UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
COMMANDER
CARRIER AIR GROUP ONE HUNDRED TWO
c/o FPO, San Francisco, Calif.

OPS:ht
A9
Serial: 023
18 Aug. 1951

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander, Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO
To : Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)

Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO for Period of 10 May 1951 to 28 July 1951

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

Ref : (a) CNO Instruction OP342 Ser. 408P34 of 1 July 1951.

1. This report is forwarded for inclusion in the Action Report of the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) as required by reference (a).

2. Information, comment and recommendations are presented under the following headings:

I Mission and Composition
II Chronology
III Ordnance
IV Damage
V Personnel Performance and Casualties
VI Comments and Recommendations
A. Operations
B. Intelligence
C. Maintenance
D. Electronics
E. Survival

I. MISSION AND COMPOSITION

1. Departing SAN DIEGO, 10 May 1951, Carrier Air Group 102 (composed of four reserve squadrons) embarked on the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31), flew training exercises in the Hawaiian area during the period 14 - 18 May and arrived in the WESTPAC area 28 May 1951. The Air Group immediately began flying close air support, armed reconnaissance and strikes in support of the United Nations' effort in Korea as assigned in the Daily Air Plan by CTF 77.

2. The composition of the Air Group was as follows:

UNIT COMMANDER	TYPE A/C	5/10 Operating A/C	7/28 Operating A/C	5/10 Pilots	7/28 Available Pilots
CAG 102					
CDR H.N. FUNK					
VF 781					
LCDR C.I. OVELAND	F9F-2B	24	16	62	32
VF 783					
LCDR J.O. ANTHONY	F4U-4	16	15	25	22
VF 874					
LCDR D.L. WATTS	F4U-4	16	13	26	25

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UNIT COMMANDER	TYPE A/C	5/10 Operating	6/17 A/C	5/10 Pilots	6/17 Available
VA 923	AD-3	16	15	27	25
LCDR H.W. WILEY VC-3	AD-4Q	2	1		
LCDR C.J. SCHROEDER VC-11	F4U-5NL	4	4	6	6
LT. L.E. KIRK, Jr. VC-35	AD-4W	3	3	6	6
LCDR A. WALDMAN VC-61	AD-4W	0	2	6	6
LT W. WESTMORELAND HU-1 Det.	F9F-2P	3	3	4	4
LT. W. LEARY	HO3S	1	1	2	2
		85	75	134	128

This does not include the Air Group Commander (who regularly flies the AD or F9F) or the Staff Operations Officer (who flies the AD)or the Assistant Operations Officer (who flies the F4U). During this period, 6 F4U and 3 AD replacement aircraft were flown aboafd from AFB Itazuke.

II CHRONOLOGY (10 May through 28 July)

1. Carrier Air Group 102 aboard the USS BON HOMME RICHARD departed San Diego at 1000 on 10 May 1951, enroute to Pearl Harbor.

2. On 13 May with Diamond Head in sight, 16 F4Us (cargo planes being ferried to NAS Atsugi) were launched for Ford Island, all landing without incident. At the same time 60 ADs and F4Us were launched for NAS BARBERS POINT to clear the deck for refresher landings, practice strikes and for the use of 30 pilots of the Air Group who were to night qualify. On the nights of 14 and 15 May, 25 pilots of the Air Group made one night landing aboard without accident. On the night of 17 May a simulated strike was launched and the remaining 5 pilots on return made their one night landing. On the 18th of May the ship docked at Ford Island.

3. On 21 May, the ship got underway at 0900 arriving off TOKYO early on the 28th of May. Time in transit was spent on map assembling and Air Intelligence lectures given by the Squadron AIOs who had preceded the Air Group to the war zone and had rejoined their squadrons in Hawaii. Sixteen F4Us were launched for delivery to FASRON 11 at NAS ATSUGI. The ship then continued on to its rendezvous with Task Force 77 in the Sea of Japan.

4. The first strikes were scheduled for the afternoon of 30 May, but because of poor weather all were cancelled. Air Operations were limited to the arrival of 3 CODFISH planes with the ferry pilots and 3 ADs from the USS PHILIPPINE SEA for transfer to VC-35.

5. The Air Group launched its first strikes against the enemy on 31 May. On that day 26 sorties were flown, 20 offensive and 6 defensive. The day was marred when the first F9F with a BOXER pilot at the controls was catapulted into the water , reason unknown. He was picked up in a matter of minutes by the helicopter. Under the leadership of experienced pilots from the USS BOXER, planes strafed ridges on close air support with 90% coverage reported by the controller. Also the planes hit four boxcars and a supply dump leaving both burning.

6. 1 June saw 99 sorties launched, on recco hops, close air support, bridge strikes, photo hops and defensive missions. The breakdown was 70 offensive missions and 29 defensive. Buildings housing troops were strafed and rocketed, 4 boxcars destroyed on a railroad siding. On close air support troops on ridges were strafed and napalmed with 90% coverage. Four night hecklers were particularly effective, catching a truck convoy on a bridge scored one direct hit on the bridge and left twenty trucks burning. One jet was hit with small arms fire.

7. On 2 June, 94 sorties, 78 offensive and 16 defensive, were launched. F4Us flew NGF hops in the vicinity of WONSAN with results unobserved. Bridge strikes were relatively ineffective with large bombs near misses. There was effective coverage on close air support mission with 100% coverage on enemy held ridges reported by the controller.

8. On 3 June, 55 offensive missions and 8 defensive missions were flown. Close air support missions were particularly effective with 100% coverage and 75 confirmed enemy dead. One F4U stalled directly in front of the ship on take-off. The pilot was not recovered. At 1500 the ship replenished.

9. On 4 June, despite poor weather, 69 offensive missions and 25 defensive missions were flown. Primary targets for the most part were weathered in and planes were directed to targets of opportunity. Troop encampments, supply dumps and bridges were strafed, rocketed, bombed and napalmed. One bridge was knocked out and two spans of another were seen to drop. Two ADs and 1 F4U were hit by small arms fire but returned without accident.

10. Weather over the target area again hampered operations on 5 June when 92 sorties were flown, 63 offensive and 29 defensive. ADs and F4Us on close air support had 100% coverage on enemy held ridges. Others hit a supply dump leaving it burning along with 15 other buildings. 4 NGF sorties were unable to spot because of concealing clouds in the target areas. However, they hit and damaged with 500# bombs the entrance to a tunnel and strafed personnel in the area.

11. 6 June saw 91 sorties launched, 62 offensive and 29 defensive. All close air support flights were diverted to recco because of poor weather over the bomb line. Planes hit targets of opportunity North of the bomb line including bridges, buildings, troop barracks, trucks, etc. Fair to good results were attained. ASP was diverted to direct helicopter to a down Princeton pilot. He was picked up from the water and taken to the PRINCETON by helicopter from the USS BON HOMME RICHARD.

12. 7 June was replenishment day and there were no air operations.

13. 8 June found the Air Group back in action with 82 sorties, 66 offensive and 16 defensive. Offensive missions consisted of recco flights, close air support, and bridge attacks. Weather hampered the close air support, 4 planes jettisoning in the sea. Others were diverted to targets of opportunity, strafing and rocketing a village, bombing 8 vehicles which were left burning. One large bridge was effectively bombed, 6 to 5 spans being destroyed.

14. Poor weather over the bombline once again hampered the close air support flights on 8 June when 87 sorties were flown, 69 offensive and 18 defensive and one abortive because of fuel trouble, the plane landing safely on the USS PRINCETON. Flights were diverted to bridges and targets of opportunity. One bridge was well hit, 75% destroyed. Eleven buildings were hit and left burning by another CAS diverted mission. In the afternoon the weather cleared sufficiently over the bombline for 4 planes to strafe and napalm an enemy held position on a hillcrest. 98% coverage was estimated by the controller with 10 enemy killed, 20 wounded, the rest scattering. Four planes on NGF hit and damaged a tunnel entrance after their spotting mission was completed. Night hecklers destroyed 4 box cars after strafing an estimated 60.

15. On 10 June because of bad weather, only 18 sorties were flown, 10 offensive and 8 defensive.

16. Sixty-nine sorties were launched on 11 June, 39 offensive and 30 defensive JETCAPS, Piston caps, and ASPs. Once again poor weather and visibility cut down on the effectiveness of strikes and close air support. On armed recco, 8 houses were destroyed 2 factory buildings were hit but assessment was scanty.

17. On a NGF mission, two F4Us totally demolished five buildings, and hit another which exploded with an enormous sheet of flame. It is believed the building contained stored gasoline drums.

18. The early morning hecklers started the day off on 12 June by destroying 5 railroad cars, damaging a factory and hiway bridge. In all, 54 sorties were flown, 30 offensive and 24 defensive. One jet was hit and landed safely with escort at K18. CAS flights destroyed 4 houses and had excellent coverage on entrenched troops. Afternoon strikes were cancelled in favor of special ASPs with negative results.

19. On 13 June 99 sorties were flown, 55 offensive and 44 defensive. In addition two planes flew to K18 to assist the two F9Fs. Using water injection and a very light fuel load, both planes were airborne in 2260 feet. From this it is apparent that no F9F pilot should hesitate using K18 for a deferred emergency landing inasmuch as there is sufficient room for landings and takeoffs. The Air Group continued its attacks on enemy ground installations, destroying or damaging 24 trucks and 14 buildings. In addition CAS hops were effective in strafing and napalming enemy ridges with an estimated 25 troops killed.

20. The 14th of June was replenishment day. However, at 1700 flight operations were begun with JetCAPS, photo recco, CAS and bridge strikes. Five direct hits damaged 70% of a bridge. CAS also had a good coverage on enemy held ridges. Night hecklers destroyed or damaged 3 factory buildings and 3 trucks. In all 22 sorties were flown of which 14 were offensive and 8 defensive.

21. On 16 June, the Air Group was severely hampered by weather with almost all strikes cancelled and the remaining jettisoning in the sea. One close air support mission, taking a momentary break in the weather, strafed and napalmed a ridge with 100% coverage reported by the controller. Sixty-two sorties were flown, 28 being offensive and 34 defensive.

22. Weather was again the limiting factor on 16 June when 42 sorties were flown, 16 offensive and 26 defensive. Good results were obtained however by 2 large CAS strikes which hit two ridges with 100% coverage, killing 90 enemy troops and wiping out one machine gun nest and 4 artillery pieces.

23. On 17 June the ship left the Task Force anchoring at Sasebo at 2000. Four defensive sorties were flown this day.

24. The ship and Air Group remained at SASEBO Harbor until 30 June 1951. The time was spent for the most part, in rest and recreation for all hands. In addition, however, maintenance work was performed on all planes. On 30 June at 1900 the ship departed SASEBO Harbor to rejoin TF 77 off the Eastern Coast of Korea. Rendezvous was effected at 0600, 1 July and the ship replenished. Flight operations were restricted to recovering 1 AD4Q and 5 F4Us, launched from Itazuke Air Force Base as replacement for planes previously lost. In addition 1 AD and 4 F4Us were catapulted in order to test the port catapult which had undergone extensive repairs at SASEBO. The shots were all successful and the planes landed aboard without incident.

25. On 2 July the Air Group, although somewhat hampered by weather, returned to action with 81 sorties being flown. 71 of these were offensive missions, of which 7 were aborted because of poor weather. 10 flights were defensive ASPs and CAPs. Close air support sorties were particularly effective. One enemy held ridge was blasted with napalm and rockets and 30 troops were definitely killed. On other strikes, 8 vehicles were destroyed together with 10 railroad cars and one bridge. One F9F jet on recco became separated from his section leader returned late and low on fuel and ran out of gas while attempting to make an emergency straight-in approach. The plane landed about 1500 yards from the ship and the pilot was speedily picked up by TRUSTFUND guard helicopter.

26. The threatening weather of the previous day settled over the entire area on 3 July and no offensive sorties were flown. 8 defensive CAPs and ASPs were launched with negative results. Taking advantage of the adverse weather, the ship replenished.

27. Independence Day was to be a busy day with co-ordinated strike against the troublesome Wonsan Harbor area, but the adverse weather continued. 44 sorties were launched, 26 being offensive and 18 defensive. The one large

attack group rocketed, strafed and napalmed buildings and a transformer in the vicinity of South Wonsan Airport. Assessment was impossible because of low hanging clouds. The defensive sorties were without vectors. The Air Group lost its second pilot when an F4U-4 returning from an ASP escort mission spun in at the 90° position in the landing pattern. The plane sank almost immediately and the hovering helicopter saw no sign of the pilot.

28. On the 5th of July, foul weather continued, and no flight operations were conducted.

29. 135 sorties, the most launched on this cruise, were thrown against the enemy held Wonsan and vicinity on the 6th of July. Targets were varied, ranging from concealed troop concentration and training grounds, to huge power plants and factories, as well as power lines, torpedo launching sites and small boat areas. A combined co-ordinated attack by F9Fs ADs and F4Us heavily strafed, rocketed and napalmed a troop bivouac area. It is estimated that 80% of the assigned area was hit. 30 barracks were definitely destroyed. In other coordinated efforts, reminiscent of World War II days, with F9Fs and F4Us strafing and rocketing AA postions and ADs carrying the heavy bombs, one power plant was 70% destroyed, one grenade factory wiped out and another power plant damaged. Six small boats were sunk and one radio tower damaged by the rockets of the F9F's. 18 defensive missions were flown with no vectors. One AD was lost while attempting a landing at K18 with a hung and armed bomb. The bomb exploded on landing, demolishing the plane and killing the pilot.

30. The 7th of July found the Air Group back to the normal routine of interdiction, close air support and strangle missions. A total of 86 combat sorties were flown, of which 17 were defensive ASP and photo escort and 69 were offensive, with 4 aborted because of hung ordnance, engine failure and ResCap. One train was strafed, chased into a tunnel and the track at the tunnel mouth bombed out. In addition, 15 railroad cars were destroyed and one building damaged. On close air support an enemy ridge and mortar position was napalmed and rocketed with excellent results. U.N. forces moving up shortly afterward counted 40 enemy dead. On another CAS mission an estimated 25 enemy troops killed and one machine gun position damaged.

31. Ninety one sorties, 72 offensive including CAS, recco, interdiction and photo missions, and 19 defensive CAPs, ASPs and photo escort was the score on 8 July. The early morning hecklers started off the day by destroying one 130 foot boat, 10 trucks 3 boxcars and silenced 3 AA positions. A bridge strike was successfully carried out when 3 spans of a hiway bridge and 2 spans of a railroad bridge were seen to drop, the result of direct hits by one and two thousand pound bombs. In addition one road was cratered and a tunnel entrance caved in. On CAS a ridge was heavily worked over with bombs and rockets with estimated 75% coverage. All photo missions were accomplished successfully. AA opposition on some strikes was intense and accurate with 2 ADs being hit.

32. The 9th of July was replenishment day and no air operations were conducted.

33. The pilots received another day of rest when because of inclement weather no operations were conducted on the 10th.

34. 95 sorties were launched on 11 July, 73 offensive missions and 22 defensive. Jet recco missions rocketed and strafed warehouses camouflaged vehicles and trucks with good results. ADs and F4Us on close air support bombed and rocketed enemy positions with 75% coverage reported by controller. Bridge interdiction missions were carried out destroying and damaging 3 bridges. AA continued to be heavy. One F4U was hit but pilot parachuted safely and was picked up via helicopter after playing hide and seek with some North Korean civilians for 45 minutes. The night hecklers reported good hunting destroying a locomotive and string of forty railroad cars. One AD4N had engine trouble after take off and and was forced to ditch. The pilot and two crewmen were rescued by the BOXER helicopter and destroyer.

35. On 12 July 77 CAS, recco, NGF and bridge strikes were flown. Defensive missions totaled 24, for an overall count of 101 combat sorties. Rockets, napalm and high explosive toppled bridges, buildings and rolling stock. ON CAS two bunkers were burned out with napalm. One enemy held ridge very heavily populated with enemy troops were hit with rockets and napalm with the controller estimating 80% coverage. 2 AD's and one F4U were hit by small arms. All defensive sorties were without vectors.

36. On 13 JUly 90 missions were flown, 22 on defensive CAPs and ASPs and photo escort and 68 on offensive. One CAS flight was credited with killing 180 troops and destroying 10 gun emplacements. On another mission 80 troops were definitely killed and one gun emplacement destroyed. Bridge strikes continued with one destroyed and another well seeded with 1000# delayed action bombs. Photo missions were successfully covered. All CAP vectors friendly.

37. 14 July was replenishment and no air operations were scheduled.

38. Poor weather limited air operations on 15 July when 57 sorties were flown, 49 offensive and 8 defensive. Assigned targets were for the most part, weathered in and planes diverted to reconnaissance and targets of opportunity, 3 bridges were damaged, one locomotive left burning in addition to 2 warehouses, 6 railroad cars and 4 buildings.

39. 94 sorties, 62 offensive and 32 defensive were flown on 16 July. F4U-5Ns and ADs started the day by attacking and damaging a locomotive and 20 railroad cars. The locomotive escaped into a tunnel whereupon a 500 pound bomb hit tore up the track at the tunnel entrance. F4Us and ADs on later strikes attempted to hurl napalm into tunnel mouth but results were unobserved. Later strikes seeded roads and bridges with 6 Hour delay bombs. One jet experienced trouble lowering his tail hook and was vectored to K18 with a jet escort. Two ADs with starting equipment and a mechanic were sent to the beach, the trouble rectified and all planes returned without incident at sunset.

40. On 17 July, 96 sorties were flown 66 offensive and 30 defensive. One flight of hecklers caught a locomotive and string of ten boxcars leaving the whole train ablaze. A close air support mission napalmed and bombed a town and was credited with 70% of its destruction, while a bridge strike knocked down 3 spans of one bridge and seeded two others with 1000# delayed action bombs. One F4U was hit badly and forced to ditch in Wonsan Harbor. The pilot was picked up speedily by a destroyer. Our jet photo planes cv covered all assigned targets while all defensive missions were without vectors.

41. 28 defensive missions were flown on 18 July and 69 offensive for a total of 97. ADs and F4Us ran into intense and accurate ground fire while attacking a railroad bridge. One AD failed to rendezvous and no trace could be found of plane or pilot. Four F4Us on a later reconnaissance in the area found what may have been plane wreckage but were unable to verify. The pilot is listed as missing. Interdiction missions continued with three roads well cratered and seeded with 1000# bombs. A NGF mission scored direct hits on one bridge and successfully strafed and silenced 4 AA positions.

42. 19 July was replenishment day, no air operations were scheduled.

43. On 20 July air operations were severely limited by adverse weather conditions. 12 sorties were flown all defensive, they were without vectors. 1 COD TBM was landed and launched together with one AD for ITAZUKE Air Force Base with six pilots to pick up replacement aircraft.

44. Adverse weather continued on 21 July when 18 sorties were flown. Two were jet recco hops diverted to weather reconnaissance, and 16 were defensive anti-submarine patrol and CAP.

45. Clearing weather found the Air Group back in action on 22 July when 81 sorties were launched, 56 offensive and 25 defensive. CAS flights were diverted to strikes against Hodo Pando Peninsula where 12 buildings were destroyed together with one gun emplacement. Two direct hits with 1000# bombs dropped two spans of a large railroad bridge while another flight was seeding and cratering 2 roads and a hiway bridge. All defensive missions were flown without vectors.

46. The 23rd of July saw 62 offensive and 27 defensive sorties. A locomotive was hit and positively destroyed by ADs and F4Us, while close air support napalmed and bombed a town destroying 17 buildings which were left belching oily smoke. 50% coverage on a ridge sheltering 100 Communist troops was credited to another CAS mission. Thirty troops were confirmed casualties on still another CAS flight. The jets jumped and killed 15 troops crossing a bridge. One jet was hit in the tail section which made his hook inoperative. He was landed aboard the PRINCETON without injury and with but minor damage to the plane.

47. Ninety sorties were flown on 24 July, 63 offensive and 27 defensive. Huge fires were kindled, visible 52 miles at sea when a warehouse and 29

boxcars were successfully bombed. An NGF flight was diverted to troops and truck concentrations and covered the area well with bombs, napalm and strafing. An interdiction mission knocked out one bridge with 4 direct hits and seeded two other with 36 hour delay bombs. The night ASP had one radar contact near the force but it was lost. All CAP vectors were friendly.

48. On 25 July the ship replenished, no flight operations were scheduled.

49. 93 sorties were flown on 26 July - of these 66 were of the offensive variety, including CAS, bridge strikes and jet reconnaissance. Twenty-seven were defensive ASPs and CAPs. F4U-5Ns and AD-4Ns attacked and destroyed one locomotive. One CAS flight accounted for 100 enemy troops definitely killed while another flight with napalm and rockets polished off an additional 60 troops and two mortar positions. Two spans of a bridge were seen to drop after direct hits with 1000# bombs. All photo missions were successfully completed, the defensive flights were negative.

50. 27 July saw 62 offensive and 27 defensive sorties flown for a total of 89. In addition one jet recco was aborted when the plane failed to remain airborne after catapulting and was lost. The pilot was picked up by the helicopter. Another jet recco was aborted when, on the first run, one of the planes was hit in the canopy and the pilot cut about the eyes and face by flying glass. Rockets were jettisoned and the planes returned to the ship. Although the pilot was partially blinded, a safe landing was effected. On other missions twelve buildings blew up violently when strafed and rocketed by ADs and F4Us indicating a possible ammunition storage. Thirty enemy troops were confirmed casualties after napalming and strafing on a CAS mission. All defensive sorties were without vectors.

51. On the 28th of July an abbreviated flight schedule was flown, 30 offensive and 12 defensive for a total of 42. One F4U pilot was injured slightly in the arm when his plane was hit in the cockpit area. He returned to the Task Force and landed without incident. Two spans of a bridge were knocked out by one strike, while 40 MM and 6 - 20 MM gun positions were silenced by the rockets of the jets. The ship left the Task Force at 0900 and the last strike group was recovered enroute to YOKOSUKA. Arrived that port at 1130 on 30 July.

(NOTE - The sorties listed in the chronology were taken from the Daily Air Summary which has a cut-off time of 2000 daily; the Sortie Box Score (page 10) is based on the calendar day)

Date	Sort	Aborts.	CAS sort	Armed Recco Day	Armed Recco Night	Bridge Strikes Sorties	Escort photo	CAP	ASP
May									
31	26	1	4	14		2	0	4	2
June 1	105	18	16	22	6	26	6	19	10
2	92	6	27	14	4	31	0	8	8
3	59	2	10	12		27	2	6	2
4	94	11	14	38		13	4	19	6
5	92	16	17	16		24	6	19	10
6	91	18	16	22		18	6	19	10
8	82	6	16	16		28	6	14	2
9	105	3	18	17	6	32	6	20	6
11	69	1	16	11		12		22	8
12	54	4	4	16		10		16	8
13	99	3	20	12		17	6	38	6
14	32	0	4		4	8	2	12	2
15	42	0	12			12		24	4
16	42	0	12	4				22	4
July 2	84	8	19	18		43	4	6	4
3	6	0						2	4
4	42	0				26		10	6
6	135	3	2			115	2	10	6
7	86	4	12	10		45	8	8	3
8	91	3	12	14		41	10	10	4
11	99	1	12	18	4	35	10	10	10
12	101	0	16	6	4	46	9	10	12
13	96	2	16	8	4	36	12	8	12
15	57	1	4	23		22		6	2
16	95	2	8	23		30	6	20	8
17	95	1	12	18		31	6	20	8
18	106	2	12	27		30	4	20	8
20	8	0						4	4
21	18	0		2				12	4
22	80	2	11	6	4	31	6	16	6
23	90	1	15	10	4	32	7	20	2
24	90	0	16	8	4	32	6	20	4
26	93	1	16	16		31	6	16	8
27	89	5	12	16		31	6	16	8
28	42	0	8	12		10		8	4

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BOX SCORE OF SORTIES

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III ORDNANCE

A. SUMMARY

1. Summary of ammunition expended by Carrier Air Group 102 during the period 31 May 1951 through 28 July 1951. (These figures include expenditure by VC-3 and VC-35 detachments.)

50 Cal	687,895	rounds
20 MM	238,668	"
100# G.P.	5,012	"
250# G.P.	1,039	"
260# Frag.	2,557	"
375# Frag Clusters	76	"
500# G.P.	865	"
1000# G.P.	863	"
2000# G.P.	42	"
Rockets 5.0	1,093	"
ATAR 6.5 Heads with 5.0 motors	1,237	"
Napalm	724	Tanks

Total of approximately 2,035 tons

B. WING BOMB RACKS

1. Although the AERO 14 A Launcher and Bomb Rack has several discrepancies it has been an improvement.

2. It is recommended that if the AERO 14A rack is to be a permanent installation, a manual release would increase its efficiency.

3. After a survey of the MK 55 wing rack with the consideration of the heavier loads that are being carried, it is recommended that the MK 55 be replaced with the AERO 14A.

C. F4U-4 ORDNANCE DISCREPANCIES.

1. AERO 14A rocket Launcher and Bomb Rack. The bomb sway braces built into this combination rocket launcher and bomb rack are inconvenient to use and are unsatisfactory in that:

a. They require a great deal of work in restricted spaces to tighten them down and with the wings in the folded position (F4U planes are invariably loaded with wings folded) it is almost impossible to get these sway braces tightened.

b. The time required to "tighten" these sway braces is unduly long and greatly impairs loading speed and efficiency under heavy operational schedules.

c. The combination latch and sway brace crank tool does not hold up under heavy stress and tends to bend and give way under constant use.

2. GUNS - There were 10 cases of explosions at the muzzle of the .50 caliber B.A.M. guns that occurred at various times in firing runs. Some occurred in the first firing run; some in later runs. The majority of cases did not cause too severe damage. However, in three instances a wing change was required. An investigation is in progress at this time. To date no satisfactory explanation has been obtained. The problem of falling brass cutting rocket pigtails when using rockets on AERO 14A launcher seems to have been satisfactorily solved by wrapping pigtail around the rocket fins. However, the F4U squadrons have used rockets too few times to be completely sure that this is a final solution.

3. Ordnance Personnel - Despite very heavy work loads and a limited number of trained personnel the squadron ordnance personnel were very efficient and by the time they had met about two days of heavy operation schedules were able to cut their loading time per plane in half and this loading efficiency was further improved after meeting additional operating schedules. Probably additional ordnance trained personnel added to F4U fighter squadron complements would more than proportionally increase efficiency in meeting heavy operational schedules. For F4U squadrons it is felt that a quota of one ordnanceman per assigned plane plus 1 chief petty officer per squadron is the minimum complement for top squadron ordnance efficiency under heavy operating schedules.

4. Ordnance Support - Supply of ordnance to squadrons was slow and inadequate at first. The principal reason for this situation was the small inadequate ammunition elevators on the BON HOMME RICHARD that could only handle a small proportion of the munitions needed for a single strike. This problem was partially solved by stockpiling on deck and below decks but this stockpiling is accomplished at the cost of safety. However, it is absolutely necessary if heavy schedules are to be met.

5. Munitions - A.G.P. Bombs.

a. 1000# and 500# bombs gave very little trouble although a small percentage of duds were reported. According to best information obtainable from verbal reports about 1 bomb in 15 failed to explode when using fuzes other than the VT fuzes. No bombs with VT fuzes were reported as failing to fire when armed.

b. No accurate reports were given on the functioning of the 100# bombs but as the same standard fuzes were used on these as on the above it is assumed that the percentage functioning may be about the same.

c. A fairly high percentage of explosions were credited to the VT fuze when it was first used and dropped unarmed in this squadron but when arming plates and extra jump-out pins were finally obtained and installed this problem seemed to have been more or less solved. Also a

number of reports from pilots indicate that a large number of VT fuzed bombs dropped singly were exploding at altitudes of over 1000 feet. Recommend investigation be made of T91 VT Fuze.

NAPALM BOMBS

a. A great deal of difficulty was experienced in obtaining the proper functioning of NAPALM bombs by all squadrons in the Air Group. As high as 50% or more duds were reported in the first few days of operations. By experimentation with mixing and finally by obtaining a plan for a modified Napalm mixer that would add creosote to the Napalm mix as it was forced into the bombs along with the gasoline, a good mixture was obtained and reports now indicate that very few duds are occurring.

OTHER MUNITIONS

a. No major difficulties have been experienced with other munitions.

D. F4U-4 ORDNANCE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. AERO 14A Rocket Launcher and Bomb Rack.

a. Because of time limitations in loading and the difficulty of tightening down sway braces on this bomb rack it has been noted that many wing loads of bombs have been getting off the deck with the bombs swinging slightly loose on the racks. However, the bombs have remained secure on the racks and no difficulties have been experienced in taking off and landing.

b. Special effort is made to tighten sway braces when VT fuzes are used but even when this is done a slight amount of play can be noted in bombs after the loaded wings are lowered for take-off. This extra play has not seemed to have any apparent effect on the proper functioning of this fuze.

c. Recommend that special care be taken in arming of wing bombs to provide positive security of arming wires where there is some play or looseness of the bomb on the rack. Expecially emphasize the need for arming plates and extra jump-out pins and arming wire on all VT fuzes used in wing bombs.

2. Loading of Munitions.

a. Probably efficiency or time studies of all of the factors governing or controlling or affecting the loading of planes, including squadron supporting activities, under heavy operating schedules would result in very substantially cutting down loading time. These studies should be undertaken using varied crew organizational setups to determine just what type of crew organization is the most efficient.

b. An overall study of loading procedures used should be made under actual operating conditions by qualified industrial or mechanical engineers to develop new and better methods of loading. Men loading heavy bombs and munitions by hand, with the consequent loss of efficiency and safety, seem rather incongruous on a modern mechanized aircraft carrier. In this respect it is felt that good loading procedures involving the use of specially developed machines could increase efficiency several hundred per cent over present methods.

E. AD ORDNANCE DISCREPANCIES.

1. Guns.

a. Broken firing pins (20 MM) represented the majority of breakdowns and will be alleviated with the new permanent firing pins being made available through ComFairJAPAN and ordered at SASEBO.

b. With MK 8 links it was found that the adding of oil on the projectile seemed to grant better service and fewer stoppages.

2. Douglas Bomb Ejector

a. Individual parts for the Douglas Bomb Ejector cannot be obtained. To secure a foot, which is sometimes lost due to severing of the locking pin, it is necessary to purchase a complete ejector.

b. Use of Japanese Napalm tanks on Douglas Bomb Ejector cannot be recommended unless a different type of side sway brace is used. The foot alone is not sufficientyto prevent swaying on the Japanese tank and could damage the thin skin of the Napalm container.

c. Auxiliary sway braces are not long enough to contact the F-51 tank.

d. To use the MK 12 external fuel tank as a Napalm tank requires addition of a rack to hold an external igniter. An internal igniter cannot be used because it stands too high to permit the oil cooler flap to open. When flap is opened in flight it strikes the upper section of the internal igniter and could cause an explosion.

e. During recent operations it was found that when using only the internal igniter there were 60% misfires. It has become advisable to use both the internal and external igniters specially when using the F51 or MK12 droppable tanks.

3. Ordnance Support.

a. During operations, timing and cooperation must be worked out with flight deck crews, to be able to load properly. The AD cannot be loaded with wings folded and unless timed properly, spreading the wings will foul the re-spot.

b. Rigging the Douglas crane requires too much time to be practical.

4. VT Fuzes.

a. These fuzes have not been operating satisfactorily. Pilots report that they are exploding in midair on clear days for no apparent reason and failing to explode within proximity on other occasions. These reports are made in sufficient number to offset the possibility of pilot error. Fuzes are being armed doubly with one positive arming wire and the second wire and second jump-out pin in the arming solenoid. This is to insure against arming in flight.

F. AD ORDNANCE RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. MK 55 Bomb Racks -- It is recommended that an excess of 20% MK 55 bomb racks be the original allowance for planes using same. This rack is partially inadequate because of lack of manual release and toggle spring latch requiring recentering. Because of the frequent overload the rack may fail more quickly.

2. In one instance a 250# G.P. lost a fin and subsequently the arming wire while in flight. The bomb failed to drop when activated and the pilot, LTJG J. A. SAVAGE, 403195/1515 carried it to KING 18 airstrip in South Korean territory. Upon landing the bomb jarred loose and exploded, killing the pilot and destroying the aircraft. A subsequent investigation revealed no additional information in the malfunction. The racks underwent all regular maintenance including oiling, checking corrosion and recentering solenoid plungers.

3. It is recommended that all VA squadrons be able to draw spare parts for the Douglas Bomb Ejectors either in kits or individually.

4. During heavy operations this VA squadron was short on ordnancemen to maintain equipment and still carry out loading programs for operations. It is recommended that a ratio of 1½ ordnancemen per plane would alleviate the shortage.

G. F9F ORDNANCE DISCREPANCIES.

1. Rocket launcher wing firing receptacle was poorly designed and caused misfires in many instances. RUDM 8-51 was submitted in conjunction with this trouble.

H. F9F ORDNANCE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Jet squadrons should be supplied with arming stands for loading rockets and bombs when wings are folded. A ratio of 5 light-weight, collapsible arming stands per squadron is recommended.

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Serial: 023
18 Aug. 1951

Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO for Period of 10 May 1951 to 28 July 1951.

I. ORDNANCE SUPPLY

1. Prior to leaving San Diego this activity ordered 20 MM spare parts; however, the Supply Department there advised that this equipment would be available in the forward area.

2. During heavy operations there was a resulting shortage of 20 MM spare parts, bomb racks and rocket launchers. When subsequent requisitions were made through supporting activities in Japan it was learned that these items were not available in the area.

3. It is recommended that in the future all ships leaving the States for this area be fully supplied with all ordnance spare parts equipment needed for the period of operation. In lieu of this the equipment could be made available in the forward zone.

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OPS:rjr
A9
Serial: 023

Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO for period of 10 May 1951 to 29 July 1951.

18 August 1951

IV DAMAGE

A. Damage to own Aircraft:

Type of Plane	Number Hit	Cause
F4U-4	49	AA
AD-3	34	AA
F9F-2B	15	AA
F4U-5NL	7	AA
AD-4N	4	AA
F9F-2P	3	AA
AD-4Q	2	AA

B. Loss of Aircraft:

Date	Squadron	Type	Bu. NO.	Cause
5/31/51	VF-781	F9F-2B	123670	Cat Shot
6/3/51	VF-783	F4U-4	80947	Launch
6/16/51	VF-874	F4U-4	97292	Engine-Launch
7/3/51	VF-781	F9F-2B	123677	Fuel Exhausted
7/4/51	VF-783	F4U-4	97239	Spin on Approach
7/6/51	VA-923	AD-3	122746	Blew up K-18
7/7/51	VC-35	AD-3	122768	Engine Trouble
7/11/51	VF-874	F4U-4	81962	AA
7/11/51	VC-35	AD-4N	124137	Cat Shot (Eng)
7/17/51	VF-874	F4U-4	97034	AA
7/18/51	VA-923	AD-3	122760	AA
7/27/51	VF-781	F9F-2B	123700	Cat Shot

C. Summary of Accidents:

1. 31 May 1951 - F9F-2B failed to remain airborne after catapult shot. Cause believed to be insufficient wind. Pilot rescued by helicopter.

2. 3 June 1951 - F4U-4 plane spun in on deck launch. Pilot was not recovered.

3. 16 June 1951 - F4U-4 failed to get airborne at end of flight deck. Fell into the sea. Cause malfunctioning engine. Pilot recovered by helicopter.

4. 3 July 1951 - F9F-2B on approach to ship exhausted fuel supply. Emergency landing in water. Pilot recovered by helicopter.

5. 4 July 1951 - F4U-4 on final approach to ship in port turn with nose high. Spin resulted and plane crashed inverted. Pilot not recovered.

6. 6 July 1951 - AD-3 with hung armed 250 pound bomb exploded upon landing at emergency field (K-18). Pilot killed instantly.

7. 7 July 1951 - AD-3 made emergency landing in Water. Engine failure. Pilot recovered.

8. 11 July 1951 - F4U-4 hit by AA fire over Korea. Plane caught fire and pilot bailed out. Rescued by helicopter over beach.

9. 11 July 1951 - AD-4N could not stay airborne after cat shot and made emergency landing in water. Pilot and crew rescued.

10. 17 July 1951 - F4U-4 hit by AA fire west Wonsan. Pilot ditched plane in Wonsan Harbor and was rescued by Destroyer.

11. 18 July 1951 - AD-3 believed lost to AA fire while on strike over Korea. Pilot and plane not seen after entering dive.

12. 27 July 1951 - F9F-2B made emergency water landing after cat shot. Pilot recovered by helicopter.

D. Damage inflicted on enemy:

TARGETS	DAMAGED	DESTROYED
Tanks	26	16
Trucks	168	119
Cars	13	2
Locomotives	14	2
Ox Carts	53	123
Hi-Way Bridges	31	8
Supply Dumps	16	1
Ammo Dumps	0	1
Factories	15	2
Warehouses	33	9
Barracks and Miscellaneous Buildings	230	326
Gun Emplacements	24	25
Mortar Emplacements	0	2
Lumber Piles	1	0
Horses	[illegible]	6
Oxen	0	4
Villages	34	0
Boats	7	4
Power Installations	2	1
Bunkers	4	0
Rail Road Yards	26	1
Rail Road Tracks	12	0
Rail Road Tunnels	15	0
Rail Road Cars	544	172
Rail Road Bridges	45	7

Troops Killed 1475 confirmed.

V
PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. Personnel Performance

1. Enlisted. Morale of the Group was high throughout the reporting period. The men worked long hours, often as much as 18 to 20. Although the squadrons are composed almost entirely of reserves the men quickly adapted themselves to carrier shipboard life. Ordnancemen are a critical rate in the type operations being conducted. It is felt that the on-board count of ordnancemen for the squadrons should be increased upon deployment.

2. VC Units. Administratively, the VC units were attached to the Staff of the Air Group. All records were maintained by the Staff, reports were prepared by the Staff, and VC yeomen were assigned duties under the supervision of the Staff Chief Yeoman.

Operationally, the teams were assigned to squadrons in accordance with type aircraft, as follows:

VC-3(F4U-5N) - - - - - - - - VF 783 (F4U-4)
VC-11 (AD4W) - - - - - - - - VA 923 (AD3)
VC-35 (AD4N) - - - - - - - - VA 923 (AD3)
VC-61 (F9F2-P) - - - - - - - VF 781 (F9F2)

This system has worked admirably and is recommended for all Air Groups deploying with VC teams.

B. CASUALTIES

1. LT Eugene Daniel REDMOND 250615/1315
On 3 June 1951, at or about 0900, while in a status of combat duty in the Korean area, LT REDMOND failed to successfully become airborne in Corsair F4U-4 type plane, BuAer No. 80947, on a carrier launch from USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31). He became airborne with a nose-high attitude. Not having sufficient flying speed, spin to the left resulted with the plane striking the water inverted at an angle of approximately 30° to 40°. The ordnance load aboard the plane was 2400 rounds of .50 cal. ammunition, one 150-gal. external belly tank, Mark 9, eight 100-pound general purpose bombs with VT nose fuse and no-delay tail fuse, and one napalm filled 150-gal. external belly tank, Mark 9. The plane carried a full internal fuel load of 233 gallons of 130/145 octane gasoline. The launch was effected from approximately 490 feet with 35 knots of relative wind over the deck. The helicopter plane guard was over the downed aircraft immediately and hovered over the area approximately twenty minites. Additional rescue effort was furnished by one destroyer. LT REDMOND was not seen to leave the plane after the crash and no recovery was effected.

2. On 4 July an F4U-4, piloted by LTJG Authur (n) DIXON, 453354/1315 of VF 783, spun in and crashed in an inverted position on the crossleg of a normal recovery. Pilot was returning from an ASP Escort and carried a depth charge and rockets. Pilot was not recovered.

3. On 6 July an AD-3, piloted by LTJG James A. SAVAGE, 403195/1315 of VA 923, was killed while attempting to land at K18 with a hung armed bomb. Bomb exploded on landing.

4. On 18 July an AD-3 piloted by LT Orville M. COOK, 301489/1315 of VA 923, was lost on a Bridge Strike at Lat 39°-20'40"N Long 126°-50'30"E. Aircraft was not seen to crash, but was believed to have been hit by AA which was heavy and accurate.

A 4 plane rescap was put over the area for the next 4 hours in an effort to locate the aircraft. Nothing could be positively identified. Pilot is listed as missing.

5. On 21 July LTJG Braxton G. HARRELL 403072/1315 of VF 781, while on an armed jet recco hop south of Wonsan over Haech-on-ni was hit in the cockpit by a 20mm shell which lodged in the headrest. Pilot was severely cut about the right eye by flying glass from the canopy. Pilot was escorted back to the ship by his wingman and landed safely aboard.

6. On 28 July LTJG Hugh C. INGLE 453365/1315, while flying an F4U-4 on an armed recco hop, was hit by small arms fire which exploded in the cockpit. Pilot received fragments in the left forearm and lacerations about the face. Although the plane suffered complete hydraulic failure, the pilot made a successful emergency landing aboard the PRINCETON.

VI COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. OPERATIONS

Air operations were handled in routine manner in accordance with USF 4. Rendezvous provided no difficulties even though as many as six separate missions were launched in one event. Since a 180° sector was available (only two carriers operating together), it was possible to assign areas and stagger altitudes to avoid confusion in the rendezvous. Recovery was routine since most flights of an event rendezvoused over the beach (in accordance with CTF 77 instructions) and returned as a group.

The Air Group quickly reached the "expert" stage in the recovery of aircraft with intervals of under 30 seconds. Launchings, however, left room for improvement. As the ship and pilots gain experience the intervals of launches is expected to decrease considerably.

The VC-11 Detachment has been utilized exclusively for ASP. No opportunity to evaluate the APS20A in the field of AEW has been possible. On one flight the ASP was diverted to act as escort for a rescue helicopter and fair results were obtained in vectoring the helicopter to the downed pilot. If the planes over the downed pilot had been flying a tighter formation much better information would have resulted.

The Hunter Aircraft should be radar equipped during low visibility conditions. Some difficuulty has been experienced on dusk ASP when using F4U-4 as investigators. This is probably due to the poor ahead visibility of this type coupled with approaching darkness.

Jamming of the APS20A was apparently attempted on 14 June, However it was not effective. No comment can be made regarding the relay feature of the APS20A as this vessel is not P.C. equipped and units receiving this service have not reported any trouble.

Extreme fatigue has been noticed in the operators after three and one half hours on the scope, and it is felt that their efficiency falls rapidly after this point is reached.

B. INTELLIGENCE:

1. By trial and error of the Air Group Intelligence Officers, many discrepancies were ironed out. Some of those resulted from the fact that only one (1) ship intelligence officer was aboard. If the ship's intelligence office is well organized and ready for operation when the Air Group comes aboard, little or no difficulty should be encountered. At the completion of this operating period, most of the "growing pains" have ceased and most of the organizations problems have been solved.

Based on the experience gained by this Air Group during this first operating period, the following recommendations are submitted:

2. Recommendations:

(a) The Air Group and ship's Air Intelligence Officers should be deployed to WestPac approximately six (6) weeks before the ship and Air Group is deployed and be returned to the West Coast at least one (1) week before actual departure.

(b) Escape and Evasion material should be aboard and available prior to leaving West Coast. These should include pointie talkies, blood chits, E & E kits, safe conduct passes, etc.

(c) All charts should be issued to the pilots before leaving the West Coast so the time enroute could be spent on actual briefing and problemss.

(d) A teletype should be installed in the Air Intelligence Office thereby eliminating the "squawk" box which disturbs briefings.

(e) Briefings should be conducted by event numbers thereby eliminating numerous small briefs for each AIO.

3. Reports:

(a) Air Attack Report - This report is not suited to this type operation. It does not produce a true picture of the events. Evaluation groups should consult experienced AIO's who make out these reports.

(b) Aircraft Vulnerability Report and Crew and Survival Report. These reports are short, concise, and seem to be good except the subject is covered completely in the Action Report. Therefore, these reports could be eliminated.

(c) Action Report - those are excellent and if completed in detail with a true picture of the complete operation, will give more accurate information to all concerned including evaluation groups than all other reports. These should not be doctored up to look good but should show the what, when, why, where, and how of each operation.

C. MAINTENANCE

1. JET AIRCRAFT - One of the problems concerning Jet Maintenance has been the lack of drop checking facilities. The ship had only one chain fall located just forward of the quarter deck. It was almost impossible to get an aircraft under it due to the hangar spotting. This condition has been somewhat corrected by the installation of additional chain falls spotted in several more places on the hangar deck.

In the upkeep and servicing of the J42 engines it would be of great value to have a small test stand located on the hangar deck near an opening where engines could be turned up and adjusted at any time. Many man hours are wasted due to not having the space to move aircraft for a turn up. It is believed that many

man hours could be saved if a plan for rotation of engines could be initiated. This could be accomplished by the use of a test stand as previous mentioned, by having a jet engine all checked adjusted and ready to install. Whenever it was necessary to remove an engine from an air frame for any reason such as malfunction or periodical check, it could be exchanged with a minimum of man hours. This would insure availability and permit check crews to correct discrepancies and have the engine available to install in the next downed aircraft.

2. F4U Type Aircraft - Maintenance availability has been very good except for a series of spark plug changes which in some part can be attributed to the excessive number of turn ups and taxiing operations.

Change 393 (Installation of Armor Plate) is still being incorporated since the armor plate was not received until the latter part of July. It was stated by ComAirPac Staff that the armor plate was available in the forward areas, prior to the ship's departure from the United States. A canvas of all supply centers in this area did not uncover a single set. Approximately forty incoming and outgoing dispatches were initiated prior to the final receipt of the armor plate.

The MK 14A Rocket launchers are not being received on replacement aircraft. Due to the lack of space and availability of the installation kits the replacement aircraft have not been modified. It is highly recommended that all MK 14A kits be forwarded to FasRon 11 to be installed on replacement aircraft, as the man hours required for this change would tie up valuable hanger deck space too long.

3. AD-3 Type Aircraft - In general the availability has been very good. Some spark plug trouble has been experienced due to fouling the plugs in the lower cylinders. This also can be attributed to the many turn ups and taxiing operations. Spark plugs are now unpacked, cleaned, and bomb tested then placed in a hot locker, re-bomb tested when they are removed from the hot locker and immediately installed in the engine. This procedure has eliminated much of the prevailing moisture in the spark plugs.

4. Maintenance in general - Many of the aircraft are returning with damage due to enemy gun fire. In many cases excessive damage is done to ribs, spars, and other main components of the air frame. Wings and tail surfaces could be repaired providing heat treat equipment was available aboard ship. However, by not having this equipment there is a high usage of these surfaces, many of which have not had the latest changes or modifications installed.

Inexperience of aircraft handling crews has resulted in many hanger deck crashes which cut down aircraft availability and caused many man hours of work in the replacement of tail surfaces, wing tips, and wing tips tank. Some of these parts could have been repaired providing the ship had heat treat equipment.

5. Beneficial Suggestion - Two of our F9Fs were down at one of the auxiliary air strips. The problem of starting the aircraft without starting equipment was solved by the use of an AD-4Q. A jumper head was attached to the plug-in receptacle of the AD and led to the plug-in receptacle of the jet. The AD was then turned up and with its two generators supplied ample amperage to start the jet engines.

A complete coverage of this operation has been written and sent in for comment.

D. ELECTRONICS

1. The performance of the airborne electronic equipment during this period was very satisfactory and no major maintenance problems were encountered. Services of one NAESU Technician was used to good advantage in the maintenance of the APX-6 equipment since this was the first time such equipment had been operated and maintained by this activity.

2. Electronic supplies appeared to be a continuing problem. Allowance lists for the various types of electronic equipment are below that required to properly maintain all equipment in service under fleet operating conditions. Some items such as crystals (detection type) pulse forming networks, pulse transformers, button type capacitors, antenna transfer relays, parasitic dipoles, electrolytic capacitors for ARR-2, and certain parts for ARC-1 transmitter-receivers are still required by this activity.

3. Failures were encountered in some parts not listed in the Section R Allowance and recommendations are being made to include these parts in the allowance lists. It is felt that a review should be made of the allowance lists for fleet operation in order that the supply required can be furnished to ships initially. It appears that some of the items should be increased in order to insure proper maintenance under fleet operating conditions.

4. During this period of operation the main electronic equipment that was used were the communication transmitter-receiver (AN/ARC-1), homing devices (AN/ARN-6 and AN/ARR-2), radio altimeters (AN/APN-1), IFF units (AN/APX-1, AN/APX-2 and AN/APX-6) and radar (AN/APS-19A) in the F4U-5NL and AD type aircraft. Continuous use was also made of the AN/APS-20A radar equipment in AD-4W aircraft. Little use was made of the other type equipment. On a few occasions it was found necessary to use the countermeasure equipment installed in the AD type aircraft. This was due to indications of jamming occurring to the AN/APS-19A radar equipment. Additional use was made of the countermeasure equipment to observe radar frequencies in operation. However, because of the limit of frequency range of countermeasure equipment presently in use in AD type aircraft only the S and X bands could be observed.

5. The performance of the different units of electronic equipment varied depending upon the amount of usage made of any particular type. Except for numerous troubles occurring in the guard channel after modification, no reoccurring troubles were experienced in the AN/ARC-1 equipment. Modifications to this equipment were made while the ship was enroute. An unusual number

of troubles have occurred in the guard channel due to resistor and capacitor failures. It is possible that excessive heat applied during modification may have contributed to these failures which were not encountered prior to this time. It is believed that in future cases a word of precaution should be included in the Technical Order to insure that all personnel are aware of the need for using the best skilled technicians in the performance of this type of work. It would be more desirable to have modifications of this nature performed by O and R units because of the availability of more suitable shop equipment.

6. Considering the number of AN/APS-19A radar units in service (7) the ratio of troubles per unit was exceedingly high. Troubles were due mainly to defective pulse transformers, pulse forming networks and magnetrons. The failure of pulse forming networks has been recognized as a basic weakness in the unit. In addition failure of a large number of 1N23 B crystals occurred, the reason for which has not yet been determined. An acute condition exists at present in the maintenance of AN/APS_19A units due to shortage of pulse forming networks, pulse transformers and 1N23B crystals.

7. A high casualty rate was experienced on the AN/APN-1 radio altimeter antennae on F9F aircraft due to their location. The number damaged during the period due to plane handling was about 48 which is far in excess of the six months Section R Allowance of twelve antennae. It was therefore necessary to devise some method to repair damaged antennae rather than order new ones. Successful repairs were made to approximately 80 percent of the antennae damaged. Tests on the antennae repaired aboard ship indicate that no detrimental effects were noted.

8. No unusual trouble occurred in the operation of the AN/ARR-2 or AN/ARN-6 homing devices. There does, however, seem to be an increase in the number of failures in the filter capacitor in the power supply of the AN/ARR-2 units. This particular capacitor is not carried in the Section R Allowance. Some difficulty was experienced with the response in the range of this unit installed in F4U aircraft. Excellent long range reception was received while the aircraft was headed away from the ship, but on return flight it appeared that the belly tank offered some shielding thus reducing the range of reception. This effect was verified by several flights.

9. Very little use was made of the AN/APS-4 radar equipment. All units aboard were checked and placed in a readiness condition. Due to the type flights it seemed advisable to utilize the bomb rack normally occupied by this equipment thus permitting the rack to serve a more useful purpose. Only occasions for use of the equipment occurred when it was necessary to use AD type aircraft for heckler missions or as escort for ASP.

10. Satisfactory operation was obtained with all types of IFF equipment. Very few troubles were experienced although it was first thought that the AN/APX-6 might have an unusual number. However, extra precautionary measures and close observation of the performance of the equipment kept it operating satisfactorily at all times. A method was devised to interrogate the units installed in

F9F aircraft using a spare APX-6 unit which was modified and used as an interrogator with an antenna installed on the hangar deck. This permitted the maintenance personnel to preflight APX-6 equipment and insured that all aircraft taking off had satisfactory units.

11. Only minor troubles occurred in the maintenance of the AN/APS-20A radar equipment. This equipment performed to a very high degree during the entire period and can be contributed to an excellent job of maintenance. It was necessary for the Air Group personnel to establish the maintenance shop and install all power required. This was done after the ship departed from the States and was completed prior to arriving in the present operating area.

12. During this period four of the F9F aircraft landed at one of the airstrips in Korea and it was necessary to devise some method of providing the DC power for starting. Investigation of the available DC generator power in planes aboard ship indicated that the DC power supply in the AD-4Q was sufficient to operate the F9F starter. A suitable cable was made and the AD was flown to the beach. On the initial trial of this method the power was taken direct from the main bus bar serving the generators. The two initial aircraft that landed on the airstrip were started with ease. On a later occasion the same method was used, however the power was taken direct from the power receptacle of the AD-4Q. This was done after a check revealed that the cabling was of sufficient size to handle the load.

E. SURVIVAL

1. Over Land - With the assistance of squadron survival officers, the Air Group survival officer made up 4 droppable survival kits. As soon as all the necessary items are procured, 4 more kits will be made up in our 4 already constructed napalm cans. One droppable kit is carried on every launch with our two F4U's and one AD squadron taking turns assuming the responsibility of the kit for the entire week; thus, one squadron carries it every 3rd week.

One droppable kit has been released inadvertently and it worked perfectly but there is a minimum of these kits and they are not expendable and pilots carrying them are to insure that they are not inadvertently released.

2. Over Water - Six droppable MK-2's (life raft) and six droppable ADR-1's (ration kit) are carried on one of our Guppies for every ASP or AEW for assistance to pilots forced down at sea. ADS-1's (signal kit) have been ordered and will be included on the Guppie over-water survival gear list.

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18 August 1951

Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO for Period of 10 May 1951 to 28 July 1951.

VII CONCLUSION

In conclusion, a summary of the operation of Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO in this first period is contained in Commander Task Force's dispatch 272330Z of July in which he states:

> "IT HAS BEEN A PERSONAL PLEASURE TO OBSERVE THE OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF BIG DICK AND ATTACHED SQUADRONS DURING THIS TOUR OF DUTY IN THE OP AREA X THE COMBINATION OF B H RICHARD AND AIR GROUP 102 IS ONE WHICH DOES CREDIT TO NAVAL AVIATION AND I AM MIGHTY PROUD OF YOU X GOOD LUCK AND HAVE FUN IN PORT X"

H. N. FUNK

ORIGINAL

DISTRIBUTION LIST

U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31) ACTION REPORT FOR PERIOD
31 MAY TO 28 JULY 1951

SERIAL 069 OF 18 AUGUST 1951

Original - Chief of Naval Operations
Via (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN (1)
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces Far East
(4) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Copies as follows to:
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Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN (2 advance)
Commander Carrier Division ONE (2)
Commander Carrier Division THREE (2)
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