USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47)
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From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 2 June through 6 July 1953

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.4

Encl: (1) CVG-9 Action Report 2 June through 6 July 1953 P. 26
(2) Collection of Air Department Safety Precaution Cartoons P. 56

1. In accordance with reference (a) the action report for the period 2 June through 6 July 1953 is hereby submitted.

PART I - COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION:

The USS PHILIPPINE SEA with the staff of RADM R. E. BLICK Jr., USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE and Carrier Air Group NINE embarked, got underway from Yokosuka, Japan at 0745I on 2 June 1953. This sortie was made in accordance with Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka dispatch 010619Z of June 1953. There were no accompanying ship on this sortie. At 1236I on 3 June the USS COWELL (DD-547) joined the PHILIPPINE SEA off the Goto Retto. Rendezvous with the Task Force was made in operating area Tare at 0511I on 3 June. The Task Force was under the command of RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE embarked in the USS BOXER (CVA-21), USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45), USS MANCHESTER (CL-83), and units of Destroyer Division THIRTY-ONE, TWO EIGHTY ONE, TWO EIGHTY TWO and Escort Division ELEVEN.

The Task Force operated in accordance with Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN Operation Order 2-52. Its mission was to support the United Nations Forces in Korea and to uphold the policy of the United States in the Far East. This was accomplished by aerial and surface strikes against enemy targets from the bombline north to the Manchurian border.

Ships joining the Task Force during this period were the USS NEW JERSEY (BB-62) with VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, Commander SEVENTH Fleet embarked, USS PRINCETON (CVA-37), USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39) with RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE embarked, USS BREMERTON (CA-130) with RADM W. G. SCHINDLER, USN, Commander Cruiser Division THREE embarked, and units of Destroyer Division ONE SIXTY ONE and THREE HUNDRED ONE.

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The Task Force was visited during this period by U. S. Ambassador W. C. BULLITT, ADM A. W. RADFORD, USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, VADM R. P. BRISCOE, USN, Commander Naval Forces Far East, VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, Commander SEVENTH Fleet, and RADM A. P. STORRS,. USN, Chief of Staff, Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet. At the conclusion of the period, the USS PHILIPPINE SEA was detached at 1438I on 4 July and returned to Yokosuka.

PART II - CHRONOLOGY:

2 June 1953 At 0745I got underway from Yokosuka, Japan by authority Commander Naval Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, Japan dispatch 010619Z of June 1953. The staff of RADM R. F. BLICK, Jr., USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE was embarked in the USS PHILIPPINE SEA on this sortie. There were no ships accompanying the PHILIPPINE SEA at this time.

3 June 1953 Underway for operating area. Launched Marine helicopters to K-3. USS COWELL (DD-547) joined the USS PHILIPPINE SEA.

4 June 1953 Joined the Task Force at 0511I in operating area Tare. No operations, Task Force replenished. RADM R. E. BLICK, Jr., USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE arrived aboard the USS PHILIPPINE SEA and assumed command as CTF 77 at 1806I. The USS MANCHESTER (CL-83) departed the Task Force.

5 June 1953 Combat air operations limited due weather, to weather recco, close air support, FCM, photo, and strikes on coastal guns in the Wonsan area. USS NEW JERSEY (BB-62) with VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, Commander SEVENTH Fleet embarked joined the Task Force, RADM W. D. JOHNSON,USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE transferred from the USS BOXER (CVA-21) to the USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45). LT C. E. JOHNSON, USN, Composite Squadron THREE suffered head injuries from enemy flak and landed at K-47.

6 June 1953 Combat air operations limited due weather, to armed reconnaissance and night interdiction along enemy main supply routes. The USS NEW JERSEY (BB-62) with VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, Commander SEVENTH Fleet embarked, left the Task Force. The USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45) with RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE embarked, left the Task Force. The USS MANCHESTER (CL-83) arrived Task Force.

7 June 1953 Task Force replenished. Combat air operations conducted consisting of attacks on bridges and supply buildings, Cherokee strikes against troop billeting areas. CDR S. B. BERRY, Commanding VA-95, crashed into sea from landing pattern. Pilot was recovered uninjured. LT R. J. KUEHLER, USNR of VC-11 ditched enroute to K-50. Pilot and crew were recovered uninjured.

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8 June 1953 Combat air operations limited due weather to Cherokee strikes, against billeting areas, close air support of front line troops, and MPQ bombing. DesDiv 301 joined and DesDiv 31 departed the Task Force. LT W. C. FELDMEYER, Jr., USNR, of VF-94, landed K-46 due flak damage to aircraft. LTJG J. P. SKYRUD, USN, of VF-94, crash landed at K-13 due flak damage to aircraft and suffered a broken arm.

9 June 1953 Cherokee work and close support of the front line troops continued in an effort to smash enemy offensives along the front. MPQ bombing was conducted and rail and highway bridges in the rear areas were attacked.

10 June 1953 The Cherokee and close support effort were stepped up as the front line action intensified. MPQ bombing was also conducted and attacks on the marshalling yard at Hasepo-ri were made with good results. Bunkers and trucks were the main front line targets. RADM A. P. STORRS, USN, Chief of Staff for CinCPacFlt visited the Task Force and the USS PHILIPPINE SEA.

11 June 1953 Once again the main effort was directed against front line targets. Cherokee strikes, close air support, and MPQ bombing constituted the majority of our sorties. ADM A. W. RADFORD, USN, CinCPacFlt and appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited the Task Force and the USS PHILIPPINE SEA. With ADM RADFORD were VADM R. P. BRISCOE, USN, ComNavFe, and VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, Com7thFlt. The USS NEW JERSEY (BB-62) arrived and departed the Task Force. The USS PRINCETON (CVA-37) joined the Task Force. The USS MANCHESTER (CL-83) left the Task Force. LTJG J. TOROSIAN, USNR of VF-94, bailed out of his aircraft because of fire in the engine and drowned before recovered.

12 June 1953 Front line targets were again the objects of most sorties. In addition airfields in the vicinity of HAMHUNG, HUNGNAM, and WONSAN were bombed. Weather prevented a full days operation.

13 June 1953 The USS PHILIPPINE SEA again set a new record for naval aircraft in this conflict when 160 sorties were flown. Cherokee strikes and close air support drew the main attention but numerous strikes were flown against North Korean marshalling yards and main supply routes. The USS NEW JERSEY (BB-62) with VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, and Ambassador W. C. BULLITT aboard, joined the Task Force. The USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39), USS MANCHESTER (CL-83) and USS BREMERTON (CA-130) joined the Task Force.

14 June 1953 Beginning with night heckler interdiction, attacks on enemy positions ranged over the whole Northeast sector of Korea, centering mainly on front line support. Communist rail and road networks were pummelled, resulting in numerous boxcars and several vehicles destroyed. Heavy blows were struck at marshalling yard near Hasepo-ri. RADM W. D. JOHNSON,

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USN, ComCarDiv ONE, assumed command as Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. The OTC shifted to the USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39). RADM W. G. SCHINDLER, USN, ComCruDiv 3 visited the ship. DesDiv 32 joined and DesDiv 301 departed the Task Force.

15 June 1953 The heaviest naval air blow of the conflict was struck today. Despite a crippled engineering condition the USS PHILIPPINE SEA launched seventy effective close air support sorties.

16 June 1953 As repairs were effected today sorties were limited to thirty-two close air support missions. LT H. J. AIREY, USN, of VC-3 detachment MIKE, was forced to ditch due to flak damage. Pilot was recovered uninjured.

17 June 1953 Again operating with full effectiveness but hampered by weather, attacks were limited to strikes on coastal defense guns guarding Wonsan and Hungnam and interdiction of the main enemy supply routes. ECM sorties were flown. RADM J. M. CARSON, USN, ComFair Japan visited the ship and Task Force.

18 June 1953 Combat air operations were cancelled due weather.

19 June 1953 Cherokee strikes and close air support missions were the main effort of the day which was curtailed due to inclement weather. The USS NEW JERSEY (BB-62) with VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, and Commander SEVENTH Fleet embarked, joined and left the Task Force. The USS BOXER (CVA-21) departed for Yokosuka. LT. H. L. FOSHEE, USNR, of VF-91 ditched his plane off Wonsan but was recovered uninjured.

20 June 1953 No combat air operations. Task Force replenished. DesDiv 161 joined the Force.

21 June 1953 No combat air operations due weather.

22 June 1953 No combat air operations due weather.

23 June 1953 No combat air operations due weather. DesDiv 282 departed Task Force.

24 June 1953 Primary consideration today was given to close air support and MPQ although strikes were flown against coastal defense guns near Wonsan and against Sondok air field.

25 June 1953 A full day of sorties with continuing emphasis on front line support in the form of Cherokee strikes, close air support and MPQ bombing. Armed recco of the enemy rail and road network was flown. RADM R. E. BLICK, Jr., USN, and ComCarDiv THREE transferred with staff from the USS PHIL-

IPPINE SEA to the USS PRINCETON (CVA-37). Ensign M. W. WAKELAND, USNR, of VF-91, ditched due fire and suffered minor injuries.

26 June 1953 Air operations limited due weather to Cherokee, close air support, and night interdiction of the main enemy supply routes. LTJG C. D. MAC DONALD, USN, of VF-91 ditched due fuel state but was recovered uninjured. LT A. E. WESTMORELAND, USN, of VF-91 crashed short of the runway at K-18 but suffered no injuries.

27 June 1953 No air operations due weather. The USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39) with RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, ComCarDiv ONE, departed Task Force.

28 June 1953 No air operations due weather. DesDiv 11 joined and DesDiv 32 departed Task Force.

29 June 1953 Air operations again consisted primarily of close air support and Cherokee but attacks were made against troop cantonments near Pukchong and Hamhung. Hoemun air field was attacked and coastal guns near Wonsan were bombed. NGF spot was flown for the USS MANCHESTER (CL-83) and strikes were made against supply routes near Hongwon. LT J. R. CAUFIELD, USNR, of VF-94 was forced to ditch his plane due to enemy flak damage but was recovered uninjured.

30 June 1953 Conducted combat air operations consisting of close air support, Cherokee, and recco. ECM was flown and NGF spot was conducted for the USS MANCHESTER at Wonsan.

1 July 1953 Hard blows were struck today against enemy front line positions. Chongjin air field was hit as was the marshalling yard south of Wonsan. ECM proved successful today. DesDiv 302 arrived and DesDiv 71 departed the Task Force. LT. H. L. FOSHEE, USNR, of VF-91 crash landed K-18 due enemy flak damage but suffered no injuries.

2 July 1953 Although delay by weather, sorties were launched against Cherokee and close air support targets, rail tunnels, coastal defense guns, and enemy vehicles. NGF spot dropped Psychological Warfare leaflets on villages in the Anbyon Valley area.

3 July 1953 Weather forced a divert from front line attacks to strikes on Communist air fields. These struck today were Chongjin, Kilchu, Yongpo, and Wonsan. ECM, MPQ, NGF, and day and night interdiction sorties were launched.

4 July 1953 Air operations cancelled due weather. The USS PHILIPPINE SEA was relieved on the line by the USS BOXER (CVA-21) and

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departed for Yokosuka at 1438I, in accordance with Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN Confidential Dispatch 040510Z of July 1953.

5 July 1953 Enroute to Yokosuka.

6 July 1953 Arrived Yokosuka.

PART III - ORDNANCE

1. Materials There were no major casualties to Ship's ordnance material during the period. Correction to/or repair of minor casualties were accomplished expeditiously and no item of ordnance equipment was secured for repairs for a period greater than two (2) hours.

2. Ammunition Expenditures:

a. Ship:

(1) No firing was conducted due to operating schedules or inclement weather.

b. Air Group:

(1) Expenditures of ammunition by the Air Group is covered in enclosure (1).

PART IV - BATTLE DAMAGE:

1. No battle damage was inflicted on the PHILIPPINE SEA during the period.
2. Damage inflicted on PHILIPPINE SEA aircraft (refer to enclosure (1)).
3. Damage inflicted by PHILIPPINE SEA aircraft (refer to enclosure (1)).

PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES:

1. Performance

a. Personnel

Morale and discipline continued to be exceptionally high. The educational program continued to be popular with all hands. Classes in Leadership have been continued and are conducted weekly for officers and senior petty officers.

GED Tests Administered	23
USAFI Correspondence Courses Req.	36
Enlisted Correspondence Courses	43
End of Course Tests	[illegible]
Manuals Issued for Self-Improvement	[illegible]

During the period of this report 24 enlisted personnel and 5 of-

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ficers have been detached from the ship. Nine enlisted personnel and one officer have reported for duty.

b. Welfare and Recreation

The ship's orchestra and the "hill-billy" band have played regularly scheduled concerts for groups throughout the ship, and during replenishment. Numerous requests were received from replenishment ships for various selections which were fulfilled whenever possible. The noticeable lift in morale, due to the efforts of the ship's musicians, reemphasized the desirability of retention of the ship's band in CVA class ships.

Bingo games in the crew's mess were a regular Wednesday night feature and were an outstanding success. The library hours were continued from 0830 to 2130 and the library was well patronized.

The hobby shop continues to be popular with the men with model planes, model ships, and leatherwork still leading in popularity.

The crew's and officer's work-out rooms, with qualified physical instructors as supervisors, have remained crowded with large numbers of officers and enlisted men.

The recreation room continues to be a popular place for the men in an off-duty status to read, write letters or listen to short wave radio programs.

A mimeograph morning newspaper has been published daily containing world news and shipboard happenings. A Sunday supplement, "The Philippine Sea Lines" was published weekly, containing feature stories about the ship with pictures of current ship happenings. The U.S. Naval Liaison Officer JOC, Korea, furnished copies of "Stars and Stripes" to ships of Task Force Seventy-Seven daily. This service enabled wide dissemination of a far greater news coverage than is possible with the regular ship's press news.

c. Divine Services

Divine services were held regularly for men of the Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Latter Day Saint and Christian Science faiths. Catholic Mass was celebrated daily and three times on Sundays and Catholic instructions were held twice weekly. The Blessed Sacrament was reserved so pilots could receive communion at any time. Protestant Divine Services were held twice on Sundays with a daily morning prayer service and Bible Study three evenings a week. Jewish, Latter Day Saints and Christian Science services and Study groups were held regularly with interested personnel in charge. Evening prayers followed "Taps" every night with the Catholic and Protestant Chaplains alternating.

2. Medical

a. Performance

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This period on the line has been just about a month long, and included a "maxium effort" of about ten days. However, the weather interfered considerably with flight operations, and there were prolonged episodes of enforced relative inactivity for a considerable number of people. On top of this the promising peace negotiations in Korea failed to produce the hoped for results in spite of our all out effort.

The general health and well being of the personnel remained good in spite of many days of cold, damp weather.

b. Illness

During this period there were 2171 outpatient treatments rendered and 169 admissions to the sick list. These figures include V.D., and are the totals for all on-board personnel. There were no unusual or critical illnesses, however, there were two cases of infectious hepatitis transferred to the hospital and one relatively severe dermatitis thought to be the result of aureomycin. There were no serious accidents on board (see enclosure (1) for aircraft injuries). The sick bay did 25 surgical cases of which four were major, three emergency and one elective.

c. Casualties

No serious injuries or deaths in the ship's company.

d. Venereal disease

G.C.	10
Non G.C.	116
Chancroid	4
Total	130

Since our arrival in the Far East in January 1953, the average incidence of V.D. for the ship has been 35 per thousand. This figure includes non-specific urethritis.

PART VI - COMMENTS

1. Aviation

a. Safety

An extensive safety program was conducted in the Air Department endeavoring to achieve maximum safety during flight operations. Prior to the commencement of each cruise in the Korean operating area, safety lectures were conducted and all personnel connected with the handling, servicing, and maintenance of aircraft were compelled to attend. Officers and Chief Petty Officer, roaming the decks, acted as safety officers for on-the-spot correction of violations observed and reported violators to the Aircraft Handling Officer for a discussion of the precautions to be observed and practiced regarding the reported violation. Articles pertaining to safety during flight operations were included in the ship's newspaper. Additionally, in an effort to instill and further promote safety

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consciousness, a series of safety sketches were designed to portray the various dangerous aspects of the flight and hangar decks during flight operations. Though dangerous practices continue to exist, most gratifying results were attained. Enclosed herewith are samples of safety sketches which are considered noteworthy.

b. Catapults

There were 692 aircraft catapulted from the port catapult and 533 from the starboard catapult during this period. Since the commissioning of this ship 10,097 aircraft have been catapulted from the port, and 9,835 from the starboard catapult.

Sustained operations at maximum launching pressures greatly increased the maintenance required to keep the machinery operating. High pressures and vibration increased the number of fluid leaks around fittings and packings and caused numerous failures of hold-down brackets on the main oil supply line.

The vanes on the jet blast deflector continually crack around the welds and a constant program of re-welding is necessary.

c. Arresting Gear

There were 1,839 arrested landings during this period making a total of 58,485 since commissioning of the ship. The average number of landings obtainable on the first four cross deck pendants before changing is required is as follows: P1 - 90, P2 - 74, P3 - 91, P4 - 94.

On 26 June 1953 the sleeve on the shaft of the vertical deck edge sheave, port side on P2, turned 90° on the shaft during jet landings, cutting off all lubrication to the bearing surface. Alert deck edge control operators noted excess smoking from that sheave and repairs were effected before the sheave froze. At present, it can only be concluded that this failure occurred because of the added forces imposed on that sheave by port off-center landings combined with the already increased loads attendant to jet landings. There were 5934 landings on this sheave since installation. This is the second such failure on this ship. It is incumbent upon arresting gear personnel to be ever alert for indications of such failures.

d. Aircraft Handling

The following distances were successfully used to deck launch the AD-4 Type aircraft with a 4000 pound bomb load. The F4U-4 with a 1500 pound bomb load can be launched at distances of 15 feet less than those listed for the AD-4. When launching under gusty wind condition and pitching deck, it is considered advisable to add fifteen feet to the listed distance.

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Distance in Feet	Wind in Knots	Temperature
535 575 600	36 33 30	30°
560 600 620	36 33 30	50°
600 630 675	36 33 30	70°
620 650	36 33	75°

e. Aircraft Maintenance

For a 30 day operating period, 170 gallons of Stoddard solvent are sufficient provided plane captains are limited to one quart and maintenance personnel to 3 quarts per issue. The normal tendency for personnel to take more than required can double or triple quantities used, resulting in a logistics problem. The five gallon containers for Stoddard Solvent make excellent waste baskets.

In the support of AD type aircraft, 12½ ton jacks are a necessity. One pair will suffice for a squadron and the VC detachments.

No trouble was experienced with the Universal Tow Bar (R89-B-104300) cutting the side walls on F9F-5 nose tires, after the nose wheel towing hooks were installed on the inside of the Tow Bar Tow hook support plates.

There were no complete failures of the F9F arresting hook tips during this tour; however, the NAF 603410-1XX reannealed hooks are not proving satisfactory with off center landings. The hook tips received to date have initial slot widths of 1.880 or less, yet, after two to seven landings, numerous tips were removed for excessive slot width. These hook tips appear too soft and spread readily from an off center landing. It is believed that the original NAF hook tips were better,

provided F9F change #156 was properly incorporated and all leading edges of the hook tip slot were provided with a smoothed 1/16" radius.

The Bendix high pressure cock and pressurizing valve assemble, P/N R85-BPD-116417-5, used on F9F-2, J42 engines are being disassembled and cleaned aboard successfully and are operated as satisfactorily as new assemblies.

The locally manufactured outer wing panel bomb-rack tie down fittings and rings continued to give satisfactory performance. The tie down ring fitting is screwed in the outer bomb-rack wing fitting, thus providing a satisfactory means of securing the F9F-2 wings during high wind conditions.

Considerable trouble was experienced with the aileron boost valve, P/N R83-AP-25400-20, on F9F-2 aircraft. Gumming, resulting in sticking of the "kick out pin" in the solenoid, caused most of the failures. When the kick out pin sticks, the cut-out contacts usually arc, burn, or stick, resulting in burning out the solenoid itself. If only the cut-out contacts burn, repairs can be made by cleaning the "kick out pin" and replacing the cut-out contacts. Twenty failures of this valve have occurred this tour and sixteen of these were repaired in the above manner. Burned out solenoids were not repairable.

f. Gasoline

The following aviation gasoline and aviation lube oil was expended during the period 2 June 1953 to 4 July 1953:

Av/Gas 115/145	Av. Lube Oil 1100
988,900 gals.	4,215 gals.

2. Gunnery

a. Replenishment

(1) During the period 2 June to 6 July 1953 the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47) refueled from AO's 14 times.

(2) One destroyer was refueled.

(3) Eleven destroyers were received alongside for transfer of freight and/or personnel.

(4) One hundred fifty four persons were transfered via high-line.

(5) Aviation stores were replenished from USS JUPITER (AVS-8) once.

(6) Replenishment of provisions:

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17 June 1953	USS PICTOR	99 Tons	76.8 T/Hr.
30 June 1953	USS ALSTEDE	75 Tons	87.6 T/Hr.

(7) Rearming:

7 June 1953	USS FIREDRAKE	80 Tons	172 T/Hr.
10 June 1953	USS RAINIER (Night)	219 Tons	170 T/Hr.
12 June 1953	USS VESUVIUS (Night)	211 Tons	124 T/Hr.
14 June 1953	USS VESUVIUS (Night)	261 Tons	134 T/Hr.
16 June 1953	USS MT. BAKER (Night)	261 Tons	133 T/Hr.
20 June 1953	USS FIREDRAKE	117 Tons	214 T/Hr.
25 June 1953	USS FIREDRAKE (Night)	120 Tons	144 T/Hr.
30 June 1953	USS RAINIER	131 Tons	148 T/Hr.
2 July 1953	USS VESUVIUS	120 Tons	160 T/Hr.
3 July 1953	USS VESUVIUS (Night)	110 Tons	165 T/Hr.

3. Supply

a. Aviation Supply

(1) Due to sailing unexpectedly after only four days in port the Aviation Stores Group had little time to procure items that were not immediately available from the USS JUPITER. This vessel was replenished on the line by the USS JUPITER on 25 June. Of 105 line items requisitioned, 74 were received.

(2) Due to unexpected high usage of Hydrolube, a shortage was experienced and it was necessary to ration the remaining stock and procure emergency requirements from other carriers. Four hundred gallons were used during this tour.

(3) Shortages of the following items were experienced. They appear to be in short supply in the area.

R83-AP-25400-20 Valve (3 ACOG)
R88-I-1325-012-000 Indicator

b. General Stores Material

(1) To facilitate the handling of stores it is suggested that the stores issue ships comply with COMSERVRON THREE INSTRUCTION 4460.1 of 9 February 1953. While replenishing at anchor 1 June, the boats from the USS POLLUX (AKS-4) arrived alongside with all the stores stowed in the boats without cargo nets.

(2) Due to lapsed time of over a month in the receipt of priced invoices covering general stores material, it is difficult to maintain allotment and requisition records in an expeditious manner.

(3) Difficulty has been experienced in obtaining stock numbers

G58-C-660-50 and G58-G-100-50. It is recommended that these items be included in the AKS Load List.

c. Ship's Store

(1) Ship's Store luxury items and foreign-make products are sold aboard as quickly as they are put on sale. Items such as Japanese cameras, binoculars, and cultured pearls are continually in demand and exceed the ship's ability to obtain supplies of these items.

d. Commissary

(1) During this operating period provisions (fresh, frozen, and dry) were replenished as indicated below:

DATE	PROV. ORDERED (TONS)	PROV. RECEIVED (TONS)	SHIP	TIME (MIN)
6/17/53	108	99	USS PICTOR (AF-54)	83
6/30/53	92	74½	USS ALSTEDE (AF-48)	50

(2) The quality of fresh fruits and vegetables was not too satisfactory and their availability was limited.

(3) During the replenishment on 30 June, it was noted that the frozen meats, vegetables and fruits had begun to thaw considerably. Apparently they had been removed from cold storage several hours in advance of the actual replenishment. However, it is not contemplated that loss of any of these items because of thawing will occur.

(4) This vessel experienced no supply shortage of critical items.

4. Engineering

a. During the period 26 May to 16 June 1953, the USS PHILIPPINE SEA experienced difficulties with Nos 2 and 3 Main Engines which required operation with three shafts on 26 May and 9 through 13 June and on two shafts from 14 through 15 June. A chronological narrative of the events surrounding these casualties, including analysis of the difficulties, remedial action taken and the results obtained, follows:

(1) 26 May

The 1600 micrometer thrust reading for No. 2 H.P. Turbine indicated insufficient axial chearance of the rotor in the forward direction just after the ship had executed a hard right turn out of the wind while steaming full power in connection with launching aircraft. No unusual noises emanated from the turbine or reduction gears and there was no interruption of lube oil supply to the bearings. Bearing temperature readings did not indicate excessive temperature. The USS PHILIPPINE SEA was

detached from Task Force 77 to proceed independently for a scheduled upkeep and recreation period in Yokosuka, Japan. Investigation of the casualty and subsequent repairs were carried out during the evening of 26 May. Thrust readings were taken by jacking the rotor hard forward and aft and gave a total float reading of 0.080", indicating that the forward thrust shoes had been wiped. No. 2 H.P. Thrust Bearing was disassembled and the conclusions verified. The thrust bearing collar, the after thrust shoes, and the forward and after journal bearings were inspected and found to be in satisfactory condition. The forward assembly of thrust shoes was replaced with shoes from spare parts. The bearings and housing were reassembled and new thrust readings taken, giving a total float of 0.010". It was estimated that 0.004" was wiped from the blade shrouding as a result of this casualty. This derangement was reported on a Material Analysis Data Sheet. Four-shaft operation was resumed with the No. 2 H.P. Turbine axial clearances adequate except that the rotor showed a tendency to ride the forward shoes.

(2) 9 June

While making high speeds for air operations at 0630, deficient forward axial clearance of the No. 2 H.P. Turbine Rotor was again noted. No unusual noises emanated from the turbine or reduction gears and there was no interruption of lube oil supply to the bearings. Bearing temperature readings did not indicate excessive temperatures. No. 2 Shaft was stopped and locked. Air operations were then resumed with three-shaft operation with shaft speed limited to 237 RPM (10 RPM less than that specified by BuShips Manual, Article 41-130, for three-shaft operation), with a minimum loss of scheduled launches. Thrust readings were taken by jacking the rotor hard forward and aft and gave a total float of 0.081", indicating that the forward thrust shoes had again been wiped. No. 2 H.P. Turbine thrust bearing was disassembled and the suspicions verified. The after thrust shoes and the forward and after journal bearings were inspected and found in good condition. The after shoes were shifted to forward, and new shoes from spares were installed on the after side because the spares were not in first-class condition. The bearings and housings were reassembled and thrust readings taken, giving a total float of 0.007". No. 2 Shaft was unlocked after the completion of air operations on 9 June during the evening. As the speed was increased it was noted that No. 2 H.P. Turbine Rotor was persistently riding forward at high speeds. An upper operating limit of 120 RPM was set for No. 2 Shaft to maintain the rotor at its forward axial limit in order to insure a maximum of 120 RPM. This action was taken in order to provide maximum ship speed for the maximum air effort directive currently in effect. The ship was able to make 28.5 knots under this arrangement. This machinery derangement was reported on a Material Analysis Data Sheet.

(3) 10 June

No. 2 High Pressure Turbine Rotor continued to ride forward although limiting the speed of the shaft prevented its exceeding the for-

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ward axial limit. Data for the rotor axial positions of all H.P. turbines and for No. 2 and 3 Main Reduction Gear positions for the complete range of ship's speed as recorded during the previous week were collected and plotted upon a series of line graphs. Analysis of these graphs showed that the characteristic movement at high speeds of the H.P. turbine rotors was aft, and of the reduction gears, forward. No. 2 H.P. Turbine Rotor, however, moved forward at high speeds in the same manner as No. 2 Main Reduction Gear and along a parallel curve. It was concluded that there must be positive engagement between the rotor and the reduction gear. Since the only link between the two units was the H.S. flexible coupling, it was concluded that the coupling must be binding. It was decided to lock No. 2 Shaft and check the coupling at the earliest available opportunity.

(4) 11 June

No. 2 Shaft was stopped and locked to investigate the condition of the flexible coupling between the H.P. Turbine Rotor and the H.S. Pinion of the reduction gears, and the bearings for the H.S. Pinion. Air operations were continued with three-shaft operation with shaft speed limited to 237 RPM with a minimum loss of scheduled launches. It was found that the teeth on the forward end of the flexible coupling shaft and on the forward coupling sleeve were so worn and shouldered that there was positive engagement between the turbine rotor and the main reduction gear when the gear moved forward under load. A check for parallelism between the H.S. pinion and the first reduction gear and visual examination of babbit in accessible bearings indicated that the pinion bearings had not been damaged, and therefore, they were not removed for inspection. A request for a replacement coupling was sent by dispatch, and a spare coupling assembly was ordered by ComServPac to be shipped special air freight from Naval Supply Center, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

(5) 12 June to 14 June

The USS PHILIPPINE SEA continued to operate on three shafts from 12 June to 14 June. Air operations were carried out on schedule during the intensified effort on the Korean Front with 138 and 160 sorties being flown on the first two respective days. However, on the afternoon of 14 June deposits of metal flakes were obtained from the magnets in the lube oil strainers of No. 3 Reduction Gear Lubrication System. In addition, it was noted that at high speeds No. 3 H.P. Turbine Rotor was riding forward, following the characteristic trend of No. 3 Main Reduction Gear. At 1545 No. 3 Shaft was stopped and locked. There was no interruption of lube oil supply to the bearings, and bearing temperature readings did not indicate excessive temperatures. The USS PHILIPPINE SEA commenced two-shaft operation with maximum speed limited to 18 knots (200 RPM for Nos. 1 and 4 Engines), with limited air operations continued on schedule. The flexible coupling between No. 3 H.P. Turbine Rotor and No. 3 Reduction Gear H.S. Pinion was inspected, and the teeth on the coupling shaft and coupling sleeves were found to be slightly worn and shouldered.

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The journal bearings and the thrust bearings for No. 3 H.P. Turbine were found satisfactory. Check for parallelism between the H.S. pinion and first reduction gear and visual examination of babitt in accessible bearings indicated that the pinion bearings had not been damaged, and therefore they were not removed for inspection. Inspection of the reduction gears revealed metal chips on brackets in the vicinity of the H.S. pinion shaft. In addition, the teeth of the H.S. pinion showed more evidence of edge-feathering than normal. It was decided to remove the flexible coupling and dress its roughened working surfaces to remove shoulders which had started to develop.

The advance of the main reduction gear forward from its normal position was attributed to increased propeller slip and abnormal forces caused by turning during three-shaft operation. The slip for four-shaft operation at full power of 257 RPM and at a ship's speed of 31.1 knots is 0.217; for three-shaft operation 237 RPM and at a ship's speed of 26.5 knots it is 0.265. Since thrust is directly proportional to slip, it is evident that three-shaft operation increases the reduction gear load appreciably and thereby the tendency of the main reduction gears to ride forward. Because it was considered that maloperation of the reduction gears was attributable to the unbalance caused by three-shaft high power operation and that the metal flaking was caused by the H.S. pinion running in a new position, it was decided that operation of No. 3 Main reduction gear would return to normal with the restoration of four-shaft operation.

(6) 15 June

During the early morning hours prior to air operations the ship lay to for four hours to permit removal of the H.P flexible coupling assemblies from Nos. 2 and 3 Main Engines. The teeth of the flexible coupling shaft and sleeves from No. 3 Main Engine were filed, dressed and made ready for installation. The replacement assembly for No. 2 Unit, less the body bound bolts and elastic nuts, arrived by COD Aircraft on the morning of 15 June. Air operations on two shafts continued with 70 sorties being flown.

(7) 16 June

After replenishment on the evening of 15 June and during the early morning of 16 June the ship again lay to for four hours to permit reinstallation of the two coupling assemblies. Lube oil had been pumped from No. 2 and 3 Main Reduction Gear Sumps to the settling tanks and the sumps cleaned and inspected. The lube oil was renovated and returned to the main sumps. No. 2 Coupling Assembly was installed using the old bolts and elastic nuts. No. 3 Unit was reinstalled using the after coupling sleeve from the old No. 2 Unit since it showed a minimum of wear and was in excellent condition. It was found that due to the rake of the shaft, the free-floating coupling shaft normally positioned itself aft, with its after coupling flange hard up against the H.S Pinion itself aft, with its after coupling flange hard up against the H.S. Pinion coupling flange, so that tooth wear resulted in the development of shoulders on the teeth.

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The removal and re-installation of the coupling sleeve body-bound bolts was an extremely difficult operation. Cloth bags were installed in main lube oil strainers to collect small particles of sediment. Air operations continued until 1200 on 16 June. At 1215 the USS PHILIPPINE SEA again lay to to permit raising of vacuum in Nos. 2 and 3 Main Plants, and Nos. 2 and 3 Main Engines were warmed up in accordance with BuShips Manual Chapter 41, Article 41-32. The ship got underway at 1345 making 10 RPM, and each turbine was investigated for unusual noises and for rotor distortion. Speed was increased on main engines 10 RPM each 10 minutes while working up to 245 RPM. There were no unusual noises from the turbines or reduction gears, no appreciable deposits of metal flakes appeared in lube oil and the axial positions of Nos. 2 and 3 H.P. Turbine Rotors resumed the normal characteristic of riding aft at high speeds. Clearances and temperatures were normal in all respects. At 1800 Nos. 2 and 3 Main Engines were considered fully operational (full power of 257 RPM was not attained becuase of the operational necessity for rendezvous with a replenishment ship at 1900).

(8) Results

The repairs and replacements to Nos. 2 and 3 H.S. Flexible Couplings were completely effective. The H.P. Turbine Rotor axial positions moved aft at high speeds following the normal characteristic of the H.P. turbines. With the return to four-shaft operation, Nos. 3 Main Reduction gear took its normal position. Frequent checks of lube oil strainers showed no evidence of metal flakes and indicated that the flaking had discontinued.

5. Damage Control

a. No comment.

6. CIC

a. Due to the necessity of operating aircraft under unfavorable weather conditions, especially during periods of low ceilings and reduced visibility, a low visibility approach procedure was devised.

Two air controllers were used. One acted as strike controller and vectored the returning aircraft to a holding sector approximately 20 miles downwind of the formation. Here the flights were put in "orbits" and turned over to the second or "final controller" on a different VHF frequency.

Close liaison with Primary Fly was kept and aircraft were fed into the landing pattern by the final controller who would detach aircraft by divisions, sections, or singly depending upon severity of the weather. At a distance from the force dependent upon their holding altitude, inbound planes were instructed to set up a standard rate of descent (4000 feet per minute for jets, 2000 feet per minute for props) to enable them to break clear of the overcast 6 to 8 miles down wind of the force.

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Inbound vectors were given using the 20 mile scale of the map sector scan of the SX console and were found to be highly satisfactory.

A status board was kept displaying the identity, altitude, and position of all inbound aircraft giving the watch officer an up-to-the-minute picture of the situation and enabling him to relay such information to the bridge, Pri-fly and the force commander.

7. Communications

a. The overall performance of communications during this tour on the line is considered to have been eminently successful. The unexpected embarking of ComCarDiv THREE and Staff who subsequently assumed CTF 77 resulted in traffic volume multiplying severalfold. Although hampered by inadequacies in personnel, equipment, and operating space, flagship communications were conducted without incident. It is believed that traffic volume reached an all time record for Korean action during this period and traffic analysis is included below.

TRAFFIC ANALYSIS FOR PERIOD 2 June to 3 July 1953

Messages received (radio) - - - - - - - -	20,662
Messages relayed (radio) - - - - - - - -	1,113
Messages sent (radio) - - - - - - - -	2,782
	24,557
Messages received (visual) - - - - - - - -	1,460
Messages relayed (visual) - - - - - - - -	338
Messages sent (visual) - - - - - - - -	933
Total handled (visual) - - - - - - - -	2,371
Total messages handled - - - - - - - -	27,288
Total encrypted groups received - - - -	224,933
Total encrypted groups sent - - - - -	33,649
Record day, 11 June 1953 - - - - - - - - Total handled (radio)	1,189

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b. Mail was received eleven times during the period and was dispatched nine times at intervals of two to five days. On two occasions the incoming mail had been soaked, apparently having been allowed to stand in water for some time as labels were washed off, addresses unreadable and much film had been ruined. It is noted that since the last incident, mail has been protected by the use of double bags and was recieved in good shape and dry. It is recommended that supercargo reports showing the amount of mail coming aboard be included in the replenishment messages.

8. Air Intelligence

a. The air intelligence office functioned smoothly during this period. There was an adequate supply of charts and materials available and no shortages were encountered. The air intelligence advance party from the USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33) and Carrier Air Group ELEVEN came aboard for orientation and observation and were furnished the latest information available on the current Korean conflict.

b. This office, as probably all air intelligence offices, suffers from lack of a teletype screen. Such an installation would provide the latest information on weather, air operations etc. to be sent to the A.I. office at the same time as to the ready rooms, instead of depending on a separate communication from air operations over the intercom box. As a teletype screen is not practical due to space limitations it is felt that this problem may be solved by cutting a small hole in the after bulkhead of the A.I. office. This arrangement would allow visual observation of the teletype screen in Ready Room #3 which is just aft of the A.I. Office.

9. Photographic Interpretation

a. A high degree of cooperation from the photo lab has been instrumental in producing more presentable mosaics and a more precise interpretation of areas which have presented a problem to the P.I. The hand contact prints, in preference to sonne-prints, produce a clearer and more easily reproduced target mosaic. The enlargements made from the K-38 IMC film have proven an aid in the interpretation of certain exceptional items and areas where the original scale of 1:5000 was too small to determine conclusively the identity of the objects in question. This is especially true during the summer months when camouflage is most prevalent.

b. The major problem encountered has been the consistent shortage of natural rubber cement essential to the laying of target mosaics.

10. Photographic Laboratory

a. Equipment failures

(1) Several failures of the A&B magzine have been caused by fragments of the paper inter-liner of the 9½ x 390', Stock No. E18-F-31485-160 aerial film can being jammed between the spool flange and edges of film.

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This paper acts as a wedge which prevents the film from being transported or jams the film in the focal plane causing film breakage. As much as ten feet of film have been unwound in the dark room before loading the magazine in an attempt to remove these fragments with no success.

(2) Primary cause of the inter-liner shredding is rough handling of film during shipment and excessive vibration in Film Stowage Compartment C-615-A during high speed operation of the ship. This situation does not arise with 205 foot rolls, apparently due to difference in weight.

b. Supply

(1) In several instances delivery deadline dates on essential photographic supplies were not met. Consequently it was necessary to requisition these supplies from other units in the Task Force.

(2) This situation created a hardship on all activities and seriously affects their stock planning.

c. Photography

(1) Hand cameras have been checked out to several air group pilots. These pilots have brought back excellent pictures of aircraft in flight for P.I.O. purposes.

d. Production

(1) Total number of aerial negatives and prints made during this operating period is as follows:

NEGATIVES		PRINTS	
9 x 9	353	9 x 9	754
9 x 18	2,816	9 x 18	8,226

11. Aerology

a. Weather Summary

During the period from 4 June to 4 July, 1953, the mean position of the Polar front was east-west across southern Korea and Japan. A series of waves passed along the front from time to time. The resulting poor weather in the operating and target areas caused considerable restriction of flight operations for periods of several days at a time. Extensive cloudiness, fog, and rain occurred, particularly during the passage of a wave south of the operating area. Winds during this period were generally northeasterly of moderate velocities, between 10 and 20 knots. The highest wind observed occurred on the 23rd of June. A small, but fairly intense low passed just south of the force, with a maximum wind of 38 knots

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from northnortheast at 2500Z. The lowest observed pressure of 991.7 mbs. occurred on the same day, at 1000Z. Temperatures ranged from an extreme low of 56 degrees, to a high of 77 degrees. Average temperatures were between 60 to 70 degrees for the entire period. The sea water temperature rose slowly from an average 60 degrees at the beginning of the period to an average 64 degrees at the end. Two typhoons occurred during this period. The first, "Judy" originated near Guam, moved westnorthwest to Formosa, and then recurved into the northeast, passing across Japan on June 5-7, dissipating during it's passage. The second, "Kit", originated south of Guam on 25 June, and is presently centered just east of Formosa, moving northwest at 10 knots.

12. The following congratulatory dispatches were received during this period:

FROM: COM7THFLT ON 11 JUNE 1953

WHILE VISITING FRONT LINES ADMIRAL RADFORD AND VADM BRISCOE WERE INFORMED THAT NAVY STRIKE ON 8 JUNE DESTROYED A COMMUNIST BATTALION COMMAND POST KILLING THE COMMANDER A COMPANY COMMANDER AND CAUSING NUMEROUS STAFF CASUALTIES X THIS EXEMPLIFIES THE TELLING BLOWS THE PRESENT AIR EFFORT IS RENDERING AGAINST THE ENEMY X WELL DONE X VADM CLARK SENDS

FROM: CTF 77 ON 12 JUNE 1953

COMMANDER TASK FORCE 77 APPRECIATIVELY AWARE OF THE ALL OUT EFFORT BEING EXPENDED BY EVERY UNIT OF THE TASK FORCE IN PROVIDING THE NECESSARY OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE ENEMY AT THIS CRITICAL TIME X HE IS ESPECIALLY PLEASED WITH THE EVIDENT COOPERATION AND ESPRIT DE CORPS OF THE FORCE

FROM: CTF 77 ON 13 JUNE 1953

TODAY RANG UP WHAT IS BELIEVED TO BE A RECORD NUMBER OF COMBAT SORTIES AGAINST THE ENEMY X THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE LAUNCHES X THE FACT THAT THIS RECORD COULD BE ACHIEVED AFTER 5 DAYS OF DAILY OPERATIONS AND NIGHTLY REPLENISHMENT EVIDENCES THE STAMINA AND HIGH STATE OF EFFICIENCY OF EVERY UNIT IN OUR TASK FORCE TEAM WELL DONE

FROM: COMCARDIV 3 ON 13 JUNE 1953

YOUR SCORE OF COMBAT SORTIES TODAY IS BELIEVED TO BE A RECORD ACHIEVED AFTER PRACTICALLY CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS DAY AND NIGHT FOR FIVE DAYS X IT WAS DONE ON THREE SHAFTS X THINK WHAT YOU COULD HAVE DONE ON FOUR SHAFTS X ALL HANDS ARE JUSTIFIED IN FEELING INDIVIDUAL PRIDE IN THIS ACCOMPLISHMENT

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FROM: CTF 77 ON 15 JUNE 1953

DESPITE A VERY CRIPPLED CONDITION WITH TWO SHAFTS ONLY PHILIPPINE SEA LAUNCHED 70 VERY EFFECTIVE CAS AND CHEROKEE SORTIES X LAKE CHAMPLAIN IN SPITE OF HER INEXPERIENCE GOT OFF 148 AND BOXER 150 X PRINCETON STOLE THE SHOW WITH AN ALL TIME RECORD 184 X GRAND TOTAL 554 OF WHICH 180 WERE CHEROKEE AND 204 CAS FOR WHICH THE CONTROL WAS EXCELLENT X ALTHOUGH STRETCHED OUT OF SHAPE THIS FORCE HAS NOT REACHED ITS ELASTIC LIMIT AND IS PREPARED TO REPEAT TOMORROW

FROM: CTF 77 ON 15 JUNE 1953

FOL RECEIVED FROM NLO JOC KOREA QUOTE YOUR SHOW COMPLETELY SUCCESSFUL X REGAINED ALL OBJECTIVES UNQUOTE X THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS FORCE TODAY WAS SUPERB

FROM: CG EIGHTH ARMY ON 15 JUNE 1953

H 15099 KOG PD THANKS TO THE SEVENTH FLEET PD TODAY SAT HAS BEEN A COSTLY ONE FOR OUR ENEMIES PD THE FRONTLINE TRPS OF ARMY EIGHT WERE IN PRAISE OF THE MAGNIFICIENT SUPPORT THEY RECEIVED TODAY FROM THE PLANES OF THE SEVENTH FLEET AND THE GUNFIRE OF THE SHIPS AT NA PLEASE EXTEND MY SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS TO THE MEN OF YOUR COMD PD SIGNED TAYLOR

FROM: COM 7TH FLT ON 16 JUNE 1953

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM CAPTIVE 26 OBOE X QUOTE PLEASE ACCEPT MY DEEPEST THANKS AND APPRECIATION FOR THE MAGNIFICENT EFFORT OF YOUR NAVAL AIR AND SURFACE FORCES IN SUPPORT OF THE CORPS OPERATIONS X I HAVE NEVER SEEN A BETTER PERFORMANCE X WILL YOU KINDLY PASS ON MY GRATITUDE TO THE UNITS AND INDIVIDUALS SPECIFICALLY CONCERNED X SIGNED LT GEN LEE UNQUOTE

FROM: COM 7TH FLT ON 16 JUNE 1953

THE OUTSTANDING JOB OF ENGINEERING REPAIRS EFFECTED BY YOUR SHIP IS AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE WAR EFFORT X YOUR STAYING IN THE FIGHT DESPITE SERIOUS HANDICAP OF SPEED IS IN KEEPING WITH THE BEST TRADITIONS OF THE NAVY X WELL DONE X VADM CLARK SENDS

FROM: COMAIRPAC ON 17 JUNE 1953

YOUR 160851Z X SHIPS FORCE DIAGNOSIS DEMONSTRATED HIGH ORDER ENGINEERING PROFICIENCY X FOR THIS AS WELL AS FAST REPAIRS, WELL DONE X VADM MARTIN

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SECURITY INFORMATION

FROM: CNO ON 18 JUNE 1953

HAVE WATCHED WITH PARTICULAR INTEREST THE REPORTS OF OPERATIONS OF TF 77 DURING PAST WEEK OF STRENUOUS COMBAT ACTIVITY AND HAVE NOTED ESPECIALLY THE FORCEFUL SUPPORT GIVEN THE HARD PRESSED GROUND FORCES MY SINCERE APPRECIATION TO ALL CONCERNED WITH THIS FINE JOB X SIG FECHTELER

FROM: COMNAVFE ON 19 JUNE 1953

PASS TO OFFICERS AND MEN OF TF 77 CLN YOUR RECORD HYPHEN BREAKING STRIKES AGAINST THE ENEMY HAVE PROVIDED MATERIAL COMFORT TO THE TROOPS ON THE LINE X POWERFUL ATTACKS ON SUPPLY FACILITIES AND BUILDUPS, COUPLED WITH COORDINATED CLOSE AIR SUPPORT OF OUR GROUND FORCES HAVE VISIBLY WEAKENED THE ENEMYS DRIVES X IT IS TO YOUR CREDIT THAT THESE RECORDS WERE SET DURING THE TIME ONE OF YOUR CARRIERS, THE USS PHILIPPINE SEA, WAS HINDERED IN HER OPERATIONS BY A MATERIAL DIFFICULTIES X NEVERTHELESS, SHE MAINTAINED HER POSITION ON THE LINE AND MANAGED TO LAUNCH HER PLANES X THE ENTIRE PERFORMANCE OF TASK FORCE 77 WITHIN THE PAST 12 DAYS HAS BEEN IN THE HIGHEST TRADITION OF THE NAVAL SERVICES, AND RATES A HEARTY WELL DONE X BRISCOE

FROM: COMNAVFE ON 19 JUNE 1953

PASS TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE SEVENTH FLEET X YOUR STRAIGHT SHOOTING OF THE PAST TWELVE DAYS WILL NOT SOON BE FORGOTTEN BY THE ENEMY X YOU KNOCKED HIM OFF ANCHOR HILL, RIPPED UP HIS FRONT LINES AND SUPPLY ROUTES AND ADDED ANOTHER CHAPTER TO THE LESSON THAT THE WAY OF THE AGGRESSOR IS HARD X BRISCOE

FROM: CTF 77 ON 19 JUNE 1953

IT IS WITH PRIDE THAT I PASS TO YOU THE JUSTLY DESERVED RECOGNITION OF YOUR GALLANT EFFORT CONTAINED IN CNO 181313Z AND COMNAVFE 190107Z

FROM: CG AF FIVE ON 20 JUNE 1953

CG 34221 PD I AM PLEASED TO FORWARD THE FOL MSG OF APPRECIATION FROM CG X CORPS: "CITE M11228, PERSONAL FOR GEN ANDERSON, PLEASE PASS OUR APPRECIATION AND THANKS TO THE NAVY FOR THE SPLENDED CLOSE AIR SUPPORT GIVEN THE CORPS TODAY. SIGNED WHITE."

FROM: CTF 77 ON 4 JULY 1953

A WELL EARNED CHANGE FOR A DESERVING SHIP AND CREW X YOUR POWERFUL PUNCHES WILL BE MISSED BY COMMIES AND US ALIKE X HURRY BACK

[redacted]

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[redacted]

SECURITY INFORMATION

PART VII - RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Photographic Laboratory

a. Refer to page 19 paragraph 10. a. (2). It is recommended that a heavier type inter-liner be used with $9\frac{1}{2}$ x 390' film.

PAUL H. RAMSEY

Copy to:
CNO (2) Advance
CINCPACFLT (5) Advance
CINCPACFLT EVALUATION
COMNAVFE (1) Advance
COMNAVFE EVALUATION GROUP
COMSEVENTHFLT (1) Advance
CTF 77 (1) Advance
COMCARDIV 1
COMCARDIV 3
COMCARDIV 5
COMAIRPAC (10)
COMSERVPAC
COMFAIRALAMEDA
COMFAIRJAPAN
COMFAIR QUONSET
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
NLO JOC KOREA
USS BOXER (CVA-21)
USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)
USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45)
USS ORISKANY (CVA-34)
USS PRINCETON (CVA-37)
USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33)
USS WASP (CVA-18)
USS YORKTOWN (CVA-10)
USS ESSEX (CVA-9)
CVG-2
CVG-5
CVG-7
CVG-9 (15)
CVG-11
CVG-15
CVG-19
CVG-101
CVG-102
ATG-2

[redacted]