

DECLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
CARRIER AIR GROUP ONE HUNDRED ONE

FF12/CVG-101/A9
WWB:js
Ser 056
5 Oct 1951

3-5

From: Commander Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE
To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21)
Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE
(3 Sep 1951 - 5 Oct 1951)
Ref: (a) CNO Instruction 3480.4 of 1 July 1951

1. In compliance with reference (a) the following information is submitted for inclusion in the action report of the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21).

PART I MISSION AND COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES:

a. Mission: The primary mission of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE during this operating cycle was interdiction of the enemy's transportation and supply system in North Korea. This consisted of knocking out railroad and highway bridges on the main supply routes, breaking the railroad tracks at selected spots, and harassing the enemy by destroying his trains and vehicles of transportation when they could be found. Close support of troops was discontinued on 20 September in order that the naval forces could concentrate more on interdiction work.

b. Composition of own forces:

UNIT & C.O.	TYPE A/C	NO. A/C		NO. PILOTS	
		9/3	10/5	9/3	10/5
CVG-101 CDR W. W. BREHM		0	0	5*	5
VF-721 LCDR W. E. WOODMAN	F9F-2B	18	18	31	31
VF-791 LCDR J. B. KISNER	F4U-4	16	14	25	25
VF-884 LCDR G. E. HARTLEY	F4U-4	16	13	23	22
VA-702 LCDR S. C. SEAGRAVES	AD-2 AD-4Q	17 1	15 1	26	26
VC-3 (VFN) Det. LT J. D. ELY	F4U-5NL	3	3	5	5
VC-11 Det. LCDR R. I. HALEY	AD-4W	3	3	5	5
VC-35 Det. LT W. C. RAPOSA	AD-4N AD-4Q	2 1	2 1	5	5

UNIT & C.O.	TYPE A/C	NO. A/C		NO. PILOTS'	
		9/3	10/5	9/3	10/5
VC-61 (Det) LT H. A. TOMPKINS	F9F-2P	3	3	4	4

* Air Group Commander, Operations Officer, and two Landing Signal Officers flew regularly with squadrons.

PART II CHRONOLOGY

On 3 September 1951, Carrier Air Group 101, aboard the USS BOXER (CV-21), departed Yokosuka enroute to the Sea of Japan where it rejoined Task Force 77 on 5 September.

On 6 September, the first operating day after returning to the operating area, the BOXER launched 98 sorties, of which 12 were defensive. The early morning hecklers led off with the discovery and damaging of two locomotives and four boxcars. A four-plane jet recon went out an hour and a half later and found a third locomotive which they chased into a nearby tunnel. Three rocket explosions inside the tunnel probably damaged the locomotive. An early morning bridge strike broke two rail bridges and two highway bridges, and close air support was given the 2nd Infantry Division. Nineteen troops and two pack animals were reported killed. Fifteen troop casualties were credited to a mid-day close air support mission over the 7th ROK Division. An early afternoon bridge strike destroyed two rail bridges and one highway bridge.

One hundred and six sorties were launched on 7 September. Twelve of these were defensive. VAN early morning hecklers began the day by derailing and destroying a locomotive with a 500# GP bomb which made a direct hit. The first bridge strike of the day destroyed six rail bridges and four highway bridges, every bridge assigned to this mission. A two-plane gunfire spotting mission working with UN ships near the eastern end of the bomblines got credit for approximately 50 troop casualties by bombing and strafing. The second bridge-breaking strike of the day dropped spans from seven highway bridges on the heavily-travelled Wonsan to Pyongyang rail line.

Sorties on 8 September were reduced to 84, including eight defensive. Foul weather at the bomblines forced cancellation of close air support and some naval gunfire support missions. The locomotive for the day was found at Songjin by a four-plane jet recon. The boiler was punctured by 20mm strafing hits.

The Task Force replenished on 9 September and no sorties were flown.

On 10 September 86 sorties were launched. Ten of these were defensive. The first jet recon of the day was diverted to search for a train that had been attacked earlier in the morning but was unable to locate it. However, the flight did find seven boxcars and destroyed four of them. The pilots of four AD's and six F4U's left a bridge-breaking mission to go to the assistance of the ships in Wonsan Bay when heavy shore defense batteries opened up on them. The BOXER planes silenced 10 shore defense guns and broke two rail bridges in spite of the interruption. Meanwhile, close air support planes from the BOXER were flying ResCap over a downed "mosquito" pilot who was later rescued. Other close air support missions over the 8th ROK Division during the day were credited with destroying four bunkers, six heavy artillery pieces, and many enemy troops.

DECLASSIFIED

FF12/CVG-101/A9

WWB:js

Ser 056

5 Oct 1951

A total of 81 sorties, ten of which were defensive, were flown on 11 September. This was "railroad-rolling-stock day" for UN planes over Korea. It began for BOXER planes when the first launch, a two-plane jet recon, was diverted to two stationary trains consisting of one engine and 12 boxcars each that had been trapped by rail breaks during the night. They set six boxcars afire by strafing. Four AD's and six F4U's, launched with jets, were diverted from bridge targets to two locomotives and 325 cars found trapped on a track leading into Pyongyang from the northeast. They destroyed both locomotives and 37 cars. The next launch included six F9F reconcs to the same area. They strafed approximately 200 cars. Meanwhile, an F9F photo plane from the same launch found approximately 75 cars trapped between two track breaks near Wonsan. Four AD's and six F4U's scheduled for a bridge strike were diverted to the 325 car concentration shortly before their noon launch, and succeeded in derailing 30 cars and damaging approximately 60 more. They then succeeded in further trapping the cars by breaking bridges at both ends of the concentration. Two F4U's on the mid-afternoon gunfire spotting mission over Wonsan Bay found 20 more cars near Wonsan and destroyed 6 cars by bombing and rocketing. Two jets reconced the Songjin-Chongjin rail route during late afternoon and found a locomotive pulling three boxcars and two passenger cars. The locomotive's boiler was punctured by strafing, and two boxcars were destroyed. A few miles further up the track another locomotive was found pulling 20 cars. The locomotive's boiler was exploded by strafing, and approximately half of the cars were left burning. The rolling stock damage was inflicted without diverting any close air support or gunfire spotting missions.

On 12 September 86 sorties, including 14 defensive, were flown. Two Panther reconcs of the first launch began a second day of heavy boxcar "busting" when they found and damaged four flat cars loaded with lumber northeast of Hungnam. A Panther photo pilot from the same launch found a "live" locomotive near Kilchu. Meanwhile, AD's and F4U's were destroying 15 rail cars and damaging approximately 40 near Wonsan. Twenty-five additional rail cars were destroyed during the day. Meanwhile, 30 rail and highway interdiction sorties destroyed eight bunkers, six artillery pieces, and an unknown number of troops facing the 5th ROK and 2nd Infantry Divisions.

The morning and early afternoon of 13 September were spent replenishing, but 22 planes were launched at 1500I. Two sorties were defensive, the others were bridge and marshalling yard strikes.

One hundred and two sorties were launched on 14 September. Sixteen of these were defensive. The hecklers opened operations for the day by dropping a span from a rail bridge with one bomb, destroying nine trucks and killing seven enemy troops. Keeping up the locomotive a day record maintained so far in this reporting period a two-plane Panther recon launched at 0545 found an engine and tender near Hamhung and strafed it until steam arose from all sides. The locomotive was destroyed on a later flight by direct ATAR hits. Sixteen close air support missions were flown during the day with 50 casualties reported. Four very successful interdiction strikes, three naval gunfire spotting missions, four jet reconcs, and six photo reconnaissance missions were flown during the day.

The first widespread foul weather of this reporting period reduced BOXER sorties to 28 on 15 September. Only four of these were defensive. Early morning hecklers broke the first bridge of the day when they dropped three bombs that were left over on a concrete rail bridge. They had finished their assigned route and selected the bridge as a dump target. All three bombs hit the bridge, dropping one span. On a bridge strike later in the day three highway bridges and three rail bridges were broken. A close air support mission to the 1st ROK Corps was credited with 40 casualties. Fifteen additional enemy troops were killed by a weather recon mission.

On 16 September the weather over North Korea improved and 101 sorties were launched. This figure includes 16 defensive sorties. Another railroad rolling stock day was begun when the early morning hecklers found seven locomotives and ten cars in the Kowon and Hamhung areas. Four locomotives were stopped when their boilers were punctured by strafing hits, and a fifth was destroyed when a napalm tank landed in the cab. A jet recon later derailed one of the damaged locomotives with three direct rocket hits. The three remaining damaged locomotives were destroyed by bomb hits from AD's and F4U's that arrived later. Four boxcars were also destroyed, and a later flight of jets set three cars on fire. An early afternoon naval gunfire spotting mission to the Wonsan Bay area found and damaged four locomotives in the Wonsan marshalling yard. BOXER planes flew 16 close air support sorties during the day with the 10th Corps, 7th ROK Division, 2nd Infantry Division, and 1st Marine Division. They were credited with 70 casualties, eight artillery positions destroyed, and six bunkers destroyed. On three missions they watched friendly secure ridges upon completion of strafing and bombing runs.

On 17 September 98 sorties were flown including 16 defensive. The early morning hecklers again got the day's first locomotives when they stopped two near Songjin by puncturing the boilers. Two jet recons from the following launch found and damaged another locomotive and nine gondola cars near Kowon. The next launch sent out a marshalling yard strike that damaged 30 more cars. Close air support was flown in the U.S. 10th Corps and ROK 1st Corps sectors accounting for 40 confirmed casualties. Bridge strikes and naval gunfire spotting missions were conducted as usual, and four photo reconnaissance missions were completed.

Only 36 sorties were launched on 18 September, of which four were defensive. The remainder of the day was used for replenishment. Four of the sorties were close air support in the 1st ROK Corps sector. Others were interdiction strikes, armed recons, and early morning hecklers. One pilot and two planes were lost. An F4U-4 flown by LTJG H.R. PODORSON, USN, 472941, of VF-884, was lost on a bridge strike a few miles south of Wonsan. The plane wreckage was later found, and it is assumed that the plane was hit by flak. The pilot is listed as missing in action. The other F4U-4 was lost when it failed to gain altitude after take-off. The pilot, LTJG Robert May, USNR, 363583, of VF-791, was recovered uninjured by the BOXER helicopter.

On 19 September 78 sorties were launched. Ten of these were defensive. The first locomotive for the day was found by the first jet recon, but all rockets had been expended and no damage was inflicted. Close air support missions with 2nd Infantry Division were credited with 20 casualties. Bridge strikes were conducted as usual, but one AD-2 was lost. The plane received a direct 40mm hit in the engine which blew the cowling and two (2) cylinders off. The pilot, LTJG P.M. FANT, USNR, 492685, of VA-702, managed to reach the coast east of Kilchu before having to ditch his plane. He was picked up from his rubber raft an hour and forty-five minutes later by the HMAS ANZAC (DD).

A total of 71 sorties, of which 12 were defensive, were launched on 20 September, and another AD-2 was lost to enemy fire. Twelve close air support sorties were flown during the day in the 10th Corps sector. Five mortar positions and five machine gun nests were destroyed. This was the last day in which Task Force 77 planes flew close air support missions. Twenty-nine AD and F4U sorties went on bridge strikes during the day breaking three rail bridges and damaging two. While on one of these strikes near Kilchu LCDR F.W. ROSSON, USNR, 122009, of VA-702, was forced to crash-land his AD-2 due to loss of power which resulted from enemy AA fire. An efficient ResCap protected the pilot until he was picked up later by a helicopter which had to fly all the way from Wonsan Bay.

On 21 September BOXER planes flew 81 sorties. Twelve of these were defensive. The locomotives for the day were near Kowon. Three were found there by planes from the BON HOMME RICHARD which were out of ordnance. Two BOXER Panthers were diverted and scored rocket hits on two of the locomotives. The next locomotive was found by two BOXER naval gunfire spotters south of Wonsan. It was damaged by rocketing and strafing.

The task force replenished on 22 September and BOXER pilots got their second non-flying day of this reporting period.

BOXER planes flew 83 sorties on 23 September. Eighteen of these were defensive CAP's and ASP's. Another locomotive find was made by the early morning hecklers when they found two locomotives and 12 cars in the marshalling yard in Hamhung. One locomotive and one car were destroyed by bombing and strafing. The early morning jet recon was called in to help, and they punctured the boiler of the other locomotive by strafing. Four boxcars were damaged. The day's third locomotive was found west of Kowon on the Wonsan to Pyongyang main line by a jet recon. It was damaged by strafing but was not stopped. The interdiction program was continued with the usual bridge strikes, and gunfire spotting for UN ships in the Wonsan and Songjin areas.

A total of 78 sorties were flown by BOXER pilots on 24 September. This included 16 defensive sorties. The interdiction program was continued with 44 AD's and F4U's breaking five rail bridges and seven highway bridges, and damaging one highway bridge. The usual large number of rolling stock targets were found. Of these, six rail cars were destroyed, 28 damaged, two trucks were destroyed, nine ox carts were destroyed, and four were damaged.

DECLASSIFIED

FF12/CVG-101/A9

WEB:js

Ser 056

5 Oct 1951

On 25 September 83 sorties were launched including 16 defensive. Night hecklers and jet reccos found all highway and rail supply routes comparatively quiet. The bridge breakers were successful as usual in breaking most of their assigned bridges. Naval gunfire spotting was done for UN ships at Wonsan and Songjin.

On 26 September the task force replenished and no sorties were flown.

On 27 September BOXER planes flew 72 sorties, including 8 defensive. BOXER planes initiated a new phase of the interdiction program. Two strike groups of ten planes each cratered tracks in 26 places on the Songjin-to-Kilchu, Chigyong-to-Tongchon-ni, and Tongchon-ni-to-Songjin rail routes. The program is aimed at overtaking the repair crews and aggravating an already critical rail shortage. Furthermore, it is believed this will be less hazardous than attacks on bridges around which AA guns are being concentrated. The late afternoon missions were cancelled due to weather.

On 28 September flight operations were limited to ten sorties, of which eight were defensive. The two offensive sorties were a gunfire spotting mission for UN ships at Songjin. Six ox carts were destroyed by strafing, and approximately 50 troops were dispersed. Two casualties were observed. The foul weather prevailed through 29 September, but eight defensive and two offensive sorties were flown. The offensive sorties flew a weather recco along the east coast, and made several strafing runs on Hamhung.

On 30 September the task force replenished.

On 1 October BOXER planes returned to their usual heavy operating schedule. Eighty-four sorties were flown, including 14 defensive. The early morning hecklers found two locomotives and 12 boxcars in the marshalling yard at Hamhung. They perforated the boiler of one locomotive and damaged the other by bombing and strafing. Two Panther jets arrived shortly afterward and inflicted further damage on the damaged locomotive and two boxcars. The boiler of the damaged locomotive was punctured by strafing hits and all 12 cars destroyed by bomb hits from a later strike group of BOXER F4U's. A jet photo pilot later discovered a locomotive and 12 cars northeast of Hungnam, but it reached the safety of a tunnel before an armed plane could arrive. The early afternoon strike was diverted to the Hamhung marshalling yard where they found and destroyed three locomotives in addition to the two that had been crippled by the morning flights. Meanwhile, a track breaking strike group cratered track in six locations and seeded four others. Naval gunfire missions were flown for UN ships at Wonsan and Songjin.

Eighty-four sorties were flown on 2 October. This included 16 defensive. Track breaking strikes blasted 32 craters in North Korea's main rail routes during the day, and early morning hecklers dropped one bomb on a rail by-pass bridge on the Hamhung-to-Kowon route and dropped one span. Other offensive operations included photo reconnaissance, armed recco, and naval gunfire spotting missions.

DECLASSIFIED

FF12/000-101/A9
WWB:js
Ser 056
5 Oct 1951

On 3 October BOXER planes flew the final 84 sorties, including 16 defensive. Four track breaking strike groups during the day broke, or displaced, track in 51 strategic locations and broke one rail bridge. It was on one of these missions on the Wonsan-Ambyon route that a BOXER F4U-4 developed engine trouble followed by a power failure which resulted in ditching in Wonsan Bay. It is believed that the plane was hit by enemy AA fire. The pilot, LCDR A. Y. STURDIVANT, Jr., USNR, 121975, was picked up by a crash boat from Yodo Island in Wonsan Bay. During late afternoon the BOXER departed from the task force for Yokosuka.

4 October was spent enroute to Yokosuka.

On 5 October 16 AD-2's, 13 F9F-2B's, and 20 F4U-4's were launched for Japan. The BOXER arrived at Yokosuka during the afternoon.

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PART III ORDNANCE

A. Jet Ordnance.

1. Machine Guns.

The jet squadron has experienced a high percentage of replacements on the new braided driving springs that drive the breech block forward in the 20mm guns. Replacements of these new springs have been considerably greater than the replacements on the old springs, and breaks sometimes occur after relatively little use.

2. Rockets.

One incident occurred in which the "shoe" on the Mk. 9 Mod. 2 rocket launcher was completely torn off the launcher and lost along with the rocket on a high speed pullout (450 kts and 6G's). There have been several cases in which screws holding the launching plate to the launcher are not large enough. It is also possible that the casting into which the screws fit is too soft.

B. F4U Ordnance.

1. Machine Guns.

A full report on the .50 cal. machine gun blast tube explosions has been submitted by CVG-101 in the form of a RUDACE. Much discussion of this problem has been submitted in previous action reports, and at this time it is believed by this command that the basis of the trouble lies in faulty APIT ammunition received on board. Also, belted ammunition is still being received in a corroded condition with solder used in sealing the containers found on the rounds and links.

Squadrons anticipating operations in the Korean area during the winter months must familiarize themselves with proper operation and maintenance of gun heaters.

2. Solenoids on the Aero 14A launchers continue to be troublesome because of their vulnerability to corrosion. It is suggested that the possibility of moving the solenoid to a more protected position within the launcher structure and constructing the solenoid of more corrosion resistant material be investigated.

C. AD Ordnance.

1. Machine Guns.

The new firing pins (stock no. 820392-B) which were installed in

the 20mm guns have given satisfactory service and are an improvement over the type formerly used. The reamers, however, which were furnished for reaming the bolt prior to installing the new pins are brittle and inadequate. In spite of careful handling the supply of reamers was exhausted before new firing pins could be installed in all guns.

A large number of feed jams have been experienced in the AD type 20mm gun installation. The reason for this is believed to be the large open top of the ammunition can which permits the ammunition belt to move about. This is particularly true when the front can is empty and the belt stretches over the empty can.

2. Bombs.

VA-702 has found the present type bomb skid to have several undesirable features. The difficulty and hard work required in pushing a load of bombs from the No. 1 bomb elevator to the after end of the flight deck over the cross deck pendants materially saps the energy of the ordnancemen. In addition, the skids are easily overturned when carrying a full load of 260 lb. Frag or 250 lb. GP bombs. It is believed that some thought should be given to perfecting a more efficient skid for use in operations such as this ship has been conducting. A wider carriage and larger wheels are recommended.

The Mk.10 hoisting adapter for the 2000 lb. bomb is good. When installing the adapter however, it must be offset enough to prevent the double suspension lugs of the bomb from fouling on the sway braces after the bomb has been hoisted into position. When the adapter is installed on the bomb in this offset position the bomb must be placed in such a position that the single suspension lug will not engage the slot provided for it in the Mk.5 Mod. 1 bomb skid.

DECLASSIFIED

D. EXPENDITURES

EXPENDITURES FOR OPERATING PERIOD OF 3 SEP 1951 to 5 OCT 1951

	F9F	F4U-4	F4U-5NL	AD's	Total
20mm	72,435		25,500	92,200	190,135
.50 cal.		721,550			721,550
100# GP		3388	6	542	3936
250# GP			84	2036	2120
500# GP		538	39	253	830
1000# GP				644	644
2000# GP				88	88
260# F			172	1104	1276
6.5" ATAR	319	9	60	115	503
5.0" HVAR	381	415	16	35	847
3.25" AR			16	2	18
Napalm		94		213	307
Flares			24	52	76
M-29 Cluster				11	11

DECLASSIFIED

WWB:js
Ser 056
5 Oct 1951VF-721 Damage F9F-2B

<u>Date</u>	<u>Bu.No.</u>	<u>Damage</u>
9-6-51	123668	Bullet hole in port stabilizer.
9-6-51	123659	Bullet hole in nose section.
9-8-51	123634	Bullet hole in port wing.
9-8-51	123668	Bullet hole starboard elevator.
9-14-51	123666	Fragment own rocket blast - fuselage.
9-14-51	123642	Flak hole in rudder.
9-19-51	123653	Bullet hole in tail.
9-19-51	123699	Bullet hole in dive brakes.
9-27-51	123660	Bullet hole in tail pipe.
10-1-51	123712	Bullet holes in both wings.

VF-884 Damage F4U-4

<u>Date</u>	<u>Bu.No.</u>	<u>Damage</u>
9-6-51	96984	Bullet holes, belly, wing, and elevator.
9-7-51	96940	Bullet holes, numerous.
9-7-51	97413	Bullet hole, wheel well.
9-7-51	96984	Flak, stub wing.
9-17-51	97413	Bullet hole in starboard wing.
9-18-51	97208	Bullet holes, stub wing and tail.
9-18-51	97011	Shot down.
9-20-51	97210	Bullet holes in fuselage.
9-21-51	97045	Bullet holes, wing and speed ring.
9-25-51	81714	Hole in prop.
9-25-51	81969	Hole, magneto and starboard elevator.
10-1-51	81936	Bullet holes in fuselage.
10-1-51	97413	Bullet holes in cowling.
10-3-51	81866	Shot down.

VF-791 Damage F4U-4

<u>Date</u>	<u>Bu.No.</u>	<u>Damage</u>
9-6-51	97266	Flak holes lower section of fuselage and starboard stabilizer.
9-7-51	82070	Flak holes thru left wing.
9-7-51	82000	30 cal hole through top aft section of canopy.
9-7-51	81269	Flak hole in forward part of starboard, stabilizer and vertical tab.
9-8-51	97317	Flak hole leading edge of port wing.
9-8-51	97327	Flak hole in fuselage and root fairing on starboard wing.
9-12-51	97256	Hole in left wing and flap.
9-13-51	97317	Bullet holes in both wings.
9-13-51	97373	Flak holes in both wings.
9-14-51	81712	Bullet hole in rudder.
9-14-51	81715	Flak hole in speed ring.

VF-791 Damage F4U-4

<u>Date</u>	<u>Bu.No.</u>	<u>Damage</u>
9-16-51	97310	Bullet hole in cowl ring.
9-17-51	81712	Hole in speed ring.
9-18-51	82070	Bullet hole in bottom of fuselage.
9-19-51	82070	Large hole in speed ring.
9-20-51	81196	Flak hole right aileron.
9-23-51	97305	Flak left inboard flap.
9-25-51	97137	Replace canopy bullet damage.
9-26-51	82070	Hole in port wing.
10-2-51	96763	Bullet hole through starboard aileron.

VA-702 Damage AD-2 & AD40

<u>Date</u>	<u>Bu.No.</u>	<u>Damage</u>
9-7-51	122248	Bullet hole, fuselage.
9-8-51	122329	Bullet hole in fuselage.
9-8-51	122324	Bullet hole in stub wing.
9-14-51	124047	Bullet hole in nose section.
9-14-51	122211	Bullet hole in wing.
9-16-51	122329	Bullet hole in wing.
9-18-51	122333	Flak, leading edge port wing.
9-19-51	122319	Bullet hole in tail section.
9-19-51	123301	Shot down.
9-20-51	122275	Shot down.
9-20-51	122311	Bullet hole in wing.

VC-3 (Det) Damage F4U-5NL

<u>Date</u>	<u>Bu.No.</u>	<u>Damage</u>
9-8-51	124539	Bullet hole port stabilizer, elevator, starboard flap, cowling, and port wing.
9-19-51	124539	Bullet hole in tail section.
9-20-51	124539	Bullet hole in rudder.
9-28-51	124539	Bullet holes in port wing and elevator.

VC-35 (Det) Damage AD-4N-40

<u>Date</u>	<u>Bu.No.</u>	<u>Damage</u>
9-6-51	124141	Bullet hole starboard wing.
9-16-51	124070	Bullet hole in port aileron.
9-23-51	124141	Bullet holes in both wings and cowling.

PART IV B.

DAMAGE INFLICTED ON THE ENEMY

<u>TARGETS</u>	<u>SEEDED</u>	<u>PROBABLY DAMAGED</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>
RR Bridges	1		18	88*
RR Tunnels	1	1	14	
RR Tracks	2			197#
RR Locomotives		9	6	16
RR Cars		410	296	201
RR Marshalling Yards			27	
RR Turntables			2	
RR Maintenance Buildings			1	1
Highway Bridges	4		9	52*
Highways	3			52#
Tanks		2		
Trucks		140	64	55
Other Motor Vehicles		11	10	3
Carts		7	36	84
Beasts of Burden				29
Fuel Dumps			4	3
Supply Dumps		2	15	15
Villages		1	79	
Factories			10	6
Warehouses		1	56	31
Barracks		3	58	26
Hangers		1	2	3
Lighthouses			1	
Other Type Buildings		2	109	269
Pill Boxes		4	9	12
Mortar Positions			2	13
AA Positions		18	8	30
Shore Batteries		8	10	10
Artillery Pieces		18	7	23
Troop Concentrations			67	
Casualties Inflicted				486
Other Military Installations				3
Surface Boats		20	9	9

* Railroad and highway bridges with at least one complete break are counted as destroyed.

This is the number of locations at which tracks were broken on highways cratered. These figures do not include damaged or destroyed highway or railroad bridges, but do include bridge approaches.

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PART V PERSONNEL

A. The four squadrons of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE will lose the following percentages of reserve personnel under the phasing out program during the month of October.

1. 40% of all rated personnel.
2. 26% of all enlisted personnel.
3. 100% of rated yeomen.

B. Losses:

LTJG Harold R. PODORSON, 472941/1310, USN.

LTJG PODORSON is listed as missing in action as a result of a plane crash near Anbyon, Korea, on 18 September 1951.

C. Recommendations.

Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE has operated throughout the entire cruise with the VC teams combined into one group known as VC-1010. This system has had advantages and drawbacks. The maintenance results derived from having the VC teams maintain their own aircraft cannot be denied. All VC teams have operated continuously with high availability and have been more than satisfied with the results of having their own men work together. However, an additional load is imposed upon the small air group staff in the administration of the group of 140 men and 30 officers which constitutes a squadron in itself. This restricts the staff in functioning as such by throwing an additional amount of paper work upon it. It is also believed that the overall number of personnel utilized in keeping the VC teams separate from the operating squadrons is excessive. A letter to ComAirPac is now being prepared concerning personnel recommendations by Commander Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE.

PART VI MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS

A. Maintenance

1. Jet Maintenance.

There were two instances in the jet squadron in which the landing gear could not be lowered. Both instances were reported in VF-721 RUDM No. 44-51. Briefly, the failure is due to a malfunction of the landing gear door control unit, which permits the door to open partially, the gear to become unlocked and start down, and the gear to jam on the door which retracts prematurely. In both cases the gear came down and locked normally when the air bottle was dumped.

2. F4U Maintenance.

A notable decrease in wing explosions took place during this period. Selected ammunition was in use for the first two and a half weeks during which time no explosions occurred. When this ammunition was exhausted explosions again began. Total explosions for the period were ten (10), two (2) of which required wing changes. Eight other wing changes were effected for various reasons, mainly AA damage. One F4U-4 was landed at Kangnung with the engine stuck in high blower, but a crew was sent ashore from the ship, and an engine which was delivered by the 1st Marine Air Wing was installed in the aircraft. Considerable engine trouble was experienced during this period, but most of the discrepancies are attributable to high operating time at high power on the engines. The use of new RB 19 spark plugs has greatly decreased the number of planes being downed for plug changes.

3. AD Maintenance.

During this operating cycle two AD engine changes were effected before the normal service life of the engines were completed. On one occasion the engine was damaged by flak, and the other was changed because of low compression and rough operation. During the early part of this operating cycle three AD canopies were found sprung and had to be changed. The cause of this is believed to have been the summer heat. It is recommended that canopies be left cracked when aircraft are sitting in the sun on hot summer days.

B. Operations

1. Jet Operations

A few armed reconnaissance flights were flown by four plane groups which proved to be very unsatisfactory as compared to the two plane flights. On the four plane flights the third and fourth pilots had to devote most of their efforts to keeping track of the planes ahead which precluded their conducting any reconnaissance and made navigation practically impossible. Also, when a target was spotted, considerable confusion arose in attempting to point out the target to the other three planes. Radio transmissions were doubled. Another bad feature was the fact that the first two planes alerted flak positions which were able to man guns and subject the second two planes to intense anti-aircraft fire. These four plane reccos were an unsuccessful attempt to increase the effectiveness of the jet reccos by a greater show of force to discourage AA fire.

DECLASSIFIED

FF12/CVG-101/A9
WFB:js
Ser 056
5 Oct 1951

In the two accidents involving the F9F which occurred in VF-721, injuries have been caused by the sharp edges of the knee braces on the ejection seat striking the pilot's legs. It is recommended that these braces be padded or even better that the shape be changed to prevent further occurrence of these injuries.

2. F4U Operations.

Because of the increase in ground fire in North Korea in the last few months and the vulnerability of the Corsair to ground fire, the F4U squadrons have concentrated on utilization of protective tactics and rigid air discipline around the target. Radio discipline has been emphasized and enforced within CVG-101, but other air groups operating in the area persist in using such channels as #7 which is the reporting in and out frequency for tactical purposes. This cannot help but lower the standards of radio discipline for all aircraft in the area. A separately designated frequency for tactical use by TF 77 aircraft would help considerably. It has been found that with rigid air discipline, radio discipline, and well planned coordinated attacks executed on the targets of North Korea, that this force could deliver a maximum amount of damage to the enemy with a minimum amount of battle damage.

3. AD Operations.

Two definite changes in missions have come about during this operating period. One is railroad track breaking instead of bridge breaking, and the other is the varied loading of the early morning strike to meet any target discovered by the morning hecklers. Delayed action bombs are used in breaking the tracks in order that they may be dropped from minimum altitude for greater accuracy. The pilot must know which bomb station is to release next in order that his drop will be centered on the narrow track. It is now considered a good policy for the strike leader to contact the morning hecklers on the way in on the first strike. Then if there are targets of sufficient value available the strike may be diverted from a less important target as the situation may dictate. In several instances the strikes have been able to accomplish the primary mission and have sufficient ordnance left to proceed to other targets discovered by the hecklers.

4. Recommendations.

On 20 September the fast carriers ceased all close air support in order to concentrate on interdiction. It is recommended that the fast carriers be scheduled for a certain minimum number of CAS flights daily in order to maintain familiarity with the control procedures, terrain, and attack technique.

DECLASSIFIED

FF12/CVG-101/A9
WWB:js
Ser 056
5 Oct 1951

With the approach of cold weather pilots can no longer ditch off shore with any degree of safety. It is strongly recommended that additional helicopter coverage be provided in the northeast area near Songjin so that pilots have a greater chance for rescue in case of bail-outs and crash landings. A well coordinated ResCap can easily protect a pilot in this area but at present the helicopter based at Wonsan cannot reach north of Songjin or Kilchu.

C. FLIGHT HOURS (4 Sep 1951 - 3 Oct 1951)

<u>SQUADRON OR UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL HOURS</u>	<u>HOURS PER PILOT</u>	<u>FLIGHTS PER PILOT</u>
VF-721	726.1	24.2	14.4
VF-791	995.2	39.8	13.1
VF-884	984.5	42.8	13.8
VA-702	1366.0	52.5	14.4
VC-3 Det.	306.6	61.3	20.0
VC-11 Det.	205.4	51.3	17.7
VC-35 Det.	228.2	45.6	14.8
VC-61 Det.	146.8	36.7	22.5
*CAG-101 Staff	120.2	30.0	10.2
TOTAL	5079.0		

*Air Group Commander, Air Group Administrative Officer, and 2 LSO's.

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SORTIES FLOWN (3 SEP 1951 - 3 OCT 1951)

	CAS	TRANS	STRIKE	RECON	NGF	PHOTO	PHOTO ESCORT	CAP		ASP		HECKLER		AERO	OFF	DEF	TOTAL	
								DAY	NIGHT	DAY	NIGHT	PRE- DAWN	NIGHT					PRE- DAWN
VFJ				168			87	160						255	160	415		
VFP						87								87		87		
VF	83	453			84			10		13				620	23	643		
VFN					2					23		30	12	2	46	23	69	
VA	81	310							5					2	393	5	398	
VAN									4	14	6	27	12		39	24	63	
VAW									45	14	6					65	65	
TOT	164	763		168	86	87	87	170		90	28	12	57	24	4	1440	300	1740
																		REFRESHER, TEST, COURIER, TOW, ETC.
																		164
																		TOTAL
																		1904

NOTES:

1. VAW and VAN pilots flew additional missions in VA aircraft, and VFN pilots flew additional missions in VF aircraft.
2. "TRANS" includes bridge breakers, railroad breakers, highway breakers, and seeders.
3. The VAN sorties listed in the "TRANS" column were Radar Countermeasures sorties that accompanied bridge breaking strikes.
4. "RECON" includes armed reconnaissance of transportation routes and areas.
5. "NGF" missions spot gunfire for UN surface units along the eastern coast of Korea.
6. "AERO" sorties were weather reconnaissance.

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PART VII SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

When Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE deployed March 1951, aboard the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21) operations consisted of several types. The jets flew armed reconnaissance missions in two plane flights and were more successful than the props because of the high speed of approach and the lack of engine noise. On the other hand the propeller driven craft could stay over the target for longer periods of time and do a greater amount of damage while there. However, the enemy had ample time to get off the highways and concealed before the arrival of props so that it became necessary for the aircraft to fly armed reconnaissance flights at low altitudes in order to spot the targets. This practice was abandoned because of the vulnerability of the low flying planes to ground fire. Many flak traps were discovered by the propeller driven aircraft only after planes had been severely damaged or shot down by ground fire. The final conclusion of this group is that the armed reconnaissance flights be conducted by two plane groups of jet aircraft. During daylight hours the transportation system can be kept free of movement with minimum losses to own forces. The special missions teams can operate at night in propeller driven aircraft with equal results.

Close air support flights were conducted entirely by the F4U and AD aircraft. The use of napalm, VT fuzed fragmentation and GP bombs, and strafing by BOXER planes received much praise from the ground and air controllers along the front. Close air support was given troops as close as fifty yards from our own lines. Tactics consisted of thoroughly strafing and bombing an area before making the low and flat napalm dropping run which is necessary to get the proper amount of spread and accuracy. Coordinated runs were used in areas of much enemy activity and ground fire. On one occasion during August at the request of the Army a special CAS flight loaded only with 1000 and 2000 lb. bombs with .025 sec. delay fuzes was directed against some communist bunkers 15 feet thick on the side of a mountain. While some of the bunkers were destroyed the outstanding feature of the attack was the large number of enemy casualties caused by concussion. Large numbers were found dead and apparently untouched except for brains sticking out their ears.

Coordinated strikes were conducted against the cities of HAMHUNG and WONSAN with excellent results. These strikes consisted of hitting important pre-assigned targets in the cities themselves. Target coordinators were used very successfully to keep the attacks following in orderly fashion and to obtain maximum coverage.

Since the summer the primary mission of the fast carrier air groups has been interdiction of the transportation system. Bridge strikes proved highly successful in that key bridges both railway and highway were systematically destroyed. Pilots from Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE became highly successful in the art of bombing bridges. Strikes of four (4) AD's

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FF12/CVGL01/A9
WWB:js
Ser 056
5 Oct 1951

and six (6) F4U's have been sent on bridge strikes and have destroyed as many as eight (8) bridges in a single strike. Toward the end of the summer the enemy began to fortify his bridges with heavy and medium anti-aircraft positions. This necessitated flak suppression runs by the fighters and coordinated attacks by the AD's. As the supply of bridges dwindled the tactics were changed to railroad track breaking. Isolated sections of railroad track were selected and broken in many places with delayed action bombs. Highways were cratered in remote mountain passes and seeded with delayed action "Butterfly" bombs. The efforts of the fast carrier forces were so successful in stopping transportation on the eastern half of the Korean peninsula that no close air support missions were flown after 20 September in order that the carriers could concentrate on the interdiction of an additional area toward the west formerly assigned to the Air Force.

The night special missions teams were used successfully on dusk and dawn heckler missions. It became common practice in Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE for the morning hecklers to locate targets at daybreak and call the day flights in to aid in the destruction. Many prize targets such as locomotives and truck convoys were annihilated in this manner. The night teams flew in two plane groups and operated along assigned transportation routes.

In the mountains which extend along the eastern coast of Korea weather was often a limiting factor. Clouds forming among the tops of the mountains sometimes prevented operations in that sector. On days such as these coastal or inland targets were concentrated upon.

Corsairs were utilized to spot for naval gunfire along the bomblines, at Wonsan, and around the Songjin area. Most of the pilots who spotted for naval gunfire were trained within the squadrons while aboard. ComAirPac's policy of training pilots in NGF spotting at the CAS school is considered to be a genuine improvement.

During the spring and summer months the propeller aircraft flew with maximum loads, but the low and shifting winds and high temperature of the summer season plus the lessening need for heavy bombs necessitated a change to lighter loads. F4U's generally carried only six (6) wing bombs and a 500# or napalm.

The amount of ground fire in Korea increased tremendously while Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE was deployed. Although most of it cannot be seen, it is apparent from the number of holes appearing in the returning planes. Pilots of jet aircraft are able to hear rifle fire from the ground when the cabin pressurization is turned off. Forty and twenty millimeter bursts are now seen in abundance on every flight. Anti-aircraft fire is now encountered up to as high as twelve thousand feet above the terrain.

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DECLASSIFIED

RF12/CVG101/A9
WWB:js
Ser 056
5 Oct 1951

New air groups being deployed should bear in mind a few facts learned by Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE through the experience of eight months of operation. First, the weather is extremely bad during certain seasons and should be respected. On days when inclement weather persists flight leaders should exercise extreme caution in operating around the mountainous areas. A pilot can render much more damage to the enemy by flying many missions on days of good weather than by flying into the side of a mountain while trying to effectively use his ordnance on one day of marginal weather. An even greater hazard is the danger of being hit by AA fire due to the pilots' eagerness to press home attacks under low ceilings.

Secondly, areas of heavy flak should be avoided unless sufficient planes are present to divide the ground fire and suppress it. Slight turns and a spread formation while flying over land and not staying on a set course for too great a length of time are helpful in avoiding anti-aircraft fire. Coordinated attacks should be used on areas of known flak or on doubtful targets. CVG-101 generally flew over land at an altitude of above 7000 feet enroute to targets.

Third, low pull outs should be avoided. There are targets along the coast where pull outs may be made as low as one thousand feet, but the majority of targets now have anti-aircraft positions near them, and the danger of bomb blast is always prevalent. Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE has found that highly accurate bomb drops can be made with either the F4U or AD without making excessively low pullouts.

Fourth, it takes a new air group at least a month to get settled down and really proficient at its job. Too often the new pilots read the strike flash reports of the experienced groups and determine to equal the results of their elders. This in turn results in the pilots taking unnecessary chances and incurring unnecessary losses which serve to destroy confidence when it is needed most.

W. W. EREHM
W. W. EREHM

PILOT HOURS FLOWN
(27 Mar 1951 - 5 Oct 1951)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DAY</u>	<u>NIGHT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
VF-721	3277.7		3277.7
VF-791	4828.2		4828.2
VF-884	4860.9		4860.9
VA-702	6007.3		6007.3
VC-3 Det.	891.9	409.0	1300.9
VC-11 Det.	955.2	102.8	1058.0
VC-35 Det.	875.7	314.3	1190.0
VC-61 Det.	495.0		495.0
CVG-101*	609.4		609.4
TOTAL	22,801.3	826.1	23,627.4

* Air Group Commander, Air Group Administrative Officer, and 2 LSO's.

PILOT CARRIER LANDINGS

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DAY</u>	<u>NIGHT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
VF-721	1749		1749
VF-791	1622		1622
VF-884	1595		1595
VA-702	1898		1898
VC-3 Det.	347	64	411
VC-11 Det.	343	28	371
VC-35 Det.	334	77	411
VC-61 Det.	298		298
CVG-101*	212		212
TOTAL	8398	169	8567

* Air Group Commander, Air Group Administrative Officer, and 2 LSO's.

NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT DAMAGED
(27 Mar 1951 - 5 Oct 1951)

TYPE A/C	FLAK OR BULLET HOLES	BLAST TUBE EXPLOSION	CARRIER		LANDING		OTHER CATWALK	MISC.	TOT
			BARR- LER	CAT- WALK	OTHER				
F9F-2B	39		2		1			1	43
F9F-2P	2								2
F4U-4	95	19	3	1	4	1			123
AD-2	42		2						44
F4U-5NL	11				2				13
AD-4N	13								13
TOTAL	202	19	7	1	7	1	1	1	238

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DAMAGE INFLICTED ON THE ENEMY
 (27 Mar 1951 - 5 Oct 1951)

<u>TARGETS</u>	<u>SEEDED</u>	<u>PROBABLY DAMAGED</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>
RR Bridges	4	17	80	213
RR Tunnels	3	15	46	
RR Tracks	3		2	436#
RR Locomotives		15	25	22
RR Cars		998	741	493
RR Handcars			3	1
RR Marshalling Yards		7	73	
RR Turntables			4	1
RR Maintenance Buildings			5	2
Highway Bridges	4	12	80	131
Highway Tunnels		1	2	
Highways	53			212#
River Ford				1
Tanks		34	16	10
Trucks		428	362	383
Bull Dozers			2	
Other Motor Vehicles		35	57	33
Abandoned UN Vehicles				107
Carts		50	93	343
Beasts of Burden				127
Ammo Dumps		3		22
Fuel Dumps		1	10	40
Supply Dumps		14	80	57
Suspected Mine Depot			1	
Lumber Piles			24	14
Villages		26	390	53
Factories		4	43	16
Saw Mills			3	5
Warehouses		88	260	175
Barracks		75	121	43
Hangers		1	3	3
Lighthouses			1	
Other Type Buildings		165	1090	1995
Pill Boxes		7	11	15
Mortar Positions			2	13
AA Positions		18	8	30
Shore Batteries		8	10	10
Artillery Pieces		18	7	23
Other Gun Emplacements		99	38	131
Troop Concentrations			354	
Casualties Inflicted				8661##
Airstrips			3	
Other Military Installations		6	18	20
Surface Boats		57	49	50
Floating Mines				1

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WFB:js
 Ser 056
 5 Oct 1951

This is the number of locations at which tracks were broken or highways cratered. These figures do not include damaged or destroyed highway or railroad bridges, but do include bridge approaches.

This figure represents only corpses counted by ground troops, enemy troops seen to fall as a result of strafing or rocketing, and the estimated casualty figures of air controllers.

P I L O T C A S U A L T I E S
 (27 Mar 1951 - 5 Oct 1951)

	<u>INCIDENT TO ENEMY ACTION</u>			<u>OPERATIONAL</u>	
	<u>INJURED</u>	<u>MISSING IN ACTION</u>	<u>KILLED IN ACTION</u>	<u>INJURED</u>	<u>KILLED</u>
VF-721				1	
VF-791	2			1	
VF-884	1	3	4		1
VA-702	1		1		
VC-3 Detachment					
VC-11 "					
VC-35 "			1		
VC-61 "					
CVG-101					
TOTAL	4	3	6	2	1

ORDNANCE EXPENDED
(27 March 1951 - 5 October 1951)

	F9F	F4U	F4U-5NL	AD	TOTAL
2000# GP				416	416
1000# GP		343		1725	2068
500# GP		1339	239	1310	2888
260# FRAG			696	7058	7781
250# GP			148	5013	5161
220# FRAG			22	708	730
100# GP		9712	25	2011	11,748
350# ADB		1	2	19	22
11.75" ROCKET				10	10
6.5" ATAR	1692	1150	278	152	3272
5.0" HVAR	2013	6538	196	232	8979
3.25" AR		579	26	57	662
NAPALM		813		1586	2399
20MM	265,205		84,300	411,100	760,605
.50 CAL.		2,928,695			2,928,695
FLARES (MK6, MOD 4)			76	162	238
AN-M12 INCENDIARY				24	24
M-29 CLUSTER		16		149	165

SUMMARY OF ORDNANCE EXPENDED

Bombs: 5087.6 Tons
 Rockets: 12,923
 Napalm: 2399
 Ammunition: 3,689,300
 (20mm & .50 cal.)

DAMAGE TO OWN FORCES

(27 March 1951 - 5 October 1951)

NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT LOST:

TYPE AIRCRAFT	ENEMY ACTION	DITCHED ON TAKE-OFF	OTHER DITCHINGS	MISC	TOTAL
F9F-2B		2	1		3
F9F-2P					0
F4U-4	9	5	2	1	17
AD-2	8			1	9
F4U-5NL	1				1
AD-4W					0
AD-4N					0
TOTAL	18	7	3	2	30

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SORTIES FLOWN (27 MAR 1951 - 5 OCT 1951)

	GAS	TRANS	STRIKE	RECON	IGF	PHOTO	PHOTO ESCORT	CAP DAY	ASP DAY	ASP PRE- DAWN	ASP NIGHT	HECKLER PRE- DAWN	HECKLER NIGHT	AERO	OFF	DEF	TOTAL		
VFJ			48		657											976	700	1676	
VFP						277											277	277	
VF	663	1240	204		218			375	82							2583	457	3040	
VFN					22			12	44	3			107	52	4	203	59	262	
VA	609	981	135		148				72						2	1875	72	1947	
VAN		6			3				20	44	20		99	49		157	84	241	
VAW									203	47	20						270	270	
TOT	1272	2227	387		1048	277		271	1087	421	94		40	206	101	6	6071	1642	7713
																			REFRESHER, TEST, COURIER, TOW, ETC.
																			1120
																			TOTAL
																			8833

NOTES:

1. VAW and VAN pilots flew additional missions in VA aircraft, and VFN pilots flew additional missions in VF aircraft.
2. "TRANS" includes bridge breakers, railroad breakers, highway breakers, and seeders.
3. The VAN sorties listed in the "TRANS" column were Radar Countermeasures sorties that accompanied bridge breaking strikes.
4. "RECON" includes armed reconnaissance of transportation routes and areas.
5. "IGF" missions spot gunfire for UN surface units along the eastern coast of Korea.
6. "AERO" sorties were weather reconnaissance.

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WLB:js
Ser 056
5 Oct 1951

CVG-101 PERSONNEL STATISTICS
(5 Oct 1951)

Total Officers Assigned	153
U.S.N. Officers	20
Reserve Officers	133
Ground Officers	23
CDR	1
LCDR	18
LT	92
LTJG	35
ENS	6
W.O.	1
Average Flight Time Per Pilot	1686 Hours.
Average Number of Missions Per Pilot	59.3
Average Age of Pilots	28.2 Years
Average Number of Carrier Landings Per Pilot	145.
Pilots Married	83%
Total Enlisted Assigned	634.
% of Enlisted Reserves	73%

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