would be responsible for dissemination of this type of information, would eliminate, or largely reduce, duplication and would, thereby, reduce the load on personnel at smaller communications activities. While, in some cases, the nature of the intelligence to be transmitted would be of such importance that immediate delivery to an action addressee is necessary, it is believed that in many instances the following procedure might be employed:

(a) All intelligence information of a general nature be forwarded to a joint intelligence center for screening.

(b) A series of dispatches, addressed to all concerned be originated by the joint intelligence center, wherein duplications are eliminated, and certain non-essential items deleted or made the subject of separate dispatches to only those who need to know.

(I) Intelligence:

(1) General Organization - All ship and air group intelligence personnel were pooled and placed under the senior air group intelligence officer to work together to handle all air group and ship's intelligence work. Squadron and ship intelligence officers were then reassigned as their experience and capabilities dictated. The organization chart of the Air Intelligence Section is attached as enclosure (3). Thus each individual squadron received an intelligence officer whose primary job was intelligence.

The practice of combining the air group intelligence function and the ship's intelligence function under the direction of the Air Group Intelligence Officer proved itself and would be even more effective if the ship's intelligence officer has had previous squadron intelligence experience.

(2) Briefing and Debriefing - With the squadron AIO's working under the direction of the Ship-Air Group Intelligence Officer and out of the ship's Intelligence Office, a complete PILOT BRIEFING SHEET was compiled each night to be used by each squadron AIO for the next day's briefing. Whenever available

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Though the above system sounds cumbersome, once it is installed it becomes surprisingly easy to handle and a very simple and exact way to be sure that all intelligence and operations personnel concerned receive the correct information with a minimum of confusion. The PILOT BRIEFING SHEET became the Bible of intelligence operations but in no way supplanted the efforts of the squadron AIO's who used the SHEET as a base for their own initiative, efforts, and briefing.

An intensive program was developed to maintain a running file of targets of opportunity. These were briefed by the AIO relative to the assigned mission and in the event no secondary targets were assigned. This practice is highly recommended to avoid abortive missions due to weather over the assigned targets, etc.

All squadrons were briefed and debriefed in their ready rooms by their individual AIO's. Mass debriefing was and should never be attempted because of the obvious and dangerous fallacies and inaccuracies inherent in this system. The integration of the individual squadron debriefing information (particularly important when several squadrons hit the same target) into a composite and informative Strike Flash Report, was handled by the Ship-Air Group Intelligence Officer. After a period of trial and error, a highly efficient Pilot Debriefing Form was developed, based upon three points; (1) efficiency and speed in debriefing, (2) efficiency and speed in Strike Flash reporting, (3) compliance with Air Summary requirements CNO letter 1 Sept. 1950 ser 013P05C. Sample briefing and debriefing forms are attached as enclosures (1) and (2).

In order to simplify Strike Flash reporting, a definite pattern was developed as follows: Target name, target description in detail, coordinates, ordnance used by category of destruction, results of attack, pertinent observations of results. Each attack made was described in this manner. It is recommended as a means of establishing uniformity in reporting to the Task Force Commander.

(3) Personnel. - The ship's intelligence and assistant intelligence officers were assigned the duties of statistical report and plot responsibility respectively. All squadron Combat Reports were funnelled through the Ship-Air Group Intelligence office for correction and distribution. In cases where squadron yeoman fell behind in the compilation of these reports, assistance was lent by the Ship-Air Group office. A quartermaster striker was placed in charge of all charts. By means of a running inventory log, office stocks were kept at operating levels by drawing from storerooms. When not busy, the striker assisted the AIO yeoman. In this manner sufficient stenographic help was available at all times. The ship's intelligence officer was placed in charge of the preparation of all statistical ship and air group reports required, with the exception of the Strike Flash Report. The assistant ship's

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(4) Charts - With the application of the UTM grid to all charts regardless of originator or scale, a long step towards coordination of Army, Navy and Air Force operations will be made. The AMS L552 series are particularly desirable because of their tint shaded gradation. However, elevations in meters neutralize this advantage. The blue UTM grid lines are excellent for night operations. It is recommended that the foot scale replace the meter scale on the AMS L552.

The quartermaster striker issued all charts and maps from the Ship-Air Group Intelligence Office upon request of the squadron AIO's. A log was kept to avoid wastage. Ten sheets of each Close Air Support chart were kept for issue in the office. These were logged out to each AIO and returned after each hop. This system was found necessary, for strikes against the same target were run time and time again; if the squadron AIO's were not held responsible, the storage supply as well as the office supply would soon be exhausted. It was necessary to store 67,000 CAS charts in order to have available 100 of each 670 CAS charts of all Korea. It is urgently recommended these charts be packaged in 50's with an informative label. Currently they are issued in bulk, about two thousand charts to a box without labeling or sequence of any kind. As a result hundreds of unnecessary hours of rehandling is necessary in order to set up a storage supply system which can be readily drawn upon when office stocks run short. The same situation was found in the issue of AMS L552 charts, in fact worse for these charts came in rolls which made additional handling necessary.

(5) Air Combat Reports - All squadron Air Combat reports were funnelled through the Ship-Air Group Intelligence Office for correction and distribution. Responsibility for preparation and typing was left entirely in the hands of the squadron air intelligence officers.

(6) Office - A Master Plot Board of all intelligence was kept in the Ship-Air Group Intelligence office. From this master, squadron AIO copied whatever information was necessary for their operations or whatever, because of its classification, was not included in the Daily Pilot Briefing Sheet. This plot was carried on USAF 1:250,000 Approach Charts and proved highly valuable in briefing squadron commanders and operations officers of the ship as to the full progress of the war and the reasons behind our daily activities. Reconnaissance routes, interdiction destruction, enemy concentrations and supply dumps, flak traps, troops movements and concentrations and the like were plotted on acetate roller curtains over the Master Plot.

A miniature of the Master Plot was installed in the Ward Room for general information and was corrected each day. All pre- and post- target photos were posted on the miniature as well as master plot. This method developed an intense interest in aerial photography and much healthy inter-squadron bombing rivalry.

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(4) Suitable hoists for bomb loading on wing racks when wings are folded be developed to be available as soon as new aircraft types are assigned to carrier air groups.

(5) Operational schedules be adjusted to provide ten days in port availability for every thirty days operations in the combat area.

(6) A joint central intelligence agency be established to accumulate, screen, digest and disseminate intelligence information.

(7) More complete and better recognition material be made available.

(8) Target Dossiers be more completely illustrated with up to date photographs.

J. M. CARSON

Copy to:		
CNO (Advance)	2	(Airmail)
ComairPac	10	(Airmail for further distribution as deemed appropriate)
ComCarDiv ONE	4	
ComCarDiv FIVE	4	
ComCarDiv THREE	4	
CO, USS PHILIPPINE SEA	4	
CO, USS BOXER	4	
CO, USS PRINCETON	4	
CO, USS LEYTE	4	
CTF 77	2	
CAG 5	2	
CAG 11	2	
CAG 19	2	
CAG 2	2	
CAG 3	2	

- A. LOCAL INTELLIGENCE:
Any info enemy or friendly specifically concerning our general operations; daily or long range. Target info found in previous days debriefing forms etc.
Weather.
- B. FLAK:
Include flak from debriefing.
- C. BOMCOMOPS:
- D. SAR AND E & E:
- E. EMERGENCY AIRFIELDS:
- F. STARS; PANESL; VEHICLES; SURFACE:
Recognition Signals.
- G. STRIKE INFORMATION:
 - 1. OPS INFO AND INTELLIGENCE:
Ops policies, strike or enemy intelligence.
 - 2. ARMED RECCO:
2a. ARMED RECCO SECONDARY.
 - 3. CAS TACP'S AND PLANES
 - 3a. CAS SECONDARY:
 - 3b. TACP LOCATIONS:
 - 4. DUMP TARGETS:
 - 5. STRATEGIC STRIPS:
5a. STRATEGIC SECONDARY.
 - 6. PHOTO MISSIONS:
 - 7. HECKLER OR NGF:
7a. HECKLER SECONDARY.
- H. BOMPLINE IN SEQUENCE:
- I. COMMUNICATIONS:
- J. APPENDIX
Issued in numerical sequences during the following day as additional information is available.

Air Attack Report No. _____ Date _____
Squadron _____ Type Plane _____ Event No. _____ TOT _____

COMMUNICATIONS COMMENTS-CAS:

E. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT:

1. Number of sorties _____
2. Total number runs made on ground or surface targets
(Bombing, rocket, napalm and strafing) _____
3. Total aircraft hours on station awaiting target assignment _____ Total aircraft hours over target from first until last run _____
4. Number of night sorties _____

F. OFFENSIVE SORTIES:

1. Number of sorties _____
2. Total number runs made on ground or surface targets
(Bombing, rocket, and strafing) _____
3. Total aircraft hours over target from first until last run _____
4. Number of night sorties _____

G. NUMBER RECCO SORTIES _____

H. NUMBER AIR DEFENSE SORTIES _____

I. NUMBER ANTI SUB SORTIES _____

M. TOTAL AIRCRAFT LOST (CAUSES) _____

N. NUMBER AIRCRAFT LOST TO AA _____

O. NUMBER OFFENSIVE AIRCRAFT LOST TO ENEMY _____

P. NUMBER DEFENSIVE, AS AND RECCO AIRCRAFT LOST TO ENEMY _____

T. AIRBORNE ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED AND DAMAGED BY OWN AIRCRAFT:

In vicinity of Task Force (Day) Destroyed: _____ Damaged _____

In vicinity of Task Force (Night) Destroyed: _____ Damaged _____

Over target area Destroyed: _____ Damaged _____

U. AIRBORNE ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED AND DAMAGED BY SHIP'S GUNFIRE: Destroyed _____ Damaged _____

V. ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED AND DAMAGED ON GROUND _____

W. DAMAGE TO ENEMY VESSELS:

Type vessel(size)	Location	Results
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FLAK:

caliber	intensity	accuracy
_____	_____	_____
location	damage to aircraft	
_____	_____	

WEATHER:

X. DAMAGE TO GROUND TARGETS:

Target and Description	Location	Ordnance	Results
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OBSERVATIONS: (Includes info such movements, damaged bridges and facilities, condition of highways and railroads, and anything unusual pertinent to Intelligence not related to results).

CAG

Ship's
Operations
Officer

Ship's - Air Group
Intelligence Officer

Master Situation
Plot, Briefing -
Strike Flash

Ship's Intelligence Off.
Administration
Reporting (Ship & Air Gru)
Air Group Combat Reports
Registered Pubs.
Security

Ship's Photo Interpreter
Photo Interpretation
Briefing - Photo Unit

Air Intelligence Officer
Briefing & Debriefing
Attack Squadron, ASW &
Night Attack Units

Air Group
Officer
Briefing
Group Le

Assistant Ship Intelli-
gence Officer
Master Situation Plot
Charts Issue
Escape and Evasion
Flak Plot

Air Intelligence Officer
Briefing & Debriefing
Fighter Squadron, Night
Fighter Unit

Air Group
Recognit
Officer
Briefing
Lectures

Air Intelligence Officer
Briefing & Debriefing
Fighter Squadron

Air Intelligence Officer
Briefing & Debriefing
Fighter Squadron