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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
AIR FORCE  
CARRIER AIR GROUP ONE HUNDRED ONE

FF12/CVG101/A9  
WJM:en  
Ser. 08  
5 June 1951

5-5

From: Commander Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE  
To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BOXER

Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE (30 April 1951 -  
4 June 1951)

Ref: (a) CNO restricted ltr OP-345 ser 1197P34 of 3 Aug 1950

1. This report is submitted in compliance with reference (a) for inclusion in  
the report of the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21).

PART I: COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSIONS

a. The composition of the group was as follows:

UNIT	TYPE A/C	OPERATIONAL A/C		PILOTS	
		4/30	6/4	4/30	6/4
CVG-101 CDR W.W. BREHM				Note (1)	
VF-721 LCDR W.E. WOODMAN	F9F-2B	20	18	31	31
VF-791 LCDR J.B. KISNER	F4U-4	14	14	26	26 Note (2)
VF-884 LCDR G.F. CARMICHAEL*	F4U-4	14	14	25	22
VA-702 LCDR S.C. SEAGRAVES	AD2 AD4Q	16 2	17 1	28	27 Note (3)
VC-3 (DET) LCDR G.E. HARTLEY*	F4U-5NL	4	4	6	6
VC-11 (DET) LCDR R.I. HALEY	AD-4W	3	3	5	5
VC-35 (DET) LT D.A. ARRIVEE	AD4N	3	3	6	6
VC-61 (DET) LT H.A. TOMPKINS	F9F-2P	3	3	4	4
HU-1 LT V.W. COLLINS	HO3S	1	1	2	2

Note (1) CAG-101 flies regularly with VF-721, VF-791, VF-884.

Note (2) Includes CAG-101 Administrative Officer

Note (3) Includes one LSO

\* LCDR CARMICHAEL was killed on 24 May and LCDR HARTLEY was ordered to  
BuPers as CO of VF-884. LT D.J. DIMATTEO acting as Officer-in-  
Charge of VC-3 Detachment pending arrival of replacement, LT ELY.

17

b. Mission

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The mission of the air group during this reporting period was primarily close support of troops. During the first and second phases of the Chinese offensive many flights were sent out on armed recco missions and diverted to close support missions before reaching the target area. Napalm, frags, and strafing were used most successfully in the mosquito controlled close support work.

Night hecklers were employed in night recco work against the enemy's transportation system. Night attacks were conducted against trucks, trains, barracks, and troop concentrations. The pilots were particularly fortunate in discovering large numbers of vehicles at dawn and dusk.

In addition to the close support work strikes were conducted against bridges and railroads. Corsairs were frequently used in spotting for naval gunfire along the east coast of Korea.

Recco flights were employed largely after the Chinese offensive had been broken and the troops on the run. Jets flew armed reccos consistently with only moderate success in finding targets, but they served to immobilize the enemy over a large area during daylight.

18

19

## II CHRONOLOGY

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On 30 April Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE aboard USS BOXER departed Yokosuka, Japan, to rejoin Task Force 77 in the Sea of Japan. 1 May was spent enroute.

On 2 May USS BOXER reported back on the firing line to find the first phase of the Communist's spring offensive being battered to a halt. Air group planes joined planes from the PHILIPPINE SEA and PRINCETON in a three carrier operation of disrupting North Korea's main rail and highway traffic arteries. Bridges were blasted and vehicles and other targets of opportunity were destroyed.

The bridge breaking program was continued on 3 May with box cars and other rail equipment becoming the victims of left over bombs. Jet Panthers riddled a switch engine and left it smoking, and shot up many targets of opportunity.

On 4 May the planes were weathered in.

On 5 May BOXER sorties included armed reconnaissance, bridge strikes, and close air support missions.

On 6 May the BOXER planes flew 55 close air support sorties and many armed reconnaissance flights assisting the ground forces in consolidating their positions and in feeling out the next enemy moves.

7 May saw more close air support work with 64 sorties spread over front line troops from dawn to dusk. One BOXER AD pilot, LTJG F. B. ROBBINS of VA-702, was killed when his plane crashed near the bomb line. His plane was hit by small arms fire as he was making a strafing run on a machine gun position.

Bad weather moved across North Korea and the Sea of Japan keeping BOXER planes on the deck 8 and 9 May.

Adverse weather conditions continued to hold this Group's planes on the deck throughout the morning and early afternoon of 10 May, but by 1600 the weather had cleared enough to launch a special event of four F4U's and four AD's for close air support. A second special event of four F4U's and four AD's was launched at 1700K on armed reconnaissance. The armed reconnaissance sorties were an attempt to detect enemy redeployment for the expected second phase of his spring offensive. These sorties found evidence of heavy highway traffic on the east coast routes. This substantiated an earlier intelligence report that the next phase would be launched on the eastern half of the front line.

Operations on 11 May were again hampered by weather. Nevertheless, 58 offensive and 28 defensive sorties were flown. The offensive sorties were close air support and armed reconnaissance, but many close air support sorties were diverted to armed reconnaissance when unusually heavy daytime rail and truck traffic was discovered behind the bomb line in the central and eastern section.

Heavy close air support, bridge breakers, armed reconnaissance, and photographic operations were continued through 12 and 13 May in an effort to keep up with the enemy's eastward and southward movement, and hit his troops and supplies wherever they might be found.

On 14 and 15 May no flights were flown because of adverse weather conditions.

Three events with a total of only 24 sorties were launched 16 May. Poor visibility restricted their efforts to dump targets along the coast.

On 17 May there were 91 sorties but all were handicapped by bad weather and limited visibility.

18 May was another day of bad weather, but it was a day of action. The delayed phase two of the enemy's spring offensive was on. Commies had begun in the darkness of the previous night to move south in the central section of the line. BOXER planes flew 66 offensive sorties during the day. The

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FF12/CVG101/A9/Ser. 08 .

majority of these were close air support. It was on these that BOXER pilots bombed and strafed a large concentration of abandoned UN vehicles. Two BOXER pilots were lost earlier that day. An F4U-4, flown by LT C. GARRISON of VF-884 was shot down by small arms fire while attempting to contact a controller for close air support. LT GARRISON was seen to leave the cockpit, become entangled in the tail assembly of his plane, work free, and finally open his chute. Witnesses said he landed safely but appeared to have been injured when he struck the tail assembly. ResCap pilots eventually lost him and he is now listed as missing. LTJG M. T. DRAGASTIN was flying ResCap over LT GARRISON when witnesses saw his head slump on his chest. His F4U-4 crashed to earth shortly afterward with him in it. Witnesses believe he was killed by a direct small arms hit.

On 19 May weather continued undesirable but 70 BOXER offensive sorties were launched on close air support and armed reconnaissance missions.

By 20 May the enemy offensive had shifted eastward and the bad weather had passed on. A total of 126 sorties were launched from the BOXER. 104 of these were offensive.

On 21 May the weather deteriorated, BOXER operations were cut in half, and the enemy pushed on.

A small increase in sorties was launched 22 May. Two of the missions were a bridge breaker and a seeding of highway intersections with long-delay fuzed bombs. The attacks were made in positions calculated to cut enemy lines of movement to and from the front line.

A steady southward advance of the enemy along the east coast and improved weather brought out 122 BOXER sorties on 23 May. 93 of these were offensive.

On 24 May while leading a close air support mission an F4U-4, flown by LCDR Glenn F. CARMICHAEL, USNR, Commanding Officer of VF-884, was hit by what appeared to be a fragment of an automatic weapons shell. After subsequent loss of oil pressure, bail out, and crash of plane, the pilot was seen to be approached by ROK troops. A helicopter from USS NEW JERSEY was dispatched to the rescue and was lost enroute. A Marine Corps helicopter and medic arrived one hour later, just a few minutes before LCDR CARMICHAEL died with a crushed chest. It is assumed that he struck his plane's tail assembly after leaving the cockpit. Other planes were diverted to ResCap over the pilot and downed helicopter.

The major part of the operations on 25 May was concentrated in a 19 plane strike against heavy gun installations and troop bivouacs in the northern Wonsan Bay perimeter. Lesser events of the day were armed reconnaissance sorties and Naval Gun Fire spotting for the USS NEW JERSEY near the bomb line.

Flying on 26 and 27 May was cancelled because of adverse weather conditions.

On 28 May some close air support missions were flown inspite of poor visibility.

By 29 May the Communist retreat was full grown and during that day 78 BOXER planes pounded them from the air.

On 30 May 56 BOXER planes continued the assault against the retreating enemy and his escape routes.

On 31 May flight operations were conducted on a small scale.

On 1 June 65 offensive sorties were launched in the continued battering of the retreating enemy.

On 2 June 80 sorties were launched, of which 74 were launched against a battered and pursued enemy in conjunction with the UN counter attack. The afternoon of the second was spent in replenishing while enroute to Yokosuka. The two following days were spent enroute.

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## a. Machine guns

The functioning of guns, both .50 caliber and 20 millimeter, has been excellent. Considerable difficulty has been experienced with the incendiary .50 cal. ammunition, however. Pilots have reported erratic behavior of this type ammunition, and recommendations have been made to discontinue its use until the trouble has been investigated. Explosions of this type ammunition have occurred in and around the blast tubes of the guns. This leads us to believe that the ammunition may be the reason that numerous blast tubes and several wings have required changing. Boresighting continues to be a problem because of space limitations, and can be accomplished only in port.

## b. VF-721 has found that much better gun camera coverage can be had by turning the angle of the camera down two rounds. This does not interfere with the air to air camera coverage.

## c. Bombs

The installation of the Aero 14A system on the F4U-4 has greatly increased the effectiveness of the aircraft. Pilots are reporting excellent results with the frag and G.P. bombs carried on the wing racks. A separate letter on the Aero 14A is under preparation. Very little can be said about napalm that has not already been said. It is an excellent weapon in close air support when delivered in a low attack. It was also used by this group in destroying bridge by-passes built of wood. The group had very few napalm duds. One napalm tank came off on a catapult launch of an F4U but did not ignite, and was quickly cleared by the flight deck personnel. The Japanese F-51 napalm tank presents too much drag and a more streamlined tank is desired. Dud bombs were rare with the VT fused bombs being the chief offenders.

## d. Rockets

Dud rockets decreased with the installation of the Aero 14A launchers on the F4U's. Brass and links from the .50 cal. guns broke the rocket pigtails on the first few installations, but a fix was effected in the form of metal deflectors on the after end of the racks. This has been very satisfactory, but it adds more drag to an already overloaded F4U-4.

## e. Flares

Night target illumination is at present inadequate through the use of the MK6 Mod 4 flare. During the reporting period the VAN aircraft used 35 flares. Four of these failed to release and thirteen failed to ignite. These flares were loaded on MK 55 wing racks using a makeshift suspension and were released at speeds of from 140 to 170 knots. No flare containers are available capable of use on board carriers due to catapult and arrested landing limitations.

## f. It is urgent that additional Aero 14A kits be made available for installation on replacement aircraft and wing changes.

g. A summary of ordnance expended during the reporting period is as follows:

(4-30 - 6-4)

	F9F	F4U/F4U-5	AD	TOTAL
2000# GP			113	113
1000# GP		110	341	451
500# GP		187	318	505
260# FRAG		260	2746	3006
250# GP			1030	1030
220# FRAG				
100# GP		1123	301	1424
350# ADB				
11.75" RX				
6.5" ATAR	574	672	31	1277
5.0" HVAR	378	2476	15	2869
3.25" AR		235		235
NAPALM		324	659	983
20mm	48,018	17,000	101,860	166,878
50 cal		601,400		601,400
Flares MK 6 Mod 4		28	32	60

F9F hung rockets - 4.6%

## IV DAMAGE

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a.	Damage to Enemy.	Probably Damaged	Damaged	Destroyed
	RR BRIDGES	2	19	35
	RR TRACKS			87#
	RR LOCOMOTIVES	1	2	
	RR CARS	73	154	108
	RR YARDS	1	10	
	RR TUNNELS	2	10	
	RR TURNTABLE			1
	Hwy BRIDGES	7	32	10
	Hwy TUNNELS		2	
	HIGHWAYS			29#
	TRUCKS	54	121	164
	VEHICLES	3	21	8
	ABANDONED U.N. VEHICLES			107
	CARTS	5	24	83
	BEASTS OF BURDEN			25
	FUEL DUMPS		3	11
	AMMO DUMPS			7
	SUPPLY DUMPS	1	12	11
	WAREHOUSES	2	71	47
	FACTORIES	1	13	
	BUILDINGS	14	510	732
	VILLAGES	17	65	46
	LUMBER PILES		12	
	SAWMILLS			3
	TANKS	26	5	7
	MILITARY INSTALLATIONS			6
	GUN EMPLACEMENTS	14	11	32
	TROOP CONCENTRATIONS		144	
	TROOPS KILLED			2230#
	SURFACE BOATS		11**	6**
	SUSPECTED MINE DEPOT		1	
	AIRSTRIPS		2	

# This is number of locations at which tracks were broken by bomb blast.

\* This is number of locations at which highways were cratered by bomb blast.

## Of this number 1300 corpses were counted by ground troops. The other 970 are troops seen to fall as a result of strafing and rocketing.

\*\* This number includes sampans, junks, fishing boats, and one ferry boat.

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b. Damage to own aircraft.

### VF-721

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>	<u>INFLICTED BY</u>
5-2-51	F9F-2B	Bullet in engine	Enemy
5-3-51	"	Flak holes	"
5-6-51	"	"	"
5-6-51	"	Elevator Damaged	Rocket fin
5-7-51	"	Flak holes	Enemy
5-7-51	"	"	"
5-7-51	"	"	"
5-13-51	"	"	"
5-17-51	"	"	"
5-19-51	"	"	"
5-21-51	"	"	"
5-22-51	"	"	"
5-29-51	"	"	"
5-29-51	"	"	"
5-29-51	"	"	"
5-30-51	"	"	"
5-30-51	"	"	"
5-30-51	"	"	"

### VF-791

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>	<u>INFLICTED BY</u>
5-2-51	F4U-4	Flak holes	Enemy
5-5-51	"	"	"
5-5-51	"	"	"
5-6-51	"	"	"
5-7-51	"	"	"
5-7-51	"	"	"
5-7-51	"	"	"
5-11-51	"	"	"
5-17-51	"	"	"
5-18-51	"	"	"
5-23-51	"	"	"
5-24-51	"	"	"
5-29-51	"	"	"
5-29-51	"	"	"

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>	<u>INFLECTED BY</u>
		<u>VF-884</u>	
5-3-51	F4U-4	Flak holes	Enemy
5-3-51	"	"	"
5-5-51	"	"	"
5-6-51	"	"	"
5-6-51	"	Blast tube explosion wing changed	Own gun
5-11-51	"	Flak holes	Enemy
5-13-51	"	"	"
5-14-51	"	"	"
5-17-51	"	"	"
5-17-51	"	Blast tube explosion	Own gun
5-17-51	"	Blast tube explosion	Own gun
5-17-51	"	Wing, Engine, Prop change	Flt. Deck crash
5-19-51	"	Blast tube explosion	Own gun
5-23-51	"	Flak holes	Enemy
5-28-51	"	"	"
5-28-51	"	"	"
5-31-51	"	Left wing and stab. damaged	Napalm tank came loose on catapult.

		<u>VA-702</u>	
5-22-51	AD-2	Flak holes	Enemy
5-23-51	AD-4Q	"	"
5-28-51	AD-2	"	"
5-28-51	"	"	"
5-29-51	"	"	"
5-29-51	AD-4Q	"	"
5-29-51	AD-2	"	"

DATE                      TYPE A/C                      DAMAGE                      INFLECTED BY

VC-3

DATE	TYPE A/C	DAMAGE	INFLECTED BY
5-7-51	F4U-5NL	Flak holes	Enemy
5-13-51	"	"	"
5-23-51	"	"	"
5-29-51	"	"	"
6-1-51	"	"	"
		Bullet through Radome	"

VC-35

DATE	TYPE A/C	DAMAGE	INFLECTED BY
5-6-51	AD-4Q	Flak holes	Enemy
5-7-51	"	"	"
5-19-51	"	"	"
5-20-51	"	"	"
5-20-51	"	"	"
5-22-51	"	"	"
5-22-51	"	"	"
5-28-51	"	"	"

In addition to the above damage three F4U's and one AD were shot down by enemy fire during the reporting period. One AD spun in while making a carrier approach and was lost. One F4U-4 went into the water on take-off. One F9F was lost as a result of going into the water on take-off.

VC-11 and VC-61 detachments had no damage to aircraft through enemy action.

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## V PERSONNEL

## a. Pilots

It is believed that the number of propeller pilots assigned is adequate except for VF-884 which has only 22. Pilots usually are required to fly but one mission per day, and with the aircraft assigned it works out satisfactorily. A three hour flight plus adequate briefing and debriefing lengthens into a five or six hour affair. The limited jet operations plus the fact that the flights are of one and one half hour duration has not imposed a strain on the jet squadron pilots.

An exercise room for pilots would be highly desirable, but space limitations have prevented it thus far.

## b. Enlisted Personnel

The chief shortage of enlisted personnel has been in the ordnance branch. One squadron was forced to use electronics personnel for a short time to augment the ordnance crew. It is recommended that big men be assigned to ordnance because of the loading requirements. The AD with the wings folded presents a difficult arming problem as do the outboard wing racks of the F9F and Corsair.

Maintenance problems have increased with the age of the aircraft and the need for AD1 and AD2 ratings in the prop squadrons is apparent.

## c. Casualties

Air Group 101 lost four pilots during this reporting period:

LTJG F. "B" ROBBINS, 460390/1315, USNR, VA-702

Aircraft hit by small arms fire on 7 May 1951; crashed and burned. Listed as dead.

LT C. GARRISON, 320629/1315, USNR, VF-884

Aircraft hit and on fire; bailed out and seen lying on the ground in his chute harness. (18 May 51). Later he disappeared. Listed as missing.

LTJG M.T. DRAGASTIN, 496796/1315, USNR, VF-884

Shot down by ground fire and exploded while flying rescap over LT GARRISON.

LCDR G.F. CARMICHAEL, 114951/1315, USNR, VF-884

Plane hit by burst of flak 24 May; bailed out and landed among ROK troops; died of crushed chest; possibly sustained injury in leaving aircraft.

VI OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE

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a. Operations

- (1) Jets. In close support and armed recco work the doctrine has been to operate at higher altitudes. The increase in the amount of ground fire, both small arms and automatic weapons, has forced higher pull-outs and particular attention to direction of runs. The jets now recco at altitudes of 500' to 1000' for better visual coverage.  
During this reporting period the jets operated at extreme ranges up to 180 miles from the initial point of the recco route. Visual contact between the leader and wingman must be maintained at all times. Predetermined rendezvous points along assigned routes assist in maintaining this contact.  
Foul weather let-down procedure published by CTF 77 has been found to be most helpful. The procedure was tried under contact conditions, and it is felt to be suitable for jet operation under instrument conditions. More jet instrument training is recommended.
- (2) Propeller Aircraft. The props like the jets have become altitude conscious in the close support work. More stress has been placed on coordination between VA and VF types in making runs. It is recommended that napalm runs be preceded by strafing aircraft. The ground fire has increased tremendously in the past few weeks and unless it is suppressed prior to a low pass, the aircraft is almost sure to receive hits. Take off of the fully loaded F4U-4 is critical and newly arrived air groups are cautioned to insist upon 550 feet of deck run and to turn up to full power before releasing brakes.
- (3) Exposure suits have been packed away with the advent of warm weather.
- (4) Proper bailout procedure cannot be overemphasized. Two F4U pilots from this group were injured, one fatally, while attempting to clear the aircraft. One AD pilot who went in with his aircraft could have possibly escaped had an ejection seat been installed.
- (5) F4U-4's have been used as ASP escort for the AD/W. This releases AD's for close air support and strike flights.
- (6) It is recommended that all corsair pilots be indoctrinated in naval gunfire spotting procedure. Spotters are required for all day to day operations and most of CVG 101 spotters were trained within the squadrons.
- (7) It is considered essential that search and rescue be given much thought and that squadrons set up definite doctrines for the use of RESCAP, helicopter escort, and air-ground signals. A helicopter is difficult to see from the cockpit of a fighter when the fighter is attempting to lead him to a downed pilot.

DECLASSIFIED

FF12/CVGL01/A9

Ser: 08

- (8) Recco tactics during this reporting period consisted of sending a large flight of from eight to twelve aircraft to a prescribed point where the flight is broken into two or four plane elements. These elements then proceed to prebriefed areas and conduct their searches. The flight is directed to rendezvous at a prescribed time and place for return to the ship. This is believed to give more coverage without lessening the strength of the flight. If a target of sufficient value is discovered, the remainder of the flight can be called in within 10 to 15 minutes at the most.
- (9) Flights have reported enemy troops employing the use of panels for identification. One mosquito directed a flight to drop napalm and bombs in the vicinity of troops using these panels.
- (10) The shortage of maps has been relieved for quite some time. It is suggested that new groups preparing to deploy be familiarized with the new type maps now available.

b. Maintenance

(1) Supply

- The ship's inability to carry enough spare parts for the AD-2's, AD-4's, and AD-4Q's is a supply problem. The lack of interchangeability of major component parts adds to the problem. Hand tools are scarce and are critically short in the squadrons. There has been a shortage of F4U wings owing to blast tube explosions mentioned previously. The ship is unable to stock enough gaskets, exhaust stacks, hoses, clamps and such fittings which the tired F4U's consume at a great rate.
- (2) Frequent inspection of blast tubes has revealed that many are faulty. It is believed, however, that faulty incendiary ammunition is responsible for the recent blast tube explosions.
- (3) Arming wire damage to paint on wings is still a problem. Planes must be taken below for painting and are consequently left for long periods of time with bare metal exposed.
- (4) More damage was inflicted upon BOXER aircraft during this period than before. Maintenance personnel have been kept constantly busy patching bullet holes and repairing damage done. It is a constant source of amazement how much internal damage one .30 bullet can do.
- (5) Jet maintenance problems are discussed in the May Jet Operating Bulletin.

SORTIES FLOWN

TYPE A/C	CAS	TRANS	STRIKE	RECON	NGF	PHOTO	PHOESCORT	CAP	ASP	NON	OFF	DEF	TOT
VFJ				173			47	114		220	114	334	
VFP						47				47		47	
VF	248	156	23	121	64			116	15	612	131	743	
VFN				47	4				3	51	3	54	
VA	248	151	18	84					22	2	501	22	525
VAN				54					8	2	54	8	64
VAW									47			47	47
	496	307	41	479	68	47	47	230	95	4	1485	325	1814

NOTES: VAW and VAN pilots flew additional missions in VA aircraft, and VFN pilots flew additional missions in VF aircraft.

"TRANS" includes bridge breaker, highways, and railroad breakers, and seeders.

"STRIKE" missions were aimed at area destructions.

"RECON" includes night hecklers.

"NON-COMBAT" includes courier and weather recon.

DECLASSIFIED

FF12/CVGL01/A9

Ser: 08

AIRCRAFT HOURS FLOWN

SQDN	TOTAL
VF-721	594.8
VF-791	1080.6
VF-884	1128.5
VA-702	1596.9
VC-3	211.4
VC-11	141.5
VC-35	252.1
VC-61	87.4
HU-1	97.3
TOTAL	5190.6

*W. W. Brehm*  
W. W. BREHM