UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
CARRIER AIR GROUP FIVE

as ORIGINAL
CVG5/A4-3/A16-3/(cfc)
Serial 067-50

1-5

AUG 24 1950

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED

From: Commander Carrier Air Group FIVE
To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)

Subj: Action Report for period 4-21 August 1950

Ref: (a) ComCarDiv-3 Conf ltr ser 070 dtd 4 August 1950

I. NARRATIVE:

1. Operations against North Korean invasion forces were conducted by Air Group FIVE on 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 16, 17, 19, and 20 of ~~July~~ Aug as directed by ComCarDiv-3 in compliance with Com7thFlt Secret Operation Order #13-50 of 4 August 1950.

2. The Air Group, under the command of Commander H. P. LANHAM, commenced this operation with the following number of aircraft and pilots available.

a.	F9F-3 Jets (two squadrons)	28 aircraft, 40 pilots
b.	F4U-4B Fighter Bombers (two squadrons)	22 aircraft, 39 pilots
c.	AD-4 dive bombers (one squadron)	15 aircraft, 21 pilots
d.	F4U-5N, AD-2N night unit	5 aircraft, 6 pilots
e.	AD-3W AEP unit,	3 aircraft, 4 pilots
f.	F4U-5P photo unit,	2 aircraft, 3 pilots

3. During this period our carrier (USS VALLEY FORGE) operated in company with the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) and Air Group ELEVEN. Flight operations against the North Korean invasion forces comprised controlled close suport work, armed reconnaissance patrols and sweeps, and interdiction-strike work on assigned targets by small and medium size strike groups.

Close support to the front line ground forces was furnished on four days (5, 6, 9 and 16 of August). To assist the Air Force in target spotting and controlling, the Air Group supplied Target Air Controllers to Taegu Air Force Base for a three day period (5, 6 and 7 of August). These controllers directed both Navy and Air Force aircraft on the north-south bombline from Chinju to Hamchang.

Armed Reconnaissance patrols and interdiction strikes reached targets over practically the entire Korean peninsula. The majority of the patrols were on the west side ranging from Chinju in the south, northward past Kunsan, Taejon, Suwon, Seoul, Sariwon, Haeju, and Pyongyang to as far north as Anju and Sonchon. Eastern areas covered centered near Chongjin in the north, around the Hamhung-Wonsan area, and along the Wonju-Tanyang-Pohang line.

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE 1

5

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED

4. The daily air plan best suited for this mixed type of combat operations consisted of four 3½ hour prop launches (12-24 aircraft) each followed 1 3/4 hours later by a 90 minute jet launch (8 aircraft). The PHILIPPINE SEA paralleled our schedule so that strike groups from the two carriers could be joined when necessary.

Routine CAP, ASP, and courier flights were divided between the two carriers. These non-offensive missions accounted for additional flight operations on 4, 8, 11 and 18th of August.

The total hours and sorties for the fifteen days of flight operations in this period of 4-21 August were:

				Sorties over Korean Targets	
Jet Hours	381.1	Jet Sorties	240	Jet	234
Prop Hours	2543.5	Prop Sorties	742	Prop	530
Total	2924.6	Total	982	Total	764

II. ORDNANCE

1. 214,174 rounds of 20MM ammunition were fired by all squadrons during the 11 days of action. With very few exceptions, each target sortie involved strafing. The wear from this high usage of the 20MM guns, coupled with insufficient spare parts, is beginning to be noticed in more frequent gun failures during flight. The new 7-1-50 BuOrd allowance list for an 18 plane squadron allows 4 spare guns. For continued action, of the type this Air Group has experienced in Korea, one spare gun for every four installed plus a proportionate increase of spare parts is deemed necessary.

The 20MM gun has proven to be a devastating attack weapon. Pilots of World War II experience are unanimous in their preference for the 4 20MM installation over the 6 .50 caliber installation. It is recommended that .50 caliber gunned aircraft be sent forward only in dire emergency.

2. The Mark 9, Mod 2 and 3, rocket launchers are unsatisfactory in that they are not strong enough to withstand all arrested landings with a hung 5"HVAR or 100lb bomb. Either the locking-latch-shear-pin shears allowing the projectile to drop to the deck, or the after part of the launcher starts pulling away from its base plate due to the high moment from the overhanging rocket tail. HUDM's covering this are being submitted.

A sturdy and reliable combination bomb-rocket pylon is sorely needed. It should be quickly adaptable to either choice of ordnance. Further it should be strong enough to withstand bringing stores back aboard and also have a manual as well as electrical positive release for jettisoning hung ordnance.

[redacted]

6

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED

III. BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Own Losses -

1 F4U-5P Forced down by enemy small arms AA.
1 F4U-4B Ditched at sea. Damaged by enemy AA.
1 F4U-4B Crashed in enemy territory. Cause unknown.
1 F9F-3 Missing over enemy territory. Cause unknown.

2. Forty other aircraft received minor battle damage, mostly from light anti-aircraft fire. Damage on ten of these necessitated changing a component such as a stabilizer, aileron or wing.

3. Enemy Losses -

TYPE	DESTROYED	PROBABLY DESTROYED	DAMAGED
Aircraft	5	-	2
Trains (15 ammo cars)	1	-	-
Locomotives	63	9	24
Box Cars	48	-	145
Tank Cars	23	-	17
Railroad Yards	-	-	12
Railroad Carbarns	-	1	-
Railroad Bridges	1	-	3
Railroad Tunnels	-	-	-
Refinery (small)	1	-	-
Oil Storage Tanks (large)	7	-	-
Oil Storage Tanks (small)	4	-	-
Hydro-electric Plant	-	-	1
Dam	-	-	1
Factories	-	-	15
Chemical Plant	-	-	1
Warehouses	34	-	24
Power Stations (Transformer)	2	3	46
Radio Stations	-	-	3
Hangars	-	-	1
Barracks	7	-	3
Buildings (unidentified)	22	-	4
Ammo Dumps	4	-	-
Supply Dumps	-	-	5
Fuel Dumps	2	-	3
Highway Bridges	2	-	12
Trucks	165	38	146
Jeeps	8	1	7
Tanks	14	1	11
*Other Vehicles	72	6	41
Gunboats	1	-	2
Freighters (small)	1	-	-
**Miscellaneous Small Craft	10	35	45
AA Gun Emplacement	1	-	3
Field Artillery Pieces	-	-	1
Villages with military installations	-	-	29

[redacted]

7

DECLASSIFIED

* Armored cars, reconnaissance cars, buses, autos, halftracks, tractors and horse carts.

** Barges, junks, sampans, fishing boats, power boats, motor launches, ferry boats and PC boats.

IV. CASUALTIES

1. Own Personnel Losses -

a. Captain J. V. BOOKER, USMC, 020617/7302. Missing. Forced down (F4U-5P), uninjured, by small arms fire near Chorwon, 7 August 1950.

b. Ensign A. W. HANTON, USN, 49696/1310. Missing. F4U-4B crashed and burned near Chemui. Parachute nearby in tree, 10 August 1950.

c. Ensign J. H. NYHUIS, USN, 496613/1310. Missing. Last seen in strafing attack (F9F-3) on train north of Kumchon, 12 August 1950.

V. (a) COMMENTS

1. It is desirable for CV Air Groups to be consolidated in wartime into three squadrons, (VF(Jet), VF(Prop), and VA(Prop) plus the necessary specialized detachments. Administrative work is reduced, the confusion regarding the same type aircraft in two different squadrons and two separate squadrons in one ready room is eliminated, and closer control can be maintained throughout the group..

2. Three replacement F4U-4B's transferred 2 August 1950 from FASRon 119 Detachment Navy 3923 were received with the following high engine time -

Aircraft BuNo.	Hours on Engine
97499	470.6 hrs.
62917	484.4 hrs.
62974	450.5 hrs.

Engine changes are now being made on two of these with the third to be changed within a month's time. Receiving such high-time engines on replacement aircraft places an undue work load on already overworked maintenance crews.

3. There were several instances where target assignment, target information, and the proposed operating schedule would not reach the squadrons until shortly prior to take off time. Such short advance notice does not allow time for squadron CO's to get together to plan their attack, designate a flight leader if its to be coordinated, and then properly brief their own pilots.

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED

Efficiency and full effectiveness of our aircraft are often lost as a result of such short notice, especially so when a new target is involved.

4. There still remains a sorely felt shortage of personnel in the Air Group. Three non-flying AIO's are needed for the squadrons and a non-flying Administrative Officer is required on the Air Group Commander's staff. With the men, the lack of ordnance, aviation machinist, and electronic rates is still outstanding. The former rate being the most in demand.

V. (b) RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Increase the ordnance allowance list for 20MM gun squadrons to allow one spare gun for every four installed and increase the accompanying spare parts proportionately.

2. Use only 20MM guns in carrier aircraft.

3. Design a sturdy, reliable, and easily converted combination bomb-rocket pylon for use on carrier aircraft.

4. Consolidate the five squadrons of CV Air Group into three by combining those squadrons which fly similar type aircraft.

5. Aircraft with high-time engines should not be transferred to forward area squadrons as replacements. In World War II no aircraft was sent forward with greater than 150 hours engine time. This is still an excellent rule.

6. Squadrons should receive operation plans with target assignments and information early enough before launching to conduct adequate planning and briefing.

7. Increase squadron and Air Group complement to include -

   a. A non-flying Air Group administrative officer.
   b. Three non-flying Air Intelligence Officers
   c. More enlisted men in rates of ordnance, aviation machinist, and electronics.

H. P. LANHAM

[redacted]

9