

U.S.S. BATAAN (CVL 29)
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ORIGINAL

4 AUG 1952

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SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Commanding Officer and Commander Task Element 95.11
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 95.1
(2) Commander Task Force 95
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 12 July through 23 July 1952

Ref: (a) Article 0705 Navy Regulations
(b) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4
(c) CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 3480.1
(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52
(e) CTE 95.11 OpOrder 2-52

u Encl: (1) Sample Air Schedule

1. In accordance with reference (a), (b), (c) and (d), the action report of Task Element 95.11 for the period 12 July through 23 July 1952 is submitted herewith.

PART I - GENERAL NARRATIVE

1. During the period 12 July through 23 July 1952, the USS BATAAN (CVL 29) under the command of Captain H. R. HORNEY, 61175/1310, USN, with the Marine Aircraft Squadron VMA-312 embarked through 21 July, operated as a part of the U. S. SEVENTH Fleet in Task Force 95, under the operational control of the Commander Task Group 95.1.
2. The Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN was Commander Task Element 95.11 throughout the period 2100I 12 July until 2100I 21 July at which time the command of the Task Element shifted to the Commanding Officer, HMS OCEAN. The Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN was OTC West Coast of Korea from 2015I 13 July until the Commanding Officer HMS NEWCASTLE assumed OTC West Coast of Korea at 2100I 21 July 1952. During the reporting period, TE 95.11 consisted of the USS BATAAN (CVL 29) and a maximum of four (4) escort vessels. At varying times, the USS JOHN R. CRAIG (DD-885), USS NICHOLAS (DDE-449), HMAS BATAAN (D-191), HMCS IROQUOIS (DIE-217) and HMAS WARRAMUNGA (D-123) acted as screening vessels. One vessel of the screen was released daily for night patrol as assigned by CTE 95.12. Ships were detached late in the afternoon to proceed on this patrol, returning the following morning after refueling from a tanker located near Taechong Do.

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a. The mission of the Task Element is as follows:

- (1) Assist in enforcing the United Nations Blockade and in the defense of friendly islands of the West Coast of Korea.
- (2) Assist in protecting sea communication in the Yellow Sea.
- (3) Provide air spotting services for control of naval gunfire in order to support the United Nations effort in Korea.
- (4) Conduct air strikes against selected targets.
- (5) Conduct air reconnaissance.
- (6) Render close air support services to ground forces.
- (7) Act in accordance with current directives of CTG 95.1.

b. The mission of the Carrier Unit is as follows:

- (1) Conduct armed air reconnaissance of the West Coast of Korea from the United Nations front lines northward to Lat. 39-15N.
- (2) Attack enemy shipping and destroy mines.
- (3) Maintain surveillance of enemy airfields in the Haeju-Chinnampo region. (ONGJIN, HAEJU, and ONJONG-NI).
- (4) Provide airspot services to naval units on request.
- (5) Provide close air support and armed air reconnaissance services as requested by Joint Operations Center, Korea (JOC, KOREA)
- (6) Conduct air strikes against coastal and inland targets of opportunity at discretion.
- (7) Be prepared to provide Combat Air Patrol to friendly naval forces operating off the West Coast of Korea.
- (8) Render SAR assistance.

3. No enemy air forces were encountered by this Task Element and therefore, no air action is related. However, enemy small craft operating against the island of Changin Do, in the rivers, estuaries, and along the West Coast of Korea were attacked and destroyed by aircraft of this Element when directed or as targets of opportunity. Action of TE 95.11 on Northington Patrol as reported by CTE 95.12.

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4. During this operating period, VMA-312 aircraft flew Armed Reconnaissance, Target Combat Air Patrol, Combat Air Patrol and Pre-briefed Strikes, most of which are illustrated by schedule, (enclosure 1). Flight operations were carried out on eight of the nine days scheduled, although somewhat curtailed by weather. On 18 July, weather caused cancellation of entire day's scheduled operations. During the eight flyable days, VMA-312 aircraft flew 278 combat sorties. Two (2) flights aborted. There was a total of 553 combat hours flown for an overall average of 61.44 hours and 30.9 sorties per day for the nine day period. The squadron aircraft allowance was 24, the average aircraft on board 21.5 and the average aircraft availability 16.

5. Marlex exercises scheduled from 4 to 8 August and 18 to 22 August required that the BATAAN be available, for the first exercise, to accommodate eleven (11) helicopters from HHR 161 and a battalion of assault troops. To accomplish this VMA-312 was directed to operate as TE 95.11 from King 6 during the periods normally scheduled for the U. S. Navy carriers to be on the Korean west coast. They were further ordered to continue operations at King 6 as TE 95.11.1 during the periods when the British carriers were in the operational area. By directions from CTG 95.1 VMA-312 aircraft were flown off on the last operating day. The remainder of the personnel and supplies and spare parts to maintain the squadron ashore were off loaded at Incheon the following morning.

6. During this operating period, ships of Task Element 95.11 operated in the Korean Coastal Area MAN in the vicinity of Latitude 37° 30'N. and 124° 30'E.

PART II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

12 July 1952 -

Enroute to Operating Area MAN from Sasebo, Japan in company with HMAS WARRAMUNGA. Low ceilings at Itazuke, Japan caused delay of tow plane for the scheduled gunnery exercise. By the time the target tow plane arrived on station the formation had passed beyond Area George, forcing cancellation of the exercise.

At 2100I the Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN assumed Command of Task Element 95.11.

At 2315I the USS JOHN R. CRAIG joined the formation.

13 July 1952 -

Forty-four (44) combat sorties were launched from the BATAAN on this first day back in the operating area. Primary targets included buildings, 113 of which were destroyed.

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At 0650 the USS NICHOLAS joined the formation. At 1320I a VMA-312 Corsair, piloted by Capt. Ewart G. DICK, USMCR, stalled on a landing approach. The plane spun, struck the water, and sank immediately. Captain DICK swam clear and was picked up by the BATAAN helicopter. Injuries suffered by the pilot are reported under CASUALTIES in Part V of this report. At 1717I HMAS WARRAMUNGA departed on Worthington Patrol. Captain H.R. HORNEY assumed CTC West Coast of Korea at 2015I, by direction of CTG 95.1.

14 July 1952 -

Poor flying weather in the afternoon forced the cancellation of twenty (20) flights. The twenty-six morning sorties accounted for 172 enemy troops killed in action and the destruction of a command post as principal targets.

At 0520I the USS NICHOLAS was detached for Yokosuka, Japan. At 0537I the CTE 95.11 held Roger gunnery firing exercises.

At 0818I HMAS WARRAMUNGA returned from patrol.

15 July 1952 -

Forty-six (46) flights were launched this date with part aiding in the defense of the island of Changin Do. At 0944I a report was received from CTE 95.15 that 300 North Korean troops were invading the island of Changin Do (this figure was subsequently reduced to an invading force of 200) and a request for strike and TARCAP support was made. Scheduled aircraft were diverted immediately and the remainder of the days schedule revised to render all possible aid. Sixty (60) troops were killed in defense of the island. Twenty (20) additional troops were killed and twelve (12) gun positions damaged as the result of some of the days efforts.

After being diverted to K-6 as an escort for a wingman with damaged ailerons, Capt. Guy A. MACLAURY, USMCR, rearmed and attempted to take off on another mission against the invaders at Changin Do. The engine of his F4U failed and the plane crash-landed and burned. Captain MACLAURY was burned to death.

At 1056I HMCS IROQUOIS joined the formation. At 1713I the USS JOHN R. CRAIG departed on Worthington Patrol.

16 July 1952 -

Forty-four (44) VMA-312 aircraft were launched with main effort directed to the retaking of Changin Do. Seventy-nine (79) troops were killed in retaking of the island. The total for the day came to one hundred eighteen (118) troops killed. Other principal targets included two (2) gun positions destroyed and two (2) damaged.

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At 0543I CTE 95.11 held a Roger gunnery firing exercise.

At 0636I a VM-312 pilot made a forced landing at Paengyong-Do, effected temporary repairs and later returned to the ship. At 0646I an F4U piloted by Capt. Charles L. DUNCAN, USMCR, was damaged by gunfire at Changin Do and forced to ditch off the island. The pilot used his life raft and was later picked up by a small boat from HMS AMETHYST. Captain DUNCAN suffered no injuries and was returned by Worthington Patrol two days later.

At 0755I the USS JOHN R. CRAIG returned from Worthington Patrol and at 1708I HMAS WARRAMUNGA was detached for similar service.

17 July 1952 -

With the securing of Changin Do on the morning of the 17th, planes from the BATAAN returned to a normal schedule of CAP, TARCAP and Recco flights. Marginal weather in the TARCAP and Recco areas forced the cancellation of 24 afternoon flights. Fifty (50) buildings destroyed and fifteen (15) damaged comprised the principal damage of the flights which were able to work the target areas.

At 0610I CTE 95.11 held a Roger gunnery firing exercise. At 0611I the WARRAMUNGA returned from Worthington Patrol and at 1706I HMCS IROQUOIS departed on a similar patrol.

18 July 1952 -

All flights were cancelled due to warm frontal weather with low ceilings in the operating and target areas.

At 0845I HMCS IROQUOIS returned from Worthington Patrol and at 1703I departed for similar service.

19 July 1952 -

Full flight operations resumed as the weather improved. Forty (40) sorties were launched with major damage to a railroad station being a principal target.

At 0825I HMCS IROQUOIS returned from patrol and at 1712I the USS JOHN R. CRAIG departed for the daily Worthington Patrol.

20 July 1952 -

Weather again caused cancellation of all afternoon flights with the result that only twenty-four (24) of the forty (40)

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scheduled flights were launched. Primary target damage included the destruction of a radio-radar station and a power sub-station. Five (5) power sub-stations were damaged.

A Roger gunnery firing exercise was held at 0533I. 0952I the USS JOHN R. CRAIG returned from Worthington Patrol and at 1527I HMAS WARRAMUNGA departed early to permit fueling before seas became too rough for the operation.

At 1910I the HMAS BATAAN joined the formation.

21 July 1952 -

The final day of flight operations with VMA-312 aboard the BATAAN was hampered slightly by low ceilings in the target areas. Twenty-six (26) sorties were launched with pilots reporting one (1) power plant damaged and four (4) rail cuts. The last two flights of the day did not return to the BATAAN but proceeded on to King-6. Six (6) flyable duds were ferried to King-6 with only one (1) VMA-312 aircraft being left aboard to be off loaded in Sasebo.

HMAS WARRAMUNGA returned from Worthington Patrol at 0629I. 1658I HMCS IROQUOIS and HMAS BATAAN were detached on assigned duty. HMAS WARRAMUNGA and the USS JOHN R. CRAIG were detached for duty with HMS OCEAN at 2330I. Immediately after detaching the two vessels the USS BATAAN set course for Inchon, Korea.

At 2100I the Commanding Officer, HMS OCEAN assumed Command of Task Element 95.11 and OTC West Coast of Korea shifted to the Commanding Officer of HMS NEWCASTLE.

22 July 1952 -

Steaming independently for Inchon from Operation Area NAN.

Anchored in Inchon Harbor at 0801I and began off-loading VMA-312 gear and personnel. Completed off-loading and got under way for Sasebo, Japan at 1203I.

23 July 1952 -

Steaming independently from Inchon to Sasebo, Japan. At 0945I conducted a gunnery exercise with towed sleeve in Area George.

1440I Moored Buoy #18 Sasebo, Japan.

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS

DATE	Total Combat Sorties	Armed Recco	TARCAP	Pro- Briefed Strikes	CAP	ABORTS	FLY-A- Ways
7/13	44	16	14		14	1	
7/14	26	4	10	4	8	1	
7/15	46		14	18	14		
7/16	44		14	16	14		
7/17	28	8	10		10		
7/18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
7/19	40		14	12	14		
7/20	24		8	8	8		
7/21	<u>26</u>	<u></u>	<u>10</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>10</u>	<u></u>	<u>6</u>
Totals	278	28	94	64	92	2	6

Average Combat Sorties Per Day 30.9

Total Combat Hours 553

Daily Average 61.44 hours

Average Hours Per Combat Sortie 2.0

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PART III - PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT INCLUDING AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES

A. Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

- (1) No undue difficulties were experienced in the handling of ordnance.
- (2) Three (3) white phosphorous rockets failed to fire. These were returned as hanging rockets.
- (3) Two (2) 1000# GP and three (3) 500# GP bombs failed to explode. All aircraft returned with one or both arming wires, with the exception of one (1) 1000# GP. The aircraft carrying it returned to K-6 and no report as to arming wires was received. It is possible that the bombs had insufficient air travel to arm.
- (4) One (1) 100# GP bomb was returned to the ship and stayed on the aircraft during landing. The bomb rack checked out satisfactorily.
- (5) One (1) napalm dud was reported. The reason for its failure to explode is unknown. The aircraft returned with both arming wires.
- (6) Fusing on bombs listed in paragraph (3) and (5) above:

<u>BOMB</u>	<u>NOSE FUSE</u>	<u>TAIL FUSE</u>
1 - 500# GP	VT - T91E1	AN-M101A2 .01
1 - 500# GP	AN - M139A1 .01	AN-M101A2 .01
1 - 500# GP	AN - M139A1 Inst.	AN-M101A2 .01
2 - 1000# GP	VT - T91E1	AN-M102A2 .01
1 - Napalm		1 - M15 Igniter, W.P. 1 - M16 Igniter, W.P. 2 - T M157 Fuse

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B. Ordnance Expenditure

(1) During the operating period covered by this report, the following ordnance was expended by VM-312 aircraft.

DATE	1000# GP	500# GP	260# Frag	100# GP	WP Rocket	Napalm	20mm rds.	.50 Cal. rds.
7/13	9	14		150	24	7	3,900	13,500
7/14	4	8	12	84	8	6	5,500	17,150
7/15	4	23	8	160	32	5	2,100	11,200
7/16	-	21	10	126	48	8	4,000	14,200
7/17	2	10		102	24	6	2,000	10,000
7/18	-	-	-	-	-	-	- - -	- - -
7/19	6	16	32	94	8	4	6,000	9,900
7/20	6	6	16	62	-	4	2,000	6,000
7/21	<u>6</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>92</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>500</u>	<u>1,000</u>
Totals	37	108	80	870	144	40	26,000	82,950

Bomb
total
lbs. 37,000 54,000 20,800 87,000

Operating period, total lbs. 198,800

Bomb
total
tons 16.5 27.0 10.4 43.5

Operating period, total tons 97.4

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PART IV - SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Own Battle Damage:

- (1) None of the ships of the Task Element sustained battle damage.
- (2) For damage sustained by aircraft see Naval Air Warfare Aircraft Vulnerability Report.

B. Battle Damage Inflicted on the Enemy

- (1) Ships of this Task Element inflicted no damage on the enemy while operating as part of this Task Element during the period covered by this report.
- (2) For detailed battle damage inflicted on the enemy by aircraft of the Task Element, see Naval Air Warfare Attack Report. A summary of damage follows.

<u>TARGET</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>
Machine Guns	5	6
Tower		1
Railroad Bridge		3
Road Bridge	2	18
Vehicle	1	1
Command Post	1	
Railroad Cars		5
Oxen	7	
Oxcarts	5	
Boats	9	16
Buildings	339	97
Supply Dumps		3
Troops KIA	415	
Transformer Station	1	8
Warehouses	10	10
Rail Cuts		3
Road Cuts		13
Bunkers	8	15
Shelters		4
Wagons		4
Tunnels		1
Gun Positions	4	15
Radio-Radar Station	1	

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PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

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A. Personnel Performance

- (1) Personnel performance was considered excellent, with the work of the catapult personnel especially commendable. Since arriving in Far Eastern area 2233 catapult launches were made from the H-2 and H-4 catapults without incident.
- (2) During this period the average enlisted on board count of personnel was 1024 (exclusive of squadron) which was adequate.

B. Casualties

- (1) Captain Ewart G. DICK, USMCR was injured on 13 July 1952 when his aircraft stalled and spun into the water on the landing approach. Nature of injury: Fracture, simple, left clavicle. Laceration one inch on chin. Laceration one inch on forehead.
- (2) Captain Guy A. MACLAURY, USMCR, was burned to death when the engine of his F4U quit on take off. The plane crash-landed with ordnance and napalm aboard.

PART VI - SPECIAL COMMENTS

A. Aerology

During this operating period two tropical storms were conceived in the Ryukus area. The first, labelled "Freda", moved slowly northward and dissipated over southern Kyushu on 15 July. This period in the Yellow Sea was marked by much instability manifested by frequent rainshower activity and large cumulus build-ups over the target area, although generally ceilings and visibility remained within operational limits.

The second tropical storm, called "Gilda", moved slowly west northwestward and finally entered the China coast just south of Shanghai on 19 July. A ridge of high pressure moved west across Korea from the Sea of Japan causing a zone of convergence along the Korean peninsula. This gave all the aspects of frontal weather causing cancellation of flights due to low ceilings and rain squalls in the target area. This condition continued during the remainder of the operating period, making the target area weather variable and generally marginal.

H. R. Horney
H. R. HORNEY



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