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DECLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
CARRIER AIR GROUP ONE HUNDRED ONE

FF12/CVG101/A9
WJM:js
Ser. 019
18 July 1951

[redacted]

From: Commander Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE
To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21)

Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE
(15 June 1951 - 17 July 1951)

Ref: (a) CNO Restricted ltr OP-345 Ser. 1197P34 dated 3 August 1950

1. This report is submitted in compliance with reference (a) for inclusion in the action report of the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21).

PART I COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

a. The composition of the group was as follows:

UNIT	TYPE A/C	OPERATIONAL A/C 6-15	OPERATIONAL A/C 7-17	PILOTS 6-15	PILOTS 7-17
CVG-101 CDR W.W. BREHM	None	None	None		
VF-721 LCDR W.E. WOODMAN	F9F-2B	18	18	32 Note 1	32
VF-791 LCDR J.B. KISNER	F4U-4	16	15	26 Note 2	26
VF-884 LCDR G.E. HARTLEY	F4U-4	16	12	23	22
VA-702 LCDR S.C. SEAGRAVES	AD-2 AD-4Q	18	16	27 Note 3	27
VC-3 (DET) LT J.D. ELY	F4U-5NL	4	2	5	8
VC-11 (DET) LCDR R.I. HALEY	AD-4W	3	3	5	5
VC-35 (DET) LT D.A. ARRIVEE*	AD-4N	3	3	6	5
VC-61 (DET) LT H.A. TOMPKINS	F9F-2P	3	3	4	4
HU-1 (DET)	HO3S	1	1	2	2
	Totals	82	73	130	131

Note 1 Includes Air Group Commander who flies regularly with VF-721.
Note 2 Includes Air Group Operations Officer. Does not include Air Group Commander who also flies with VF-791 and VF-884.
Note 3 Includes senior LSO who flies regularly with VA-702.
* LT D.A. ARRIVEE was killed in action on 21 June 1951, and has been Succeeded by LTJG W.C. RAPOSA.

b. The primary mission of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE during this reporting period was interdiction of the enemy's transportation system. The secondary mission was the bombing of supply build up areas in and around the city of Wonsan. Several flights a day were sent on close air support missions but did not meet with the success encountered in the past in finding troop concentrations. Corsairs were employed in spotting naval gunfire for ships along the east coast of Korea. The AEW Team continued its mission of providing ASP coverage for the fleet. The night hecklers were again successfully employed in keeping travel along the highways and railroads of North Korea to a minimum during darkness while the photo team photographed results daily.

PART II CHRONOLOGY

After ten days in Yokosuka Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE, aboard the U S.S. BOXER, departed for the Sea of Japan and its third cruise off the eastern Korean coast. Approximately two days were spent enroute.

On June 17 BOXER planes resumed operations against the enemy with close air support, armed recco, and night heckler missions.

On June 18 bridge strikes were flown in addition to close air support and armed recco flights.

June 19 and 20 saw a continuation of armed reccos, close air support and bridge strikes that have forced the enemy to move and fight at night. But on June 20 the air group lost its seventh pilot, the sixth for VF-884, when LTJG P. A. SCHAEFER, USNR, was hit by AA fire during a strafing attack and lost in shallow water near Songjin.

The air group lost its eighth pilot the following morning when the AD-2 flown by LT D.A. ARRIVEE, USN, Officer in Charge of the VC-35 detachment, was hit by AA fire and crashed with pilot near Yangdok. LT ARRIVEE was flying a day armed recco.

The spell was broken on June 22, the third consecutive day, when Ensign M.D. NELSON, USN, of the VC-3 detachment bailed out of his F4U-5NL over Wonsan Bay after having his controls shot away. Ensign NELSON's plane was hit by AA fire while flying a night heckler mission over the same Yangdok area in which LT ARRIVEE was hit. The VC-3 pilot maneuvered an almost uncontrollable aircraft back to Wonsan Bay where he bailed out to be snatched out of the water three minutes later by a helicopter from LST-799 in Wonsan Bay. He was returned to the BOXER two days later with bruises and abrasions received on bailout.

June 21 was another day of east coast rail and highway interdiction, armed reccos, close air support and gunfire spotting for surface units off the east coast at the bombline, Wonsan Bay and Songjin.

June 22 was a day of replenishment, and June 23 found all TF77 planes grounded by weather.

On June 24 air group planes took to the skies again to renew their efforts to penalize east coast transportation and provide close air support for friendly ground forces. By this time two transportation stopping programs were being carried out. One was "Operation Strangle", the other was the "Doug" plan.

"Strangle" divided the key north-south traffic arteries of North Korea into three groups and assigned them to the Air Force, CTF77, and the Marine Ist Air Wing. The three organizations were to keep their assigned routes so bomb cratered, de-bridged, mined, and patrolled as to keep enemy traffic off them.

The "Doug" plan differed in that it was designed by CTF77, and is aimed at keeping all key rail and highway bridges in the eastern portion of North Korea unusable. Selected bridges are knocked out, then kept under surveillance, and are bombed out again just as the repair crews complete their jobs.

June 25 and 26 saw a continuation of the above two plans, and close air support for troops who were patrolling and repulsing enemy patrols of ever increasing ferocity.

June 27 was spent in replenishing.

On June 28 BOXER planes resumed close air support, armed recco, naval gunfire spottings, strikes, photo missions, and routine defensive flights. It was on one of the close air support missions that an F4U-4 piloted by LTJG D.D. DROEGE, USNR, of VF-884 was hit by AA fire behind enemy lines. He was forced to parachute without making a radio transmission. An Army helicopter arrived within a few minutes, rescued him, and took him to a U.N. aid station where he received first aid for burns about the hands, face, and legs. He was later evacuated to the Pusan hospital and later to the Naval Hospital, Yokosuka, Japan.

June 29 and 30 saw a continuation of the operations that unseasonably good weather had made possible almost without interruption since the BOXER's latest return to the Sea of Japan.

TF77 replenished on 1 July.

The first bad weather of the summer settled down on eastern Korea on 2 July limiting BOXER planes to 46 offensive sorties, all of which diverted to secondary targets when they found their primary targets weathered. While destroying one of these secondary targets, a rail bridge at Yonghung, a BOXER AD-2 received a 20mm direct hit. At a point approximately 15 miles north of Wonsan Bay the pilot, LT Robert T. WALKER, USNR, of VA-702 bailed out. He was picked up by a helicopter from the USS TOLEDO, and was returned to the BOXER with no injuries on the next replenish day.

The entire enemy held position on the peninsula was weathered in by the next morning and operations for 3 July were limited to defensive flights.

Low ceilings and poor visibility limited BOXER planes to 36 offensive sorties on 4 July. These included 26 sorties against barracks areas and shore guns in the Wonsan Bay vicinity for what would have been an all-out Fourth of July fireworks display if the weather had been more cooperative.

Adverse weather conditions made 5 July another day of no flying.

The Wonsan Bay perimeter got the delayed fire works on 6 July when 133 sorties were launched from the USS BOXER. Among the targets were a torpedo launching station, mine depot, hand grenade factory, electric power station, rail facilities, supply depot, troop bivouacs, eight medium tanks, shore batteries, and anti-aircraft gun positions.

The usual air operations were resumed on 7 July with emphasis on supply route interdiction. Other offensive missions included close air support, photo reconnaissance, and gunfire spotting for surface units at Songjin, Wonsan Bay, and at the bomb line.

An F4U-4 flown by LT E.R. LIGON, USNR, of VF-791, was lost on a morning launch, but the pilot was picked up by the USS MASON and was returned to the USS BOXER in the afternoon.

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FF12/CVG101/A9
Ser 019

IV

b. Damage incident to enemy action.

VF-721

DATE	TYPE A/C	DAMAGE	INFLICTED BY
6-28-51	F9F-2B	Flak holes	Enemy
7-8-51	"	"	"
7-11-51	"	"	"
7-11-51	"	"	"
7-12-51	"	"	"
7-13-51	"	"	"

VC-61 DET.

6-22-51	F9F-2P	"	"
6-30-51	"	"	"

VF-791

6-17-51	F4U-4	"	"
6-24-51	"	"	"
6-24-51	"	"	"
6-29-51	"	"	"
6-25-51	"	Wing change	Blast tube explosion
6-22-51	"	"	"
7-4-51	"	Elevator torn	Rocket plug
7-6-51	"	Flak holes	Enemy
7-6-51	"	"	"
7-7-51	"	"	"
7-7-51	"	"	"
7-7-51	"	"	"
7-8-51	"	Wing damaged	Blast tube explosion
7-8-51	"	Flak holes	Enemy

VF-884

6-18-51	"	"	"
6-21-51	"	Gun explosion	Own gun
6-28-51	"	Shot Down	Enemy
6-29-51	"	Flak holes	"
6-30-51	"	Wing damage	Blast tube explosion
7-4-51	"	Flak holes	Enemy
7-6-51	"	"	"
7-6-51	"	"	"

DECLASSIFIED

[redacted]

FF12/CVG101/A9
Ser 019

DATE	TYPE A/C	DAMAGE	INFLICTED BY
7-11-51	F4U-4	Wing damage	Blast tube explosion
7-11-51	"	Flak holes	Enemy
7-12-51	"	"	"
7-13-51	"	Wing change	Blast tube explosion
7-13-51	"	Flak holes	Enemy
	VC-3 DET.		
6-22-51	F4U-5NL	Shot down	Enemy
6-30-51	"	Flak holes	"
	VA-702		
6-17-51	AD-2	Flak holes	Enemy
6-17-51	"	"	"
6-17-51	"	"	"
6-17-51	"	"	"
6-20-51	"	"	"
6-20-51	"	"	"
6-20-51	"	"	"
6-21-51	"	Shot down	"
6-21-51	"	Flak holes	"
6-22-51	"	"	"
6-26-51	"	"	"
6-28-51	"	"	"
6-28-51	"	"	"
6-29-51	"	"	"
7-2-51	"	Shot down	"
7-2-51	"	Flak holes	"
7-4-51	"	"	"
7-4-51	"	"	"
7-6-51	"	"	"
7-6-51	"	"	"
7-6-51	"	"	"
	VC-35 DET.		
6-30-51	AD-4N	Flak holes	Enemy
7-13-51	"	"	"

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FF12/CVG101/A9
Ser 019

PART V PERSONNEL

a. Enlisted Personnel. As is to be expected the release of enlisted personnel to inactive duty or to discharge is hitting the squadrons hard. Most of the critical shortages occur in the AD1 and AD2 ratings.

b. Officers. The pilot complements of the squadrons are considered adequate with the replacements already ordered to report.

c. Casualties. LTJG P.L. SCHAEFER, 465851/1315, USNR. Shot down near Songjin on 20 June 1951. Plane crashed into water with no survivor observed.

LT David A. ARRIVEE, 1176940/1310 USN. LT ARRIVEE was a night attack pilot flying a day mission on 21 June 1951 with VA-702. His aircraft was seen by his wingman to crash while on fire and burn near Yangdok. LT ARRIVEE did not survive. He is presumed to have been shot down by anti-aircraft fire

On 8 July a schedule of missions similar to those of the previous day was flown.

Replenishment was carried out on 9 July, and on 10 July adverse weather conditions precluded all flight operations.

Weather conditions improved enough on 11 July to allow a return to TF77's interdiction and close air support programs.

LTJG W.F. WALLACE, USNR, of VF884 ditched his F4U-4 in Wonsan Bay on the afternoon of the 11th when he experienced an engine failure while enroute to the target area. He was recovered uninjured by a helicopter from the rescue ship USS RECLAIMER, and was returned to the USS BOXER via several U. S. Navy ships and the Colombian frigate ALMIRANTE PADILLA.

The two following days, 12 and 13 July, saw a continuation of these operations, and numerous photo reconnaissance and naval gunfire spotting missions. Two hundred and fifty-two offensive sorties were flown during the three day period.

Fourteen July found the USS BOXER replenishing with orders to remain with Task Force 77 for a three-air group action in the afternoon against an enemy who was balking at the conference table. But bad weather moved in again holding all planes on the deck.

Thirty-five offensive sorties and four defensive sorties were launched during the morning of 15 July, but low ceilings and poor visibility hampered operations over Korea, and all later events were cancelled. USS BOXER departed the task force at 1100 for Yokosuka where she arrived on 17 July 1951.

PART III ORDNANCE

a. Machine Guns This air group has continued to notice erratic and unsatisfactory performance of .50 caliber machine gun ammunition. Explosions occur in and around the blast tubes when the projectile is only a few feet from the muzzle of the guns.

Belted ammunition received on board has been found to consist of short rounds, bent rounds, uncalibrated belts, and many instances of pieces of solder being found on the links and on the ammunition itself. This is undoubtedly from the packing operation. Three instances of ruptured barrels have been noted. In one of these a projectile was found lodged in the barrel itself. None of the barrels had had more than 5000 rounds fired through it when the failure occurred. Several wings were changed because of blast tube explosions. Although all blast tubes are frequently inspected it is believed that unburned gasses filter through undiscovered cracks in the tubes allowing explosive quantities of these gasses to accumulate in the wings. Failure of tubes in flight could cause the same situation to exist. Blast tubes are inspected after each flight and replaced if necessary. The pilots of CVG-101 do an enormous amount of strafing and have been well trained in the importance of firing short bursts to preserve the guns.

A few difficulties have been encountered with the 20mm guns of the F9F-2B. First, because a mixture of H-2 and 366 hydrolube was used the hydraulic gun chargers in some of the aircraft guns have worked sluggishly and with a jerky motion due to the jellying of the hydrolube mixture in the gun chargers. As a result, on occasion either one or all of the guns in the aircraft have failed to fire. As soon as this hydrolube mixture was removed from the aircraft and replaced with the desired H-2 hydrolube, new chargers were installed and the difficulty was remedied.

Another problem arose with the firing pins that have been used in the planes since they were received on board. They were apparently crystalizing and breaking into several pieces, due probably to the great amount of firing that has been done with them. The situation was remedied by replacing the old firing pins.

Since replacing the T-2 gun heaters with new heaters no trouble has been experienced with gun icing on flights conducted at high altitudes.

Operation of the 20mm AN-M3 gun in the AD2's continues to be erratic. Difficulties encountered are as follows: broken firing pins, broken driving spring guides, broken breach block locks, exploded cartridges that are not extracted and feed jams. The new firing pins, driving spring guides and extractors are not available in this area.

b. Bombs The AD's continue to carry their heavy load of bombs with no apparent strain. During the interdiction strikes, however, 1000 pound G.P. bombs were used mostly for cratering the roads with "butterflies" utilized thereafter for seeding purposes.

Incendiary clusters AN-M-12(100#) cannot be hung from Mk-55 bomb racks using single suspension lug. The sway braces of the rack, in the full retracted position, do not permit the single suspension lug of the cluster to be raised high enough to be latched. These braces bind on the fasteners of the metal securing bands which hold the cluster together.

The clusters were hung on the Mk-55 bomb rack by suspending them from the forward lug of the cluster.

VA-702 has had numerous failures (approximately 12) of the tail arming mechanism of the Mk-51 bomb rack. The arming solenoid plunger becomes burred so that it will not fully retract, consequently the tail arming latch cannot be unarmed.

The Aero 14A installations on the F4U-4's has shown signs of weakening under the strain of constant usage. In several instances the base plates have separated from the skin of the wing as much as 1/32 of an inch. It is believed that this is caused by having the bombs on the wings with the wings in a folded condition. 250 pound bombs have been carried on the three inboard stations of the wings on some flights, but the Aero 14A installation is not sturdy enough to withstand the tremendous moment of a 250 pound bomb when the wings are folded. The normal hot weather loading, however, is 100 pound bombs on the three inboard stations with either one 500 pounder, 1000 pounder, or napalm on the port fuselage pylon. The solenoids on the Aero 14A installations are failing to function due to corrosion. It is suggested that the position of the solenoids be altered to offer protection from the weather and that solenoid pins be made of noncorrosive material.

c. Rockets Since most of the F4U-4's are equipped with the Aero 14A installation, the F9F-2B's fired a large portion of rockets with excellent results. Although the percentage of hung rockets experienced during this cycle was extremely small, it is believed that the Mk-9 Mod 3 type launcher is not adequate in strength for the excessive stress of both carrier operations and the high speeds of the F9F. Catapult shots, high speed arrested landings, in addition to the stress of high speed maneuvers, have continually damaged launchers. Often the screws that hold the launching plate become loosened or are completely torn away from the housing unit.

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FF12/CVG101/A9
Ser. 019

d. Ordnance expenditures for the operating period are as follows:

MUNITIONS	F9F	F4U-4 F4U-5NL	AD's	TOTAL
2000# G.P.			92	92
1000# G.P.		149	407	556
500# G.P.		315	185	500
250# G.P.		36	1261	1297
100# G.P.		3249	683	3932
260# FRAG		154	1907	2061
350# D.B.		1	2	3
6.5" ATAR	649	117		766
5.0" HVAR	406	1327	16	1749
3.25" S.H.			4	4
NAPALM		207	316	523
20mm	60,440	26,500	99,875	126,375
.50 Cal		740,200		740,200
FLARES MK. 6			33	33
AN. M12-INC			24	24
M-29 CLUSTERS			127	127

PART IV DAMAGE

a. Damage to enemy:

TARGETS	PROBABLY DAMAGED	DAMAGED	DESTROYED
RR Bridges		15	52*
RR Tunnels	4	10	
RR Tracks		2	62#
RR Marshalling Yards	1	18	
RR Locomotives	1	3	3
RR Cars	237	136	64
RR Handcars		2	
RR Turntables		2	
HWY Bridges		14	30*
Highways			86#
River Ford			1**
Trucks	139	52	65
Other motor vehicles	12	10	6
Carts	30	16	101
Beasts of burden			43
Villages	8	84	3
Power plants	1	1	2
Factories	1	15	8
Saw Mills		2	2
Warehouses	36	84	44
Other Type Buildings	32	305	382
Supply Dumps	5	32	15
Fuel Dumps			22
Ammo Dumps			14
Lumber Piles		4	7
Troop Concentration		89	
Casualties Inflicted			3614##
Tanks	4		1
Gun Emplacements	42	13	40
Mine Depots		1	
Surface Boats	2	17	3
Barracks	31	28	15
NK Officers' Club			1
Other Military Installations	3	7	3

* Railroad and highway bridges with at least one complete break are counted as destroyed.

This is number of locations at which tracks were broken or highways cratered. These figures do not include damaged or destroyed highway or rail bridges, but does include bridge approaches. Not included are 36 highway locations mined by "butterfly" clusters.

** A river bed was bombed and cratered when it was found that highway traffic was fording the river to bypass a bombed out bridge.

Ninety-four enemy troops were seen receiving hits from strafing planes and the other 3520 are a total of estimated casualty figures given by controllers.

PART VI OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE

a. Operations This ends the third period for this air group in the operating area which was characterized by the successful utilization of techniques previously acquired. It is definitely noticeable that squadrons are using more coordinated attacks on all strikes regardless of the anti-aircraft fire expected in the specified area.

The lack of an adequate number of communication channels is a real problem. On reconnaissance flights where a large number of transmissions is necessary this is particularly acute. This also holds true for close support work.

Jet aircraft are used as much as possible on armed reconnaissance flights because of their high approach speeds, lack of warning to the enemy, and ability to cover a long route in a brief time. Propeller aircraft must necessarily be loaded with ordnance and are therefore very slow. At the low altitudes at which targets can readily be detected the "props" are very vulnerable to ground fire. In many instances the jets can come in and actually deliver the attack before being discovered.

When propeller type aircraft are used for reconnaissance flights, flights of four aircraft are utilized. Two aircraft fly low and ahead with the other two high in order to suppress ground fire which may be sighted.

Map reading is again emphasized. Being able to find a spot by the use of UTM grid coordinate in rugged and unfamiliar terrain is a necessary requirement in the type of war being fought in Korea.

Tactics of the AEW team have remained unchanged. One point to be mentioned, however, is that there is no way of identifying night contacts. It is suggested that an AD or TBM could be modified to serve as a flare carrier. With a load of 50 to 75 flares it could work with the VEW and VAW types to make possible full 24 hour coverage of enemy supply routes. A searchlight might be useful to the ASP types to identify submarine contact.

The night fighter and night attack pilots have been augmenting the day squadrons by flying day flights with the group. This has helped ease the load considerably during periods of heavy operation.

One particular type of strike that has become familiar during this reporting period is the "road seeder". A road is picked usually in mountainous terrain and cratered thoroughly with 100 pound to 1000 pound G.P. bombs. The spot is then seeded with "butterflies" to hinder work on that particularly inaccessible area.

High recoveries have been emphasized on all flights. Most of the damage to aircraft has been from small caliber guns.

Jet operations completed a two month period during which there were no barrier crashes or deck crashes on landing, in spite of operating under adverse wind conditions in many cases. One jet, low on fuel, landed with only 24 knots of wind over the deck. Experience indicates that the approach speed should be on the high side rather than the low side because low speeds make it difficult to stabilize the air speed and altitude. A higher speed results in a smoother approach and landing. This technique plus the use of take-off flaps for jet landings is believed to be the reason for the low operational accident rate.

By having to send gun camera film to COMNAVFE as directed, the pilots have lost a valuable training aid which helped them to review their technique and to assess damage inflicted on targets.

It is believed that the old system of processing film aboard ship should be restored so that the pilots can be the people to benefit by their efforts.

A high rate of descent by jets from high altitudes to the deck on receiving a "prop charlie" has a tendency to fog up the windshield because of moisture condensation making it difficult to see the landing signal officer on carrier approaches. The squadron has eliminated a large portion of this difficulty by making it a policy to turn on the cockpit temperature control to the maximum heat position about five minutes before commencing a high rate of descent.

Some difficulty has been encountered in having the hook drop from the stinger position as the plane taxied forward from the arresting gear. The cause of the trouble has not been located but it is certain that it is not caused by pilots actuating the hydraulic systems which was believed to decrease the hydraulic pressure and allow the hook to drop.

	OPERATIONS											
A/C	CAS	TRANS	STRIKE	RECCO	NGF	PHOTO	PHOTO ESCORT	CAP	ASP	OFT	DEF	TOTAL
VFJ			56	104			48	278		208	278	486
VFP						52				52		52
VF	143	270	112	30	42			118	57	597	175	772
VFN				28						28		28
VA	107	242	75	33					22	457	22	479
VAN				25					19	25	19	44
									64		64	64
Totals	250	512	243	220	42	52	48	396	162	1367	558	1925
							Practice and Test					67
							Grand Total					1992

Notes: 1 VAW and VAN flew additional missions in VA aircraft, and VFN pilots flew additional missions in VF aircraft.

2 "TRANS" includes bridge breakers, railroad breakers, highway craters, and seedors.

3 "STRIKE" missions were aimed at specific targets other than bridges, highways and railroads.

4 "RECCO" includes armed reconnaissance of transportation routes and areas, and night heckler operations.

5 "NGF" missions spot gun fire for UN surface units along the eastern coast of Korea.

SQUADRON OR UNIT	TOTAL HOURS	HOURS PER PILOT	FLIGHTS PER PILOT
VF-721	842.2	27.1	16.2
VF-791	1201.2	46.2	14.25
VF-884	1092.9	49.7	16.2
VA-702	1581.1	54.5	16.0
VC-3 DET	260.7	32.6	9.75
VC-11 DET	299.3	59.9	18.0
VC-35 DET	239.1	38.0	13.0
VC-61 DET	91.5	22.9	13.5

b. Maintenance The chief maintenance problem has been the inability of the ship to stock enough spare parts to compensate for the heavy operating schedules and damage by enemy fire. Also gun explosions in the wings of the F4U-4's have depleted the wing supply to zero. Engine changes have piled up to considerable proportions in the F4U squadrons. One AD was AOG for 15 days because of inability to procure a hydraulic reservoir, and another was AOG for 12 days for a power junction box. The ship has exerted every possible effort to remedy this situation.

Some of the specific problems encountered were:

1- AD canopies are showing definite warping tendencies possibly be cause of stresses imposed in dives and pull-outs.

2- A unique fix has been designed for the damage caused by arming wires on the AD bomb racks scratching the paint off the underside of the wings. This fix was engineered by Marion C. MARSHALL, AMS2, of VA-702 and will be the subject of a letter to Naval Air News. Briefly it consists of a very small spring clamp which catches and imprisons the oscillating wire.

3- Aero 14A kits are limited and the corsair squadrons have been flying approximately 25% of their aircraft with the older type rails.

4- It has been previously mentioned that the Aero 14A wing racks have taken a considerable beating, and a letter will be prepared in the near future recommending changes and limitations on the installation.

Electronics There are no facilities in the electronics shop for bench checking the AN/APX-6 IFF equipment. It has to be taken to the MK5 interrogator room to be tested. This is a crowded compartment and it is believed that the ship's aviation electronics shops should have AN/VPM-4 equipment installed.

c. Jet Maintenance The high contamination in the servo bleed filters as previously reported seems to have been eliminated during the month of June with the use of the home-made neoprene gaskets and the installation of an additional "O" ring seal at the base of the filter assembly. The maintenance effort has been seriously hampered by the poor availability of number 4 and 7 combustion chamber interliners. Because of the failure of two aneroid assemblies in the fuel control unit, the use of oil in the fuel was reverted to, but apparently not in time to prevent the failure of four more aneroid assemblies. In order to test these aneroid assemblies, the engines were checked out on the deck, and then the aircraft was climbed at a constant throttle setting and any changes in engine RPM observed. In every case the RPM were observed to rise as the altitude was increased, accompanied by an engine rumble upon acceleration which varied in intensity, depending on the severity of the malfunction. An alert pilot can usually detect the rumble and prevent any flameouts that can occur. Circumstances arising during the early part of July prompted a review of fuel system difficulties aboard ship. During the early part of this cruise 3% lubricating oil was added by pouring it in on top of the fuel. This oil concentrated at the bottom of the tanks, causing hard starting and also many low fuel boost warning lights to go on. Oil was then eliminated but after six to eight weeks of apparently satisfactory operation, failures of the TJG aneroid unit began to occur as a direct result of insufficient lubrication. The use of oil was began once more, using about half as much as was used in the first attempt.

The method of mixing the fuel was varied by pouring smaller quantities of oil at several stages of the fueling and by pouring fuel into the tank on top of the oil instead of pouring it all in at one time. This method of mixing is entirely unsatisfactory and results in too high a recurrence of failures to start. A fuel-oil mixing device has been developed recently by the Air Department and is very promising. It consists of an oil drum with a hand oil pump attached. This pump discharges oil under pressure into an annular collar around the gasoline nozzle. The resultant mixing appears to be satisfactory, but the operation of the hand pump is a tedious job.

The shortage of H-2 hydrolube is causing an excessive amount of maintenance work and numerous hydraulic failures. A limited supply to convert the planes to this fluid was received but was not enough to keep the hydraulic systems topped off. It was therefore necessary to resort to mixing 366 hydraulic fluid and the H-2 with the result that a gelatinous emulsion is formed when the concentration of the 366 fluid is built up in this mixture. This has necessitated a complete drainage of the system and reversion to the use of the original U-4 hydrolube which is available in adequate quantities.

The flapper valve is being incorporated in the arresting hook dashpot as required by the service change 96 in order to prevent hook bounces Even though all pilots are now aware of remedial measures to be taken when the hook remains in the "stinger" position in flight, it could be a possible source of serious trouble to a pilot not so familiar with its occurrence.

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