U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34)
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CVA34/A16-13
Ser 0216

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
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22 November 1952

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CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

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Subj: Action Report for the period of 28 October 1952 through 22 November 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV Instruction 3480.4

Encl: (1) CVG 102 Action Report 28 October 1952 through 22 November 1952 p.20

1. In accordance with reference (a) the Action Report for the period of 28 October 1952 through 22 November 1952 is hereby submitted.

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

The U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34), with Carrier Air Group 102 embarked, sortied from Yokosuka Harbor as a unit of Task Force 70, under SECRET orders, in company with the U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33), the U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA-133) and screening units at 1324I on 28 October 1952. Commander Task Force 70 and Commander Carrier Division FIVE RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, embarked in the U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33). At 0200I 31 October 1952 Task Force 70 was dissolved and the same units formed Task Element 77.01.

At 2035I 31 October 1952 Task Element 77.01 was dissolved and the units joined Task Force 77, Commander Task Force 77 and Commander Carrier Division ONE, RADM H. E. REGAN, USN embarked in the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31). Other ships in company were the U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63), with Commander SEVENTH Fleet, VADM J. J. CLARK, USN embarked; the U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA-133) and screening destroyers. On 1 November 1952 Commander Carrier Division FIVE assumed duties as Commander Task Force 77 aboard the U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33); the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31) with Commander Carrier Division ONE embarked, departed from the Task Force. The ship departed area SUGAR for Yokosuka on 19 November 1952, arriving 22 November 1952.

During the period in the forward area operations were conducted in accordance with Commander Task Force 77 Operation Order 2-52. The mission

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of the Force, in support of the United Nations conflict with North Korea, was close air support to front line ground forces, interdiction of enemy movements and resupply over Northeast Korean supply lines and storage areas, destruction of enemy troops, and air support of Naval gunfire.

PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

28 OCTOBER 1952

Sortied from Yokosuka Harbor at 1324I in company with the U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33), the U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA-133) and accompanying destroyer screen. RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN CTF 70 and COMCARDIV 5 embarked aboard the U.S.S. KEARSARGE.

29 OCTOBER 1952

In company with Task Force 70 enroute to the Korean operating area. Conducted AA firing exercises. At 2330I, the U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63) and accompanying destroyer screen joined Task Force 70. VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, COM7THFLT embarked in the U.S.S. MISSOURI.

30 OCTOBER 1952

In company with Task Force 70 enroute to the Korean operating area. Conducted flight operations. Launched 44 sorties consisting of ASP patrols, jet reconnaissance and photo reconnaissance flights.

31 OCTOBER 1952

In company with Task Force 70 enroute to the Korean operating area. At 0200 Task Force 70 was dissolved and Task Element 77.01 was formed consisting of the same ships formerly in Task Force 70. At 2035I Task Element 70.01 was dissolved and units joined Task Force 77 consisting of the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31) with RADM R. E. REGAN, USN, CTF 77 and COMCARDIV 1 embarked, the U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA-133) and screening destroyers with COMDESDIV 12 designated as the screen commander.

1 NOVEMBER 1952

COMCARDIV 5, RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN assumed duties as CTF 77. CTF 77 cancelled flight operations due to inclement weather and high seas.

2 NOVEMBER 1952

Conducted combat flight operations.

3 NOVEMBER 1952

Replenished ammunition from the U.S.S. CHARA; dry stores and provisions from the U.S.S. GRAFFIAS; and NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. CALIENTE. Conducted AA firing exercises.

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4 NOVEMBER 1952

Conducted combat flight operations. Conducted AA firing exercises. ENS A. L. RIKER, USNR, VA 923, was shot down while on a strike in the Wonsan area. Although he was seen to parachute from his plane, rescue operations were hindered due to heavy AA fire and ENS RIKER is listed as missing in action.

5 NOVEMBER 1952

Conducted combat flight operations. Conducted AA firing exercises. A flight deck crewman, John May GUILDHORN AA, USN, was fatally injured when he fell and was crushed beneath an aircraft being towed by a tractor.

6 NOVEMBER 1952

Conducted combat flight operations.

7 NOVEMBER 1952

Replenished ammunition from the U.S.S. CHARA and NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. TALUGA. Conducted AA firing exercises.

8 NOVEMBER 1952

Conducted combat flight operations. Conducted AA firing exercises.

9 NOVEMBER 1952

Conducted combat flight operations. Poor weather restricted afternoon flights. Conducted AA firing exercises.

10 NOVEMBER 1952

Conducted combat flight operations. Conducted AA firing exercises.

11 NOVEMBER 1952

Replenished ammunition from the U.S.S. PARICUTIN and NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. CIMARRON.

12 NOVEMBER 1952

Flight operations were cancelled due to inclement weather and high seas.

13 NOVEMBER 1952

Flight operations were cancelled due to inclement weather and high seas.

14 NOVEMBER 1952

Flight operations were cancelled due to inclement weather.

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15 NOVEMBER 1952

Afternoon flight operations were restricted and evening flights were cancelled due to weather. LT G. A. GAUDETTE, USNR, VA 923 failed to return from a combat mission. His plane was seen to spin into a mountain side. Since no parachute was seen, he is presumed to be dead. LT D. I. KINNEY, USNR, VC 61 detachment GEORGE, successfully parachuted in the vicinity of K-18 and was recovered uninjured.

16 NOVEMBER 1952

Conducted combat flight operations. Conducted AA firing exercises.

17 NOVEMBER 1952

Conducted combat flight operations. Evening operations were cancelled due to poor weather.

18 NOVEMBER 1952

Conducted combat flight operations. At approximately 1340I, CIC reported bogies at 82 miles. Task Force 77 CAP consisted of 8 ORISKANY F9F-5's. One division of this CAP was vectored to remain between the bogies and the Force. At about 60 miles the bogies were identified as seven (7) MIG type aircraft. The MIG's broke for attack and opened fire on the CAP. In the resulting melee, two MIG's were shot down and two were badly damaged. One MIG pilot was observed bailing out. The second division of CAP was not engaged. One F9F-5 received a hit in the fuselage forward of the tail section. LT E. R. WILLIAMS, USNR and LTJG J. D. MIDDLETON, USN, both of VF 781, were each credited with the destruction of one MIG. LTJG D. M. ROWLANDS, USNR, was credited with severely damaging one MIG.

19 NOVEMBER 1952

Replenished dry stores and provisions from the U.S.S. GRAFFIAS; aviation and electronic stores from the U.S.S. CHOURRE; ammunition from the U.S.S. PARICUTIN; and NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. CIMARRON. Upon completion of replenishment CTF 77 detached the U.S.S. ORISKANY and directed it to proceed to Yokosuka for upkeep.

20 NOVEMBER 1952

Enroute Yokosuka, Japan.

21 NOVEMBER 1952

Enroute Yokosuka, Japan.

22 NOVEMBER 1952

Arrived Yokosuka. End of reporting period.

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4

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PART III

ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. Expenditure of air ordnance (see enclosure (1)).

2. Expenditure of ship's ordnance for training.

   a. During employment with CTF 70

      (1) Service Types

5"/38 AAC Proj.	14
5"/38 Non-flashless cart.	14

      (2) Training Type

3"/50 FCL (VT) NF Non-flashless	76

   b. During employment with CTF 77

      (1) Service Types

5"/38 AAC Proj.	63
5"/38 FCL (VT) Proj.	30
5"/38 Non-flashless cart.	93
3"/50 FCL (VT Non-flashless	564

      (2) Training Types

3"/50 FCL (VT) NF Non-flashless	44

3. Performance was considered normal and satisfactory with the exception of three instances in which 3"/50 NF steel cases were not ejected after firing. The ejector lips have in each instance remained undamaged while bending and parting those portions of the case fuse which they engage. The case walls show light scoring which may or may not have been made after firing. At present it is believed that heat of firing causes binding through either expansion or the binding of similar metals. A more comprehensive report will be made through normal channels after further research and evaluation.

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Ship. No battle damage was sustained by the ORISKANY during the current period.

2. Damage inflicted on the enemy (see enclosure (1)).

3. Damage inflicted on ORISKANY aircraft (see enclosure (1)).

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5

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PART V

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

1. Performance.

a. Personnel.

During the period of this report morale and personnel performance has been excellent despite the fact that approximately forty-nine (49) enlisted personnel are berthed on cots and living out of seabags. U.S.S. ORISKANY letter serial 2282 of 13 November 1952 to COMAIRPAC covers this problem and requests installation of additional bunks and lockers. During this period the average on board count was 2768: 2052 ship's company; 61 marines; 17 SWU team and 638 CVG 102.

Critical shortages exist in the following rates: ET, FC, MM, and AA/AN. U.S.S. ORISKANY CONFIDENTIAL letter serial 0207 of November to COMAIRPAC covers the shortage of ET ratings.

Despite the critical shortage in some rates, berthing on cots of personnel, lack of movies during operating periods, and irregular intervals of mail delivery, the overall general performance and morale of all hands is still at a very high level.

b. Training.

Training for the period as covered by this report consisted of the following:

Enrolled	6	Officer Correspondence Courses
Enrolled	123	Enlisted Correspondence Courses
Enrolled	3	USAFI College Extension Courses
Enrolled	42	USAFI Correspondence Courses
	22	USAFI GED Examinations taken
	12	USAFI GED Examinations requested
Ordered	2	USAFI end of course examinations
	165	Classroom hours held by divisions
	509	Students attending classes (Classes are held 6 days per week)

c. Legal.

Legal activity for the period covered by this report declined considerably. The total number of mast cases, courts-martial, and sundry legal assistance matters processed is estimated to have decreased to less than 60 per cent of normal.

d. Welfare and Recreation.

Bingo equipment has been procured for regularly scheduled bingo parties in the various crew's messing compartments, Chief Petty Officers' Mess, Warrant Officers' Mess and Ward Room. Happy hours are conducted on replenishing

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days, making use of the ship's band and talent from ship's company and Air Group. Occasionally the band plays in the Ward Room.

The Hobby Shop is open daily for use by all hands. It carries a wide variety of crafts, leathercraft, model planes, ships, sail boats, wagons, autos, etc.

The ship's library is open daily from 0830 to 2130 for use by all hands.

e. Religious Services.

Catholic services are held daily. Three (3) Masses are said on Sundays followed by Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament. Special daily prayers are said for the safety of our pilots.

Protestant Divine Services are conducted on Sunday mornings and regularly as operation schedule permits. Vesper services and Bible Class meets on Wednesday evenings.

Jewish Services are conducted on Friday evenings and on special days of religious significance on the Jewish Calendar.

f. Public Information Office.

Activities of the Public Information Office were as follows:

Twenty daily press releases,
210 individual hometown releases,
Four reels of tape recordings and hometown releases consisting of 44 recordings,
a broadcast each evening of the day's combat events over the radio or public address system. (This daily event has proven very popular. The Assistant AIO prepares the script and presents the information as news commentator.)
Publication of the daily press sheet known as the HERKIMER HERALD and of the ship's paper, THE PATRIOT (bi-monthly)

2. Casualties.

a. Ship's Company.

The following casualties were incurred by U.S.S. ORISKANY personnel:

(1) On 5 November 1952 Airman John Max GULDHORN was killed as a result of an accident involving a towed aircraft. He was walking between the tow bars of a tractor towing an F4U-5. When he jumped over the tow bars he slipped and fell under the right wheel of the aircraft. The aircraft stopped on his midsection and caused extreme crushing of the abdomen and chest. His death followed approximately 7 minutes after the accident. Cause of death was listed as "Injuries Multiple Extreme Number 8651."

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(2) On 10 November 1952, MM1 Edward Herrick TOWNSEND died. Cause of death was listed as "Thrombosis Coronary Artery Number 7402."

b. Air Group 102. (see enclosure (1))

PART VI

COMMENTS

1. Engineering Department.

a. Casualties.

(1) No major damage sustained from any cause.

(2) The following minor damage was sustained during routine operations:

Date	Description	Cause
11/1/52	Minor deflection of Port side Gasoline Filling Platform.	Heavy Seas.
11/1/52	Plastic Fire Clay dislodged approximately $4\frac{1}{2}$ feet along water screen header, superheater side #6 Boiler.	360 degree rotation of soot blower, due to sheared stop pin, caused condensed moisture to strike fire clay.
11/3/52	Superficial smoke and fire damage to Squadron Locker #2.	Class "A" Fire.

b. Recommendations.

(1) None.

c. Steaming Data.

	Dates
Engine Miles Steamed - 8045.8 miles.	28 Oct - 19 Nov 1952
Fuel Oil Received - 1,336,938 gals.	28 Oct - 19 Nov 1952
Fuel Oil Delivered DD's - 435,498 gals.	28 Oct - 19 Nov 1952
Fuel Oil Consumed (underway) - 1,327,135 gals.	28 Oct - 19 Nov 1952
Fuel Oil Consumed (anchored) - 0.	28 Oct - 19 Nov 1952
Average Speed - 15.6 Knots.	28 Oct - 19 Nov 1952
Hours Underway - 514.7 Hours.	28 Oct - 19 Nov 1952

d. Fueling.

During the period 28 October to 19 November 1952, the U.S.S. ORISKANY fueled Destroyers 9 times at an average rate of 102,500 gallons per hour. The U.S.S. ORISKANY refueled from tankers 3 times during this period at an average rate of 186,000 gallons per hour.

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2. Medical Department

a. The medical department supplies and equipment were adequate. No significant supply shortage or equipment breakdown occurred during the reporting period. It is noted, however, that the procurement of certain items of supplies and equipment in excess of allowance or items not listed in the allowance is necessary and greatly increases the operating efficiency of the department.

b. The medical department personnel allowance of 25 men is considered to be adequate. At the present time there are 19 hospital corpsmen and three strikers on board; and, although the mission can be adequately carried out during normal operations, it is felt that should a major casualty incident occur this number would be inadequate.

c. Medical evaluation of Air Group and Ship's Company.

(1) For the twenty-two days of this operating period the general morale and physical well being of both the Air Group and Ship's Company was excellent. Minor anxieties, noted as the ship approached the line, disappeared after the second or third day of actual operations. It is felt that the realization that the ship was finally carrying out the mission to which it had been assigned in a more than satisfactory manner meant a great deal to the overall morale of the ship. Speculation as to what might have happened had the period of actual operations been longer, or losses to the enemy greater, is felt to be entirely unwarranted at this time. There was no detectable loss of resistance to disease; the incidence of personnel on the sick list was not increased; no increase in tenseness was noticed; and the number of minor injuries was unchanged.

(2) In general, whatever the effect of a longer period on the line may be, it is not felt that a three week period is too long. Personnel have readily responded to the demands made upon them in a more than adequate manner. The increase in the working day, the increased hardships of colder weather, irregular eating and sleeping conditions have seemed to increase morale and give personnel a pride in being a "can do" outfit rather than having a deleterious effect. In conclusion it is the opinion of this Medical Officer that the ship is a better ship for having had twenty-two days in a forward area.

d. Medical Department Statistical Summary of Air Group and Ship's Company.

(1) Admitted to sick list.	190
(2) Admitted to Binnicle List.	15
(3) Percent sick days out of possible 67,232 work days.	.30%
(4) Officers admitted to sick list.	10
(5) Total visits to sick call.	1161
(6) Patients received from other ships.	1
(7) Patients transferred to hospital.	0
(8) Minor injuries treated.	20
(9) Major injuries treated.	1

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(10) Number shipboard injuries resulting in death.	1
(11) Number personnel died of disease.	1
(12) Minor surgical procedures.	25
(13) Major surgical procedures.	3
(14) Venereal disease cases and non-specific urethritis.	58
(a) Gonorrhea.	7
(b) Chancroid.	14
(c) Non-specific urethritis following sexual exposure	37

e. Medical Statistical Summary of Air Group Pilots and Crewmen.

(1) Planes lost, enemy action, pilot killed not recovered.	2
(2) Planes lost, operational, pilot not recovered.	0
(3) Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered, minor injuries.	1
(4) Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered uninjured.	0
(5) Planes lost, operational, crewman recovered uninjured.	0
(6) Planes damaged, enemy action, crewman injured.	0
(7) Planes damaged, enemy action, pilot injured.	0
(8) Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons.	15
(9) Pilots permanently grounded pending medical evaluation.	0
(10) Average number days pilots grounded.	2.4
(11) Crewmen grounded for medical reasons.	0

3. Air Intelligence.

The Air Intelligence Section prior to departure from the West Coast lost the majority of its force due to transfers. One officer and a PNSN constituted the Air Intelligence organization. Two intelligence officers reported aboard at Yokosuka, one assigned by COMAIRPAC and one who had been sent to the Air Intelligence School at COMFAIRALAMEDA from the ship. Since the officers and men were not available for duty until the ORISKANY arrived at Yokosuka, little operational experience for the entire organization was possible.

COMNAVFE sent an officer on TAD orders to the ORISKANY prior to departure from Yokosuka for the purpose of lecturing on Escape and Evasion doctrines and procedures. This system seemed more advisable than lecturing in port.

Upon arrival on the line an Air Intelligence officer from the BON HOMME RICHARD reported aboard to assist in briefings and to pass out the latest intelligence information. This was considered of inestimable value and should be continued for all reporting carriers.

Although emphasis is still placed on interdiction operations, considerable effort is now being placed on Close Air Support by the carrier based planes.

It is recommended that the Photo Interpreters work in an office as close to the ship's Air Intelligence office as possible, but not in the Air Intelligence office.

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Since Photo Interpretation is a new function on board, the ORISKANY personnel have been temporarily assigned working space in the ship's Air Intelligence office. Work accomplished during this period included Target Searches, Route Surveillance and Touraids.

Since many of the pilots are somewhat inexperienced in using aerial photography, it was considered necessary to supplement all photography with graphic aids. Target Folders, composed of orientation maps and pin-pointed photographs, were distributed to each pilot. Although this practice will improve the effectiveness of air strikes, the nature of this work in itself proved to be a hardship because of the critically inadequate working space.

4. Photography.

There is a total of nineteen men assigned to the Photo Lab. A night crew of six men was used to complete all printing so that photographs were available for pilot briefing the following day. Air Group personnel processed gun camera film and maintained gun cameras installed in aircraft. Due to lack of experience in processing and printing of aerial film by laboratory personnel, a training program was put in effect and speed and efficiency in production increased throughout the operating period.

A total of 2896 usable 9x9 inch and 7585 usable 9x18 inch prints were made during the period. From 74 8x10 inch negatives of plot charts, overlays and target pinpoint photographs, 902 8x10 inch prints were made. Seven thousand feet of gun camera film were processed.

The Norse B5 developing outfit now in use will not hold a full roll of 9½"x390' aerial film, making it necessary to cut the film and use two reels for developing. It was found that the cover for the A8B aerial film magazine cracked very easily if not handled with extreme care in installation and stowage. This is due to the material used in the construction of the cover.

It is recommended that aerial film developing outfits with a 400 foot capacity and printing paper in 400 foot rolls, in lieu of the present 200 foot rolls, be made available to all units using the K-38 camera with A8B magazines.

5. Communications.

Communications during this period was considered highly satisfactory. The ship manned 22 different frequencies, excluding those of the AN/ARC1. Eleven circuits were manned in Main Radio necessitating a two section watch making it mandatory to place unqualified strikers on some circuits. However, this procedure provided valuable training, and no adverse conditions developed from this practice.

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Circuit T6 proved very effective in delivering high precedence traffic; however, the circuit was frequently inoperable due to unknown ship's failing to turn off their transmitters thereby leaving a continuous carrier wave on the air. It is recommended that only large ships guard this circuit. Destroyers should find circuit C4-3C adequate for their traffic.

Reception on circuit B32 was generally good but often deteriorated from midnight to 0600I. It is recommended that messages be repeated at least two hours after initial transmission instead of immediately afterwards. This practice would provide different reception conditions with more chance of receiving a clear signal.

The operations of the Primary and Secondary Tactical circuits was considered highly satisfactory. This ship employed two separate transmitters and receivers on these circuits thereby insuring against any fadeout sectors. Recommend that all ships able to do so employ this system of a back up receiver on these circuits.

It is felt that the tendency of using precedences of "OP" and "O" indiscriminately is a policy that could lead to a major weakness in the Force Communication Linkage. A better part of the traffic bearing such precedence consists of summaries of past action and other unrelated matters, which of itself does not warrant such urgency. As operations now stand, taking particular note of the general inexperience of Communication Office personnel and the cryptographic facilities of the various units, an urgent dispatch dealing with an on-the-spot tactical situation might easily be overlooked for twenty to thirty minutes while that time is spent decoding an intelligence summary of a preceding day. Subject to the above comments the following recommendations are submitted:

a. Recommend commands review current instructions defining the correct use of precedence.

b. Designate a separate circuit for traffic pertaining to tactical situations and other urgent matters only.

The following statistics are indicative of the communication aspects of the operation:

MESSAGES HANDLED IN MAIN RADIO

Transmitted on T6	967
Received on T6	314
Relayed on various circuits other than T6	769
Outgoing from ship	510
Received on B32	5,161
Received on George Fox	4,397
Total Messages Handled	14,118
Messages either from or addressed to U.S.S. ORISKANY (included in above count)	2,147
Total Classified Messages (58,333 groups)	384

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Messages handled by Signal Bridge 377

The above total does not include approximately 200 BT's handled during replenishments. Of the 377 total, 77 (1147 groups) were by Nancy.

The following statistics of Postal Activities are considered to be of general interest:

1602 Money Orders issued	$69,464.34
Stamps sold	$ 5,000.00
Registered mail received	183 pieces
Registered mail dispatched	124 pieces
Airmail dispatched	20 sacks (Approx 66,000 letters)
Airmail received	46 sacks
Air Parcel dispatched	2 sacks (approx 65 parcels)
First Class received	5 sacks
First Class dispatched	7 sacks
Parcel Post received	114 sacks
Parcel Post dispatched	76 sacks
Insured mail dispatched	105 pieces
Insured mail received	123 pieces

The only difficulty encountered in Postal operations was the shortage of stamps in this area. The delay in obtaining stamp stock from Post Office, New York almost imposed a curtailment of Parcel Post leaving the ship. It is recommended that the Fleet Post Office in this area provide stamp stock to ships.

6. Combat Information Center.

Operating procedures. During the period of this report CIC has been assigned the control of CAP, strike, and ASP on a rotational basis. Watch stations, layout of display and status boards, and techniques previously employed had to be revised considerably to adapt them to the demands peculiar to the type of operations experienced. Since none of the CIC Personnel of this ship had previous experience with TF-77 operations, the CIC officer and an Air Controller spent 10 days TAD aboard the PRINCETON and KEARSARGE prior to the ORISKANY's arrival in Japan. This plan of indoctrination is believed to be extremely beneficial and is highly recommended when the CIC team possesses little or no experience with TF-77 operations.

Strike control is practically impossible without the identification features of MK-10 IFF. On one occassion this ship was forced to relinquish strike control because of a temporarily inoperative MK-10 system. In most instances MK-10 is employed as a beacon, or, in reality, an additional radar system to locate and identify friendlies rather than to distinguish between friendly and bogey. Presentation in CIC was available to only one VK repeater and to one SX console. Additional presentation was urgently

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13

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needed and this need has been temporarily solved by piping the SPS-6B and MK-10 video through an unused position in the radar switchboard. Now any repeater can provide the MK-10 presentation as selected by the central control box on the SX console as originally installed.

Equipment performance. Radar performance has been generally good. Single B-29 type aircraft have repeatedly been detected at ranges in excess of 100 miles and an 8 plane flight of jets detected approaching at 85 miles. Although the height information of the SX is not reliable at ranges greater than 45-50 miles, on one occassion accurate altitude determination was established on a flight of 7 MIG-15 type aircraft at nearly zero target angle at a range of 65 miles. The main difficulty experienced operationally with the SPS-6B has been excessive side lobing which masks a wide band of scope presentation throughout nearly 360° at ranges of 40 miles or less from land masses.

The RCK receivers have proven to be quite limited in range unless silencer circuits are almost completely cut out. However, with silencer circuits cut out, the constant noise level of the receiver very nearly cancels out the advantage of slightly increased range. The AN/ARC-1 receivers have been more satisfactory than the RCK's. Good results have been obtained by using both an AN/ARC-1 and an RCK/TDQ simultaneously through the RCA Communication Console. This arrangement allows the advantage of long transmitter range of the TDQ and the best available receiver range of the AN/ARC. This arrangement, however, is only a temporary expedient since use of remote radio stations as selected through the console is lost for other purposes. It is planned to install headset jack boxes at key controller positions to allow transmitting on a TDQ through the normal sub-console units and receiving the AN/ARC through the jack. Excessive cross-talk and feed over on many of the VHF circuits has complicated air control problems, but they have been somewhat reduced by selection of widely separated antennae.

7. Gunnery Department

Copies of the ORISKANY's rearming plan, prepared on the basis of previous operational experience of PRINCETON and KEARSARGE, and obtained by ORISKANY's Advance Liaison Team have been forwarded to all interested commands. This plan has been used in four rearming operations, and on the basis of this limited experience it appears to be the most suitable for this ship. The "bottleneck" factor is the fragility of ORISKANY's electro-hydraulic winches, which equipment is presently under study by BUSHIPS. When these winches are operating properly the rate in loads-per-minute is optimum, but the capacity in pounds per load could be increased with no attendant overburdening in other phases.

8. Air Department

a. Personnel. During this period the personnel complement of the Air Department was as follows:

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Flight Deck	116
Hangar Deck	71
Catapult & Arresting Gear	57
Maintenance	74
Gasoline & Ordnance	140
TOTAL	458

Although all schedules and requirements were met during this operating period, shortages of personnel were particularly felt in the ordnance and aircraft handling divisions. With the advent of the winter months in Korean waters, it is recommended that at least 500 men be available in the Air Department.

b. Aircraft Handling. During the period the average on board count of aircraft was 73 plus one helicopter. Due to reduction of available space on hangar deck as a result of the CVA-34 conversion program, the rapid handling of aircraft, particularly the F9F, requires the highest degree of coordination in order to meet schedules. Obstructions on hangar bulkheads amplify the parking problem. Aircraft availability sometimes varies by four or five aircraft between squadrons. The sorting of aircraft that go "down" or come "up" only minutes prior to launch time disrupts aircraft handling and pilot plane assignment planning. All special aircraft with the exception of the jet photographic planes are parked aft in Hangar Bay #2 or on the flight deck. A total of five unflyable dud aircraft occupied Hangar Bay #3 at the end of this operating period.

In order to utilize all time possible for ordnance rearming of the AD type aircraft, these planes are recovered last and spotted starboard side and aft during modified ready deck at an angle of approximately sixty degrees with wings spread. This permits ordnance and handling crews to reload wing stations, refold wings and tighten the spot for next recovery. The development of a small easily portable hoist to load 250# bombs on folded AD wings would greatly save time and space. VA squadron 923 is at present designing and experimenting with such a hoist.

c. Catapults and Arresting Gear. During the period of this report 569 catapult launches were made, the majority of which were F9F aircraft. The BUAER forged eye pendant arrestor for the F9F has been unsatisfactory. An RUDM has been submitted reporting the damage to shuttle tow fittings with recommendations for an improved arrestor. The principal change recommended to the arrestor is to put the wire served ends of the bungee into the fire hose under the nylon straps. By using this change 510 successful F9F-5 launches at an average of 20 arrestations per arrestor have been made.

During the period of this report there have been 911 arrested landings. Approximately 50 per cent have been jets. (F9F-5). For forward area operation, arresting gear usage has indicated the desirability of having on board at least 50 per cent spares over current allowance. Highest usage items are the F2H and F9F combination barriers (longs).

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d. Gasoline. The Robb quick disconnect coupling has proven to be very efficient and time saving on replenishment days.

9. Supply Department

a. Aviation Stores

Procurement of aeronautical material from other carriers, mobile support ships, and other local sources has been successful for 61.55 per cent of 463 items requested. However, for priority "A" (53) and "B" (49) requirements availability was only 37.73 per cent and 36.73 percent respectively.

The range of items included in the various allowance lists is considered adequate since 391 of the 463 items requested were for replacement of exhausted or seriously depleted stocks or as an increase in allowance based on squadron recommendations. Most noticeable inadequacies at the present time are major control surfaces for F4U and AD type aircraft. As time on the line crystalizes this ship's experience, a more complete report of allowance list inadequacies will be made.

Usage of F9F MLG tires has been extremely high - 138 tires and 131 tubes for 436 landings. Information available indicates that other activities have not experienced such a high usage rate; therefore, further comment is withheld for the present.

The squadrons embarked with shortages of hand tools and winter flight clothing. Since the ship's allowance list for these items are intended for replacements only considerable difficulty was experienced on these items. Squadrons and composite units should be properly outfitted prior to embarkation for overseas deployment.

Cold weather items recommended in COMAIRPAC Instruction 4441.5B of 23 July 1952 and appropriate portions of Section "B" allowance are essential to operations in this area. This ship has been unsuccessful to date in its endeavors to obtain certain cold weather items, notably engine preheaters, engine; propeller and cockpit covers; and aircraft gun lubricants.

Certain items of section "B" material continue in short supply. The following items have been procured on an emergency basis only:

R 85-PW-171394 Liner Weldment - F9F
R 85-PW-198061 Liner Weldment - F9F
R 85-HO-A7002G Fuel Controls - F9F
R 82-GV-9520461 Brake Lining - F9F
R 94-C-550079 Controller Gun - F9F
R 82-P-580000 Point Tail Hook - All
R 82-GY-510717-2 Brake Lining - H035-1
R 94-C-78550 Gun Chargers Aero - 13A-AD3

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Procurement of allowance list items from CONUS has been slow. By effective area procurement, salvage and substitution, AOG's due to lack of parts, for this cruise, were limited to 2 AD3 and 2 F4U for periods of less than 7 days. 1 AD3, 1 F2H2P and 1 AD4W have been AOG for periods in excess of 7 days.

b. General Stores.

Stock level limits have been generally adequate. Most noticeable exceptions have been those for teletype paper and standard solvent, with an increase over part usage of approximately 10 to 1.

c. Ships Store.

It was found necessary to secure the after soda fountain during flight operations due to the proximity of the bomb stowage area and the resultant working groups congregated at or near the fountain. This fountain was used, however, to make ice cream for sale at the forward fountain and, in addition, has made all ice cream for the general mess and the private messes.

Ship's Store schedule was revised to include night operation of one store from 1900 to 2130 on Tuesdays and Thursdays. This revision was necessary due to the fact that the increased workload during operations in the Korean area makes it virtually impossible for many personnel to make purchases during the regular hours.

Shortages have arisen in stocks of cigars, chewing gum and marking tubes (for clothing). These items sold at approximately twice the anticipated rate.

d. Clothing and Small Stores.

C&SS Issue Room schedule was revised to include night operations from 1900 to 2130. This revision was necessary due to the fact that the increased workload during operations on the line makes it virtually impossible for many personnel to make purchases during the regular hours.

Shortages have arisen in black socks, dungaree jumpers and chambray shirts. Demand for these items as compared to past experience has proven to be approximately 1.5 to 1, 3 to 1 and 2 to 1, respectively. It should be noted that woolen socks are preferred to cotton socks.

The assigned replenishment ship was short on towels and black socks during the first period in port at Yokosuka. However, information has been received that these items can be procured from other auxiliary ships operating in the area.

e. Commissary.

Since arrival in Korean waters it was found desireable to discontinue the serving of regular night rations and to commence serving a full meal at

2315. This change has met with favorable reception and has resulted in substantial savings in bread and meat.

f. Disbursing.

The exchange of U.S. currency for MPC's and Yen upon first arrival in Japan has presented the largest problem to date. Necessity for procurement of MPC's and Yen after arrival in Yokosuka involved noticeable delay. Non-receipt of complete information regarding currency controls also contributed to the delay. Recommendations on this subject will be covered by separate letter.

It is recommended that all officers be advised as to their rights for additional income tax withholding as prescribed by para. 55431-5 BUSANDA Manual (IM 21-4) in order to prevent delay for those desiring such additional withholding. This should be done prior to arrival in the combat zone.

g. Replenishment Underway.

To date this ship has had two underway replenishments of stores under Supply Department cognizance (other than fuel oil and aviation gasoline) as follows:

11/1/52 - Provisions
11/19/52 - Aviation Stores
Provisions

Replenishment of provisions has been only moderately satisfactory in that quantities were drastically cut and in many instances some items were NIS. Further, fresh tomatoes and lettuce have been received in very poor condition. Survey was necessary for approximately one third (1/3) of the tomatoes and one fourth (1/4) of the lettuce received on 1 November.

Aviation stores were received in far greater quantity than advance reports indicated. Analysis as to types of items and priorities received could not be made prior to submission of this report.

Rate of transfer underway to date:

Provisions	65 tons/hour
Aviation Stores	45 tons/hour

While far from record shattering, the transfers were apparently effected as fast as the supplying ship could deliver. The provisions transfer was accompanied by substantial damage to crates and packages. The aviation stores transfer was very satisfactory, and accomplished in a safe and orderly fashion.

h. Wardroom Mess.

The major problem to be solved was that of serving a large number of officers at odd hours depending on operational requirements. The shift from

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table services to cafeteria style service at all meals except for the second seating at dinner has solved this problem to a very large extent. Food is kept hot and palatable, and serving time is reduced. This arrangement leaves more time for other requirements, both for the officers and the stewards. This system has received very favorable comment from all personnel concerned.

The procurement of wholesale cuts of Japanese beef and veal by the Ward room Mess has not only improved the variety available to the mess but has proven to be a sizeable economy factor.

COURTNEY SHANDS

Copies to:
CNO (2) Advance
CINCPACFLT (5) Advance
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NLO JOC KOREA
USS BOXER (CVA-21)
USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)
USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45)
USS PHILLIPINE SEA (CVA-47)
USS PRINCETON (CVA-37)
USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33)
USS WASP (CVA-18)
USS YORKTOWN (CVA-10)
CVG 2
CVG 5
CVG 7
CVG 9
CVG 11
CVG 15
CVG 19
CVG 101
ATG 2 (5)

[redacted]