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DOD DIR 5200.10

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division THREE
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the Period 18 July 1952 to 4 September 1952

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.4

Encl: (1) Air Task Group TWO Action Report, 18 July 1952 to 4 September 1952

1. In accordance with reference (a), the action report for the period 18 July 1952 to 4 September 1952 is hereby submitted.

PART I COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION.

a. During the period 18-26 July 1952, USS ESSEX (CV9) was a unit of Special Task Group 50.8. This group was composed of the following units: USS ESSEX (CV9), CTG 50.8 and ComCarDivTHREE, RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, embarked, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV47) and screening units.

b. During the above period USS ESSEX (CV9) operated in the South China Sea, the Formosa Strait and off the East Coast of Formosa in accordance with ComSEVENTHFlt Operations Plan 75-52 and ComCarDivTHREE Operations Order 1-52.

The mission of TG 50.8 was to make a show of force off the China Coast as a deterrent to Communist Chinese agressive actions against Formosa and to bolster the morale of Nationalist Chinese Forces on Formosa in support of United Nations Policy on Formosa.

c. During the period 27 July-4 September, USS ESSEX (CV9) was a unit of Task Force 77 at various times composed of the following units: USS ESSEX (CV9), ComCarDivTHREE, RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, embarked, USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV31), ComCarDivONE, RADM H. E. REGAN, USN, embarked, USS BOXER (CV21), ComCarDivTHREE RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, embarked, USS PRINCETON (CV37), USS IOWA (BB61) ComSEVENTH Flt, VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, embarked, and various heavy support and screening ships.

d. During this latter period, USS ESSEX (CV9) operated off the East Coast of Korea in accordance with CTF 77 Operations Order 22-51 (2nd Revision), plus supplemental plans and orders issued during the period.

The mission of TF 77 was primarily to support United Nations ground forces in Korea. The support missions included close support, armed and photographic reconnaissance, interdiction of enemy supply lines and strikes

e. The ESSEX Air Group flew across Korea twice to make coordinated large scale strikes with the Air Force and other United Nations aircraft; the first of these on 20 August was against a supply area in the vicinity of YD 1058 and the other on 29 August was against related targets in the general area of the capital city of Pyongyang. During the month additional heavy attacks were flown against power plants at Kyosen #1, Kyosen #2 and Chosen #1. The increased antiaircraft fire encountered at these targets, particularly Chosen #1 indicates their value and importance to the enemy. Other large scale strikes were made against Chongin by three carriers on 2 August and again on 1 September and against the Hoeam-dong synthetic oil plant on 1 September.

f. The shift of emphasis from the rail interdiction program to important industrial and military targets has been, it is believed, an increased contribution to the overall United Nations effort. It has also been more in keeping with the inherent ability of a carrier task force to utilize surprise and keep the enemy off balance. The success of these attacks and the very considerable decrease in losses of pilots and aircraft is proof of the wisdom of the present program of operations.

g. The value of coordinated intelligence from all sources cannot be over emphasized. Recent high quality photographs of assigned targets increase the accuracy of attacks and are of great assistance in avoiding heavy flak areas and in flak suppression.

h. The coordination of flak suppression flights by jets with strikes by propeller aircraft contributed effectively to the success of attacks and certainly was a major factor in reducing losses and damage from enemy anti aircraft fire. The necessity for launching the faster jets after the prop strikes and recovery before the strike aircraft returns complicates scheduling but is well worth the effort and it is recommended that it be continued.

PART II CHRONOLOGY:

18 July	0635	Departed Subic Bay, Philippine Islands enroute Formosa Strait, in accordance with ComCarDivTHREE OpOrder 1-52. OTC, ComCarDivTHREE (RADM A. SOUCEK), embarked.
19 July		Conducted Air Operations enroute Formosa Strait.
20 July		Enroute Formosa Strait. During refueling of USS DUNCAN (DDR874), DUNCAN lost steering control.
	1119	DUNCAN slid into the side of the ESSEX, breaking the after fueling boom and extensively damaging mount 311. DUNCAN sustained major damage after 5 inch gun mount.
21 July		Air operations cancelled due to bad weather.
22 July		Conducted Air Operations--mass air parade over Formosa.
23 July		Conducted Air Operations--mass air parade over Formosa Strait.

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25 July		Enroute Yokosuka, Japan.
26 July	1700	Moored Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka, Japan.
27 July		Moored Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka, Japan.
28 July		Moored Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka, Japan.
29 July	0600	Pursuant to CTF 77 confidential dispatch 270300Z July, underway for Area Sugar.
30 July		Conducted refresher flight operations enroute Area Sugar.
	1340	Rendezvoused with USS STICKEL (DD888).
31 July		Conducted refresher flight operations enroute Area Sugar.
1 August	0530	Joined Task Force 77. OTC, ComCarDivONE (RADM H. E. REGAN) in BON HOMME RICHARD. Task Force replenished. Conducted First Combat Air Operations against the enemy to commence second ESSEX Korean tour.
2 August		Conducted Air Operations.
	0603	AD BuNo 129011, crashed ahead of the ship. Pilot (LTJG L. ADDICOTT) rescued by helicopter. No injuries.
	0608	F4U BuNo 96951 suffered a similar accident. Pilot (LTJG W. RALSTON) rescued by helicopter.- minor injuries.
3 August		Conducted Air Operations.
4 August		Task Force replenished.
	1352	ComCarDivTHREE (RADM A. SOUCEK) in BOXER relieved ComCarDivONE (RADM H. E. REGAN) as OTC. BON HOMME RICHARD departed for Yokosuka, Japan. Conducted AA firing practice.
5 August		Conducted Air Operations.
6 August		Scheduled air operations cancelled because of major fire on BOXER. Received eight BOXER personnel, rescued by helicopters.
7 August	1328	ComCarDivTHREE (RADM A. SOUCEK) and Staff transferred via high line from BOXER to USS WALKER (DDE507) to ESSEX.
8 August		Conducted Air Operations.
	0448	AD4N BuNo 124710 ditched near Yangdo Island, due to loss of oil pressure. Pilot (LT J. C. NORTON) and 2 crewmen picked up uninjured by USS OZBOURNE (DD846) and returned via high line. BOXER departed for Yokosuka, Japan.
9 August		Task Force replenished. BON HOMME RICHARD joined Force. Conducted AA firing practice.

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12 August	Conducted Air Operations.
13 August	Task Force replenished.
14 August	Conducted Air Operations.
15 August	Conducted Air Operations.
16 August	Conducted Air Operations.
17 August	Task Force replenished. Conducted AA firing practice.
18 August	Scheduled air operations cancelled because of bad weather preceding typhoon Karen.
19 August	Scheduled air operations cancelled because of bad weather accompanying typhoon Karen.
20 August	Conducted air operations, participating in coordinated UN strike on supply areas, West Coast of Korea.
21 August	Conducted Air Operations.
22 August	Task Force replenished.
23 August	Conducted Air Operations.
24 August	Scheduled air operations cancelled because of bad weather.
25 August	Scheduled air operations cancelled because of bad weather. BOXER rejoined Task Force.
26 August	Task Force replenished. ComCarDivTHREE (RADM A. SOUCEK) and staff transferred via high line to BOXER. Conducted AA firing practice.
27 August	Conducted air operations.
28 August	Bad weather cancelled morning flights. Conducted air operations in afternoon.
29 August	Conducted air operations, participating in coordinated UN strikes on Pyongyang.
30 August	Task Force replenished.
31 August	Scheduled air operations cancelled because of bad weather.
1 September	Conducted air operations. ESSEX and PRINCETON conducted joint strikes against oil refinery near town of Hoeam-dong, northeast corner of Korea. BOXER conducted strikes against Musan.

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The following dispatch, addressed to TF 77 was received from Com7THFlt: " THE STRIKES ON MUSAN AND HORAM-DONG MARK A SIGNAL DEMONSTRATION TO THE COMMUNISTS THAT WE WILL FIGHT FOR OUR FREE WAY OF LIFE X CONGRATULATIONS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE OF THE PILOTS AND WELL DONE TO ALL HANDS X VADM CLARK SENDS X "

2 September — Conducted air operations.
1124 Captain Paul D. STROOP, USN, relieved Captain Walter F. RODEE, USN, as Commanding Officer USS ESSEX (CV9).

3 September — Scheduled air operations cancelled because of bad weather.

4 September — Pursuant to CTF 77 Conf. dispatch 301226Z Aug. underway for Yokosuka, Japan in company with USS BOXER (CV21) and USS PARKS (DD884).

PART III ORDNANCE:

1. Expenditure of Air Ordnance.

See enclosure (1)

2. Expenditure of Ship's Ordnance for training.

a. Period 18-31 July 1952

None

b. Period 1-31 August 1952

104 rounds 5"38 AAC
74 rounds 3"50 FCL (VT)
437 rounds 3"50 FCL (VT) Non-Frag

c. Period 1-4 September 1952

None

3. The performance of ship's ordnance equipment was satisfactory.

PART IV BATTLE DAMAGE:

1. Ship

a. On 20 July, USS HUBBARD DD748 pulled away from along side during fueling operations before the fueling hose was disconnected resulting in loss of one 50 foot length of four inch hose.

b. During the same fueling operations on 20 July, USS DUNCAN DD874 had a steering casualty. Before steering control could be regained, the DUNCAN scraped the ESSEX on the starboard side. The ESSEX suffered no personnel loss or injury. Material damage and loss of equipment was sustained.

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85 starboard side at gun mount #35. There was only slight damage to shell plating on sponson just below splinter shield. The damage consisted of approximately 20 sq. ft. of plating dished in by the bridge of the DUNCAN.

Mount #37, frame 105 starboard, was the next point of contact. The floater net basket housing, two (2) floater nets were knocked off of the splinter shield. Two small holes were pierced in the shell plating on the under side of mount #37 gun sponson and an additional 250 sq. ft. of plating was damaged.

As the destroyer drifted aft, the fueling boom at the after fueling station was badly twisted with fittings and four (4 x 50 foot) lengths of fueling hose being lost over the side. One length of (4 x 50 foot) fueling hose was lost at the forward fueling station. The safety rail around the walkway at frame 94 main deck level was damaged by the fueling hose as it was torn from its cradle and the fueling boom gave way.

The propeller guard of the DUNCAN made contact with the ESSEX at frame 157 starboard at about the 3rd deck level hitting the protective pipe covering of the gasoline filter drain line. Only slight damage was caused.

The point of greatest damage was at the gun sponson on the after starboard quarter. Gun mount #311 was badly damaged by the after twin five inch gun mount on the DUNCAN.

The DUNCAN's after mount was trained aft and slightly elevated and as contact was made between the ESSEX and the DUNCAN, the 5" gun barrels pierced the under side of the gun mount. Approximately 400 sq. ft. of sponson plating is badly damaged, 12 ft of the splinter shield is deformed, but can be repaired and the deck outboard of the gun was torn up. A detailed report of damage sustained was submitted to CNO.

PART V PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES:

1. Performance

The performance of all personnel has been excellent and morale has been a factor requiring no special attention.

2. Casualties

a. Ship's Company

(1) NELSON, Jr., Clarence W. AN, USN, sustained a simple fracture of the right tibia, while unhooking a tow bar from an airplane. Starboard wheel ran over right ankle.

b. Air Task Group TWO

(1) LTJG Donald H. HOWARD, USNR, received minor lacerations of the face when his aircraft was hit in the canopy by enemy projectiles while flying over enemy territory.

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(2) There were no casualties sustained by Air Group enlisted men.

(3) No flight time was lost due to illness of flying personnel.

(4) There were no man hours lost due to psychriatric disorders.

(5) There were no deaths.

(6) There were no venereal diseases reported.

(7) The morale was good.

c. Other Ships

On 20 July 1952, STEWARD, P.W. GM3 was received aboard via helicopter from USS DUNCAN DDR874 with lacerations of left forearm received as result of collision between USS DUNCAN (DD874) and USS ESSEX (CV9). Eight survivors were received aboard on 6 August 1952, as a result of a fire on USS BOXER (CV21). They were admitted to the sick list for approximately eight hours and returned to duty.

PART VI COMMENTS:

1. Engineering Department

a. Engineering maintenance has been seriously hindered as a result of reduced upkeep availability. The combination of curtailed navy yard overhaul availability and subsequent continuous operation has allowed little preventative maintenance. During the one month availability at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard only work of a known or emergency nature was accomplished. Since leaving the yard the ship has had three periods of 4, 3, and 10 days in San Diego, three periods of 20 hours, 17 hours, and 71 hours in Pearl Harbor, one period of one day in Subic Bay, and one period of 60 hours in Yokosuka out of a total of 115 days. The lack of opportunity for the ships force to properly inspect worn machinery since the ships return from the first tour of duty is now manifesting itself in machinery failures.

b. Recommendations

None

c. Steaming Data

	18-31 July 52	1-31 Aug 52	1-4 Sep 52
Oil received	1050506	2481125	0
Oil delivered	382021	549389	75552
Oil consumed underway	867900	1811930	278410
Oil consumed at anchor	30470	0	0
Hours underway	268.8	744	96
Hours at anchor	66.2	0	0
Average speed	18.9	15.9	17.2
Miles steamed	5080	11829	1651

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a. Catapult

During the period of this report the catapult operation was considered normal with exception of the following minor discrepancies:

(1) On 5 August the port catapult cable tensioner jammed. Investigation revealed the ram was pitted, scored and the lips on the female follower turned under. The follower was machined down and new chevron packing installed.

(2) On 12 August the port catapult domes of the cable whip dampers required new "O" ring seals.

(3) On 14 August the port catapult main oil supply line to the firing valve developed a leak. Investigation revealed that the reducer bushing threads were damaged. New reducer bushings were locally manufactured and installed.

(4) On 17 August the starboard catapult cable tensioner ram stuck at about two (2) feet from the "full in" position. Investigation revealed that the ram packing follower was out of round. This was corrected by machining the follower down to .005 I.D. and installing new packing.

b. Arresting Gear

Arresting gear operation during this period was considered normal and satisfactory. The lowest time required for rerigging jet barricade was 4.5 minutes.

The port barricade stanchion has become distorted inboard and the base plate distorted outboard, possibly due to jet barricade engagement. This causes scoring of the ram cylinder. The barricade is still operational and will be repaired upon entering port. A report is being submitted to Naval Shipyard Bremerton.

c. Aircraft Ordnance

The aircraft ordnance division shortage of personnel continues to present a problem. With the present number of personnel it is impossible to properly man all arming control stations during rearming of aircraft. Loading schedules have been met however, at the expense of tiring arming crews by working excessively long hours.

d. Maintenance

(1) General:

The first operational tour found the aircraft maintenance division working hard to meet the needs of the embarked group. Five (5) QEC's, six (6) propellers, one hundred sixteen (116) tire and wheel assemblies, and 1274 spark plugs were drawn from supply and/or cleaned, built up, or otherwise prepared for installation by the squadrons. Thirty three thousand (33,000) cubic feet of oxygen were delivered by trailer during four hundred seventy eight (478) aircraft servicings.

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Some uncertainty exists as to the exact aircraft maintenance responsibilities of the Air Department Maintenance Division. Recommendations are being submitted by separate correspondence.

(2) Personnel:

Some difficulty was experienced by lack of "know how" in engine buildup. Three AD ratings had been sent to Jet Engine School on a returnable quota, prior to deployment, but were not returned to the ship.

(3) Facilities, Equipment, and Material:

It is noted that the RB 19R-2 plugs are falling far short of the 180 hours specified by GEB 136. R.U.D.M.'s should be forthcoming.

Considerable time was spent by the division metalsmiths in fabricating a combination engine build up and installation stand for J34 engines which are used in conjunction with a universal tail jack. The J34 engine overhaul stands (R85-WXT-243265-S1) furnished by the section "G" allowance are entirely unsuited for carrier maintenance.

The one hydraulic test stand provided for hydrolube by section "G" allowance has proved inadequate, partly due to drop check requirements promulgated by ComAirPac dispatch 3020122 of April 1952. One test stand should be provided for each F9F squadron embarked, and one has been ordered "in excess" by this vessel.

A jack shortage, likewise developed, due to frequent drop checks of F9F A/C.

The section "G" allowance specifies six (6) 7.5 ton jacks but this vessel has procured jacks in quantities and for reasons shown:

Two (2) 12 ton for AD's - 7.5 ton jacks too light for carrier jacking.

Four (4) 5 ton for F2H - 7.5 ton jacks too high.

Four (4) 7.5 ton jacks for F4U's and F9F's.

Two (2) more 7.5 ton jacks have been ordered to expedite jacking of F9F's.

A preservation machine is badly needed and, although a section "G" allowance item; this vessel has been unable to obtain one.

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servicing has put a heavy load on the oxygen transfer unit. [illegible] has only been obtained by timely, ample procurement of spare parts and frequent repairs.

The twelve (12) fifty (50) foot jumper cords (28 volts) provided by section "G" have proven inadequate in length and number. No racks were provided for their stowage. APU's were used almost entirely for 28 volt A/C power on the hangar deck to the exclusion of the ship's installed system, until 100' cords and stowage racks were installed on or adjacent to each of the eight (8) deck edge 28-volt outlets on the hangar deck.

One hundred (100) foot cords and stowage racks are now being installed adjacent to flight deck outlets in anticipation of cutting down on APU operations and usage on short lived, easily breakable APU's.

Wide separation of 117 volt ship service receptacles precluded the use of this current in the UPM-8 for checking APX-6 at all aircraft locations on flight and hangar decks. This difficulty was overcome by modifying a cable assembly, furnished in accordance with C.A.P. S/L Ser. 70/1295, to take a single phase of the numerous 120 volts, 3 phase, 400 cycle aircraft electronics service power outlets.

Suitable shop facilities are not currently provided on 27A conversions for aircraft engine work. Work benches and stowage cabinets for the material and equipment used in this work, especially engine build up, are currently being installed on the hangar deck aft of frame 196. A Ship Alt. will be submitted covering this installation.

Hangar deck stowage facilities are not provided for stowing APS-19 radomes and sonobuoy dispensers when removed due to use of aircraft for other missions. An eight (8) radome rack has been installed on the after hangar deck for the radomes and torpedo dollys are presently used for the dispensers.

Propeller changes are now made anywhere on the hangar deck with the use of a light block and tackle and a beam clamp obviating the need for a special spot beneath a chain hoist. If the aircraft is not centered under a overhead beam two clamps and tackles may be used to give a varying suspension point.

3. Gunnery Department.

a. During the period 18 July - 31 July seven destroyers were refueled at sea. Ten (10) destroyers came alongside for highline transfers of personnel and freight. Three persons were transferred by highline.

b. During the period 1 - 31 August, this vessel replenished ammunition at sea eight (8) times, receiving a total of 1041.2 tons at an average rate of 76.4 tons per hour. The greatest tonnage received in one hour was 90 tons. Provisions were replenished at sea three (3) times with this vessel receiving a total of 242.5 tons at an average rate of 50.4 tons per hour and the fastest hourly rate being 69 tons. Thirty-nine destroyers came along side for highline transfers of personnel and freight, and twelve (12) destroyers were refueled at sea.

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c. During the period 1-4 September 1952.

None

4. Supply Department

a. Aviation Stores

(1) The ESSEX commenced this operating period with approximately 90% of BuAer allowance list items on board. Those shortages which caused most trouble during the period were:

(a) F9F-2 Nose Wheels
(b) AD-4 Propellers
(c) AD-4 and F4U4-4 Tail Wheels
(d) F9F-2 Nose Struts
(e) Aircraft clocks
(f) F9F-2 Fuel Pumps
(g) F4U-4 Fuel warning transfer switches.
(h) Red and Green flight deck jerseys.

(2) Supply sources utilized for aeronautical material were (1) ASB, Fleet Activities, Yokosuka; (2) ASA, Naval Supply Depot, Guam; and (3) ASD, Naval Supply Center, Oakland. Since departure of the USS JUPITER, AVS-8, the Aviation Supply Branch, Yokosuka, has taken over support of aircraft carriers in the Japan-Korea area. ASB has been able to furnish approximately 65% of items requested; the remainder were passed to ASA, Guam, or ASD, Oakland, for action only if ordered on a Priority A or B basis. As ASB is not making any obligations, all "NIS" or "NC" items not ordered on a Priority A or B basis have been cancelled. This has brought about a large number of Priority B requests in order to insure delivery of high usage items prior to depletion of remaining stock on hand.

(3) It has been determined that the time required to receive material "on the line" in the following categories is as follows:

(a) From ASB, Yokosuka via COD - approximately 4 or 5 days.

(b) From ASB, Yokosuka via fleet freight - approximately 20 days.

(c) From Continental U.S. via government air - approximately 20 days.

(d) From Continental U.S. via surface shipment - approximately 45 to 50 days.

(4) Squadrons being deployed to the forward area are advised to obtain a full allowance of sections "F" and "U" material prior to embarking on the parent carrier as subject items are exceedingly difficult to obtain in the forward area.

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(1) Issues of stock during this period were heavier than anticipated, and the items showing highest usage were hand tools, office supplies and rags. Electronics and machinery spare parts are the most difficult parts to replace.

(2) In several instances empty gas cylinders have been received in place of full ones, resulting in extra handling of bottles and a more limited stock of desired gases on hand.

c. Comissary

(1) Receipt of provisions during replenishment on the line has been stepped up approximately 20 tons per hour by the additional use of the high line.

5. Administration

a. Personnel Count:

During the period of operation the average on-board count was as follows:

	Officer	Enlisted	Total
Ship's Company	126	1944	2070
Marine Detachment	2	60	62
Air Group	130	622	752

	E-7	E-6	E-5	E-4	E-3	E-2
Transfers:	3	7	9	11	10	1
Receipts:	5	3	1	5	26	66

Petty Officers:

Pay Grade	Allowed	On Board	Percent
E-7	74	76	102%
E-6	171	72	57.8%
E-5	265	118	55.5%
E-4	374	450	120%

There continues to be a shortage of petty officers in the following ratings: QM, FC, MM, BT, EM, IC, AO, AA/AN, HA/HN, and YN.

b. The delivery of mail during this period has been slightly below average in comparison to previous periods. This may have been caused by the nature of operations just prior to reporting to ComNavFe and the relatively short period in port.

c. This vessel requested special services hotel reservations for the period 6-14 September for 100 officers and 300 enlisted. The reservations assigned were 50 officers and 53 enlisted for special services hotels. Ninety percent of the reservations for enlisted covered only two day periods, including travel time. Ninety reservations were allowed at Camp Yokohama. The majority of these special service reservations were assigned pilots and aircrewmen. These will be augmented by three (3) day leave privileges.

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a. Loran positions have been much improved with the use of the new Japan-located station 2H0 and 2H1. These stations gave very accurate positions when near Honshu in the Japan Sea, diminishing somewhat when nearer Korea. Tables have been requested. Loran charts have been provided but their small scale makes accurate fixing difficult.

7. Operations Department.

a. Air Operations

(1) After more than a year, an automatic keyer for the low frequency homer has been placed in operation. A MC ELROY PHOTO TUBE KEYER and a tape puller were located in Naval Reserve Stock and authority to draw this equipment was granted by BuShips. A continuous paper tape, coded with India Ink, is employed, giving identification every thirty seconds with a twenty second dash on each side. Connections are made directly to the transmitter at a remote telegraph station located in Air Operations. The Keyer has been highly satisfactory in operation and it is recommended that the equipment be furnished to all CV's until such time as specially designed equipment is available for this purpose. alteration submitted.

(2) The controls for the YE, Racon and Homer are now installed in the Air Operations space. This makes a convenient working arrangement.

(3) It is recommended that an AN/ARC-1 radio be installed in Air Operations to replace one of the Remote Radio Stations. Commitments on the TDQ-RCK equipment prohibit guarding two other carriers land/launch and a helicopter circuit. One AN/ARC-1 and one TDQ-RCK would eliminate this difficulty.

(4) 1929 sorties were flown during the period totalling 4,110.6 hours. 34 sorties aborted.

b. Photography.

(1) Film drying

(a) After much trial and error, the newly installed AIOA aero film dryers have been found to be efficient machines. It is important that only qualified personnel be allowed to operate them, however. The machines must be observed constantly to assure that the film is properly centered and feeding freely. The operator must learn to tell by the curl of the film whether the film is coming through too brittle or too wet. Lack of vigilence on his part can ruin several feet of film almost immediately.

(b) Only two mechanical difficulties have been experienced with the AIOA dryers. The solenoid cut-out switch for the film take-up spindle often fails to actuate properly. It was found that this was due to damage sustained when the heavily weighted spool had dropped on the actuating lever. This weighted spool has been replaced with a lighter one, thus decreasing chances of damage to the cut-out solenoid, and also exerting less force on the film, allowing it to ride against the feed rollers inside the dryer and clear of the heat louvers.

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drying paper is six to eight feet per minute. These speeds are dependent on room temperature and humidity.

(d) Space is still a problem. One dryer is installed conveniently within the main photo laboratory. The other is installed in the film stowage room directly across the passageway from the laboratory. The latter space is too small to allow proper operation.

c. Aerology.

(1) It was found by using the metalic screen reflector instead of the tin foil reflector for obtaining RAWINS that higher altitudes could be tracked and the target returns were larger.

(2) It is recommended that carriers having facsimile equipment no longer be required to transmit surface analyses to the OTC. When transmitting, the facsimile transmitter cuts out the ships communication equipment with heavy interference. Dispatching a verbal analysis is considered adequate.

(3) During the reporting period nine days of flight operations were cancelled due to bad weather.

d. Communications.

(1) The ship began the period with a relatively new and untrained Communication Section.

(a) Only two CWO's had any previous experience in this type of work. Enlisted personnel were equally inexperienced. Only fifty percent of the allowance of rated men were on board. Close supervision and continued on-the-job training for the enlisted men and a nightly communication class for officers has improved this situation somewhat. A continued rigorous training program should bring about desired results.

(2) During the time CTF 77 (ComCarDiv 3) was embarked the BOXER loaned the ESSEX three rated Radiomen and three rated Telemen to assist in the added workload. While the Flag was aboard traffic jumped from an average of three hundred dispatches per day to an average of nine hundred eighty-two per day. During the reporting period on the line the Communication Section processed a total of 26,770 messages.

(3) Keeping in operation the two CSP 2900's belonging to the ship and the one belonging to the Flag, proved a problem. CTF 77 requested and received another machine from the RPIO in Yokosuka. No qualified CRF personnel were available however. This situation will be improved when the minor CRF is set up and qualified CRF personnel made available.

e. Photographic Interpretation.

(1) The major portion of the Photographic Interpretation during this period consisted of target searches with the flak studies of the rail routes being of next importance. The flak studies of the rail routes changed in format from the

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a 1/50,000 chart. This method has proved very satisfactory from the standpoint of the photo interpreter. It saves many man hours, but for use in flak suppression strikes the mosaic type is of much more value. It is recommended that a system be instituted whereby periodic photographic touraids are distributed by the photographic interpretation unit at Atsugi and implemented by current flak studies on the 1/50,000 charts by the carrier photo interpreters.

(2) All interpretation was accomplished from fully annotated sonne prints rather than from flash prints. This proved to be more efficient in the combined teamwork between the photographic laboratory, the photo interpreter and the photo detachment. Inasmuch as the interpreter and the photo pilots did not work in the same spaces, the use of annotated prints speeded the job of identifying the area photographed. By not printing "flash" prints the photo lab was able to deliver rolls of film sooner to the photo pilots for annotation and allowed them to complete their work sooner.

(3) The interpretation unit operated under the slogan of "a picture for every pilot" on all strikes. The attack pilots had individual annotated photos of each target while the flak suppression pilots also had individual photos to pinpoint each gun position. Prior to each strike the latest photography was interpreted for all possible flak positions which were duly noted on the individual photos and on the larger briefing mosaics.

(4) The K-25 damage assessment camera was soon shelved upon the development of an excellent F-56 camera installation for the AD aircraft. The larger plate size and longer focal length proved to be a great improvement over the K-25. Further details are being submitted in enclosure (1).

(5) The photo interpretation unit of the ESSEX consists of one Lieutenant, graduate of the Photographic Interpretation Center, and three enlisted assistants, graduates of the Barbers Point and Alameda PI schools. This number is considered ideal, and it is considered important that at least one of the assistants be either an experienced assistant or a first or second class petty officer.

(6) The photo interpretation unit operated in the flag intelligence space at such times when ComCarDiv THREE was not embarked on the ESSEX. So long as the flag intelligence space is available the interpretation working conditions are considered excellent. When the ship's PI is relegated to Print Shop #2, the Ozalid room, the working space is considered inadequate and the filing space negligible. In either working space the problem of filing the 9" x 18" K-18 and K-38 photography is still unsolved. As the cruise progresses and the Banshees fly more coverage, this problem will become increasingly complicated. Added experience should bring about a solution to this problem.

f. Air Intelligence

(1) Material, Maps and Charts

(a) Concerted effort was made to obtain all the necessary intelligence materials and supplies prior to deployment. It is estimated that about fifty thousand (50,000) maps, of various scales, with a total weight of approximately two and one-quarter tons, were brought aboard during this period.

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A discussion of the services obtained from various Air Navigation offices is being submitted by separate correspondence as being of possible assistance for future deployments.

(b) The use of 1:50,000 scale maps has increased to a marked degree over the first Korean tour, and it is felt that this is due largely to the type of operations now in progress where the planes attack widely separated areas and diversified targets, whereas previously emphasis was placed on the rail and bridge interdiction program. Unfamiliarity of some of the pilots with the area ma also account for the unusual rate of consumption of 1:50,000 scale maps. Detailed comments on the attrition rate of these maps will be submitted in subsequent action reports.

. g. CIC

During the first tour on the line of the second ESSEX Korean cruise the CIC operated with a total complement of 50 enlisted men and 9 officers. Under the circumstances it is considered that the personnel were adequate to handle the assigned tasks. However, the pinch was felt during the time that ComCarDiv THREE was aboard. It is considered that a minimum of 56 to 60 enlisted men be assigned to CIC (with staff embarked) to properly handle all aspects of CIC work. Due to the fact that there were 15 stations to be manned each watch the men were divided into three duty sections. The officers stood watches as follows: Five (5) were on the regular CIC watch schedule and three (3) were assigned duties as Air Controllers both strike and CAP. Five (5) of the total eight (8) officers mentioned above have had 22 months aboard and it is anticipated that they will all receive orders to other duty within a one or two months periods. If possible it would be better if fewer officers (especially experienced) were rotated in so short a time. Replacements for these five (5) officers have just come aboard.

Indoctrination in ATP-1 proceeded smoothly. Lectures were scheduled for all officers in the Operations Department, any others who wished to were welcome to attend. Each chapter was assigned to one of the officers in CIC who was responsible for the presentation thereof. These lectures were also attended by the OOD's who were asked to make constructive suggestions and inform all attendants how some particular point effected this ship when operating with TF-77. Each lecture was given twice daily so all who needed to could conveniently attended.

It is recommended that the CIC officers of the various ships in the Task Force be called together at the convenience of the staff to standardized details of CIC operations of a routine nature.

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