U. S. S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)
Care Fleet Post Office
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Serial:

DECLASSIFIED

OCT 15 1950

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)
To : Chief of Naval Operations
Via : (1) Commander Carrier Division ONE
(2) Commander Carrier Division THREE
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces Far East
(5) Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
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Subj: Action Report for the period 4 August through 6 September 1950

Ref: (a) CNO res ltr Op-34aa serial 1197P34 of 3 August 1950

Encl: (1) Track Chart for subject period p.10
(2) Comments by CVG-11 on ordnance performance p.11
(3) Comments on intelligence personnel and material p.14
(4) Supply Department Report p.18
(5) Damage Inflicted p.16

1. This Action Report for the subject period is submitted in accordance with reference (a).

Part I - Composition of Own Forces and Mission

The PHILIPPINE SEA along with the VALLEY FORGE made up Task Group 77.4. This Task Group in company with other Task Groups of Task Force 77, departed Buckner Bay, Okinawa on 4 August 1950 for Korean Waters. For the period 4 August through 23 August, the units operated under ComSEVENTHFlt Op Order 13-50 dated 3 August 1950, with ComCarDivTHREE as OTC; and from 24 August through 3 September 1950, it operated under ComSEVENTHFlt Op Order 14-50 dated 24 August 1950, with ComCarDivONE as OTC. The mission was to conduct air operations against North Korean targets and render air support in order to support United Nations Forces in Korea.

Part II - Chronological Order of Events

(a) Period 4 August to 14 August

(1) At 1721K, 4 August 1950, the PHILIPPINE SEA sortied from Buckner Bay, Okinawa. The remainder of this day and the first half of the following day were spent enroute to Korean Waters where strike operations were conducted against the North Koreans.

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The initial operations by this force were to be conducted from the West Coast of Korea. Offensive air operations commenced at 1212K, 5 August with the launching of a strike group which had as its mission, the destruction of a railway bridge and two highway bridges near the town of IRI, Korea. The remainder of this day and the next two days were passed in striking bridges, warehouses, railyards and moving vehicles from 38°N to the front line positions, anchored near TAEGU, MASAN and POHANG. Airfields were swept and attempts were made to provide close support. The close support missions were a failure due to overloaded communications circuits and inadequate planning for the use of naval aircraft. One pilot, ENS J.F. KAIL, 296819/1310, USN, was lost in a mid-air collision during this three day operation.

(2) The 8th of August was spent in fueling. Combat operations were resumed on 9 August with strikes in the INCHON - SEOUL area. At SEOUL, anti-aircraft, moderate in intensity, was encountered for the first time. The next day, flight operations were conducted south of 37°N. Again, attempts were made to provide close support for our ground forces. Only one division succeeded in establishing good communications with a controller. This division obtained good results. The 11th was spent in refueling; and strike operations began on the 12th with attacks on the marshalling yards in SEOUL. The jet planes were used to sweeping airfields and lines of communication. On 13 August aircraft from this vessel hit targets north of 38°N for the first time. PYONGYANG, CHINNAMPO, HAEJU and various towns in between were hit. In this day's work, transportation suffered greatly. Four locomotives were destroyed, two were probably destroyed and nine were damaged. This was not the sum total by any consideration but is used as an illustration of what was done to one component of the transportation system. On the 14th, the Task Force proceeded to and moored at Sasebo, Japan.

(b) Period 15 August to 21 August

(1) Task Force 77 departed from Sasebo at 1742K, 15 August. This time the route taken was for the east coast of Korea. The next two days were spent off the east coast with operations the first day south of 38°N and the second day north of 38°N. In the south, bridges and supply dumps were hit; in the north, industrial targets, rail facilities and coastal shipping were attacked. The ship fueled again on 18 August and took station off the west

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coast for operations on 19 August. For this day's operations, the most important target was the railroad bridge at SEOUL. The bridge was knocked out but at a heavy price. CDR R.W. VOGEL, Commander Air Group ELEVEN was killed leading the attack. Again on the 20th, the scene of action moved to the northwest where rail facilities and warehouses were attacked from SINANJU to PYONGYANG to MASSONG. The third pilot of the operation, ENS C.L. SMITH, USN, was lost this day. On the 21st, the Task Force again moored in SASEBO to replenish.

(c) Period 22 August through 10 September

(1) Although the four day stay in SASEBO was supposed to be for upkeep and repair, most of the time was devoted to replenishment. On 23 August 1950, the Chief of Naval Operations, Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, Commander Naval Forces Far East and Commander SEVENTH Fleet came aboard this ship to make official calls. At 1315K, 25 August, the ship left SASEBO with Task Group Command (77.4) being shifted from ComCarDivTHREE to ComCarDivONE embarked in this vessel. RADM H.C. ENBN, ComCarDiv ONE, also became Commander Task Force 77 in lieu of VADM A.D. STRUBLE, USN. August 26 and 27 were spent off the east coast of Korea conducting strikes and sweeps from 41°N to the bombline near FUSANG. Again air support was attempted but still remained ineffective due to the lack of adequate communications facilities and the absence of radio discipline. The Task Force fueled on 28 August and operated off the west coast of Korea on 29 August and 30 August. Railroad bridges and airfields were the principal targets the first day. On the second day the water works in CHINNAMPO and PYONGYANG were attacked with bombs and then inflammable targets were hit with Napalm. The last day of the month was passed in fueling.

(2) It was originally planned to spend the next 4 days attacking targets from MASSONG to PYONGYANG to SINANJU to CHINNAMPO. After the second strike landed at 1101K, 1 September an emergency call was received from 5th Air Force Advanced Headquarters at PUSAN, requesting all available aircraft for close support. On the 1st, results were poor due to communication difficulties, but the second day was very successful. The success on the 2nd day was achieved through a liaison visit by CDR WEYMOUTH CAG-11 to JCC PUSAN. The 3rd of September was fueling day, but the non-flying status was changed at 1646K with the launching of a close support group in answer to an emergency request from 5th

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Air Force Advanced Headquarters. This flight had good communications but their effectiveness was hampered by bad weather. The last day of combat operations for this period was 4 September when again our aircraft proceeded to the PYONGYANG - CHINNAMPO area. There were no combat operations on 5 September and the sixth again found the entire Task Force moored in SASEBO HARBOR. The ship was at Sasebo for the remainder of the reported period.

Part III - Ordnance Expenditures and Performance

(a) Performance of ordnance material and equipment. See enclosure (2).

(b) The following complete rounds were expended during subject period:

BOMBS	NUMBER
100# GP	243
250# GP	148
500# GP	924
1000# GP	459
2000# GP	34
500# SAP	43
1000# SAP	72
220# FRAG	465
260# FRAG	359
350# ADD	85
100# Inc. Cluster	273

ROCKETS	
3.5" solid head with 3.25" motor	100
5.0" HE 6 head with 5.0" motor (HVAR)	4,095
5.0" HE 2 head with 5.0" motor	89

NAPALM	
Napalm Type 1	975 lbs.

AIRCRAFT MACHINE GUN	
20MM a/c	351,690 (ratio of 1-1-1)

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Part IV - Battle Damage

(a) Ship - None

(b) Own Aircraft

	COMBAT				OPERATIONAL			
	F4U	AD	F9F	TOTAL	F4U	AD	F9F	TOTAL
Lost	3	-	1	4	1	-	2	3
Damaged	5	14	2	21	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	8	14	3	25	1	-	2	3

(c) Damage inflicted on enemy. See enclosure (5).

Part V - Personnel performance and casualties

(a) Performance

(1) The health and performance of the crew has been excellent during this period. However, personnel, especially flight deck, hangar deck and gunnery personnel have been required to spend 16 to 20 hours daily on the job and evidence of fatigue has been noticeable.

(2) Certain shortages have existed and will continue to exist until the ship's increased personnel allowance is filled.

(3) The shortage in ordnance rates for both the ship and squadron has been serious. It is felt that in particular, the allowance of ordnancemen for VA-115 is short by 20 rates.

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(b) Casualties

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(1) The following personnel casualties were suffered during the period of this report:

(a) Combat Casualties

CDR Raymond W. VOGEL, 077151, USN, CAG-11 - Killed in action.
EMS Curtis L. SMITH, 480985, USN, VF-112 - Killed in action
EMS John F. KAIL, 496819, USN, VF-113 - Killed in action

(b) Operational Casualties

BAKER, Russell Arthur, 280 82 80, AMAM, USN - 1 September 1950. Killed when hit by a propeller of an aircraft while working on the flight deck.

GILBERT, Charles Augustus, 992 82 42, AE3, USN - 30 August 1950. Compound comminuted fracture of the arm with extensive avulsion of the overlying skin and muscles when a 20MM cannon was accidently fired on the flight deck while unloading.

MIKK, Harold Byrd, 361 26 35, AM, USN - 7 August 1950. Fractured lower leg when hit by the breech of a 20MM cannon.

Part VI - Conclusions

(a) Operations

(1) The operations of the ship has been satisfactory; however there are certain matters regarding combat air operations which warrant study: ordnance selection, close support, and operational reports.

(a) Ordnance Selection

(1) Special care should be given to select the ordnance and fusing after the target has been selected. Similarly, in changing targets, consideration must be given to the

loading of the aircraft and the time required to effect the armament change. If the aircraft are not properly loaded for the new target, then they should be reloaded and/or refused, or the new target should be deleted. One case in point is the use of 500 lb. bombs against concrete bridges and SAP's against steel truss bridges. Both loadings have been used and found ineffective against these targets. Nothing is more disheartening to a pilot than to obtain a hit and do no damage.

(b) Close Support

(1) This operation should prove the necessity for a standardized doctrine for providing close air support for ground forces. Until the following are adopted it is believed that the effectiveness of close support with the Army and Air Force will be limited:

(a) The adoption of a common grid system.
(b) The preparation and distribution of aeronautical charts scale 1:50,000, 1:250,000 with the above grid imprinted.
(c) The use of ten channel VHF for all air units and air controllers engaged in close support.
(d) The establishment of joint procedures for controlling aircraft and for conducting close support.

(c) Reports

(1) As the number of reports continues to increase, ship and squadron operating personnel become deeply involved in administrative matters, when the greater effort should be spent in the conduct of combat operations.

(2) In some cases the same material is submitted in two or three different reports. For example, the following reports are required; all of which furnish the same narrative information on Combat Air Operations:

(a) By ship

(1) Flash Report after each event
(2) Preliminary Action Report - daily
(3) War Diary
(4) Part II of Action Report

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(b) By squadron

(1) War Diary
(2) Air Attack Report

(b) Engineering

(1) The nearly continuous operations with the high and varying speeds required for jet operations, demanded a high performance from engineering personnel and machinery. Full boiler power was required for a large part of the time, preventing underway maintenance. The brickwork was renewed in the decks of four boilers, four plastic fronts were renewed, and considerable patchwork was performed on all boilers, either during, or immediately following the operations. Performance of men and machinery was generally excellent.

(c) Supply

(1) See enclosure (4)

(d) Intelligence personnel and material

(1) See enclosure (3)

Part VII - Recommendations

(a) Operations

(1) All commands engaged in planning air operations select targets before determining ordnance loading and fusing.

(2) Close air support procedures and doctrines be standardized for all three services.

(3) The entire present system of combat reports be reviewed, the number of reports reduced, and as an interim measure that the following action be taken:

(a) Cancel requirements for War Diary submittal by shipboard carrier squadrons.
(b) Cancel requirement for Preliminary Action Report.

(4) An allowance of intelligence material be established and filled prior to the departure of ships for the Western Pacific. Enclosure (3) includes a recommended allowance for both material and personnel.

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(5) Enlisted personnel be trained as intelligence clerks and intelligence specialists.

(b) Personnel

(1) Full wartime allowance be provided.

(c) Engineering

(1) Upkeep period be at least four full days in order that machinery can cool down sufficiently for inspection and maintenance work.

W.K. Goodney
W.K. GOODNEY

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ComAirPac
Valley Forge
Boxer
Leyte

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON
ORDNANCE PERFORMANCE

CVG-11

1. VA-115 squadron is seriously short-handed in ordnancemen. Recommend additional ordnancemen on allowance. Present occupational needs are 20 ordnancemen.

2. Loading AD with wings folded (wing racks - rockets or bombs) is very difficult, especially at night. In loading 8 rockets, it takes as long to lay two on the wing rack as it does to put the first one on the inboard racks. No method has been devised to load 220 or 260 pound bombs on the wing racks with wings folded. The aircraft must be moved and wings spread - which delays arming quite seriously.

3. 260 pound bombs have been carried on the 6 inboard stations. 220 pound bombs have been carried on all stations but it seems undesirable to carry this weight on the four outer stations.

4. Trouble was experienced in loading the 100 pound incendary cluster, AN MK12, due to suspension lugs. Lugs needed adapters. These clusters should also be redesigned for better drag characteristics if they are to be externally mounted.

VF-114

1. Use of napalm assigned in area of heavy anti-aircraft is deemed useless and ill advised.

2. 1000 pound bombs G.P. should be loaded on F4U rather than 500's. 500's are not effective on bridges.

3. Frag bombs should be used exclusively for anti-personnel work.

4. Use of the HVAR has been extensive and is considered as one of the best weapons for targets of opportunity. Excellent for vehicles, trains and tanks (ability to knock out any type tank encountered to date).

ENCLOSURE (2)

5. The 20MM cannon has improved in effectiveness due to the added experience of personnel in maintaining this weapon. Gun failures in flight have decreased from 30% to 15% since combat began. It is felt that it would be a mistake to bring back the .50 caliber.

VF-113

1. Load communication interdiction flights with 8 HVAR's - not 4.

2. Use MK 12 tanks for napalm rather than water fillables. Their damage is greater and trajectory more true.

3. Install a metal flange inside the 20MM ammunition cans at the top exit side to prevent more than one round being fed out of the can at one time. This has been the cause of many belt breakages.

4. Load F4U's with wings spread, when possible, to prevent ammunition belt tangles.

5. Rig ladders to fit into ejection chutes so that rockets can be more easily mounted with wings folded.

6. Alert ship's ordnance crews in time to assure that all bombs and rockets are available and loaded on each flight.

7. Insure an ample supply of MK 55 bomb racks, MK 51 bomb racks, and MK 9 rocket launchers on board ship as replacements for each station on each aircraft.

8. Smoke rockets are not considered satisfactory loading. HVAR are just as good for marking and do more damage.

9. Investigate cause of rocket firing damage to MK 9 Mod 3 launchers. 225 launchers were damaged in last 2 months (This separate speedletter to ComAirPac).

10. Use frag bombs when troops are encountered.

11. Always send aircraft off with maximum load possible.

12. The performance of the 20MM cannon is rapidly surpassing the .50 caliber as personnel become more experienced in 20MM upkeep. The gun throws a greater

weight/sec and its type of ammunition is vastly superior to .50 caliber types.

13. An additional safety precaution on reloading the M-3 20MM gun with T-9 (Kidde Co.) or Aero-6A type charger is to insure that bolts are actually home before winding in a new belt. A noise check or hydraulic piston check when casing bolts home is not sufficient. The ordnancemen must make a visual check of the bolt by looking up the ejection chutes on the underside of the wing.

ENCLOSURE (2)

[redacted]

INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL AND
MATERIAL

1. The intelligence section aboard ship was rapidly expanded to meet the need of combat operations. Although the ship's allowance called for one ENS ACI Officer, on LCDR and 2 LTJG's were assigned duties as Air Intelligence Officers. The ACI Office was used as the Operations Office aboard the PHILIPPINE SEA and the files were mainl for East Coast and Mediterranean work. The lack of enlisted personnel trained as intelligence specialists or trained as intelligence clerks has resulted in a loss in efficiency.

2. Personnel

No attempt will be made to determine the duties of the various individuals in the intelligence section. Based on the thirty five days of operations, it appears that the following constitutes a desirable personnel allowance:

(a) For Ship

(1) 1 LT Air Intelligence Officer

(2) 1 LTJG Reports and Statistics Officer

(3) 2 Photo Interpreters (1 Officer and 1 enlisted)

(4) 1 Yeoman

(5) 1 Draftsman - Quartermaster

(b) Intelligence personnel for squadron

(1) 1 LTJG Air Intelligence Officer

3. Material

(a) Suggested Intelligence Material for ship coming to this area:

(1) WAC - 1:1,000,000 (150 copies each)

289, 290, 380, 381, 386, 387, 492, 498, 499, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 837, 738, 739, 740.

(2) USAF Approach Charts - 1:500,000 (150 copies each) A, B, C, and D of above series.

ENCLOSURE (3)

(3) WAC - 1:1,000,000 (10 copies each)

281, 282, 291, 292, 378, 388, 389, 491, 500,

620, 734, 735, 741, 742, 799, 859, 860,

(4) 10 copies USAF - Pilot's Handbook Far East.

(5) USN - V-30 Series

(a) 17 (25 copies)

(b) 28 (25 copies)

(c) 8, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 55, 56, 57, 70, 71, 84, 85, 86,

(4 copies each)

(b) Target dossiers with appropriate illustrations

(1) 2 Copies each

290, 291, 380, 386, 387, 492, 498, 499, 613, 614, 615, 616,

618,

(c) Blood Chits, Cloth Survival Charts, Pointie Talkies (Korean and Chinese).

(150 copies each)

(d) City Plan Maps on: (50 copies each)

(1) All Korean cities available

(2) Chinese cities within 300 miles of the coast.

(e) Map Pins: Four boxes all colors available.

(f) Tracing Paper

2 - 36" rolls

(g) Cellulose Acetate

2 - 36" rolls

(h) 75 reams of "Manifold White" paper

(i) 4 sheets of 1/8" x 36" plexiglass

(j) Three hand stereoscopes

(k) Two complete PI Kits.

ENCLOSURE (3)

(l) Mounting boards should be placed completely around ACI Office except where file cabinets or safes are located.

(m) Storeroom should be completely fitted with shelves for stowing charts and target illustrations.

(n) Ships allowance for slide projectors and baloptican is adequate.

(o) Slides are no up-to-date in all cases. Additional recognition slides should be manufactured. This ships photo lab has made some slides.

(p) Material listed ComAirPac Air Intelligence Manual should also be procured

(q) Two rolls each of colored rubber tape (all colors available) should be procured.

(r) Colored pencils (grease) are available in GSK. All colors are required.

(s) Forms

(1) Air Attack Report

20 pads (100 each)

(2) Vulnerability

3 pads (100 each)

(3) Aircraft and Crew Survival

3 pads (100 each)

(4) Aircrarft Mission Log

6 pads (100 each)

(5) Aircraft Availability Report

2 Pads (100 each)

We are printing the above forms for forwarding after they have been filled out.

4. Although intelligence material and information were received, there appeared to be duplication of effort with the resulting omission of certain important phases. It is felt that closer liaison should be maintained between our carriers, ComNavFE and 5th Air Force. Through very close liaison and the assignment of an intelligence expeditor, all interested units could be kept informed on the requirements and availability of intelligence from other sources.

5. Appexdix I and Appendix II to this enclosure are briefing and debriefing forms respectively which has been found useful on this vessel and are submitted for information only.

ENCLOSURE (3)

[redacted]

Outlined below, by components, is the overall Supply Department operation during the period 4 August through 6 September 1950. With but a few exceptions, the supply picture has remained in clear focus despite extreme forward area conditions. Credit deservedly goes to our mobile logistic forces, without which we could not operate.

Primarily, difficulties encountered occurred in the aviation stores section -- because of the varied nature of the material itself and the excessive and continua combat conditions that aircraft were forced to undergo. These are enumerated below. Minor shipboard and local replenishment problems also arose - they were expected, endured, and, it is hoped, overcome.

With a basic 120 day supply of dry provisions, 90 days frozen, 40 days fresh, 180 day essential GSK items and an almost complete 180 day section "BAKER" allowance, the ship arrived in the forward area "logistically ready" for the task that eventually was assigned it. For this, the supplying activities on the West Coast, notably NAS and NSD San Diego and the Naval Supply Center, Pearl Harbor should assuredly be given praise for such an all out as well as all-night spirit of co-operation in supplying the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) for literally whatever was asked.

1. Commissary Section

(a) Logistic support excellent. "Get it when you can, where you can" is the only sensible thumb rule to follow. Always the quantity and quality was available for replenishment periods. Fresh products were the exception to the rule, being rationed equitably throughout the fleet. No exceptional difficulty in keep under ration allowance. However, aviation maintenance work, respotting aircraft and rearming of aircraft generally were conducted at night. Hot meals had to be provided and were

served to crew members performing these tasks. In effect, during periods of operation, this amounted to about 3.5 feedings every 24 hours. If operation periods at sea increase in duration, this could seriously effect present ration allowance

2. General Stores Material

(a) Logistic support good. The basic 180 day stateside load of considered essential items has cuased little or no concern. Isolated engineering or electronic spare parts failures in excess of expectant life has resulted in Priority ABLE or BAKER requests to CONLUS. Due to the understandable necessity for watertight integrity while operating in the forward area, the problem of issuing material from storerooms at or below the waterline must be met with tact and logic. Each individual has his own definete regard for the dispatch with which his particular request should be handled. When damage control regulations prevent such issues, the only recourse is - more tact. Emergency items are issued without delay.

(b) Storeroom ventilating conditions especially during the period of this report were at best, very poor. Storeroom operators, as well as the galley crew, should be encouraged to spend some time each day topside.

3. Ship's Store Stock

(a) Logistic support fair. Standard items (toiletries, soap powder, cigarettes, cigars, candy) in good supply. Luxury items (watches, jewelry, etc.) should be obtained prior to departure from the states. It is recommended that Supply Officers of ship departed CONLUS, obtain authority from commanding officers to at least triple normal Ship's Store stock. Cost of operations items (bleach, soap sour, press padding and covering) has been difficult to obtain in this area and should

therefore be heavily stocked in advance of reporting.

(b) For laundry personnel, three shifts of eight hours each is considered desirable. This has not been accomplished. With a foreseeable increase in complement it is hoped that such a work shift in the laundry will be inaugurated.

4. Clothing and Small Stores

(a) Logistic support good. Due to the extreme tropical operating conditions items such as dungarees, white socks, drawers and shirts were temporarily rationed. However, the last replenishment period afforded opportunity to heavily re-stock these items and all rationing controls have been presently suspended. With the addition of brown shoes, a bulky C&SS item storage space was drastically reduced. The tailor issue room B-425-AL afforded additional storage space and has been unilized in that capacity It is strongly recommended that items mentioned above and khaki trousers and shirts be heavily loaded with at least six month stock whenever possible.

5. Aviation

(a) The ship left San Diego on 5 July 1950 with the following aircraft with approximately 180 days Section "BAKER" spare parts on board:

Plane Types	Percentange of Spares on Board
32 F9F	84%
28 F4U-4B	95%
16 AD-4	90%
4 F4U-5N	92%
4 AD-4N	90%
2 F4U-4P	95%

Plane Types	Percentage of Spares on Board
4 AD-3W	90%
1 HO3S	98%
4 AD-4Q	90%

95 Total aircraft to support

(b) The ship operated approximately 8 days for qualifications off Pearl Harbor and approximately 45 days combat operations during which time 27% overall spares have been consumed - 5% of which were issued during qualifications period off Pearl Harbor prior to 1 August 1950.

(c) Replacements of Section "ABLE" and "BAKER" have been taking approximately 30 days via air transportation direct from date of requisitions, surface transportation approximately 45 days. Considering present conditions, replenishment has been satisfactory. Strongly recommend air Parcel Post service for small items of a priority A or B nature.

(d) During the period of combat operations there have been about 10 technical AOG's but none actual. AOG's have been nil due to lack of spares, although some of the spares which were not available we re replaced from dud aircraft through unauthorized but necessary cannibalization.

(e) The shortage of spare parts has been due to high usage over the section "BAKER" allowance. This data has been submitted to ComFairJap representatives and a separate report is being forwarded to ComAirPac.

(f) Hangar deck, catapult and arresting gear spares have been sufficient with the exception of "L" stands to build up engines as required. These are on order.

(g) Co-operation with the Air Squadrons has been satisfactory. Aviation Supply has 13 men who are attached to ship's company, and 6 squadron men on TAD. Aviation Supply issues are made on a 24 hour a day basis

with approximately 150 issues per day out of various storerooms throughout the ship. Under present conditions, it is only permitted to open three spaces in one area on the ship at one time. It is therefore very difficult to furnish spares to keep the air group with 100% availability This fact should be given wide dissemination - for misunderstanding of watertight integrity regulations could cause local friction between issuing and receiving parties concerned.

(h) Disposal of prospective class 265 material FFT to nearest activity could create a major problem because of space limitation if periods at sea were of a longer duration. Fortunately, this has not been the case so far. Large bulky items (props, wheel assembly, etc.) have been pallatized, strapped, and properly makred for off-loading. These then can be crated at shore facilities. Small items should be packaged aboard ship prior to off-loading.

6. Allotments

(a) The NSA and APA Allotments are definitely inadequate for ships operating under the Far East Command.

(b) During the First Quarter 1950, the NSA expenditures for this vessel averaged $1000.00 daily. However, these average expenditures included the (above normal) expenditures incurred prior to leaving the U.S. for the combat zone.

(c) Taking this fact into consideration, the average expenditures for the following quarter should be slightly less.

(d) The average APA expenditure totaled $350.00 daily. The APA allotment was primarily used for the requisitioning of spare parts prior to leaving the U.S. for the combat zone, and should also average slightly less in the following quarters.

7. Disbursing

(a) Before leaving the states, the Disbursing Officer drew $1,000,000.00 in U.S. currency. Pay days vary from $90,000.00 on the 15th to $150,000.00 on the 30th. About 90% of this money is returned to the Disbursing Offic through the Ship's Stores, Money Orders and sale of Yen. Actually, there is about $700,000.00 in treasury packages that are still unbroken.

(b) In Japan, Military Payment Certificates and Jananese Yen are the only forms of currency allowed ashore. In Okinawa, Military Payment Certificates are used. Both Military Payment Certificates and Yen are obtained by transfer of funds. The Disbursing Officer ashore will not accept U.S. currency in exchange for these moneys as he lacks storage space in his safes. Military Payment Certificates are on a par with U.S. currency; Jananese Yen are on a ratio of 360/1. In Japan, while in port, the Disbursing Officer sold $50,000.00 worth of Yen in a total of 12 days The first few days in port the daily requirement is $7,000.00 per day in Yen. The demand tapers off towards the end of an in-ort period. As Yen is very bulky, storage is a problem as excess U.S. currency takes up most of the space in the Disbursing Officer's safes. Yen comes in packages of one thousand bills totalling 1,000,000.00 Yen in 1,000 Yen notes and 100,000.00 Yen in 100 Yen notes. Exchange lines are a problem because of the odd value of these notes (1,000 Yen equal $2.777 and 100 Yen equal .277). The best system is the bundle Yen in value of $5.00 (1800 Yen), $10.00 (3,600 Yen), $15.00 (5,400 Yen), $20.00 (7,200 Yen), and $25.00 (9,000 Yen). This expedites sale of Yen and eliminates most of the change problems. Yen may be returned ashore as a Transfer of Funds, but must be in new bills and consecutive serial numbers. Disbursing Officers are not allowed to purchase Yen from personnel for U.S.

currency or Military Payment Certificates.

(c) U.S. change is also a problem. The Disbursing Officer left the U.S. with $1,600.00 worth of change and later purchased $1,600.00 more from the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45). Following amounts are recommended: $1,000.00 in 50¢, $1,000.00 in 25¢, $1,000.00 in 10¢, $500.00 in 5¢, and $200.00 in 1¢. While this change is not spent ashore, it is needed for operation of Ship's Stores, Post Office and exchange lines. Most of the change remains in the custody of individuals.

(d) So far there has been no difficulty with allotments being returned because of late submissions. As the mail is slow in reaching the U.S., all allotments are in the mail by the 10th and forwarded by air mail. However, to be safe it is strongly recommended to register as many allotments as possible in the U.S. and before leaving Pearl Harbor.

(e) Treasury Form 6599 and Treasury Form 1231 had to be procured from shore activities. The Disbursing Officer had 600 checks on hand and requested 1000 more. So far, he averages about 75 check a pay day, but the number is increasing every pay day. It is recommended that Disbursing Officer stock up on Money Orders. Before the new allotments took effect the Post Office sold $55,000.00 worth of money orders in one day. There should be at least an initial stock of 40 books; more can be obtained by mail as the demand necessitates. The largest sale of stamps has been in $1.00, 25¢, 20¢, and 6¢ air mail. Denomination of 1¢, 2¢ and 3¢ are seldom used, but a small amount is required. The following amounts should be on hand:

.01	$ 50.00
.02	100.00
.03	600.00

[redacted]

.04	$100.00
.05	100.00
.10	300.00
.20	500.00
.25	2000.00
.50	1000.00
1.00	1000.00
.06	4200.00 Airmail

This approximates the $10,000.00 stock allowance. Actually, in this area, more air mail and .25 stamps, are required than stock limits permit.

ENCLOSURE (4)

[redacted]

DAMAGE INFLICTED

TARGET	DESTROYED	PROBABLY DAMAGED	DAMAGED
Anti-Aircraft Positions	3	3	11
Aircraft	1	1	2
AK or AO			1
Armored car	1		
Barges			4
Bridges	6	7	25
Buses	1	1	
Carts	2	3	20
Chemical Plant			1
Command Cars		2	
Corvettes	1		2
DE	1		
Factories			15
Hangar (aircraft)	1	1	2
Headquarters Building		1	
Iron Works			2
Jeeps		4	9
Junks	7	5	27
Locomotives	23	6	30
Motorcycles	2		
Oil Tanks - Oil Storage	3		
P.C. Type			3
Power Boats	19	3	26

ENCLOSURE (5)

Damage Inflicted: (Cont'd)

TARGET	DESTROYED	PROBABLY DESTROYED	DAMAGED
Power Plant	1		2
R.R. Cars (Box)	64	15	129
R.R. Cars (Flat)			4
R.R. Cars (Passenger)		2	8
R.R. Cars (Tank)	4		12
RIKEN METAL WORKS			1
Sampans	4		49
Supply Dumps	6		5
Tanks	11	3	19
Transformers	3	1	6
Troops		(Undetermined)	
Troop Bivouacs			25
Trucks	55	15	73
Tug Boat	1		
Tunnels			2
Vehicles (Type unknown)	6	9	2
Viaduct			1
Warehouses	49	37	127
Water Works		1	2
Switvh Engines			2
Village		1	1
Water Tank			1
Barracks			4
Fishing Boats		2	8
Rafts		2	6