MIDDL 35707

U.S.S. BATAAN (CVL 29)
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CVL29/20:FDH/ct
A12
Ser 076

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DOD DIR 5200.10

10 JUL 1952

SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Commanding Officer and Commander Task Element 95.11
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 95.1
(2) Commander Task Force 95
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 5 June through 16 June 1952

Ref: (a) Article 0705 Navy Regulations
(b) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4
(c) CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 3480.1
(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52
(e) CTE 95.11 OpOrder 2-52

Encl: (1) Sample Air Schedule

1. In accordance with reference (a), (b), (c) and (d), the action report of Task Element 95.11 for the period 5 June through 16 June 1952 is submitted herewith.

PART I - GENERAL NARRATIVE

1. During the period 6 June through 15 June 1952, the USS BATAAN (CVL 29), under the command of Captain H. R. HORNEY, 61175/1310, USN, with the Marine Aircraft Squadron, VMA-312 embarked, operated as a part of the U. S. SEVENTH Fleet in Task Force 95, under the Operational control of the Commander Task Group 95.1.

2. The Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN (CVL 29) was OTC, West Coast of Korea, from 2100I 6 June until RADM SCOTT-MONCRIEFF, RN, CTE 95.19 assumed OTC, West Coast of Korea at 1700I 9 June 1952. The Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN (CVL 29), was Commander Task Element 95.11 throughout the period 2100I 6 June to 2100I 15 June at which time the Command of the Task Element shifted to the Commanding Officer, HMS OCEAN. During the reporting period, TE 95.11 consisted of USS BATAAN (CVL 29), and a maximum of three destroyers. At varying times HMAS WARRAMUNGA (D-123), HMS COMUS (D-20), USS ARNOLD J. ISBELL (DD-869), and HMS CONSORT (D-76), acted as screening vessels. The screen was reduced to less than three ships when required by operational demands. For Worthington Patrol one destroyer daily was ordered to CTE 95.12 to patrol the islands south of Haeju. Ships were detached late in the afternoon to proceed on this patrol, returning the following morning after refueling from a tanker located near Taechong Do.

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a. The mission of the Task Element is as follows:

(1) Assist in enforcing the United Nations blockade and in the defense of friendly islands of the West Coast of Korea.

(2) Assist in protecting sea communication in the Yellow Sea.

(3) Provide air spotting services for control of naval gunfire in order to support the United Nations effort in Korea.

(4) Conduct air strikes against selected targets.

(5) Conduct air reconnaissance.

(6) Render close air support services to ground forces.

(7) Act in accordance with current directives of CTG 95.1.

b. The mission of the Carrier Unit is as follows:

(1) Conduct armed air reconnaissance of the West Coast of Korea from the United Nations front lines northward to Lat. 39-15N.

(2) Attack enemy shipping and destroy mines.

(3) Maintain surveillance of enemy airfields in the Haeju-Chinnampo region. (ONGJIN, HAEJU, and ONJONG-NI).

(4) Provide airspot services to naval units on request.

(5) Provide close air support and armed air reconnaissance services as requested by Joint Operations Center, Korea (JOC KOREA).

(6) Conduct air strikes against coastal and inland targets of opportunity at discretion.

(7) Be prepared to provide Combat Air Patrol to friendly naval forces operating off the West Coast of Korea.

(8) Render SAR assistance.

3. No enemy surface or air forces were encountered by this Task Element and, therefore, no surface or air action is related. However, enemy small craft operating in the rivers, estuaries, and along the West Coast of Korea were attacked and destroyed by aircraft of this element when directed or as targets of opportunity. Action of TE 95.11 on Patrol Worthington is reported by CTE 95.12

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SECURITY INFORMATION

4. During this operating period, VMA-312 aircraft flew Armed Reconnaissance, Target Combat Air Patrol, Combat Air Patrol, Pre-briefed Strikes and Air Spot for Naval Gunfire Missions as illustrated by schedule, enclosure (1). Flight operations were carried out for the entire nine days scheduled with only eight (8) sorties cancelled due to weather. During these nine days VMA-312 aircraft flew 377 combat sorties. One (1) flight aborted. There was a total of 790 combat hours flown for an overall average of 87.77 hours and 41.9 sorties per day. The squadron aircraft allowance was 21, the average aircraft on board 19 and the total average aircraft availability 15.

5. During this operating period, ships of Task Element 95.11 operated in the Korean Coastal Area NAN in the vicinity of Latitude 37° 30' N. and 124° 30' E.

PART II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

6 June 1952 -

Enroute Operating Area "N" from Yokosuka, Japan. At 1015 the BATAAN rendezvoused with HMS COMUS. At 1520 the USS ISBELL joined the formation. At 2100 the Commanding Officer USS BATAAN assumed Command of Task Element 95.11 and OTC West Coast of Korea.

7 June 1952 -

At 0505 began flight operations. Aircraft of VMA-312 flew thirty-nine (39) sorties. Damage included 65 troops killed in action, hitting of supply dumps and attacking junk shipping. At 1017 HMS CONSORT joined the formation.

8 June 1952 -

Forty-one (41) sorties were launched. These missions included close air support, Armed Recco, Target CAP and defensive CAP.
1st LT L. W. BENDER, USMCR, made the 25,000th landing aboard the BATAAN.

9 June 1952 -

Flight operations continued with forty-four (44) sorties flown. An F4U, piloted by Capt. J. KRAUS, USMCR, was shot down west of Chinnampo. The plane caught fire in mid-air but the pilot was able to parachute to safety, receiving second and third degree burns about the hands and face. Rescue was effected by helicopter in less than an hour and Capt. KRAUS was transferred to a hospital in Seoul.
Gunnery firing exercises were held twice this date and simulated attacks were made on the Task Element during an air defense drill.
At 1700 CTE 95.19 assumed OTC West Coast of Korea. At 1716 HMS CONSORT was detached to proceed to Sasebo, Japan.

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10 June 1952 -

Launched thirty-five (35) sorties. Armed Recco worked in the Chinnampo-Chaeryong-Yonan area. A principal target of the day was the destruction and damage of forty (40) boats.

A gunnery firing exercise and an air defense drill were held. At 0633 HMAS WARRAMUNGA joined the formation and at 1719 HMS COMUS was detached to proceed on Worthington Patrol.

11 June 1952 -

VMA-312 aircraft totaled forty-six (46) sorties, destroying one large factory as a primary target. Four Naval Gun Spot sorties and one photo flight were among the missions of the day. At 0945 HMS COMUS returned from Worthington Patrol and at 1714 USS ISBELL was detached for similar patrol.

12 June 1952 -

Flight operations continued with forty-four (44) flights launched. Damage to the enemy included forty-five (45) troops killed and eight (8) gun positions damaged. Naval Gun Spot missions were again flown. At 0826 USS ISBELL rejoined the formation and at 1707 HMAS WARRAMUNGA was detached to proceed on Worthington Patrol.

13 June 1952 -

VMA-312 flew forty-five (45) sorties this date. Armed Recco attacked 200 troops with unassessed damage. Other damage included one (1) observation post destroyed and seven (7) gun positions damaged.

The BATAAN held gunnery firing exercises.

At 1448 HMAS WARRAMUNGA returned from Worthington Patrol and HMS COMUS was detached for similar service.

14 June 1952 -

Launched forty-three (43) sorties including four Naval Gun Spot and five pre-briefed strikes. Primary targets were the destruction of ninety-five (95) buildings, two (2) gun positions and the killing of thirty-four (34) enemy troops.

General Quarters drill were held at 0449 and simulated attacks were made on the Task Element during an air defense drill.

One plane of VMA-312 caught fire upon landing due to a hole in fuel tank. The hole was caused by flying brass from the plane ahead. The fire was quickly extinguished without injury to the pilot.

At 0857 HMS COMUS returned from Worthington Patrol and at 1558 USS ISBELL was detached to proceed on the Worthington Patrol.

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15 June 1952 -

On the final day of flight operations for the operating period VMA-312 aircraft flew forty (40) sorties. Targets were hit from Han Chow to the Han River Estuary. Damage included 127 buildings and two supply dumps destroyed.

One F4U nosed up when brakes grabbed while taxiing to the catapult. Pieces of flying metal from the propeller and wheel guide of the catapult injured two men as reported under CASUALTIES in PART III of this report. At 1121 one F4U dropped a hung rocket upon landing. The white phosphorous rocket bounced into the propeller. The flying particles of phosphorous caused a fire on the flight deck which was quickly extinguished by fire-fighting personnel.

At 1517 and 1859, respectively, the HMAS WARRAMUNGA and USS ISBELL were detached to patrol under orders of CTE 95.12

At 2100 the Commanding Officer of HMS OCEAN assumed Command of Task Element 95.11.

16 June 1952 -

Steaming enroute to Sasebo, Japan with HMS COMUS in company. At 0928 eight (8) VMA-312 aircraft were launched for Itami, Japan.

At 1145 conducted AA gunnery practice in area George. Practice was ineffective due to late arrival of tractor plane, haze conditions and fishing craft.

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS

DATE	TOTAL SORTIES	CAS	NGS	ARMED RECCO	TARCAP	CAP	PHOTO	PRE-BRIEFED STRIKE
6/7	39			11	14	14		
6/8	41	4		4	19	14		
6/9	44			16	14	14		
6/10	35			12	12	11		
6/11	46		4	11	16	14	1	
6/12	44		4	12	14	14		
6/13	45			17	14	14		
6/14	43		4	6	14	14		5
6/15	40			11	15	14		
Totals	377	4	12	100	132	123	1	5

Average sorties per day 41.9

Total combat hours 790

Daily aver. 87.77 hrs.

Average hours per sortie 2.1

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PART - III PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT INCLUDING AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES

A. Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

(1) No undue difficulties were experienced in the handling of ordnance.

(2) Four HVAR's and 12 white phosphorous rockets failed to fire. There were 4 cut pigtails, 3 hanging rockets, 1 bad igniter, 1 bad adapter and 7 dud rockets.

(3) Two (2) 500# bombs and one (1) napalm tank were lost during catapult shots during the operating period. Probable cause of the losses was due to the installation on some aircraft of pylons with a manual release mechanism which required rearward motion of the mechanism to release the ordnance stores. As pylons with a mechanism which required forward motion for release became available from dud aircraft the changes were made.

(4) Four 500# GP's, one 1000# GP and one 100# GP bombs failed to explode. All A/C returned with one or both arming wires. It is possible that these bombs had insufficient air travel to arm.

(5) Six napalm duds were reported. The reason for their failure to explode is unknown. All A/C returned with one or both arming wires.

(6) Fusing on bombs listed in patagraph 4 and 5 above.

BOMB	NOSE FUSE	TAIL FUSE
2-500# GP	AN-M139A1 Inst.	AN-M101A2 .025
2-500# GP	AN-M139A1 Inst.	AN-M101A2 .01
1-1000# GP	AN-M139A1 Inst.	AN-M102A2 .01
1-100# GP	AN-M103A1 Inst.	AN-M100A2 Non Delay

6-Napalm

1-M15 Ignitor, W.P.
1-M16 Ignitor, W. P.
2-T M157 Fuse

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B. Ammunition Expenditure:

(1) During the operating period covered by this report, the following ordnance was expended by VMA-312 aircraft:

DATE	1000# GP	500# GP	260# Frag.	100# GP	HVAR Rocket	WP Rocket	NAPALM	20MM rds.	.50 Cal rds.
6/7	3	16		163	16	8	12	2500	15,370
6/8	6	16		104	67		6	1500	20,790
6/9	1	19		106	24	24	8	4050	26,280
6/10	14	11		111		56	1	1800	16,700
6/11	4	19		156		73	8	2500	23,900
6/12	7	14		112		64	6	3600	17,880
6/13		16	48	18		120	8	2400	24,580
6/14	2	20	36	34		130	5	2850	28,100
6/15	6	7		56		81	17	1900	7,900
Totals	43	138	84	860	107	556	71	23,100	181,500
Bomb total lbs.	43,000	69,000	21,840	86,000					

Operating period, total lbs. 219,840

Bomb total tons	21.5	34.5	10.92	43.0

Operating period, total tons 109.92

PART IV - SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Own Battle Damage:

(1) None of the ships of the Task Element sustained battle damage.

(2) For damage sustained by aircraft see Naval Air Warfare Aircraft Vulnerability Report.

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B. Battle Damage Inflicted on the Enemy:

(1) Ships of this Task Element inflicted no damage on the enemy while operating as part of this Task Element during the period covered by this report.

(2) For detailed battle damage inflicted on the enemy by aircraft of the Task Element, see Naval Air Warfare Attack Report. A summary of damage follows:

TARGET	DESTROYED		DAMAGED
Tower			1
Railroad Bridges	6		8
Road Bridges	1		11
Vehicles	3		1
Rice Mill	1		
Command Post	1		
Railroad Cars	15		13
Pack Animal	1		
Oxen	151		
Carts	12		5
Boats	13		42
Supply Stacks	17		3
Buildings	634		312
Supply Dumps	5		1
Supply Revetments			3
Troops KIA	290		
Warehouses	7		9
Rail Cuts		25	
Road Cuts		10	
Bunkers	6		11
Observation Post	1		
Gun Positions	10		35
Shelters	1		7

PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. Personnel Performance:

(1) Personnel performance was considered excellent, with performance of fire fighting personnel during the two fires on the flight deck out-standing. During this period the average enlisted on board count of personnel was 1020 (exclusive of squadron) which was adequate.

(2) The critical shortage of petty officers continues in the BT, MM, RM, YN and SK rates. A vigorous on-board training program to train personnel of the lower ratings to fill higher ratings

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billets is working out most successfully and barring unforseen detachments, the personnel situation should continue to be adequate.

(3) The X-2 division provides a five day orientation, training and indoctrination period which has helped in assigning men to billets by considering both their personal preferences and the overall needs of the ship.

B. Recreation:

(1) The following activities for welfare and recreation were available during this period:

(a) BATAAN NEWS, a daily newspaper

(b) BBC - Bataan Broadcasting Company provided news casts and recordings, both programmed and request.

(c) Radio Broadcasts were piped to RBO's throughout the ship.

(d) Divine services were held daily for catholics and weekly for protestants. One Jewish service was held. Bataan chaplain held services on several of the screening vessels.

(e) The ship's library was open until taps.

(f) Sightseeing tours were provided to points of interest near Sasebo and were well patronized.

(g) Three movies were shown daily in addition to one in the wardroom and one in the CPO mess.

C. Casualties

(1) The below listed men were injured on the morning of 15 June when struck by flying particles of wood and metal caused by a propeller biting into flight deck and catapult spotting chock:

(a) MOTLAND, Russel A., 388 71 16, AA, USN: Mutiple, superficial abrasions. Treatment, cleaned - merthiolate applied.

(b) PILARCZYK, Charles (N), 954 98 17, AB3, USN: Wound, lacerated, back of head, superficial wounds on back left side. Treatment: Wounds cleaned and dressed. Admitted to sick list.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

PART VI - SPECIAL COMMENTS

A. Gunnery:
COMMENT - The presence of small craft in Area GEORGE made firing on target runs extremely difficult. During the tow plane plane exercise the escorting DD got one firing run. The BATAAN was unable to fire on any of the runs.

B. Aerology:
COMMENT - This nine day operating period in the Yellow Sea was marked by unusually good weather in the month of June. Weak high pressure cells moved eastward over the Yellow Sea and Korea from China followed by weak polar troughs causing light shower activity. These troughs, one of which passed over the area on 10 June, occur every four to six days. The high cells tend to strengthen over the Sea of Japan and extend westward over Korea and the western Yellow Sea causing a prevailing southeasterly wind which veers with each trough passage. Approximately two days after each trough passage, the polar air mass is marked by rising dew point temperatures and the consequent formation of coastal stratus and fog which persist over the coastal islands and waters until late morning or early afternoon.
Ceilings and visibility were generally unlimited near point Oboe except during trough passages. Surface winds ranged in velocity from 4 to 12 knots and varied in direction. Temperatures remained in the high sixties and low seventies.
Eight sorties were cancelled because of stratus conditions over the target area during one early morning period.

H. R. Horney
H. R. HORNEY

SECOND-IN-COMMAND FAR EAST STATION
11 JUL 1952

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