FM-1. Final plans for the Portland-class heavy cruiser Indianapolis (CA-35), 3 January 1933 (inboard profile).

RG 19, NARA II, College Park, MD

Published by
Naval History and Heritage Command
Washington Navy Yard, DC 20374-5060
www.history.navy.mil

Book design by Jessica Craney

U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL EDITION NOTICE

Use of ISBN
This is an official U.S. Government edition of this publication and is herein identified to certify its authenticity. This title’s print edition is cataloged under ISBN 978-1-943604-26-5. A Section 508-compliant PDF is cataloged under ISBN 978-1-943604-27-2. The title’s e-book edition is cataloged under ISBN 978-1-943604-38-8. The title’s Mobi edition is cataloged under ISBN 978-1-943604-39-5.

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To those touched by the tragedy of the loss of USS Indianapolis

This work is dedicated to the Sailors and Marines who lost their lives on the final voyage of USS Indianapolis and to those who survived the torment at sea following its sinking. The good seamanship of these men brought the successful delivery of components for the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, contributing to the end of the Second World War. This book is also dedicated to the crews of the rescue ships that saved survivors’ lives, identified the dead, and provided a proper burial at sea to those lost; to the air crews that provided critical rescue support; and to the medical staff at sea and on shore that tended to survivors. Finally, it is dedicated to those families that lost the irreplaceable and to those whose loved ones lived with the scars of their ordeal for the remainder of their lives.

CONTENTS

List of Illustrations

Methodology and Security Statement

Document Codes

Commanding Officers, WWII Record, and Summary of Final Crew

Commanding Officers of USS Indianapolis

USS Indianapolis WWII Battle Stars

Summary of Final Crew

Acknowledgments

Authors

Introduction

Chapter One: Returning to the Forward Area: Atom Bomb Delivery and the Final Voyage

Chapter Two: Sunk—Firsthand Recollections of the Attack and Time in the Water

Chapter Three: Rescued

Chapter Four: Moving Forward—Condolences and Investigations

Chapter Five: Conviction and Clemency

Chapter Six: Remembering Indianapolis

Postscript: NHHC Press Release Announcing Discovery of Indianapolis Wreckage, 19 August 2017

Appendix 1: Conditions of Readiness and Material Conditions

Appendix 2: Crewmember Ratings

Appendix 3: Indianapolis Casualties

List of Acronyms, Ranks, and Ratings

Notes

Selected Readings

Index

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FRONT MATTER

Figure FM-1. Final Plans for Heavy Cruiser Indianapolis (CA-35)

Figure FM-2. Under the New York Skyline, Indianapolis (CA-35)

Figure FM-3. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and Flag Officers on Deck of Indianapolis (CA-35)

CHAPTER ONE

Figure 1-1. Hole in Main Deck caused by Japanese Bomb at Frame 114 Port Side

Figure 1-2. Chaplain Thomas Conway Conducts Funeral Service on Indianapolis (CA-35)

Figure 1-3. Damaged Indianapolis (CA-35) at Kerama Retto, Ryuku Islands on 2 April 1945

Figure 1-4. Japanese Submarine I-58 Preparing for Scuttling, off Sasebo, Japan, during Operation Road’s End, 1 April 1946

Figure 1-5. Lieutenant Lewis Haynes

Figure 1-6. Nuclear Weapon “Little Boy”

Figure 1-7. Indianapolis (CA-35) Route from Guam to Leyte

Figure 1-8. Zigzag Plan No. 5 from U.S. Fleet Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine

Figure 1-9. LST-779 as Waves Crash Against Beached LVTs

CHAPTER TWO

Figure 2-1. Starboard Side of Indianapolis (CA-35) Off Mare Island Navy Yard, California, 10 July 1945

Figure 2-2. View of Ship’s Forward Stack, Superstructure, and Hull, 12 July 1945

Figure 2-3. Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, commander of the Fifth Fleet Awards a Purple Heart to Joseph J. Moran, RM1, Survivor of Indianapolis (CA-35)

Figure 2-4. Willie Hatfield, S2, and Cozell Lee Smith, COX, at Naval Base Hospital #20, Peleliu Island, 5 August 1945

Figure 2-5. Commander Hashimoto’s Sketch of the Attack on Indianapolis

Figure 2-6. Forward Torpedo Room of I-58

Figure 2-7. Chart of the Western Pacific, Showing Indianapolis’s (CA-35) track from Guam to her Reported Sinking Location

CHAPTER THREE

Figure 3-1. Ringness (APD-100) circa 1945, Flying a Long Homeward Bound Pennant

Figure 3-2. A Dispatch from Cecil J. Doyle (DE-368)

Figure 3-3. Lieutenant (j.g.) Wilbur G. Gwinn, USNR, Pilot of the Ventura Patrol Bomber that Sighted the Survivors of Indianapolis (CA-35)

Figure 3-4. Lieutenant Robert Adrian Marks of VPB 23, Standing Next to a Consolidated PBY-5A Blackcat, 8 August 1945

Figure 3-5. (L to R) Huie H. Phillips, S2, USNR; John Oligar, S1, USNR; and Glenn L. Milbrodt, S2, Recovering in Naval Base Hospital #20 Pelelieu, 5 August 1945

Figure 3-6. Indianapolis (CA-35) Survivors Receiving Glucose and Saline

Figure 3-7. Funeral of Fred Elliot Harrison, S2, at USAF Cemetery, 6 August 1945

Figure 3-8. Survivors of Indianapolis (CA-35) are Taken Aboard Landing Craft at Peleliu to Transfer to Tranquility (AH-14), 6 August 1945

Figure 3-9. Survivors of Indianapolis (CA-35) Transferred from Landing Craft to Tranquility (AH-14), 6 August 1945

Figure 3-10. “Rescue Dispatches,” 2–9 August 1945

Figure 3-11. An Unidentified Survivor of Indianapolis (CA-35) Aboard Tranquility (AH-14), 6 August 1945

Figure 3-12. Tranquility (AH-14) Arrives in Guam with Survivors of Indianapolis (CA-35). Joseph Jacquemot, S2, a Survivor, Listening to Ship’s Radios, 8 August 1945

Figure 3-13. Survivors of Indianapolis (CA-35) are Brought Ashore from Tranquility (AH-14) at Guam, 8 August 1945

Figure 3-14. Commander Eugene Own Examines Dressings of Dr. Haynes at Naval Hospital Guam

Figure 3-15. Admiral Raymond A. Spruance Commander, Fifth Fleet pins a Purple Heart on Clarence E. McElroy, S1, Survivor of Indianapolis (CA-35)

Figure 3-16. Captain Edwin Layton

Figure 3-17. Captain William “Deak” Parsons Supervises the Loading of the “Little Boy” Uranium Bomb

Figure 3-18. The “Little Boy” Bomb Being Lifted into the Bomb Bay of Enola Gay

CHAPTER FOUR

Figure 4-1. Last Photograph of Officers of Indianapolis (CA-35)

Figure 4-2. Indianapolis’s (CA-35) Last Commanding Officer, Captain Charles B. McVay III, Tells War Correspondents About the Sinking of His Ship

Figure 4-3. (L to R) Admiral Raymond Spruance, Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher, Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, and Vice Admiral Willis Augustus “Ching” Lee Jr. On Board Indianapolis (CA-35) on 3 February 1945

Figure 4-4. Father Thomas Conway Delivering a Sermon to Sailors on the Deck of Indianapolis (CA-35), undated, USN

CHAPTER FIVE

Figure 5-1. Crowd at a Rally in Leutze Park on the Washington Navy Yard during World War I

Figure 5-2. Commander Hashimoto’s Signed Oath

Figure 5-3. Court’s Recommendation for Clemency to Captain Charles B. McVay III

Figure 5-4. (L to R) Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, and Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz Pose Together at the Navy Department, Washington, D.C. on 21 November 1945

POSTSCRIPT

Figure P-1. Image Showing Bottom of an Anchor Marked U.S. Navy and Norfolk Navy Yard

Figure P-2. Image Showing What Appears to be Painted Hull Number “35”

METHODOLOGY AND SECURITY STATEMENT

This volume presents the final chapter of Indianapolis’s decorated service history using primary source documents. Documents were carefully selected to represent the whole story of the final months of Indianapolis. This volume should not be considered the definitive documentary history of Indianapolis. If the entirety of rescue deck logs, war diaries, after-action reports, trial transcripts, investigation reports, and correspondence were presented in one volume, it would be thousands of pages in length. This volume is a representative sample of those documents and will lead those who want to learn more about Indianapolis to the pertinent archival collections.

All documents in this volume are from public archives and have been declassified by the proper declassification authorities. Although these documents are publicly available, all street addresses and service numbers have been silently deleted in accordance with privacy laws. Names of historical actors were kept original, with explanatory notes as necessary. All efforts to maintain transparency have been taken.

The documents are transcribed and presented as closely to their original form as possible. To maintain the voice of the writer, spelling in all correspondence was left as written. In the source notes for documents, editorial codes tell readers the type of document (a listing of these abbreviations is found below). It is noted in the source note when portions of the documents were omitted due to redundancy, space limitations, or content. When sections have been omitted from the middle parts of a document, ellipses within square brackets appear to show where material was not included; omissions from the start or end of documents have been done silently, with notation in the source note. Minor formatting changes were made to memoranda and lists for ease of reading. For example, many documents were typed entirely in capitals; here the capitalization has been rendered normally. In addition, some minor stylistic changes have been used, such as standardizing italicization of ships’ names. Square brackets have been used within the text to indicate where text or explanation not found in the original has been inserted; in most cases explanation or additional information appears in an endnote. Intelligence and radio dispatches were also formatted for readability; key information such as sender, recipient, date, precedence, and so forth was kept in the transcriptions and other information related to decoding has been placed in an explanatory endnote. Spelling and grammar were kept as was in the original document unless corrections were absolutely necessary for understanding. It is noted whenever these changes were made, either with the square brackets or in a footnote.

The story of Indianapolis is not an entirely positive one for the U.S. Navy, but as this volume demonstrates, failures were studied and immediately addressed. So as to not repeat failures, or forget the lessons learned, the accurate narrative of Indianapolis must be readily available to the Navy and American public.

Document Codes

TD Typed Document

TDC Typed Document Copy

TDS Typed Document Signed

TDSC Typed Document Signed Copy

TR Transcription

TRC Transcription Copy

AL Autographed Letter

ALS Autographed Letter Signed

TL Typed Letter

TLC Typed Letter Copy

TLS Typed Letter Signed

TLSC Typed Letter Signed Copy

COMMANDING OFFICERS, WWII RECORD, AND SUMMARY OF FINAL CREW

Commanding Officers of USS Indianapolis

Commanding Officer

Assumed Command

John Morris Smeallie, Capt.

11/15/1932

William Stanley McClintic, Capt.

12/11/1934

Theodore Stark Wilkinson, Cmdr. (acting)

1/24/1936

Henry Kent Hewitt, Capt.

3/16/1936

Thomas Cassin Kinkaid, Capt.

6/07/1937

John Franklin Shafroth Jr., Capt.

8/27/1938

Edward William Hanson, Capt.

8/11/1940

Morton Lyndholm Deyo, Capt.

7/11/1942

Nicholas Vytlacil, Capt.

12/2/1942

Einar Reynolds Johnson, Capt.

7/30/1943

Charles Arthur Ferriter, Cmdr. (acting)

10/19/1944

Einar Reynolds Johnson, Capt.

11/6/1944

Charles Butler McVay III, Capt.

11/18/1944

USS Indianapolis WWII Battle Stars*

1. Bougainville Air Action and Salamaua-Lae Raid

20 February 1942 and 10 March 1942

2. Aleutians Operation: Attu Occupation

25 May 1943–2 June 1943

3. Gilbert Islands Operation

20 November 1943–8 December 1943

4. Marshall Islands Operation: Occupation of Kwajalein and Majuro Atolls and Occupation of Eniwetok Atoll

29 January 1944–8 February 1944 and 17 February 1944–2 March 1944

5. Asiatic-Pacific Raids: Palau, Yap, Ulitihi, and Woleai Raid

30 March 1944–1 April 1944

6. Marianas Operation: Capture/Occupation of Saipan and Guam and Battle of the Philippine Sea and Capture/Occupation of Guam

11 June 1944–10 August 1944 and 19–20 June 1944 and 21–23 July 1944

7. Capture/Occupation of Tinian Island

24–25 July 1944

8. Western Caroline Islands Operation: Capture/Occupation of Southern Palau Islands

6 September 1944–14 October 1944

9. Iwo Jima Operation: Fifth Fleet Raids Against Honshu and the Nansei Shoto and Assault/Occupation of Iwo Jima and Fifth Fleet Raids Against Honshu and the Nansei Shoto and Fifth Fleet Raids Against Honshu and the Nansei Shoto

15–16 February 1945 and 15 February 1945–6 March 1945 and 25 February 1945 and 1 March 1945

10. Okinawa Gunto Operation: Fifth/Third Fleet Raids in Support of Okinawa Gunto Operation and Assault/Occupation of Okinawa Gunto

17-25 March 1945 and 26 March 1945–5 April 1945

* Navy and Marine Corps Awards Manual, Part IV: Campaign and Service Medals (NAVPERS 15,790 [REV. 1953]).

Summary of Final Crew

8 August 1945

Memorandum To: Captain C.B. McVay III, USN

Attached is a roster of all personnel officers and enlisted men about [on board] the USS Indianapolis (CA 35) at the time of sinking, 30 July 1945

List I is a roster of 80 [78 McV]* officers attached to the ship and one (1) passenger, Captain Crouch, USN

List II is officers and enlisted men of Com5thFleet staff aboard the USS Indianapolis

List III is a roster of two (2) officers and thirty-seven (37) Marine personnel attached to the USS Indianapolis

List IV is a roster of enlisted personnel aboard ship. Page twenty is roster of aviation detail. Note two (2) men of Flag Allowance Com5th Fleet, are included in ship’s roster.

List V is report of Navy dead and wounded by Ensign Donald J. Blum, USNR

List VI is report of wounded Marines by Ensign Donald J. Blum, USNR

List VII is Roster of dead and wounded at Base Hospital #20

Off.

Enl.

Total

Total Personnel Aboard 30 July 1945

84 [82 McV]

1114

1198 [1196 McV]

Total Wounded Survivors

15

301

316

Casualties: “Dead”

4

4

Missing:

69 [67 McV]

809

878 [876 McV]

List I through IV have the wounded survivors marked with a “W”. The known dead are marked “Dead”. All other personnel are therefore missing.

Very respectfully,

Lee B. Cottrell,
Lieutenant, USNR.

* Struck through numbers were struck through on the original document with blue ink and corrected numbers written in beside them and initialed by Captain McVay.

Source: TD; “Enclosure in Court of Inquiry Transcript,” CINCPAC 1945 Flag Files Screening Documents, RG 38, Box 45, NARA II, College Park, MD.

Figure FM-2. Under the New York skyline, Indianapolis (CA-35) with President Franklin D. Roosevelt aboard, enters the harbor during the fleet review, 31 May 1934. Indianapolis served as President Roosevelt’s unofficial ship of state. He embarked on her multiple times, including the instance shown in the photograph above, when he and members of his cabinet reviewed the fleet on the Hudson from the deck of Indianapolis. His most notable cruise aboard Indianapolis was his South American “Good Neighbor” tour from 18 November 1936–15 December 1936.

NHHC Photo Collection, NH 678

Figure FM-3. On 3 February 1945, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (standing center) convened a meeting on board Indianapolis with all flag officers present at Ulithi Atoll. At the time, the cruiser was the Fifth Fleet Flagship of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (left of Nimitz). Her captain, Charles McVay III, is in the bottom row, fifth from right (head turned to his left). When Nimitz boarded the ship and broke his flag on 2 February, it marked the first time a five-star flag had flown from the vessel. He departed the ship on 4 February.

NHHC Photo Collection, NH 49708

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This volume would not be possible without the support of each component of the U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC) and the charge of our Director, Rear Admiral Samuel Cox (Ret.), to tell the most accurate and complete history of the U.S. Navy possible so that the hard-won and hard-learned lessons of the past can be utilized to enhance the warfighting effectiveness of today’s Navy and to inform the American people of the sacrifices made on their behalf. Special thanks must be given to Peter Luebke for his thorough editorial review and to Christopher Havern Sr. for help in planning, researching, and editing. Both Peter and Christopher offered constructive criticism and support through the entirety of this project. Alucard Capulet transcribed countless pages of archival documents related to Indianapolis, and the familiarity he developed with the subject caused him to point out many small details in the records that might have otherwise been overlooked. There is no way that this project could have been completed with such timeliness and thoroughness without the work of Mr. Capulet. The guidance and suggestions from Regina Akers, Robert Cressman, and Mark Evans, are also much appreciated. My branch head, Kristina Giannotta, and section head, Christopher Ghiz, granted me the freedom to develop, research, write, and see this lengthy project through. Their backing made this project possible. John Paulson at the Naval Historical Foundation helped tremendously analyzing rescue data, ships’ data, and explaining submarine tactics. Naval Archivist Nathaniel Patch, at National Archives II, College Park frequently directed me to documents and collections. His expertise undoubtedly made this a much richer volume. Dr. Jun Kimura of Tokai University, Japan, graciously pulled I-58 records for NHHC during one of his research trips to the Military History Research Center, National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo and provided us with the scans of those documents. Dr. Kimura was assisted by historian Kiyoshi Yamada. Japanese naval architect and researcher Yutaka Iwasaki gifted his translation of these documents to NHHC. The work of these gentlemen brought additional details on Commander Hashimoto’s perspective of the attack. The Underwater Archeology Branch at NHHC analyzed the historic data found in the LST-779 records and generated a new search area for Indianapolis. The work of underwater archeologists Robert Neyland, Alexis Catsambis, Blair Atcheson, and Abigail Casavant provided a more detailed picture of the final route of Indianapolis than previously available. They also generously answered any question that I threw their way and helped me better understand the movement of survivors in the water and the mechanics of a ship sinking. Janis Jorgensen at the United States Naval Institute graciously allowed the use of images from its A. J. Sedivi Collection. Sedivi was the photographer on Indianapolis and did not survive the sinking. The photographic record he left brings the storied service of his ship to life.

This manuscript was completed and ready to enter the publication phase on the day the wreckage of Indianapolis was discovered. Thank you to Paul Allen, Vulcan, Inc., and their research team led by Robert Kraft on R/V Petrel for graciously allowing us to include images of the Indianapolis wreck site in the postscript to this volume.

Preparing a project of this scope is a lengthy and sometimes stressful process. I thank my wife, Caitlin Spurlock Hulver, for her steadfast optimism and encouragement.

Any errors within the volume are the author’s and no fault of the individuals who graciously lent their support.

AUTHORS

Richard A. Hulver earned his PhD from West Virginia University with specialties in U.S. Foreign Relations and Public History. He has written about United States military commemorative sites from World War I and World War II on foreign soils. Currently, he works in the Histories and Archives Division of the Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC). Previous federal service included providing historical support to aid the mission at the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), World War I commemorative work for the American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC), and contributions to the U.S. Army Chief-of-Staff’s 2003–2011 Iraq War Study Group based at the National Defense University (NDU).

Peter C. Luebke earned his PhD from the University of Virginia, where he studied United States military history. Before joining Naval History and Heritage Command, he participated in multiple public history projects. In addition, he worked in the field of historic preservation at the Virginia Department of Historic Resources and authored or coauthored several National Register of Historic Places nominations, including that of Wisconsin (ex-BB-64). Currently, he is an editor for the Naval Documents of the American Revolution project at NHHC.

INTRODUCTION

It is indisputable that the loss of life attributed to the sinking of Indianapolis could have been mitigated had the proper individuals in the Navy realized sooner that the ship was overdue. Unfortunately, this was not the case. The United States Navy did, however, learn from this disaster and took immediate steps to ensure that no Sailor or Marine would again face a similar situation. Escort requirements were stiffened, lifesaving equipment improved, and more rigid movement reporting procedures put in place. The story of Indianapolis continues to serve as a point of departure for learning, as evidenced by this volume. Actions of captain and crew of Indianapolis throughout their ordeal, and in the aftermath, stand as exemplars of the highest traditions and honor of the United States Navy.

Indianapolis (CA-35) was a decorated World War II warship that is primarily remembered for her worst 15 minutes. The Portland class cruiser was commissioned on 15 November 1932 and became Flagship, Scouting Force, U.S. Fleet in 1933. She also served as President Franklin Roosevelt’s ship of state, carrying him to the review of the U.S. Fleet on the Hudson River on 31 May 1934 (see Figure FM-2) and on a Good Neighbor cruise to South America in 1936. She served with distinction from the attack on Pearl Harbor through the delivery of components for the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, much of it as Admiral Spruance’s flagship for the Fifth Fleet. Indianapolis earned ten battle stars for her service in World War II and was credited with shooting down nine enemy planes. This decorated record of service is, unfortunately, overshadowed by the first 15 minutes of 30 July 1945 when she was struck by two torpedoes from Japanese submarine I-58 and sent to the bottom of the Philippine Sea.

The sinking of Indianapolis and the loss of 880 crew out of 1,196*—most deaths occurring in the 4–5 day wait for a rescue delayed because of an unreported non-arrival—is a tragedy in U.S. naval history. The court-martial of the ship’s captain, Charles Butler McVay III, for endangering his ship through negligence by failing to zigzag when U.S. Navy tactical doctrine deemed it prudent, despite Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief Admiral Chester Nimitz’s recommendation against, further mires the story in controversy. Embracing the lessons of Indianapolis’s final voyage, the failed operational protocol in the aftermath, and the treatment of Captain McVay can teach the current Navy lessons in the responsibility of command, the need for clear operational procedures, the need for vigilance at all times, and the importance of proactively conveying honored Navy command traditions as a means of putting controversial leadership decisions in context. Emphasis on the lessons learned from Indianapolis will not only honor her final crew, but allow for a refocus on her commendable service.

The chain-of-events that ultimately placed Indianapolis on the trajectory for her sinking began in the early morning hours of 31 March 1945, during the pre-invasion bombardments of Okinawa. Around 0700 a Japanese single-engine plane was spotted in a vertical dive at the ship. The ship’s 20-millimeter guns opened fire, but less than 15 seconds after it was spotted the plane was over the ship. Tracer shells tore into the plane, causing the pilot to swerve, but he managed to release a bomb in his final seconds of life from a height of 25 feet and crash his plane on the port side of the after main deck. The plane toppled into the sea, causing little damage; but the bomb plummeted through the deck armor, the crew’s mess hall, the berthing compartment below, and the fuel tanks still lower before crashing through the bottom of the ship and exploding in the water under the ship. The resulting effect was similar to the detonation of a mine. The concussion blew two gaping holes in the ship’s bottom and flooded compartments in the area, killing nine crewmen and leaving the ship in need of major repairs. Captain McVay described the kamikaze attack as his ship’s “bloodbath.” He believed that the event taught several lessons. He himself gained a sense of the way the ship reacted to an underwater explosion and how much stress she could take. This affected the way he initially reacted to the torpedo hits that his ship took almost exactly four months later. Secondly, he believed that the episode caused the crew to take battle damage more seriously than they previously would have. He felt that the crew’s experience off Okinawa made them more aware of the danger their ship was in after being hit by torpedoes and saved lives by compelling them to get topside to await the “abandon ship” call before it was passed orally due to internal radio failure.

Indianapolis limped home to Mare Island, San Francisco under her own power, arriving in early May for refitting. In the three months at Mare Island, the makeup of Captain McVay’s crew changed dramatically. Approximately 25 percent of the crew turned over; most new assignments were fresh recruits. McVay’s desire to train up his untried men before moving back to the forward area for preparation of the invasion of mainland Japan weighed heavily on his mind. Notice on 12 July that Indianapolis was chosen to perform a top-secret delivery at high speed to Tinian on 16 July pushed up redeployment plans approximately two months. On 15 July, a large wooden crate was placed in the empty port hangar of Indianapolis and a metal canister in the empty flag staff’s quarters. McVay knew not what he carried, only that every hour saved in delivery would reportedly shorten the war by that much. Indianapolis left Mare Island the morning of 16 July with a crew that had not gone through their planned training and nearly 100 passengers being taxied to the Pacific Theater. Sailing at 28–29 knots, Indianapolis delivered its cargo to Tinian on 26 July, setting a speed record for the Pearl Harbor leg in the process. After the delivery of cargo and passengers, the ship made a short overnight transit to Guam for routing instructions to its next assignment in the forward area.

During Indianapolis’s stopover in Guam for routing to the Philippines, Captain McVay inquired about getting the needed training there before moving closer to the fighting, only to learn that training was no longer available in the Marianas. McVay was likely relieved to learn that Indianapolis would join Task Group 95.7 for two weeks of training immediately upon arrival at Leyte. His concern for training was made even more evident by his request for routing instructions to put him at his final stretch into Leyte in the early morning hours so that he could maximize the last few miles with antiaircraft practice in the best light to follow the tracer rounds. For an early morning arrival, McVay had two routing options. He could leave on 27 July, travel at 24–25 knots and arrive at Leyte the morning of 30 July, or leave the morning of 28 July, travel 15.7 knots, and arrive the morning of 31 July. Having just pushed his engines on the top-secret delivery, McVay opted for the slower speed transit. Unbeknownst to him, this decision placed his ship directly in the path of Japanese submarine I-58. McVay’s inquiry about getting an escort was dismissed, as the area Indianapolis would traverse was viewed as a backwater with minimal enemy threats, and there were no escort vessels available as every combatant ship was needed for patrol or combat operations with the pending invasion of Japan. The risk of sharing intelligence from top secret ULTRA intercepts that indicated otherwise, and was not pieced fully together, was not deemed worthwhile for such a routine transit. McVay’s routing instructions did mention three several day old possible enemy submarine contacts around the ship’s prescribed route—Convoy Route Peddie.

The intelligence available to Captain McVay, the absence of any moonlight when he was on the bridge prior to retiring to his cabin, along with his concern for getting the crew prepared to enter the anticipated bloodbath that an invasion of Japan would be, all factored into his decision to cease zigzagging the night that his ship was sunk. Feeling pressed for time and that visibility was poor, he used the discretion granted him under his routing orders and ceased zigzagging the night of 29–30 July to make up any time lost during required daylight zigzagging. Unfortunately, the poor visibility justifying this decision improved just as Indianapolis came in range of Japanese submarine I-58. The middle of the night between 29 and 30 July 1945, in the waters of the Philippine Sea, I-58 was at the right place and Indianapolis was not. A temporary change in weather conditions heightened the good and bad fortunes of each.

Japanese language records written by submarine Commander Mochitsura Hashimoto shortly after WWII from the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo provide a good description of the enemy’s perspective of the attack on Indianapolis. At 2226 (all times adjusted to Indianapolis ship time), the moon had risen, and Hashimoto looked through his periscope and determined that visibility was too poor for I-58 to surface. The submarine finally surfaced at 2335 and immediately identified through binoculars what was initially thought to be a surfaced enemy submarine to the east at a distance of 10,000 meters. Hashimoto then initiated his attack, submerged, and acquired his target perfectly silhouetted by the moon in his night periscope. Three minutes later, and still unaware of the exact identity of his target, Hashimoto ordered his crew to prepare six Type 95 torpedoes with Type 2 Mod. 1 warheads for attack and also manned the Kaiten should they be needed. According to Hashimoto’s hand-drawn sketch, by 2348 I-58 was prepared to attack and was within 3,000 meters of its target’s starboard side, completely undetected. Hashimoto, within 1,500 meters, fired the first of his Type 95 torpedoes with a solution of 11 knots (not the actual 17 the Indianapolis was travelling) at 2356—all were on their way by 0002. According to his testimony during Captain McVay’s court-martial, he was unaware if his target was zigzagging or not. His spread of six torpedoes and underestimated speed suggests that he suspected zigzagging, however.

The first torpedo hit directly in front of Turret I at 0003, causing a large explosion. Fire from the explosion allowed Hashimoto to view three water pillars in quick succession. The target reportedly came to a stop at 0004 when a fourth explosion took place. The apparent success of the Type 95 torpedoes caused Hashimoto not to deploy his eager Kaiten crews on an unnecessary suicide mission. After 18 minutes from the first hit, the lights flickered at the center of Indianapolis and ten loud explosions were heard—several making much more noise than the torpedo hits. I-58 then turned away from the ship and distanced itself from its target in anticipation of a counter-attack. At 0030, all explosions had ceased and I-58 returned to the location finding no signs of any ship. Hashimoto surfaced and moved through area at 0100 and determined that his crew had succeeded in sinking the enemy ship. At 0145 he submitted his report to Kure of a successful sinking of one Idaho-class battleship with three torpedo hits at 0003 30 July. Hashimoto provided coordinates in his report, and Allied intelligence intercepted the message. The grid coordinates were not recovered, however, and the message was viewed as a typical Japanese exaggeration of attack or an attempt to lure in potential targets.

The United States Navy investigation concluded that only two torpedoes hit the starboard side of the ship, one nearly tearing off the bow at frame 7, and the other hitting just forward of the bridge at frame 50 near the main communications room. Damage from the torpedoes to the forward engine room stopped engines No. 1 and No. 4. Lieutenant Richard B. Redmayne, the ship’s Chief Engineer of only 10 days, reached the after engine room and ordered the failing No. 2 engine shut down. Unable to communicate with the bridge, Redmayne made the decision to increase the only functioning engine, No. 3, to full speed. Unfortunately the acceleration caused by that engine allowed the ship to plow ahead and circle to port with water pouring into her wrecked bow. Captain McVay made the decision to hold off on issuing the “abandon ship” order in the first few minutes because the ship listed only three degrees, and she had been able to stay afloat under similar conditions after the kamikaze bomb hit at Okinawa. Minutes later, the ship’s executive officer returned to the bridge after assessing the damage and advised his Captain to issue the order, which he did. Captain McVay then decided to descend the bridge to get to Radio Room One to ensure that a distress signal made it off the ship. He realized that without escort the distress signal was his crew’s only hope for quick rescue. As McVay made his way from the bridge, the ship listed further starboard each minute, going to 25 degrees, 45 degrees, and 60 degrees. Within 12 minutes, she listed 90 degrees starboard, plunged by the head, rolled completely over, and assumed an up and down position before her unchecked descent into some of the deepest water on Earth. No distress signal ever left the ship, few life rafts deployed, and the crew was scattered in the water having left the moving ship in piecemeal fashion. The 200–300 Sailors and Marines who went down with the ship faced a quicker end than many of their fellow crewmates would in the upcoming days.

Up to 800 crewmen of Indianapolis went into the water following the sinking. These men were broken down into seven different groups of varying sizes and became spread out over approximately 25 miles. Almost all men had either pneumatic life belts or kapok lifejackets. The fortunate survivors, which were few, had life rafts with canned meat, malted milk balls, and some water. Captain McVay, one of the last swept off the ship, ended up in a group of 30 with life rafts. He continued to act as captain and led what he thought were the only crew left. The largest group was comprised of some 300–400 men with nothing except the life vests they wore into the water. It is likely that around 100 men who went into the water died within the first few hours due to wounds sustained in the torpedo explosions. The rest faced slow death from dehydration, overexposure, and exhaustion; all the while witnessing deaths from intentional salt water ingestion, hallucinatory driven attacks against fellow crew, mental collapse, and shark attacks.

A Navy rescue was not quickly mounted because damage to the ship’s communications system prevented a distress signal from being sent. Misinterpretation by port authorities at Leyte Gulf of Pacific Fleet Instruction 10CL-45, a directive issued in early 1945 to ease communication burdens placed on port officials by prohibiting the reporting of combatant ship arrivals, led to the non-arrival of Indianapolis going unreported until the discovery of her survivors in the water four days after her sinking. The hard realization that Indianapolis was not missed set in for Captain McVay and his crew as days dragged on with no apparent rescue underway. It is likely that the survivors were spotted on their second night in the water. An Army Air Force Captain piloting a C-54E from Manila to Guam spotted “naval action” in the form of star shells and tracers around 1900 on 31 July, 430 miles east of Manila. The incident was reported to the officers at Operations and Navigation at Guam, but was dismissed on the assumption that “if it was naval action, that the Navy knew about it.” The pilot, in all likelihood, was viewing flares fired from Indianapolis survivors in life rafts—enough to give the appearance of a naval battle. This oversight exemplifies the need for communication between the services.

Survivors were accidentally spotted around noon on 2 August, 84 hours after entering the water, when Lieutenant (j.g.) Wilbur Gwinn, the pilot of a Lockheed PV-1 twin-engine patrol bomber, spotted an oil slick while adjusting a malfunctioning antenna. He dropped altitude and followed the oil slick thinking that he had discovered a damaged Japanese submarine or cargo ship. Instead, he identified around 30 heads bobbing within the oil and a separate group of about 150 individuals. Not knowing who the survivors were, but suspecting that they were American, the PV-1 dropped a sonar buoy and a life raft. Gwinn also requested a rescue ship and air support. A relief PV-1 and a PBY Catalina were en route from Palau to the scene within an hour, along with several fast vessels. At 1520, the PBY arrived on the scene and its pilot, Lieutenant Adrian Marks, decided to make a risky water landing—partially due to witnessing sharks feeding on remains in the water. Marks used his plane as a rescue ship, ferrying between groups of survivors and pulling those most in need of rescue inside the plane and onto its wings. Destroyer escort Cecil J. Doyle (DE-368), commanded by future Secretary of Navy, Lieutenant Commander Graham Claytor Jr., arrived to survivors around 0000 3 August. Claytor saw air rescue operations and flares in his two hour approach to the scene and made the decision to illuminate the sky with the ship’s search light to provide rescue planes his location and to give men in the water hope—a dangerous move in waters with potential enemy submarines. Three more ships arrived in the early morning hours of 3 August. It was not until these ships started pulling in survivors that they learned they were rescuing the crew of Indianapolis. Captain McVay’s group was among the last to be picked up shortly after 1300 on 3 August, as the wind pushed their rafts considerably further north of the floating men. McVay did not realize that any of his crew, outside of those in his group, had survived until he saw the rescue operations underway to his south. Almost immediately, he conveyed to his rescuers the fact that he was not zigzagging when sunk.

Three hundred-sixteen of the ship’s final complement survived. The Hiroshima A-Bomb, for which Indianapolis delivered components to Tinian, was dropped 6 August as survivors convalesced in Naval Base Hospital No. 20 Peleliu and Fleet Hospital No. 114 Samar. Japan surrendered on 15 August, bringing a close to WWII. Public release of the Indianapolis loss was set to occur approximately 48 hours after the last condolence letter went in the mail to family; this was intended to ensure that all next-of-kin would learn the news prior to the public. This administrative decision unfortunately led to the public release of Indianapolis coinciding with news of Japan’s surrender on 15 August. A court of inquiry to investigate the sinking and assign responsibility convened 13–20 August in Guam under the direction of Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Chester Nimitz. After hearing testimony from Captain McVay, other survivors, and port authorities from Guam and Leyte, the court recommended that McVay face trial by court-martial for hazarding his ship by not zigzagging and for failure to issue the call to “abandon ship” in a timely manner. Furthermore, the port director at Leyte was to receive a letter of admonition, and disciplinary actions for communications officers of Task Force 95.7, which Indianapolis was to join in Leyte, were recommended. CINCPACFLT Nimitz disagreed with the court’s findings regarding McVay. He suggested that Captain McVay be given only a letter of reprimand. Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations, and James Forrestal, Secretary of Navy, uncharacteristically went against the recommendation of McVay’s operational commander. Admiral King believed that there were many “sins of omission” that contributed to the large loss of life in the Indianapolis sinking, but that Captain McVay’s failure to resume zigzagging, or to take specific measures for his officer on deck to do so if visibility improved, directly violated U.S. Fleet Tactical Orders and required formal trial.

McVay’s trial was held in the first week of December 1945 on the 3rd deck of Building 57 on the Washington Navy Yard in rooms overlooking Leutze Park. Captain McVay was convicted of negligence, hazarding his ship by not zigzagging, despite testimony from I-58 Commander Hashimoto during that trial that the maneuver would have had no impact on the outcome. He was acquitted on the charge of failing to issue “abandon ship” in a timely manner. The court’s board unanimously recommended that Captain McVay’s sentence of a loss of 100 lineal numbers to his temporary grade of captain and his permanent grade of commander be remitted due to his outstanding service record. Admiral King and Secretary Forrestal concurred. McVay was convicted but received no sentence. The Navy Department’s 23 February 1946 press release regarding McVay’s conviction and remittance of his sentence clearly stated that the captain was “neither charged with, nor tried, for losing” his ship. The remittance of the sentence further added to the controversy aroused by future researchers into the subject. Emotion and misunderstanding of Navy tradition have falsely caused the public to view McVay as the Navy’s scapegoat. The mixed-message of the conviction with no punishment ultimately hurt the Navy’s reputation and ruined the career of a fine officer. McVay would never command at sea again, but he returned to service and was promoted to the rank of rear admiral upon retirement in 1949.

The Navy addressed many of the contributing factors for the loss of life at sea immediately after the 2–3 August rescue. Escorts became a requirement for all U.S. ships with crew of 500 or more. Additionally, the misinterpreted reporting procedure was remedied. It became a requirement for any U.S. ship five hours overdue to be immediately reported and procedures for better ship movement reports initiated. The discretion for zigzagging given to captains sailing the Pacific waters was taken away, and all combatant ships were directed to zigzag at all times. Captain McVay also advocated for life-saving equipment improvements. He urged the Navy to provide parachute flares in emergency kits, to adopt a life preserver with a pocket containing freshwater, for dull colored life rafts to be replaced with bright yellow ones, and for the susceptible wooden water breakers to be replaced with watertight metal ones—just to name a few.

Captain McVay’s conviction and the remittance of his sentence did not close the story of Indianapolis. McVay’s suicide in 1968 and the 1975 Jaws monologue strongly emphasizing the role of sharks in the survivors’ ordeal brought increased public attention and dramatic flair to the sinking and the Navy’s treatment of Captain McVay. Authors in the following decades wrote books on Indianapolis focusing not on the ship’s decorated service, but primarily on conspiracies. McVay was cast as the Navy’s scapegoat in a broader effort to cover its own shortfalls. Unconfirmable claims of received and ignored distress signals from Indianapolis surfaced. Released ULTRA intelligence showing the Navy’s awareness of Japanese submarine activity along Route Peddie falsely ignited accusations that the Navy intentionally put Indianapolis in danger. Discrepancies in Japanese submarine I-58’s final Kaiten count in comparison with claimed deployments of Kaiten raised questions of a Japanese attempt to cover up the use of suicide torpedoes in the attack on Indianapolis. Public interest in the sinking peaked in the late 1990s when Florida middle school student Hunter Scott received national attention for a History Day project, supported by survivors, geared toward the exoneration of Captain McVay. The project sparked congressional interest.

In 2001, a joint congressional resolution was passed and signed into law by President Clinton expressing that evidence made available since McVay’s conviction effectively cleared the captain of responsibility for the loss of his ship and recommended that a Presidential Unit Commendation (PUC) be given to the final crew of Indianapolis. Legally, the 1945 conviction could not be overturned by the contemporary Navy. The only alteration to the case that a sitting SECNAV could make would be the remittance of McVay’s sentence—something already done by SECNAV Forrestal immediately after the trial. A presidential pardon of McVay would similarly only take away a sentence already remitted. The President is the only individual who could conceivably overturn McVay’s conviction—this would be precedent breaking, considered beyond the scope of presidential authority, and largely ceremonial. Such a ceremonial pardon already took place when Secretary of Navy Gordon England ordered that the joint congressional resolution clearing McVay of blame be placed in McVay’s official file in 2001. In the same year, the Navy Awards Board determined that the crew of Indianapolis did not meet the criteria for a PUC, but their actions in the delivery of the atomic bomb components from 16–26 July 1945 did merit a Navy Unit Commendation (NUC). No official Navy presentation ceremony of the NUC to survivors took place, as survivor animosity toward Navy leadership remained heightened.

The year 2016 marked the 71st anniversary of the sinking and another spike in public attention on the loss—including a big screen adaptation of the story, talk of future films, documentaries, and planned expeditions to locate the wreckage of the warship. Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC) revisited the sinking to make sure that an accurate history was made available to the public, to offer lessons learned from the tragedy to the Navy, and to properly commemorate the sacrifices of the crew. These efforts contributed to the discovery of the ship in August 2017.

In this book appear primary source documents that tell the story of the Indianapolis, its sinking, rescue efforts, investigations, aftermath, and continuing commemoration efforts. These documents have been drawn primarily from United States Navy records and represent a selection of available material. These contemporary documents will permit readers to investigate the story of Indianapolis for themselves, to draw their own conclusions, and to identify topics for further research. Many of the documents in this volume appear for the first time, such as the deck log of a hitherto unidentified landing ship, tank (LST). Research in the course of preparing this volume led to the identification of LST-779, and its deck logs enable a better knowledge of Indianapolis’s location when she was sunk. Other documents that appear in this volume likewise help us better understand this tragic event.

Much has been published on the Indianapolis disaster. Inevitably, errors and misinterpretations have crept into the now-standard accounts—exaggerated claims of faulty intelligence, an elaborate Navy cover-up, misunderstandings of the atomic bomb mission, and a sensationalized focus on the presence of sharks in the story. The documents here correct some of those errors and allow readers to see how the event unfolded and how the Navy responded. More importantly, it makes widely available the testimony of survivors and participants. It is hoped that the documents here will spark a greater interest in the service of Indianapolis and her crew. This volume also stands as a small example of the Navy’s moral obligation to ensure that the sacrifices of all those who served are not forgotten by telling the complete history—good and bad.

* The Navy’s official number of survivors, established days after the rescue and endorsed by Captain McVay, is 316 (see document Summary of Final Crew, page xv). This figure was determined by counting the living crewmembers convalescing at two Navy hospitals at Samar and Peleliu and cross checking them with a final ship’s roster recreated in Pearl Harbor after the rescue concluded. The incorrect inclusion of Radio Technician Second Class Clarence William Donnor as a passenger on the final roster created a longstanding discrepancy in the final casualty numbers. Donnor was not actually on the ship when she sank. However, when it was determined that he had not died on Indianapolis, he was incorrectly labeled as an Indianapolis survivor. This mistake led some to believe that there were 317, not 316 survivors. Document 4.6 in Chapter 4 clears up the discrepancy. Donnor’s exclusion from the historic survivors list makes the 316 number correct, but his inclusion on the Navy’s 1945 list of those killed and those onboard makes those figures off by one, respectively. The longstanding confusion surrounding the final number of casualties is further evidence of the chaotic nature of the loss and the tragedy that crew, their families, and friends still live with. A comprehensive list of all onboard and their disposition following the conclusion of rescue operations is presented in the back matter of this volume.

CHAPTER ONE

Returning to the Forward Area: Atom Bomb Delivery and the Final Voyage

The U.S. Navy recorded Captain McVay’s oral history on 27 September 1945, two months after his ship delivered atomic bomb components to Tinian. In this extract from the interview, Captain McVay describes how damage sustained in the pre-invasion of Okinawa positioned his ship for the top secret delivery mission. McVay additionally provided information regarding transit to Tinian and the first day of the routine voyage to Leyte and the forward area of the war.

Document 1.1: Oral History of Captain Charles B. McVay III, Describing Delivery of A-Bomb Components [Extract]

The Indianapolis had come to the Navy Yard, Mare Island in early May 1945, to get heavy underwater damage repaired from a Kamikaze hit that she took off Okinawa on 30 March [31 March]. We had more time there than anticipated and knew that we were due back in the forward area at the earliest practical date.

On about 12 July, I got orders which indicated that we had to perform some special mission, so that we knew that we would not be able to take our usual refresher course on the west coast, but had been told we would receive that in the forward area. On 15 July, I was in San Francisco, and talked with Admiral Purnell and Captain Parsons[1] who I know were connected in an intimate way with a secret project, but I did not know what this project was. I was informed at that time that when we were ready for sea on 16 July, we would proceed as fast as possible to the forward area. On Sunday, the 15th of July, about noon, we were at Hunters Point and they put on us what we now know was the Atomic Bomb.[2]

We sailed from San Francisco, 0800 the morning of 16th July. We ran into a little rough weather outside Golden Gate, so the first day we only made 28 knots. The next two days we made 29 knots and we discovered when we arrived in Pearl that we had established a new record from Faralons Light Ship to Diamond Head.[3] The old record, which is given in the World Almanac of 1944, was established by the Omaha in 1932 when she made a trip which took 75.4 hours. We made the trip in 74 1/2 hours.

When I arrived at Pearl, I knew the approximate date that I had to get out in the Marianas and since we were able to reach that area in within a week prior to the time that I knew I had to arrive, I said that I would make from Pearl to the Marianas a speed of 24 knots at which I would arrive out at Tinian the morning of the 26th. We made this sustained speed without any difficulty so that we arrived in Tinian the morning of 26 July and unloaded the material and the bomb which was later to be dropped over Hiroshima.

We left Tinian immediately upon unloading and went to Guam, an overnight trip, where we arrived the next morning and went through the usual antiaircraft practices. We got into Guam around 1000. We replenished ammunition, stores and fuel and left Guam Saturday morning[4] at about 0930. We were given a routing from Port Director, Guam, and a speed which we were told to maintain except under conditions which we thought we had to make a greater speed in order to avoid either navigational or other obstructions.

We had no incidents whatsoever. We passed an LST[5] headed toward Leyte, as we were also, on Sunday,[6] and talked to them. They were north of us and they were preparing to go further north in order to get out of our area to do some antiaircraft shooting. My instructions from Guam called for me to make an SOA[7] of 15.7 knots and to arrive at Leyte at 1100 Tuesday, 31 July.

Source: TR; Extract from “Oral History of Charles B. McVay III, Captain USN,” recorded 27 September 1945, transcribed 1 October 1945, 34 pp. Copy of original in Indianapolis Ship History Files, Naval History and Heritage Command Archives, Washington Navy Yard.

The damage suffered in the kamikaze attack off Okinawa on 31 March 1945 placed Indianapolis on its fateful trajectory. The repairs necessitated by the damage put Indianapolis at Mare Island in July 1945 and in a position to be the ship to deliver the atomic bomb components. The experience of the attack also informed Captain McVay’s reaction to the torpedo hits that sank his ship; the previous kamikaze attack gave him a sense of how his ship reacted to heavy damage below the waterline. Indianapolis arrived at Mare Island for repairs on 3 May 1945, and they were completed 13 July 1945.

Document 1.2: Report of War Damage to Indianapolis off Okinawa 31 March 1945 [Extracts]

4. On 31 March 1945, Indianapolis was in column astern the Salt Lake City, distance about 1000 Yards, closing to take station 600 yards astern Salt Lake City. Condition I was set in the AA battery. At 0708, a single enemy fighter plane, an “Oscar,”[8] was sighted emerging from a low overhanging cloud in an almost vertical dive slightly on the starboard side of the ship. The plane was apparently headed for the ship in a suicide dive, probably aimed at the bridge. Eight 20mm guns were brought into action, but the time was so short that only five of them had time to empty their magazines before the plane crashed on the port side of the main deck aft, at frame 112–113, at the edge of the waterway. The plane probably was out of control before it struck, as tracers were seen to enter the plane. Just before striking the main deck, the plane’s left wing tip struck the floater net rack on the splinter shield of the aft 20mm gun platform and this shock probably caused the bomb or bombs to release. The bomb causing the major damage pierced the main deck plating before the plane struck. Measurements indicated that this bomb probably was carried under the plane’s left wing. It is possible that there was a second bomb under the plane’s right wing, as several witnesses reported hearing a second explosion. If this was the case, it is probable that the second bomb was released at the same time as the first and went harmlessly over the side. Immediately after the plane crashed on the deck, it toppled overboard into the sea and there was a deadened sound as the bomb or bombs exploded. A column of oil and water shot up through the deck and covered the main deck aft with a layer of fuel oil, sea water and some gasoline from the plane’s tanks. Fortunately there was no fire, but the ruptured compartments flooded almost immediately. The ship soon reached its maximum draft and list, and inspection revealed the water-tight boundaries of the damaged area to be holding. With the flooding controlled it was decided there was no immediate danger and the ship proceeded to Kerama Retto where emergency repairs were made by USS Clamp (ARS 33).

[...]

8. The plane’s port bomb, estimated to have been a 500 lb., AP, delayed-action fuze type bomb,[9] pierced the main deck at the same place as the plane’s motor. From [a photograph] it is apparent that the bomb penetrated the main deck before the plane’s engine struck, as the bomb hole may be seen in the plating which was subsequently ruptured by the engine. The bomb passed through the 25 lb. HTS main deck plating and entered compartment D-201-L, crew’s quarters, destroying a diving gear locker. The bomb then pierced the 25 lb. HTS second deck plating, 39” forward of bulkhead 114 and 43” inboard of the ship’s shell, making a circular hole about 13” in diameter, and entered crew’s mess, D-301-L. Beneath the second deck the bomb struck a 5” fuel oil overboard discharge line, damaging the line and deflecting the bomb forward. The bomb continued through D-301-L, pierced the 9 lb. MS first platform deck, entered fuel oil tank D-6-F, passed through this tank and out through the 30 lb. MS plating of “F” strake at frame 112. As the bomb cleared the ship, the delayed-action fuze finally took effect and detonation occurred just outside[10] of the shell plating.

9. The effect of the underwater detonation of the bomb was that of a small torpedo. Much of the force of the explosion was transmitted back into the ship through the hole from which the bomb had emerged, blowing the edges of the bomb hole inward and increasing the size of the hole to approximately four by five feet...

[…]

13. General flexure of the ship was noted. No important damage resulted to the ship’s structure, but all three ship’s airplanes were damaged by shock. The starboard airplane was knocked off its catapult to the quarter deck and the port plane was knocked askew on its catapult, badly damaging both planes. The third plane, which was parked on the quarter deck, on the ship’s centerline, was damaged when the starboard plane fell on it. Both catapults were damaged. The starboard catapult had the outboard and inboard catwalk distorted and life lines and stanchions in the amidships section bent and torn away. The port catapult also had life lines and stanchions damaged. After minor repairs by the ship’s force, both catapults were put back in operation. The whip of the foremast damaged some radar equipment, and spring bearings and No. 2 HP air compressor suffered shock damage.

14. From April 1 to 7 the Indianapolis was given temporary repairs by Clamp (ARS 33). Patches were welded on the main deck, blown up plating on the first platform was cut away and temporary stiffeners were installed. Soft patches were placed over the holes in the hull by divers and concrete was poured in the interior. Indianapolis patched the bomb hole in the second deck with its own velocity power tool. Later Indianapolis proceeded to Guam where repair forces chipped out the concrete and removed soft patches with the intent of replacing them with steel plate, but this was found to be impractical and the soft patches and concrete were replaced. Soon after, Indianapolis proceeded to Navy Yard, Mare Island for permanent repairs.

Source: TDS; Extracts from “Report of War Damage to USS Indianapolis, Okinawa 31 March 1945,” Enclosure in Commandant Navy Yard Mare Island to Bureau of Ships, 7 August 1945, signed by A. O. Gieselmann, Planning Officer. War Damage Reports, RG 19, Entry P1, Boxes 30–31, NARA II. Sections omitted provide detailed analysis of structural damage caused by bomb. References to specific photos of bomb damage contained in the report have been removed.

Figure 1-1. Hole in main deck caused by Japanese bomb at Frame 114 port side.

Photograph taken by Indianapolis (CA-35) ship photographer Alfred Sedivi. BUSHIPS War Damage Reports, RG 19, Boxes 30–31, NARA II, College Park, MD. Declassified, Authority [NND960035]

Figure 1-2. Indianapolis (CA-35) Chaplain Thomas Conway conducts funeral services for crewmen killed by kamikaze attack off Okinawa while the ship is anchored at Kerama Retto for repair. Three burial services were held for the nine Sailors. Their bodies were recovered in stages as water was pumped from flooded compartments. The service for one Sailor was held at 1730 on 31 March, a service for six at 1600 on 1 April, and for two at 0800 on 2 April. The funeral service pictured above is for the six crewmen on 1 April, Easter Sunday. All bodies were removed from Indianapolis for burial on Zamami Jima. Captain McVay considered this incident his ship’s bloodbath, and he felt confident that all crew present for it had learned the hard realities of war and stood ready to respond to damage in the future.

Courtesy of United States Naval Institute—A. J. Sedivi Collection

Figure 1-3. The damaged Indianapolis (CA-35) at Kerama Retto, Ryuku Islands, photograph dated 2 April 1945. Indianapolis is listing noticeably and water is being pumped from starboard aft. According to the Indianapolis’s deck logs, from 0300–0600 on 2 April the ship fired more than 300 rounds from its 20mm and 40mm guns at enemy aircraft operating in the area. At 0800, burial services were held for the final two crewman recovered from flooded compartments below deck. At 0855, shortly after the morning burial services, a kamikaze splashed into the water approximately 5,000 yards from a CVE. The photo was taken from New Mexico (BB-40) and YMS-327 is forward of Indianapolis. LCT-1414 is approaching Indianapolis starboard to replenish her spent ammunition. Indianapolis is anchored for repairs prior to her return to Mare Island, San Francisco, for her final overhaul. She arrived at Kerama Retto under her own power on 31 March at 1221, escorted by Twiggs (DD-591). Clamp (ARS-33) moored alongside Indianapolis to port after arriving to assist with repairs.

Navy Photograph 80-G-316816, NARA II, College Park, MD

This 14 July 1945 intelligence dispatch from the headquarters of Commander-in-Chief Pacific, Pearl Harbor had the highest security classification, top secret ULTRA. As such, the intelligence was held closely and only distributed to a select number of individuals on the staffs of Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-in-Chief Pacific, then to subordinate commands on a strictly need-to-know basis. Because ULTRA was one of the United States’ most closely guarded secrets during the war, intelligence derived from it would only be used if the information might affect operational-level decisions. Routine wartime operations could not receive ULTRA intelligence due to the risk of the Japanese learning that their codes had been broken. This dispatch indicated that the U.S. Navy was aware that Japan planned to deploy four submarines armed with suicide Kaiten torpedoes for offensive action against Allied forces operating in the Philippine Sea.

Document 1.3: ULTRA Dispatch Outlining Japanese Submarine Operations Between Leyte Gulf and Okinawa

14 July 1945

From: CINCPAC PEARL

For Action: All Holders 35-S[11]

Information: CINCPAC ADV. HDQTRS., CTF 77, CINCAFPAC, COMSEVENTHFLT

Precedence: OP OP OP

Submarine I-53 departing Bungo Channel 141700 for patrol station midway between Leyte Gulf and Okinawa. This is first of 4 subs which have been directed sortie western inland sea for offensive patrols against Blue Shipping[12] and for reconnaissance. This is ULTRA. Following are available details regarding other three. I-58 departing (18th) for patrol in vicinity position 500 miles north of (Palau?). I-47 and I-367 depart 19th for patrol on line between Okinawa and Marianas. The former 355 miles from Okinawa and latter (450?) miles from Marianas. All subs carry 5–6 human torpedoes probably on deck and probably in addition to regular torpedoes. In apparent effort increase effectiveness anti-sub operations in Tsugaru-Soya Straits area all magnetic detector equipped planes of Saeki Air Group directed 10 July proceed Ominato and report to Comdr. Ominato Guard District Escort Force. Evidence 12th that radars urgently requested for 30 Jills of Night Torpedo Attack Unit of Air Group 131 believed at Katori.[13]

Source: TDC; “ULTRA Extracts,” Photocopies in USS Indianapolis file, Box 396B, Naval History and Heritage Command Archives, WNY. Originals from COMNAVSECGRU File 5830/114.

Figure 1-4. Japanese Submarine I-58 is prepared for scuttling, off Sasebo, Japan, during Operation Road’s End, 1 April 1946.

Official U.S. Navy Photograph, now in the collections of the U.S. National Archives, NHHC Photo, 80-G-260244

Atomic bomb components for Little Boy, the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, were loaded onto Indianapolis on 15 July, and the ship departed with them the morning of 16 July. The plan of the day for the departure day from Captain McVay’s submission of final deck logs to the Chief of Naval Personnel provided a sense of the activity on the ship prior to departing on its top-secret mission.

Document 1.4: Indianapolis Plan of the Day for 16 July

PLAN OF THE DAY FOR MONDAY 16 JULY 1945 ROUTINE AS PER SECTION 51 and then SECTION 55 SHIP’S ORGANIZATION BOOK.

0530 Reveille.

0600 Breakfast. Secure patrols.

0630 Shore Leave and Liberty expires on board for Port Watch.

-Shift into the Uniform of the Day (topside personnel):

Officers – complete uniform

Enlisted men – undress Blues, blue-dyed hats.

0645 Make preparations for getting underway. Be prepared for high speed.

-Hoist in #1 Station Wagon upon its return.

0645 U. S. Guard Mail and OM trip to Yard.

0730 Division Officers report Readiness for Sea to First Lieutenant.

0730 Station Special Sea Details. Set Condition of Readiness III, Material Condition Y (Modified).

0800 Quarters for muster and getting underway.

Division Officers conduct sight muster.

0800 Underway, assisted by NYD tugs and pilot and NYD line handling party.

0830 (About) Retreat from quarters.

0830 Turn to.

0930 Gunnery Dept. issue binoculars and helmets, Control Aft.

1030 Set Condition I in the Anti-Aircraft Batteries.

1100 Commence BAKER firing runs, 5” Battery.

1130 Commence GEORGE firing runs, 5” and automatics.

1135 Mess Gear.

1150 Pipe to noon-day meal.

1200 Commence TARE firing runs, 5” and automatics.

1220 Relieve the watch.

1230 Commence UNCLE firing runs, 5” and automatics.

1300 Completion of firing. Resume Condition III in AA batteries.

1300 Noon-day meal for AA Batteries.

1300 Turn to. Ship’s work.

1400 Gunnery Dep’t. Officers report to Wardroom for lecture by Gunnery Officer.

1445 Censors assemble in Wardroom.

1500 All Main Battery firecontrolmen report to Control for instruction (C Gunner Harrison).

1500 Radarmen (off watch) report to Radar Aft for telephone talker instruction (Lt. Jenney).

1500 After Ammo. Supply Party report to #3 mess hall for instruction (Lt. jg) Ullman.

1600 Division Officers assemble in Wardroom (Executive Officer).

1600 Gunnery Dept. issue pistols, armory.

1630 Pipe sweepers.

1655 Mess Gear.

1715 Pipe to supper.

1900 Retard clocks one hour to zone plus 8.

1930 (About) Sunset. Darken ship.

1945 Eight o’clock reports.

Notes:

1. Examinations for advancement in rating will be conducted tomorrow. See note 7 of 14 July Plan of the Day.

2. It is imperative that the expenditure of fresh water be reduced.

[signed J. Flynn]
J. A. FLYNN
Commander, U.S.N.
Executive Officer.

Source: TDSC; “July Plans of the Day from Deck Logs for USS Indianapolis” submitted to Chief of Naval Personnel by Captain McVay 10 October 1945, transcribed 1 October 1945, signed by J. A. Flynn, CDR, USN [USS Indianapolis, Executive Officer]. RG 24, Deck Logs, NARA II. Cover page notes that smooth deck logs for July could not be reconstructed because rough deck logs and quartermaster’s notebooks were lost with the vessel.

In the official U.S. Army history of the Manhattan Project, historian Vincent C. Jones described the delivery of the atomic bomb components from Los Alamos, New Mexico, to the waiting Indianapolis: “Most of [Little Boy’s] components and the U-235 had left Los Alamos in mid-July in the custody of Maj. Robert R. Furman, a special projects officer from Maj. Gen. Leslie Grove’s Washington headquarters and Capt. James F. Nolan, chief medical officer at the New Mexico installation. They traveled by automobile from Santa Fe to Albuquerque, by airplane to Hamilton Field near San Francisco, thence to Hunters Point to board the cruiser Indianapolis.” Lieutenant Lewis Haynes, the Medical Officer aboard Indianapolis described the circumstances of the A-bomb components being loaded onto the ship and the delivery mission in the extract from his oral history with historians from the Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED).

Document 1.5: Oral History with Captain (Ret.) Lewis Haynes, MC, USN [Extract]

Figure 1-5. Lieutenant Lewis Haynes.

Photograph courtesy of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED)

[...][14]

Anyway, I went back to Connecticut and saw my family then came back to Mare Island when our repairs were completed. Then we were supposed to go on our post repair trial run. But instead, on July 15th, we were ordered to go to Hunter’s Point in San Francisco, where we anchored. Hunter’s Point was also a busy naval shipyard. After getting underway, we all went up to the bridge and Capt. McVay told us we were going to dock at Hunter’s Point and take on some cargo.

We went alongside the pier and I was amazed to notice that there was a quiet, almost dead Navy Yard. Two big trucks came alongside. One truck had a bunch of men aboard. They came aboard the ship including two Army officers, Capt. [James F.] Nolan and Maj. [Robert R.] Furman. I found out later that Nolan was a medical officer. I don’t know what his job was, probably to monitor radiation. The other truck contained a big crate which was almost the size of this room which was loaded by crane and put in the port hangar. And I noticed of the men who came aboard, when I filled out their health records, some went to every division on the ship. When we got to Pearl, they all left. Two men carried another container, a canister about 3 feet tall and about 2 feet square up to Adm. Spruance’s cabin where they welded it to the deck. I had that thing welded to the deck above my cabin for the 10 days. Later on, I found out that this was the bomb core and the large box in the hangar contained the device for firing the bomb, bringing the two pieces together to form the critical mass.

We stayed tied up to the pier until after we got this cargo on board. Then we pulled away from the pier and anchored out off Hunter’s Point. This was July 16th. What we were really waiting for, I found out later, was for them to explode the bomb at Alamogordo to see if it worked.[15] And after the bomb was exploded at 4 o’clock in the morning, we got dispatch orders to proceed. As we got underway, Capt. McVay called us to the bridge again and he told us we were on a special mission. “I can’t tell you what the mission is. I don’t know myself but I’ve been told that every day we take off the trip is a day off the war.” Later, Maj. Furman came into my hospital bed on Guam, sat down on the bed and told me about it. He told me that they only had the one bomb of the type “Little Boy” was. The Little Boy type bomb had two portions of uranium at both ends of a tunnel with charges at each end. The fission was created by firing the charges simultaneously and bringing the two halves of the softball together at the center under great force.

Capt. McVay told us that his orders were that if we had an “abandon ship,” what was in the admiral’s cabin was to be placed in a boat before anybody else. That was our priority. McVay told us this in a staff meeting.

Did you know what the cargo was?

I had no idea. I don’t think Capt. McVay knew. We had all kinds of guesses as to what the cargo was. I had additional duty as medical officer on Adm. Spruance’s staff. The day we left I signed a dispatch as a member of the staff, which went only to the staff. It was addressed to all commanders and said that the Indianapolis was under the command of the Commander in Chief. Of course, that was Harry S. Truman. The ship was not to be diverted from her mission for any reason whatsoever, which meant that we could sail through a battle and the commander couldn’t take us there. From that point on I said, “My God, what have we got that’s under the control of the president?” And I talked to Capt. McVay and he talked to us officers. We discussed what it might be and he thought it might have something to do with bacteriological warfare. I don’t think he really knew that it was part of the atomic bomb.

Anyway, by the time we hit the Farallon Islands we were making 33 knots. The Indianapolis still holds the ship’s speed record from San Francisco to Pearl Harbor.

Normally, when you went into Pearl Harbor during the war, you had to take your turn going in. There were ships going in and out of the harbor. The harbor was very busy. As we came around the entrance to go toward the submarine net there were all these ships—carriers and everything else sitting out there not doing anything.

We had a straight run in. The net was open. Normally, there were boats tooting at each other and motor whaleboats and everything going back and forth. That harbor was deserted. We went alongside the dock and I told the executive officer that I wanted to transfer a man who had fractured his leg to the hospital. He said that no one was to leave the ship. I insisted that the man should be in the hospital. He had a fractured ankle which was in a cast. He repeated that nobody was to leave the ship.

We were tied up for 6 hours, refueled and went out. The harbor was still empty and as we went through the gate and left, all the ships that had been waiting as we went in were still floating out there waiting for their turn. Then I really knew that what we had aboard was awfully important.

After we left Pearl Harbor heading for Tinian, one of the crewmembers, a man named [RdM3 Harold J.] Schechterle, developed acute appendicitis and so Mel Modisher, my junior medical officer and I took his appendix out. Schechterle was one tough boy. I did the appendectomy under regional block because we couldn’t get the spinal to work. It was a red hot, acute appendix. When I finished sewing him up, I said to Schechterle, “OK, Schechterle, you can go back to your bunk now.” He sat up and said okay and swung his legs over the side of the table and we all laughed and helped him get to his bunk in sick bay. The day before we were sunk he asked to be returned to his own bunk which was a good thing because everyone in sick bay was killed by the explosions. Schechterle abandoned ship, was 4 days and 5 nights in the water and survived.

It was just a straight run to Tinian at as much speed as they could economically go, which I think was about 25 or 26 knots. Everybody was at Condition Able which was 4 hours on, 4 hours off. It was like going into battle the whole way out. The trip from San Francisco to Tinian took a total of 10 days.

When we got to Tinian we went into the harbor and anchored. All these LCIs came out and as they took our special cargo aboard I noticed there were a couple of general officers handling these crates like they were a bunch of stevedores. They were Air Force officers. Then again, I was sure we had something important.

How long did it take to unload all this stuff?

It didn’t take long. And after we unloaded it we immediately got underway and headed for Guam. It was at Guam that we got our orders. I thought we were going to go back to Pearl to pick up Adm. Spruance. Instead, we were ordered to the Philippines for training exercises preparing for the invasion of Kyushu.

[…]

Source: TR; Extract of “Oral History with Capt. (Ret.) Lewis Haynes, MC, USN, U.S. Navy Medical Department Oral History Program,” interview conducted by Jan K. Herman, Historian, 5, 12, 22 June 1995, BUMED Archives. The remainder of the interview deals with Haynes’ naval experience prior to and after the Indianapolis sinking. He also covers in detail his experience during the torpedo attack, the sinking, and his time in the water. For more on the Manhattan Project, see Vincent C. Jones, United States Army in World War II, Special Studies, Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1985).

Figure 1-6. Nuclear weapon of the “Little Boy” type, the kind detonated over Hiroshima, Japan, in World War II. The bomb was 28 inches in diameter and 120 inches long. It weighed about 9,000 pounds and had a yield equivalent to approximately 20,000 tons of high explosives. Indianapolis (CA-35) delivered the components for Little Boy to Tinian where it was assembled.

Courtesy of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, NHHC Photo Collection, NH 123862

The following ULTRA dispatches from 18 and 19 July 1945 confirmed the 14 July intelligence report that Japanese submarines were deploying for offensive action in the Northwest Pacific. Submarine I-58 left the Inland Sea of Japan through the Bungo Strait and entered the Pacific on 19 July, a day behind schedule, due to problems with some of its Kaiten periscopes. I-58, along with I-47, I-53, and I-367, had orders to patrol the Allied shipping lanes between Leyte, Saipan, Okinawa, Guam, Palau, and Ulithi.

Documents 1.6 and 1.7: ULTRA Dispatch Reporting Departure of Japanese Submarines for Offensive Actions and the Departure of I-58.

18 July 1945

From: CINCPAC Pearl

For Action: All Holders 35 S, COMINCH

Information: CINCPAC, CINCAFPAC, COM 7th FLEET, CTF 77

Precedence: OP OP OP

This is ULTRA. Submarines I-47 and I-367 depart east entrance Bungo channel 19 July at 1930 and 2000 respectively for offensive patrols against Blue Shipping. Both will be stationed on line between Okinawa and Marianas. Former about 350 miles from Okinawa and latter about (450?) miles from Marianas and both equipped with human torpedoes. All detachments of Air Group 901 (Japan Sea Air Escort Air Group) were notified 16th that Blue Subs had not been detected in Japan Sea since 11 July. Evidence enemy found destruction of oil processing installations at Balikapapan unexpectedly difficult and discovered destruction by explosives more effective than burning. Evidence heavy damage inflicted in Kamaishi attack 14th with “enormous” damage to one unspecified factory and important machinery. Evidence 12 July transportation difficulties seriously hampering accumulation stockpiles of aviation fuel and ammunition in preparation for Operation Homeland.[16]

Source: TDC; “ULTRA Extracts,” Photocopies in USS Indianapolis file, Box 396B, Naval History and Heritage Command Archives, WNY. Originals from COMNAVSECGRU File 5830/114.

19 July 1945

From: CINCPAC Pearl

Action: All Holders 35 S, COMINCH

Information: CINCPAC ADV HQTRS, CINCAFPAC, COM 7th FLEET, CTF 77

Precedence: OP OP OP

This is ULTRA. Submarine I-58 equipped with human torpedoes departing eastern entrance Bungo Channel 191935 enroute patrol station about 500 miles north of (Palao?). Nil information on track except that after 210330 course will be 160. Submarines I-401 and I-400 departed Maizuru 18 July at 16[??] And 18[??] respectively arriving Ominato morning 20th. These subs comprise force to carry out “Arashi” Operation (attack on Ulithi anchorage involving use of six sub-borne aircraft). Departure date from Ominato unknown. Enemy planning lay mines off expected invasion beaches in homeland using new type mine especially designed against landing craft and laid in waters where depth is less than 15 meters (8.2 fathoms). Completion this mining in Kyushu Shikoku area planned by end of August and in unspecified sector of Tokyo area by end of September. Evidence 15 July Comdr 5th Air Fleet requested installation of searchlights on suicide attack planes.

Source: TDC; “ULTRA Extracts,” Photocopies in USS Indianapolis file, Box 396B, Naval History and Heritage Command Archives, WNY. Originals from COMNAVSECGRU File 5830/114.

The following three dispatches relate the scheduled course of Indianapolis from Tinian, Guam, and onward to Leyte. Upon arrival to Leyte on 31 July, Indianapolis was to report to CTG 95.7 for training prior to joining the armada of Vice Admiral Jesse Oldendorf, Commander Task Force 95, in preparation for an invasion of the Japanese home islands. Rear Admiral Lynde D. McCormick, Commander Task Group 95.7 was Admiral Oldendorf’s direct subordinate and anchored in Leyte aboard Idaho (BB-42). Dispatch 280032 notifying CTG 95.7 of Indianapolis’s departure from Guam and ETA at Leyte was received by McCormick, but the message stating that he was to arrange training was garbled and never decoded by his communications staff. In McCormick’s testimony at the Court of Inquiry into the Indianapolis loss, he explained that his training group departed Leyte around 1000 31 July for two days of training. He expected Indianapolis to be waiting to join them when they returned to Leyte 2 August, but the ship was still not present.

Document 1.8: Dispatches Dealing with Indianapolis’s Routing, 26–28 July

26 July 1945

From: CINCPAC ADV HQ

Action: INDIANAPOLIS (CA 35)

Info: PD TINIAN, PD GUAM COMMARIANAS, CTF 95 CINCPAC PEARL, COM 5th FLT CTG 95.7

Precedence: Routine

Upon completion unloading Tinian report to Port Director for routing to Guam where disembark COM 5th Fleet Staff Personnel. Completion report to PD Guam for onward routing to Leyte where on arrival report CTF 95 by despatch for duty. CTG 95.7 directed arrange 10 days training for Indianapolis in Leyte Area.[17]

26 July, 1945/1021

From: PD Saipan 260918z

Action: PD Guam

Info: SCOMA, COMMARIANAS, CTG 94.10, CINC PAC ADV HQ

USS Indianapolis (CA 35) departs Tinian 26th 0830Z (GCT). SOA 10. 15 Miles west of Rambler. Destination Guam. ETA 262000Z. WP 32 QPF 31 QPH 119. Communications accord USF 70A and PAC 70B.[18]

28 July 1945

From: PD Guam

Action: SCOMA/PD TACLOBAN/CTG 95.7

Info: COM 5th FLEET, COMMARIANAS, CTF 95, COMPHILSEAFRON, CINCPAC BOTH, COMWESCAROLINES

Precedence: Priority

USS Indianapolis (CA 35) departed Guam 2300Z 27 July. SOA 15.7 knots. Route Peddie thence Leyte. ETA Position PG 2300Z July ETA Leyte 0200Z 31 July. Chop 30 July. QP 32 QPF 31 QPH 119 QH 5 QHA 37 QNH 35. USS Indianapolis guards NPM F.[19]

Source: TD; “Dispatches Dealing with Departure and Arrival of Indianapolis,” 26–28 July 1945. These were submitted as evidence to the Court of Inquiry convened to investigate the loss. In CINCPAC 1945 Flag Files, RG 38, Box 45, NARA II. The entire collection spans approximately 150 dispatches covering 26 July 1945–16 August 1945.

The correspondence from the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Oceans Area Estimates Section to the Advanced Headquarters of Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet on 27 July 1945, demonstrated attempts by U.S. intelligence officers to make sense of the information coming in to them. Notable in this exchange was the belief that submarine I-58 had been damaged or sunk days after departing the Bungo Strait. This estimate was made the day that Indianapolis received its routing instructions for the transit from Guam to Leyte. It is also worth noting that the intelligence chart showing submarine locations was not scheduled to arrive to Guam until the morning of 28 July. Indianapolis departed Apra Harbor in Guam approximately 0900 that very day.

Document 1.9: JICPOA Estimates of Japanese Submarine Locations and Belief that I-58 Was Sunk

27 July 1945

From: Lt. Comdr Johnson

To: Lt. Showers

Reference your 262. Do not RPT do not believe anti-submarine group presently working over I-47 assigned patrol station should be shifted because current contacts in that area probably authentic. Estimate this sub near 22-00NAN, 132-00EASY.

Review of submarine data and above contacts makes us now RPT now believe victim of plane attack off Anami Oshima on 21/22 July may be I-58. This sub departed Bungo at 1930/19 for estimated patrol station near 15-30NAN, 134-30EASY. Schedule called for a course of 160 degrees approximately 32 hours after sortie from Bungo, suggesting original course from Bungo was southwesterly. Projected course of 160 degrees from position of plane attack off Amami goes through estimated patrol stations of both I-47 and I-58. I-58 is considered a supply type sub which further confirms her identity as the victim.

I-400 and I-401 were originally scheduled to depart Maizuru on 17 July for Ominato. The despatch to which you referred was addressed to I-14 scheduled to depart Ominato at 1500/17 for Truk. Captain Carlson has reworked this despatch and it now RPT now reads: “will send documents for Truk by land leaving Maizuru morning of 17th”.

Submarine chart will be placed aboard Guam bound plane tomorrow morning.[20]

Source: TDC; Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Areas. United States Navy File of SIGTOT Messages From JICPOA Estimates Section to CINCPAC Advanced Headquarters, March–August 1945 [SRMD-005]. Located in Navy Department Library Special Collections, WNY.

Commander Johns Hopkins Janney, navigator of Indianapolis, received the following two documents, Routing Instructions and Intelligence Report, the evening before the ship’s departure for Leyte. The instructions were generated after routing officers discussed the transit with Captain McVay earlier in the day. McVay desired to arrive to Leyte at dawn because it was the best lighting for antiaircraft firing practice. This meant that Indianapolis could travel between 24–25 knots and arrive the morning of the 30th, or 15.7 knots and arrive the morning of the 31st. Having just completed a high-speed transit, McVay opted for the slower speed to rest his engines. He was notified that no escort ship was available for Indianapolis, but that the enemy threat in the area did not merit one. It would later be learned that additional enemy submarine intelligence gathered from top secret ULTRA was not included in this report due to security concerns and likely an incomplete picture of the actual submarine threat. As the previous intelligence dispatches demonstrate, estimates on Japanese submarine deployments remained vague or incorrect, reflecting the difficult task of intelligence work. The routing instructions provided a basic guide for getting from point A to B by a designated time, and the U.S. Navy left much to the discretion of the commander of a combatant ship during the transit.

Document 1.10: Routing Instructions and Intelligence Report for Indianapolis

PDG 1849

OFFICE OF THE PORT DIRECTOR

28 JULY 1945

/s/ J.H. Janney

From: Port Director, Guam.

To: Commanding Officer, USS Indianapolis (CA 35).

Subj: Routing Instructions.

Encl: (A) Intelligence Report. (B) Approach Instructions. (C) Flight Briefing Bulletin.

1.When in all respects ready for sea on or about 0900 King, 28 July, depart Apra Harbor, proceed Leyte via the following route positions:

Code Letter

Latitude

Longitude

MNG

13-35 N.

144-00 E.

BWV

13-14

143-00

CFL

12-30

138-00

DCM

11-44

132-30

EHO

11-06

128-05

PG

10-37

126-00

HN

10-41.5

125-40

Thence Leyte as directed by branch Port Director’s Office on Homonhon Island.

2.Speed of advance shall be at 15.7 knots. Distance to position PG 1123 miles. ETA 0800 I, 31 July. Distance Guam to ETA point (10-54 N. 125-20 E.) is 1171 miles. ETA 1100 I, 31 July.

3.Friendly submarines may be observed west and south of Guam in established haven and training areas; they will be escorted by surface vessels. Your route takes you clear of these areas.

4.See Intelligence Reports (Enclosures A and C) for information of our own and enemy forces.

5.Crossing and joining traffic may be encountered in the following areas:

a.Apra to 142-30 E.

b.138-30 E. to 137-30 E.

c.134-30 E. to 131-00 E.

d.127-00 E. to destination.

6.Commanding Officers are at all times responsible for the safe navigation of their ships. They may depart from prescribed routing when in their judgment, weather, currents, or other navigations hazards jeopardize the safety of the ship. They shall return to the prescribed route as soon as safety permits. Zigzag at discretion of the Commanding Officer.

7.A Fleet Unit Commander, while carrying out a movement, is authorized to originate supplementary messages when the military situation permits. These messages shall contain information of:

a.Breakdown.

b.Changes in orders or corrections of erroneous information.

c.Weather conditions or any circumstances which cause a deviation from schedule of more than 40 miles in controlled waters or delay in ETA of over (3) hours.

These messages shall be addressed (if approaching Philippine Islands) to Commander Philippine Sea Frontier.

8.Communications shall be conducted in accordance PAC 70 (B).

9.Port Director, Guam will make your departure report including Queen messages: QP 32, QPF 31, QPH 119, QN 5, QNA 37, QNH 35 held by you.

10.On arrival destroy these instructions; carry out basic orders incorporated in CinCPacAdvon 260152.

[Certified a True Copy, Signed, J.J. Waldron]

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SECTION[21] NOB, GUAM, M.I.

Intelligence Brief for GUAM to PHILIPPINES (This brief is a part of your secret routing instructions and merchant ships must turn in with same at next port of call.)

FOR: [Left Blank]

Date: 27 July 1945

The enemy held bases within approximately 300 miles of your route are as listed below. No enemy offensive activity from any of these bases has been reported in recent months unless specifically mentioned under this heading:

ROTA

14:09N

144:37E

WOIEAI

07:21N

143:53E

SOROL

08:08N

140:23E

YAP

09:31N

138:08E

BABELTHAUP

07:30N

134:34E

Enemy Submarine Contacts:

22 July – Sub sighted surfaced at 10:34N-132:47E at 0015K. Hunter-Killer ordered.

25 July – Unknown ship reports sighting a possible periscope at 13:56N-136:56E at 250800 K.

25 July – Sound contact reported at 10:30N-136:25E. Indications at that time pointed to doubtful submarine.

Enemy Surface Contacts:

None

Friendly Ship Movements:

It is impracticable to attempt to enumerate all the ship movements which might pass within visual range of your route, however, the positions at which your route crosses or approaches regular shipping lanes is indicated in your routing instructions.

General Information:

1.Friendly submarines are operating south and west of Guam and possibly in the vicinity of Ulithi. They should be escorted at all times when in the vicinity of these islands.

2.Several instances of floating mines have been reported in the Forward Area recently. A sharp lookout should be kept and a report made if any sighted.

3.Firing Notice – Guam:

a.There will be sleeve and drone AA firing practice from Agat between 1000-1500, danger area 12,000 yards to seaward, 235-305 degrees from Agat.

b.Until further notice, the area in the vicinity of Santa Rosa Reef, SW of Guam, as well as balance of area A-8, will be used as AA ships gunnery area.

4.Menace to Navigation:

PCE-898 sighted large floating palm stump with three feet above water at 260945Z in position 14:53N-132:48E.

[Certified a True Copy, Signed R.E. Orr, Intelligence Officer]

Source: TDS; “Routing Instructions for USS Indianapolis (CA-35),” Port Director Guam to Captain Charles B. McVay III, 28 July 1945, original signed by J. H. Janney, CDR, USN, Certified True Copy of Instruction signed by J. J. Waldron for W. F. Brooks and signed by R. E. Orr, Intelligence Officer, submitted as Exhibit in Court of Inquiry convened to investigate the loss. CINCPAC 1945 Flag Files, RG 38, Box 45, NARA II, College Park, MD.

Figure 1-7. Detail of segment of Indianapolis (CA-35) route from Guam to Leyte taken from Court of Inquiry Exhibit.

From “Indianapolis Court of Inquiry,” CINCPAC, Pacific Flag Files Screening Documents, RG 38, Box 45, NARA II, College Park, MD.

The 3400 section of Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine U.S. Fleet, USF 10A defined the tactical zigzag doctrine that U.S. naval commanders would follow during World War II. Captain McVay cited his understanding of this doctrine in the subsequent investigations and believed that the weather conditions and enemy submarine threat defined in 3410 did not meet the requirements for zigzagging the night of 29–30 July.

Document 1.11: U.S. Navy Zigzag Tactical Doctrine and Example of Pattern

3400. Zigzag.

3410. Ships and dispositions shall zigzag during good visibility; including bright moonlight, in areas where enemy submarines may be encountered, unless the accomplishment of the task assigned will be jeopardized by the reduced speed of advance, increased fuel consumption, or both.

3411. When the disposition as a whole is ordered to zigzag, each station unit including the guide station unit, will regulate without signal, its speed so as to make good the fleet speed along the fleet course.

3412. When the limiting speed of slow ships in the disposition prohibits their complying with paragraph 3411, the OTC[22] may either:

(a) Prescribe a new and slower fleet speed; or

(b) Prescribe the speed for the guide to take during the zigzag.

3420. Zigzag plans are contained in the following publications.

Plan 1, and Plans 3 to 10 inclusive – General Tactical Instructions.

Plans 19 to 26 inclusive – USF 10A

Plans 1Z to 43Z inclusive – Zigzag Diagrams, for Single Ships and Convoys, 1940.[23]

3421. For convenience, zigzag plan 1, and plans 3 to 10 inclusive, are reproduced in appendix 2 with plans 19 to 26.

3422. Zigzag plans should be selected primarily from considerations of submarine menace and size, shape and speed of disposition.

3430. Zigzagging by task organizations containing only U.S. naval vessels, or allied men-of-war regularly attached and equipped with U.S. naval tactical and signal publications, shall be in accordance with section 37, General Tactical Instructions, as excepted below, and the optional special rules given in paragraphs 3450 to 3459, regardless of the source of the zigzag plan.

[. . .][24]

Source: TD; Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine U.S. Fleet, USF 10A (U.S. Fleet: HQ of COMINCH, 1944). The omitted portion deals primarily with instructions for altering a zigzag course. And, Zig-Zag Diagrams for Single Ships and Convoys 1940 (London: Signal Department, Admiralty, 1940). Both available from Navy Department Library, WNY.

Figure 1-8. Zigzag Plan No. 5 from U.S. Fleet Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine (USF 10A, 1944). While the specific zigzag plan that Captain McVay used during the daylight hours of his final voyage is not known, this pattern serves as an example of a likely possibility. Plan No. 5 is very similar to Convoy Zigzag Plan No. 40Z from Zig-Zag Diagrams for Single Ships and Convoys 1940 (London: Signal Department, Admiralty, 1940). Smooth deck logs for Indianapolis (CA-35) in April 1945 indicate that she used Plan 40Z while steaming independently without escort. Although a publication of the Admiralty, zigzag patterns from this British publication were among those available to combatant commanders in accordance with U.S. Fleet Tactical Orders and Doctrine (USF 10A, 1944). The major difference between the Plan No. 5 and Plan 40Z was the side the zigzag run was made off of the base course. Plan No. 5 had the ship zigzag starboard to the base course, while 40Z was port of the base course.

LST-779 was only recently identified as the LST passed by Indianapolis around 1300 29 July. The passing of an unidentified LST was mentioned by Captain McVay in his oral history and in the after-action report submitted by the Peleliu Island commander to HQ of COMINCH Pacific. Captain McVay recalled passing an LST moving north for firing exercises after midday. While the deck logs of LST-779 do not mention the encounter, its movements north at 1300 for firing exercises and its position along Convoy Route Peddie leaves little doubt that it was the last U.S. ship to make visual contact with Indianapolis. After the encounter, LST-779 remained slightly north of Route Peddie while Indianapolis remained on a slightly southern course. LST-779 was at too far a distance north to witness the attack on Indianapolis in the first few hours of 30 July, or to spot any survivors or flotsam in the water at daybreak.

Document 1.12: Deck Logs of LST-779 for Voyage from Guam to Samar along Route Peddie

Sunday 29 July, 1945

0000–0400 Underway as before in passage from Guam to Samar, P.I., course 261°T., speed full. [signed] Lt. (jg) N. R. Ellis, USNR.

0400–0800 Underway as before, course 261°T., speed full. 0615 C-54 Skymaster passed overhead on portside, going in same direction.

[signed] Ens. H. L. Luckey, USNR.

0800–1200 Underway as before on course 261°T., speed full.

[signed] Ens. E. S. Hineline, Jr., USNR

1200–1600 Underway as before on course 261°T., speed 280 R.P.M. 1312 Held General Quarters to conduct firing exercises. 1317 c/c to 280°T. 1319 c/c to 300°T., 1320 c/c to 330°T. 1321 c/s to 2/3 ahead. 1322 c/c to 350°T. 1353 Secured from firing exercises. 1357 c/s to standard. 1358 c/s to full, c/c to 261°T. 1400 c/s to flank. 1410 Secured from General Quarters, stations regular sea watch.

[signed] Lt. (jg) A. E. Higgins, USN.[25]

1600–1800 Underway as before on course 261°T., speed flank (300 R.P.M.s).

[signed] Ens. N. V. Wahl, USNR.

1800–2000 Underway as before on course 261°T., speed flank (300 R.P.M.s).

[signed] Lt. (jg) W. A. Griffith, USNR.

2000–2400 Underway as before on course 261°T., speed flank. 2200 Changed speed to full (290 R.P.M.).

[signed] Ens. Peter Pierce, USNR.

Monday 30 July, 1945

0000–0400 Underway as before, 261°true, speed full (290 R.P.M.) in passage from Guam to Samar, P. I.

[signed] Lt. (jg) Alan S. Wood, USNR.

0400–0800 Underway as before on course 261°T., speed 290 R.P.M.

[signed] Lt. (jg) James Glover, USNR.

0800–1200 Underway as before on course 261°T., speed full, 290 R.P.M.s. 0800 Changed course to 255°T.

[signed] Lt. (jg) N. R. Ellis, USNR.

1200–1600 Underway as before, course 255°T., speed full, 290 R.P.M.s. 1425 Changed course to 260°T. 1430 Southern, H.G., S2c, 865 18 95 released from brig by order of Commanding Officer.

[signed] Ens. H. L. Luckey, USNR.

1600–1800 Underway as before on course 260°T., speed 290 R.P.M.s. 1630 Set clocks back one hour.

[signed] Ens. E. S. Hineline, Jr., USNR.

1800–2000 Underway as before on course 260°T., speed 290 R.P.M.s. 1915 Contacted ship by radar bearing 009°R., distance 10 ½ miles. 1945 Ship passed to port distance 1 ½ miles.

[signed] Lt. (jg) A. E. Higgins, USN.

2000–2400 Underway as before on course 260°T., speed 290 R.P.M.s. Contacted ship by radar bearing 040°R. at 16 miles. 2028 Ship passed to starboard 5 miles. 2203 Radar contacted ship 290°R. range 14 ½ miles. 2230 Airplane bearing 270°R., distance 7 miles. Challenged by radar. Friendly.

[signed] Ens. N. V. Wahl, USNR.

[. . .]

Source: TDS; Log Book of USS LST-779, Commanded by Lieutenant Joseph A. Hopkins, USNR, Attached to 36th Division, 18th Group Squadron, 6th Flotilla, U.S. Pacific Fleet: Commencing 1 July 1945 at sea en route from Iwo Jima to Guam, and ending 31 July 1945 at sea en route from Guam to Samar, P.I. [Extract/Remarks Sheet]. LST-779 July/August 1945 Deck Logs, signed by Joseph A. Hopkins, LT., USNR, RG 24, NARA II, College Park, MD. Omitted columnar sheets and entries dealing with departure from Guam and arrival to Philippines. All times noted in the Log Book for 29 July noted as -10 King time Indianapolis crossed the line into -9 1/2 Item-King time the afternoon of 29 July. Japanese submarine I-58 was on -9 time.

Figure 1-9. Image of LST-779 as waves crash against beached LVTs (the one in the foreground, 5A-30, named FELICE), LST-779 unloads at Iwo Jima Yellow Beach 1, 26 February 1945. Suribachi looms in the background). Note weathered camouflage and duplicate identification numbers. LST-779 provided the flag used in the iconic flag raising on Mount Suribachi.

Navy Photograph 80-G-317961, NARA II College Park, MD

When Indianapolis did not arrive at Leyte on 31 July, she was subsequently added to the expected arrival lists for 1 August and 2 August. Also note that LST-779 had an expected arrival for 1 August, traversing the same route as Indianapolis.

Document 1.13: Expected Arrivals at Leyte Gulf

LEYTE GULF EXPECTED ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES
31 JULY 1945

SOPA[26]-(COMBATDIV 3, USS IDAHO); (RADM L. D. MC CORMICK)

SOPA-(ADMINISTRATIVE FOR 3RD FLEET); (COMSERON 10); (RADM A. E. SMITH)

SOPA-(ADCOMPHIBSPAC, CAPTAIN C. H. PETERSON); (COMLSTFLOT 29 IN LC (FF) 998)

SOPA-(ADMINISTRATIVE FOR LEYTE GULF LESS 3RD FLEET); (CNOB[27], LEYTE GULF – TACLOBAN); (COMMODORE, J. H. JACOBSON, USN)

NOTE: (a) This list is compiled by CNOB, LEYTE GULF as of 2000 daily on date prior to that shown above.

(b) The value of this list lies in its accuracy, completeness and prompt dissemination. It is requested that CNOB, be informed of errors or omissions.

(c) Symbols used: # Operational Control COMSERON 10; *Operation Control CNOB.

EXPECTED INDEPENDENT ARRIVALS

SHIP

FROM

REMARKS

BERTH

31 JULY

GEN MEIGS (AP 116)

GAMBIA

E 12

FACILITY (AM 233)

ULITHI

57

STRENGTH (AM 309)

ULITHI

57

EL RENO VICTORY

(FOR SUBIC)

17

ROBT. INGERSOL

509

JANSENS

ILOILO

FRANK WIGGINS

MANUS

GUIUAN

MILO (APB 2)

GUIUAN

LCI 639

GUAM

L.C.A

CAPE MEREDITH

282

WILBUR WRIGHT

BATANGAS

24

ALHENA (AKA 9)

MANILA

(THEN FINSCHAVEN)

YP 289, YF 1042

BIAK

LSM 31

TALOMA

L.C.A

TP 120

ILOILO

TAC

WARRICK (AKA 89)

MANILA

9

FS 175

BATANGAS

TAC

FS 267

ZAMBO

“

ALEXANDER WOOLCOTT

MACALJAR

(THEN USA)

ATA 215

ENIWETOK

(TOWS YF*929,*942,*943)

LCI 340

L.C.A

FS 392

HOLLANDIA

TAC

P.T. BARNUM

BIAK

213

LST 636

BIAK

L.C.A

FLYING DRAGON

TOWNSVILLE

LT 531

MINDORO

TAC

LT 650

MANILA

TAC

BRITAIN VICTORY

ULITHI

134

LST 755,757,1034

ILOILO

L.C.A

CAPE NEWENHAM

ULITHI

HODGES (DE 231)

ULITHI

INDIANAPOLIS (CA 35)

GUAM

FAIRFIELD (AK 178)

MACALJAR BAY

1 AUG

UPHAM (AP 129)

MANILA

T. W. DRENNON

BIAK

LST 779

GUAM

GUIUAN

LST 640

MOROTAI

L.C.A.

PCE 850

MANUS

TITANIA (AKA 13)

MOROTAI

509

LIPAN (ATF 85)

GUAM

45

MATACO (ATF 86)

GUAM

45

ROBT. S. COUSINS

ULITHI

[. . .]

Source: TD; “Expected Arrivals and Departures Leyte Gulf,” 31 July 1945. Certified True Copy James D. Brown, Lt., USNR, submitted as Exhibit in Court of Inquiry convened to investigate the loss. CINCPAC 1945 Flag Files, RG 38, Box 45 NARA II, College Park, MD. Omitted Arrivals August 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 and expected departures.

CHAPTER TWO

Sunk—Firsthand Recollections of the Attack and Time in the Water

Captain McVay gave his recollections of the attack on his ship, its rapid sinking, and his crew’s time in the water in his official oral history. It conveys how rapidly Indianapolis sank and the urgency with which Captain McVay had to act. Captain McVay’s oral history varies little from the responses he gave at his court of inquiry and court-martial, but it does offer more immediacy and a different narrative style. The less formal nature of the interview allowed him to answer more freely and discuss issues that he personally deemed important to the story. McVay’s description of his time in the water following the sinking gives a sense of the distance between groups of survivors and the relative isolation McVay’s raft group faced. While McVay provided only secondhand accounts of other groups’ ordeals, his dismissive attitude toward sharks is notable given the notoriety shark attacks gained in future retellings of the Indianapolis story.

Document 2.1: Oral History of Captain Charles B. McVay III [Extract]

On Sunday night, the 29th of July, we had been zigzagging up until dark. We did not zigzag thereafter. We had intermittent moonlight, so I am told, but it was dark from about 2330 until sometime earlier the next morning.

At approximately five minutes after midnight, I was thrown from my emergency cabin bunk on the bridge by a very violent explosion followed shortly thereafter by another explosion. I went to the bridge and noticed, in my emergency cabin and the charthouse, that there was quite a bit of acrid white smoke. I couldn’t see anything.

I got out on the bridge. The same conditions existed out there. It was dark, it was this whitish smoke. I asked the Officer of the Deck if he had had any reports. He said “No, Sir. I have lost all communications, I have tried to stop the engines. I don’t know whether the order has ever gotten through to the engine room.”

So we had no communications whatsoever. Our engine room telegraph was electrical, that was out; sound powered phones were out, all communications were out forward. As I went back into my cabin to get my shoes and some clothes, I ran into the damage control officer, Lieutenant Commander Casey Moore, who had the midwatch on the bridge as a supervisory watch.

He had gone down at the first hit and came back up on the bridge and told me that we were going down rapidly by the head, and wanted to know if I desired to pass the word to abandon ship. I told him “No.”

We had only about a three degree list. We had been through a hit before, we were able to control it quite easily and in my own mind I was not at all perturbed. Within another two or three minutes the executive officer came up, Commander Flynn, and said, “We are definitely going down and I suggest that we abandon ship.”

Well, knowing Flynn and having utter regard for his ability, I then said, “Pass the word to abandon ship.”

As I had this word passed, I turned to the Officer of the Deck. This had to be passed verbally, the man on watch, the boatswain’s mate, had to go below. Two people did go below and the word was passed. However, I knew from past experience that we had had in Okinawa, since we had our blood bath, you never had to pass the word for anybody to man the general quarters station or get on topside when something was wrong. The ship and crew sense it. They come to their stations immediately. So I am sure that everybody who could get up topside was up topside before we ever passed the word.

Then I turned to the Officer of the Deck, Lieutenant Orr, and said, “I have been unable to determine whether the distress message which I told the Navigator to check on has ever gotten out.”

I had asked Commander Janney,[1] the navigator, when I first went on the bridge to make certain that he got a message out. He went down below and that was the last I saw of him. So knowing that it was absolutely essential that someone be notified where we were, since we were unescorted, I felt that was the most important thing to know at this moment and told the Officer of the Deck I was going to Radio Room One, below the bridge, to find out for myself if this message had gotten out. Also I wanted to take a look at a part of the main deck which some people had said had split near No. 1 stack. Also I could not visualize why we were going down by the head. Nobody had given me any report that we were other than just badly damaged.

I passed through the charthouse and picked up in my emergency cabin a kapok life preserver which I put on and stepped out on the after side of the Bridge and Captain Crouch[2] who was a passenger and who had been sleeping in my cabin said, “Charley, have you got a spare life preserver?” I said, “Yes, I have. I’ve got a pneumatic life preserver,” and I stepped back into my cabin and picked this up and handed it to, I believe, a seaman quartermaster by the name of Harrison and asked him to blow this up for Captain Crouch.

I then stepped to the ladder on the bridge which leads down to the signal bridge and as I put my foot on the first rung, the ship took a 25 degree list to starboard. People started to slide by and I went down to the signal bridge. As I reached that platform, she went to about 40 or 45 degrees. I managed to get to the ladder leading from the signal bridge to the port side of the communications deck. As I reached the communications deck, she seemed to be steadied at around 60. There were some youngsters there that were jumping over the side and I got to the lifeline on the communications deck and yelled at these boys to not jump over the side unless they had life jackets, or to go back by the stack which was just behind me and cut down the life raft, or the floater net rather, and throw that over the side before they jumped.

Within another few seconds the ship listed to 90 degrees and I jumped to the forecastle deck and pulled myself up on the side and started to walk aft. She apparently stayed in this position for some time, at least long enough for me to walk from abreast the bridge to approximately No. 3 turret on the after deck, at that point I was sucked off into the water by what I believe was a wave caused by the bow going down rather rapidly, because I found myself in the water and looked above me and the screws, port screws, which by this time had been stopped, were directly overhead.

I immediately thought “Well, this is the end of me,” and turned around and immediately swam away from the descending screws. Within a few seconds, I felt hot oil and water brush over the back of my neck and looked around and heard a swish and the ship was gone.

[. . .][3]

To go into some detail of what I have been told conditions were in this life preserver group:[4] first of all, I would like to give thanks to the Commander, Western Sea Frontier, who was able to put enough pressure on somebody to enable us to get our supply of kapok life preservers. We were unable to obtain any until about 48 hours from the time we were due to leave, and ComWestern Sea Frontier, himself, his office unearthed some someplace, and had we not had these, of course, we now know we would have saved almost nobody, but fortunately these were new and although I understand kapok is only supposed to hold up for about 64 hours, we know that these held up for as long as four days.

It’s true that after about 48 hours the wearer had sunk low enough in the water so that if his head fell forward he would drown. Consequently, the people had to look out for one another. One tried to sleep while the other watched him. Very little sleeping was done the first 48 hours, but after that the people became so exhausted that they would drop off to sleep. There were apparently two groups of these survivors all in approximately the same position.

The reason I knew nothing about them was because we were apparently around seven to ten miles north of them. They were being carried southwest with the current, whereas we were being either blown a little northeastward or else being held just against the current. So that is the reason, another reason, why when morning came, we could not see any of this survivor group which was south and, as I said before, we did not know of their existence until we saw planes and ships down south and then we knew that there must be somebody there.

There are all kinds of horrible stories that have come out of the experiences that this life preserver group had. They’re very unpleasant. I hope none of the parents will ever know that their boy was in that group for some time and then could not keep up until help arrived, but for the record, we had two doctors in that group, the senior doctor and the junior doctor and a Chief Pharmacist’s Mate who were all saved. They were, of course, topside administering aid to people aboard ship who had been injured prior to the ship rolling over and that is why they were apparently among the survivors.

The people who were in this group had mass hallucinations. One of the stories is that three or four people would swim away at dark and the next morning they’d come back and say, “Why, the Indianapolis didn’t go down after all. She is just over there and we were on her all night. We got fresh milk, we got tomato juice, we got water.” When they would tell these stories, immediately there would be a break from the group and these people would try to swim away in the direction in which they thought the Indianapolis was.

Another hallucination that they had was some of them said they had been on an island all night where they had coconut milk and were able to refresh themselves and after those stories were told people would then break away from the group.

It was in that way that so many people apparently died of exhaustion. Either that or else they drank salt water and went completely out of their head. One that comes in my mind particularly was Captain Parke[5] of the Marines. He was a very strong, athletic man, a young man, he just killed himself by exhaustion through trying to keep those people who were swimming away, trying to keep them with the group. He died of exhaustion, from that alone. The injured, of course, that were in that group didn’t last more than 24 hours.

The people who had the kapok life preservers on tied themselves together to try to keep themselves together during the night. They also had quite a long piece of manila line which they had taken off a ring life preserver which they used to secure their ties on their kapok life jackets, which they managed to keep together during the night, but it must be realized that most of those people within 48 to 60 hours went out of their head. Some of them lived through the period, but those who went out of their head earlier than, say 48 to 60 hours, didn’t last. The people that were down in that group feel quite sure that a number of people just gave up hope because they would be with the bunch at sundown and in the morning they would be gone, so they feel that people just slipped out of their life jackets and just decided that they didn’t want to face it any longer. We do know that people who had pneumatic life jackets were able to get kapok life jackets from people who did die or just slipped out of the jacket and it was found in the morning.

How many people actually got off the ship I don’t think anybody will ever know but we tried to make estimates, we made guesses, I think we actually guessed at a figure between five and six hundred, but I don’t believe that anybody could definitely say, if you pinned them down, that that number did get off, because they weren’t seen that night. It was too dark to see anybody until between two or three o’clock in the morning when the moon came out.

But the following morning they counted noses down there and they had a considerable group, quite a number more than actually were survivors in the final analysis. We had that group down there, I shouldn’t say “we” because I was not with it, I didn’t know it existed until Friday morning when I was picked up. I have been told by officers who were in that survivor group that there were people who when they did find something to eat would try to hide it, and they got food Thursday.[6] Planes came out and dropped food and water and things like that to them.

They were, I think, you might say a cross-section of what you would expect in any group of 300 people. There were a few who were willing to sacrifice their lives for others and did so. There were those who were in more or less of an exhausted state and stupefied and they didn’t know much of what was going on. There were others who took the attitude that “I’m going to save myself and the hell with everybody else.” But, I don’t think that you can censure any of that because so many people by that time were out of their heads, most of them didn’t know what they were doing.

You can’t pin anybody down. There are people who think certain things happened. Nobody naturally, now, in their right mind would ever admit that he did anything like that and he would deny it if you confronted him with it. There were no flagrant cases that we could bring to light, there were just people who said, “Well, I know somebody who got more food than I did,” and somebody said, “Well, I didn’t have any food at all. I wasn’t eating anything.” So you can’t definitely state that there were really, you might say, acts of violence.

We had sharks, or rather they had sharks down there. We know that because we have two survivors who were bitten by sharks and as I told this one boy in the hospital. I said, “You’d better take some castellanne paint and put on that thing before it heals up because nobody will ever believe you’ve been bitten by a shark.[7] You might as well outline the teeth mark and you will have it for the rest of your life and can say ‘I know I was bitten by a shark’.”

We have one boy who was bitten on the thigh. The group down there said that on the calm days, they knew there were sharks around because they could see them underneath. They didn’t actually seem to bother them on the surface. It was different with my group who were in rafts. We had a shark that adopted us apparently sometime in the early morning of Monday. We couldn’t get rid of him. The kids who were in rafts by themselves on this one raft were scared to death of this shark because he kept swimming underneath the raft. You could see his big dorsal fin and it was white, almost as white as a sheet of paper, apparently spent most of his time on the surface and this fin had bleached out so he didn’t blend in with the water at all.[8]

Source: TR; Extract from “Oral History of Charles B. McVay III, Captain USN,” recorded 27 September 1945, transcribed 1 October 1945, 34 pp. Copy of original in Indianapolis Ship History Files, Naval History and Heritage Command Archives, Washington Navy Yard.

Yeoman Second Class Otha Havins was berthed inside of the ship opposite the torpedo hits. The space he occupied that night had housed the components for the atomic bomb delivered to Tinian. Havins’ description of the sinking shows how little time there was for anyone to act. Havins was fortunate to be among the survivors who located a life raft in the water amid the chaos. He does not provide much detail about his time in the water, but his brief description of Captain McVay shows his view of his captain’s leadership.

Document 2.2: Written Account of Survivor Otha Alton Havins, Y2, USNR, Post-Rescue

I was sleeping in my sack which was located on the Mezzinenine in the port Hangar. I was awakened by a loud rumble and by the viribiration and something like water or oil hit me in the face. I immediately jumped out of my sack and landed on someone and I asked what hit us. I then ran in my Office which is located in the Port Hangar and dressed, I also put my rubber life belt on and went down on the quarterdeck to see if there was something I could do. There was plenty to do, but ten minutes doesn’t give a fellow much time to do much of what had to be done. Upon reaching the quarterdeck a Sailor ran out of #1 mess hall with bad burns on his arms and chest and was screaming for a doctor, and another fellow and I layed him on a cot and covered him with a blanket and told him we would get a doctor. Just then a fellow came up from below covered with oil, but I don’t think He was burned, but he couldn’t see for the oil and asked someone to wipe his eyes, I cleared away the oil from his eyes as best I could while the other fellow went in search of a doctor or corman. I then turned to help one of the Victor Division men with his life belt and get him over the side. By this time the ship was listing badly to starboard. I crawled on hands and knees to life line port side of quarterdeck and climbed through the life line and blew up my life belt forgetting to tighten up the escape valve, then I walked down to the keel and told another Victor Division man it was time to make tracks. I hit the water and took about half dozen strokes then someone wraped their arms around mine and down we went. I busted his grip on the way up then he grabbed my legs and when the ship went under it pulled the two of us with it, but with the help of God we came back up then the fellow with me let go and went down. I swam out and found a do-nut raft and hung on for dear life because I was very much winded. Glenn and I started yelling we had a raft and for people to join us. One fellow yelled over that he couldn’t swim, so Glenn and I swam over with the raft. Soon there after we spotted a big life raft so the five of us swam over and climbed aboard. About three hours later the Captain and three men came over and we tied our rafts together, from there Captain McVay was in charge.

[signed]

Otha Alton Havins, Y2/c

Source: ALS; “Account of Survivor Otha Alton Havins, Y2, USNR,” Correspondence Relating to the Sinking of USS Indianapolis, RG 24, Box 1, NARA II, College Park, MD. These are handwritten letters of survivors shortly after rescue prepared for the Navy’s initial investigation into the loss. Spelling and punctuation are as originally written.

Figure 2-1. View of starboard side of Indianapolis (CA-35) off the Mare Island Navy Yard, California, 10 July 1945, after her final overhaul and repair of combat damage. On the night of 30 July two torpedoes fired from Japanese submarine I-58 slammed into this side of Indianapolis at frame 7 (slightly aft of the hull number) and frame 50 (directly below the navigation bridge).

Photograph from the Bureau of Ships Collection in the U.S. National Archives. NHHC Photo Collection, 19-N-86199

Figure 2-2. Detail view of ship’s forward stack, superstructure and hull, from alongside her starboard side amidships, at the Mare Island Navy Yard following her final overhaul, 12 July 1945—the day that Captain McVay received notification of his top secret mission. Circles on photograph mark recent alterations to the ship. Note the life rafts and floater nets. The ship sunk by the starboard side and went down within 15 minutes of being hit. Many of the life rafts did not release when underwater. Also note the bow of Hercules (AK-41) in the left distance.

Photograph from the Bureau of Ships Collection in the U.S. National Archives. NHHC Photo Collection, 19-N086917

Questions regarding the transmission of an SOS message and the precise location of the sinking remain central in the Indianapolis story. Radioman First Class John Moran directly addressed these topics at the Court of Inquiry. Moran’s testimony provides a crucial perspective on whether Indianapolis transmitted a distress signal and, if it did, what it gave as its location, as he was one of the Sailors who physically keyed the distress signal, as well as latitude and longitude. Moran did not believe that the message from his radio room left the ship, nor did he recall the exact coordinates.

Document 2.3: Testimony of Radioman First Class Joseph John Moran, USN, at Court of Inquiry, Guam, 14 August 1945

Examined by the judge advocate:

1.Q. State your name, rate, and present station.

A. Joseph John Moran, radioman first class, U.S. Navy, survivor of the U.S.S. Indianapolis.

2.Q. Tell the court what you know regarding the sinking of the U.S.S. Indianapolis on 30 July.

A. At the time of the explosion I was sleeping in the coding room on the main deck, starboard side, forward. I immediately dressed, and as the passageways were filled with fire and smoke, I went through a port hole to the forecastle deck and from there to the communications deck. The ship had stalled and taken a slight starboard list and we were taking water over the starboard side of the well deck. At this time the ship seemed to steady and gave me the impression that it was not sinking. From the communication deck I went into radio room number One and was there approximately four to five minutes when the ship started to roll to starboard. On the orders of the Communication Watch Officer all radiomen evacuated radio One and I went aft on the communication deck again.

3.Q. State what you observed as to the conditions of radio One.

A. All power, both normal and emergency, was out. The only lights we had were battle lights and flashlights.

4.Q. What do you know about the condition of radio Two?

A. All I know is what I have picked up from other survivors as I was never in radio Two.

5.Q. What messages did you hear, either transmitted or attempted to be transmitted?

A. From radio One we set up what should have been TCK-3, as the word from radio Two by messenger was that we had 4235 kilocycles on CW cable Three. I transmitted the following message, “NQOV” code which was: “XRAY VICTOR MIKE LOVE – WE HAVE BEEN HIT BY TWO TORPEDOES”; then I gave the position by latitude and longitude-the numbers I do not remember; “NEED IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE.” This passage was sent in groups, twice the first time, and repeated in groups once, followed by two Q signals meaning “I AM UNABLE TO USE RECEIVER.” This was the only message we sent from radio One.

6.Q. Have you any definite indications as to whether that message did or did not get on the air?

A. I had no definite indications either way and we were very much in doubt, as the pilot light, which should have been lit, was out. Control cables went through passage ways which were on fire and later under water, and we had no definite word from radio Two that the transmitters were keying.

7.Q. Explain your statement “control cables went through passageways and were under water.” Did you know that there was water over them?

A. Before I went into radio One, the ship at the well deck was awash, and control cables drop from radio One to the second deck and run aft on the starboard side and up into radio Two. It was approximately two or three minutes after I left the communication deck before we started transmitting.

8.Q. Explain more in detail what light you referred to by your statement that the light should have been on.

A. In the motor generator circuit of all transmitters controlled remotely from radio One there is a communication light which should normally burn after relays for turning on the motor generator are energized. This light was not burning when we attempted to turn on our transmitter. The transmitter will run, however, without the light burning.

9.Q. What was the source of your auxiliary power in radio One?

A. For auxiliary power we drew alternating current from the forward Interior Communication room, located on the second platform at frame 50.

10.Q. Did you know whether the transmitter in radio Two was operating?

A. From indications in radio One the transmitter was not operating.

11.Q. What were the indications?

A. The pilot light was not burning, and between the time we started transmitting the control cable we were using would have been under water and previously exposed to fire. There was, however, no definite indication for us in radio One that the transmitter was not operating.

12.Q. Did you know the condition of the meter of the transmitter TK-3 in radio Two?[9]

A. No, sir, we had no way of noting transmitter meters from radio One.

13.Q. Were any messages recorded received after the explosion?

A. Not in radio One. All power was out, we had no receivers.

14.Q. Tell as best as you can what planes or ships you saw while you were in the water, and when you saw them, up to the time you were picked up?

A. Monday morning at approximately 1000 we sighted a PB Ventura and about five minutes later a B-29. Those two planes were on a northeasterly course and passed to the south of us, about five miles, flying I would say at about 2000 feet. Wednesday afternoon a plane, believed to be a C-47, passed overhead, very low on a westerly course. Wednesday night, near midnight, we sighted running lights of a plane flying northeast, and we fired flares, and he appeared to circle once and then continued on course. Thursday afternoon approximately at 1500 we sighted two Grumman Avengers to the southwest on the horizon, and very low. They appeared to be searching the water. Friday morning we sighted a PB Ventura which started searching to the north and picked us up about one-half hour later. About 1030, same morning, we sighted two vessels on the horizon to the southeast, one of which, the U.S.S. Ringness, picked up our group.

Examined by the court:

15.Q. How many survivors were in the group in which you found yourself?

A. We started out with one officer and nineteen men. The officer, Lieutenant Freeze, died Tuesday evening at approximately 1807.[10]

16.Q. Were you on a raft or supported by a life jacket?

A. We had four life rafts and one floater net; all men were on rafts.

17.Q. What was the condition of these rafts?

A. One raft started to sink on Monday and we used the floater net underneath it to keep it afloat. All other rafts remained in good condition.

18.Q. What was the condition of the equipment on the rafts?

A. We had plenty of provisions and water; however, we did find three of our water casks to be dry.

19.Q. Tell us what caused the raft to sink.

A. It seemed to get water-logged at the start. It was a balsa wood raft as far as I know, and by Monday morning she was barely afloat.

20.Q. How many explosions did you hear?

A. I heard only one myself.

21.Q. Where did you think the explosion took place?

A. The impression I had was that the forward boilers blew up as the passageway right outside the compartment I was in was alongside the drying rooms. These passageways were burning very hot and smoke filled them.

22.Q. You spoke of a message being sent from Communications; where was the data obtained for that message?

A. Lieutenant Driscoll, the Communications Watch Officer, gave me the message to send. I think he got his position from the Junior Officer of the Deck, who was seen by other men in the survivors’ group, down in radio One, and who ordered a distress message sent.

23.Q. Did both radio One and Two draw their auxiliary or emergency power from the same source?

A. Negative. Radio One drew auxiliary power from the forward Interior Communication room while radio Two had a two-KVA moto generator which got its direct current from the after electrical board.

24.Q. Have you a fairly clear idea of the interval of time the ship went down after the explosion?

A. I had estimated that as not more than ten to fifteen minutes.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statements concerning anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement:

Our first aid gear requires some modifications, as they were supposed to be waterproof, and all gauze bandages were saturated with salt water when we opened the packages. We had only two tubes of burn ointment and burns seemed to be the most prominent casualty aboard the ship. Also, it would seem advisable to have at least one side of all life rafts painted a bright yellow as blue camouflage is hard to spot in the water. These packages had not been tampered with as far as we could observe. They were sealed in a paraffin wrapper.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Source: TD; Records of Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry Convened at Headquarters, Commander, Marianas, Guam by order of Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas to Inquire into all the Circumstances Connected with the Sinking of the USS Indianapolis (CA-35) and the Delay in Reporting the Loss of that Ship, 13 August 1945 (Volumes One and Two and Papers Concerning), CINCPAC 1945 Flag Files, RG 38, Box 45, NARA II, College Park, MD. COI testimony took place 13–20 August 1945.

Figure 2-3. Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, commander of the Fifth Fleet awards a Purple Heart to Joseph J. Moran, RM1, survivor of Indianapolis (CA-35), which was lost to enemy action in the Philippine Sea, as fellow survivors await similar awards at Naval Base Hospital No. 18, Guam, Marianas on 13 August 1945.

Navy Photograph 80-G-490311, NARA II, College Park, MD

Lieutenant (j.g.) Richard Redmayne, USNR, became the Chief Engineer of Indianapolis when Commander Glen F. DeGrave was beached at the Pearl Harbor stop for overage. He thus had held this position for only four days when Indianapolis was torpedoed. Redmayne remarkably made it to his battle station, the after engine room, within minutes of the torpedo hits. The after engine room seemed relatively stable given the circumstances. With no communication with the bridge, or understanding of the full extent of the damage to the ship, Redmayne made the decision to keep the one functioning engine at full speed. This decision unfortunately kept the ship moving forward and increased the amount of water pouring into the opened bow. In addition to describing his decision-making process at his battle station following the torpedo hits, Redmayne recounted what he considered inappropriate behavior by Sailors in the water in his testimony. The Court ultimately ruled that all of Redmayne’s accusations against crewman were inadmissible because he was likely “out of his mind” when he perceived witnessing them.

Document 2.4: Testimony of Lieutenant (j.g.) Richard Banks Redmayne (Chief Engineer), U.S. Naval Reserve, at Court of Inquiry, 15 August 1945

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1.Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. Lieutenant Richard Banks Redmayne, U.S. Naval Reserve, survivor of the U.S.S. Indianapolis.

2.Q. State to the court all matters pertaining to the inquiry which happened from the time about one-half hour before the explosion until the time you were picked up.

A. One-half hour before the explosion I was on the bridge as Junior Supervisor of the Bridge Watch. About a quarter to twelve I left the bridge and went down to the wardroom and had a sandwich, and went from there up to the Head of Department head, at frame 54, on forecastle deck, amidships. While in the head, the first explosion occurred, and it seemed to be directly below me. And simultaneous with the explosion, I heard and smelled a fire just outside the head door. I opened the door and went through the fire to the port passageway. I walked aft on the port passageway and down the ladder to number Two mess hall, and from there into the after engine room. When I arrived in the engine room the ship had a ten degree starboard list and number Three engine had just been secured due to loss of vacuum. Number Two engine was able to make 160 turns and still maintain a vacuum of twenty-five inches. Both main generators were running in the after engine room, and we had lights down there. We had sound power communication with the forward engine room, number Four fire room, and Repair Five. The officer watch reported that he lost the electrical lead forward and had no steam in the forward engine room. After I had been down there about five minutes, Nightingale, machinist’s mate first class, who had the chief machinist mate watch in the forward engine room, came down to the after engine room and reported that he had abandoned the forward engine room due to lack of lights, heat, smoke, and the heavy list. He asked if he should return to the forward engine room. My answer was no. Shortly thereafter a chief oil king and one of his assistants reported to the after engine room and asked if they should pump fuel oil from the starboard fuel tanks overboard. They were told to do so. I then noticed that the ship seemed to be remaining steady with but about a fourteen degree starboard list, so, since we had no communications with the bridge, I started up to the bridge to find out what the complete picture was and what the Captain wanted done. When I got up to the top of the ladder from number Two mess hall, the ship seemed to list rapidly to starboard and I went aft by hand walking on oxygen bottles which were normally in vertical position. As soon as I got on the main deck aft, I went into the water just as the ship was about to capsize. I swam away from the ship to starboard, and I was fully clothed, and after five minutes in the water I found a kapok life jacket. About half an hour later, I found a group in a life raft, which I joined and during the next three hours we joined up with two other life rafts, which were fully loaded, and with people on two floater nets. We secured the three life rafts and the two floater nets, and drifted that night, picking up other survivors and water breakers and provisions that floated by. We had about one hundred fifty men in our group. Monday was uneventful except for two planes that passed over head, neither of which saw us. No food was given out Monday. Monday night one plane passed over, but didn’t notice us, even though we fired two Very pistol shells. Tuesday morning we buried one man by the name of Barker, radio technician first class, who was on Commander FIFTH Fleet Staff. Tuesday afternoon one cracker was given out to each man. And Tuesday evening, about 2000, a low flying plane with running lights on passed over us, but did not notice our Very flare. Wednesday morning another cracker was issued to each man and one malted milk tablet. I had told the men that all the rations would be kept on one raft, and wouldn’t be issued without my permission. Even after those orders were given, a group of men on one raft were noticed frequently to be eating and once in a while drinking some water. The ringleader seemed to be a man by the name of Morgan, boatswain’s mate second class. Wednesday several men went out of their minds and attempts to stop several of them from swimming away failed. Our attempts at fishing were unsuccessful due to the presence of numerous sharks. On Wednesday afternoon it was decided that we would send four men in a raft south in an attempt to hit Ulithi or Palau. These men left our group about 2000. Wednesday evening more and more men seemed to be going out of their minds and drinking salt water and swimming away. Several instances of homosexual relations were reported. Then during the night Wednesday, I went out of my mind. Next thing I remember I was being taken aboard the U.S.S. Bassett.[11]

3.Q. Who was in the engine room when you arrived there?

A. Ensign Herstien[12] was the officer of the watch and Rue, machinist’s mate first class. I don’t remember the names of the other men who were down there.

4.Q. Are any of these you mentioned survivors?

A. I don’t think any of them are survivors.

5.Q. Do you know what the status of the engine room telegraphs were in the after engine room when you arrived there?

A. I think they were both dead.

6.Q. Do you know if the officer of the watch had had any communications with the bridge after the explosion?

A. He had no communication. He told me that.

7.Q. Do you know what the effect of the explosion was on the fire main?

A. I noticed that we had only about ten pounds of fire main pressure in the engine room, and fire and flush pump in the after engine room was running, so I assumed the fire main was ruptured forward.

8.Q. Did you receive any reports of the status or conditions of the fire rooms?

A. I received no report as to the condition of them. The officer of the watch reported that he had attempted to contact number One fire room immediately after the explosion by sound powered phone and ship’s service phone, but he was unsuccessful.

9.Q. What was the condition of the steam pressure on the main steam line when you first arrived in the after engine room?

A. Three hundred pounds, sir.

10.Q. What happened to the steam pressure?

A. It remained steady at three hundred.

11.Q. For how long?

A. We still had three hundred pounds of pressure when I left the engine room.

12.Q. How and where did you receive your burns?

A. I got burned when I came out of the Head of Department head.

13.Q. Were you burned solely by flames, or did you touch any metal which might have burned you?

A. My right hand was burned by flames, my left finger tips were burned when I supported myself on the deck with left hand.

14.Q. Do you know what happened to the four men and the raft which you started in the direction of Palau or Ulithi?

A. They rejoined our group thirty hours later.

15.Q. Did the irregularities of the man named Morgan impress you as being subject to special censure?

A. Yes, sir.

16.Q. Have you anything more to state on that subject other than what you have already stated?

A. No, sir.

17.Q. Have you any comments to make other than those you have already made concerning the material condition of the rafts or equipment?

A. In the first place, the water in the water breakers was no good, and the containers which contained articles on the rafts were not watertight. Some of the Very flare containers were not watertight. In my opinion, about twice as many Very Flares should be provided for each raft. We had no top in order to protect us from the sun. That is all.

18.Q. At about the time that you left the bridge to go below, describe the visibility conditions existing as far as concerns the state of the moon, the direction of the moon, and your estimate of the range of visibility in various directions.

A. I don’t remember the direction of the moon. All I remember is that the visibility during the watch as from good to excellent.

19.Q. Do you remember the state of the moon?

A. No, I don’t remember.

20.Q. Do you remember whether visibility appeared to you greater on one side of the ship than the other?

A. No.

21.Q. What would you estimate the range of visibility on the starboard side?

A. Five miles.

22.Q. Do you mean that you could see dark unlighted objects five miles away from the ship?

A. Large objects, yes.

23.Q. What material or readiness condition was the ship in, and did you notice any violations?

A. Material condition was YOKE, modified.

24.Q. Did you notice during the period of your watch, or up to the time of the explosion, any violations in the material condition as regards hatches, doors, or ports?

A. No, sir.

Examined by the court:

25.Q. In the first part of your testimony you said the first explosion occurred when you were in the head. What was your sensation and impression with regard to that explosion? What did you think it was?

A. I thought it was a torpedo.

26.Q. You didn’t mention a second explosion, did you feel, hear, or see a second explosion?

A. Yes, sir, immediately after the first one.

27.Q. What was your impression with regard to the second explosion as related to the first?

A. The sound was similar, but it impressed me as being a little bit farther away, forward.

Cross-examined by Captain Charles B. McVay III, U.S. Navy, an interested party:

28.Q. You mentioned that the visibility that night was approximately five miles. Did you notice that five-mile visibility before or after the sinking? In other words, when [did] you ascertain the visibility was five miles?

A. When I was on the bridge.

29.Q. You say that you couldn’t remember the direction or state of the moon. Is it possible that you don’t remember either of those facts because, even though the moon had already risen, it was obscured by cloud cover?

A. Yes, it is possible.

Re-examined by the judge advocate:

30.Q. To what do you attribute the source of fire which you encountered just outside the head?

A. I don’t know.

31.Q. Was the entire passageway in that area a mass of flame or what was the size of it?

A. I don’t know, sir, I closed my eyes when I went through.

32.Q. Have you an impression as to the direction from which the flame was coming, whether forward or aft or from either side of the ship?

A. My opinion is that it came up through the hatch there.

The judge advocate made the statement that this witness was not present at either reading of the official report and narrative of the Commanding Officer before the assembled survivors, due to inability for physical reasons to attend those proceedings.

Re-examined by the court:

33.Q. Have you anything to lay to the charge of the Commanding Officer, or of any other officer or man with regard to the loss of the United States ship Indianapolis?

A. Nothing than what I have already indicated.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relative to the subject matter of the inquiry which he though should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Source: TD; Records of Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry Convened at Headquarters, Commander, Marianas, Guam by order of Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas to Inquire into all the Circumstances Connected with the Sinking of the USS Indianapolis (CA-35) and the Delay in Reporting the Loss of that Ship, 13 August 1945 (Volumes One and Two and Papers Concerning), CINCPAC 1945 Flag Files, RG 38, Box 45, NARA II, College Park, MD. COI testimony took place 13–20 August 1945.

The accusations of unauthorized use of rations brought against Boatswain’s Mate Second Class Eugene Morgan[13] by Lieutenant (j.g.) Richard Redmayne led to further questioning from the Court of Inquiry. The court ultimately determined that the allegations were sufficiently refuted by witnesses and recommended no further proceedings against Morgan. The three testimonies below represent charges against and in defense of Morgan. Morgan’s own testimony is also included. The court declined to recommend that the Navy pursue further action against Morgan. The testimony regarding these alleged events has been included because it demonstrates the hardships the survivors faced in the water and underscores the extreme circumstances they faced. These testimonies also indicate how the limited rations were distributed and how the rotation between time in rafts and water functioned. Captain McVay effectively addressed such issues in the extract that opened this chapter, “You can’t pin anybody down. There are people who think certain things happened. Nobody naturally, now, in their right mind would ever admit that he did anything like that and he would deny it if you confronted him with it. There were no flagrant cases that we could bring to light.” Essentially, the extraordinary circumstances that the men of Indianapolis were placed in created a scenario incomprehensible for judgment by ordinary standards.

Documents 2.5–2.8: Testimony from Ensign Harlan Malcom Twible, USN; William Edward Simpson, Boatswain’s Mate Second Class, USNR; Eugene S. Morgan, Boatswain’s Mate Second Class, USNR, 15–16 August 1945.[14]

[Testimony of Harlan Malcolm Twible, Ensign, U.S. Navy, at Court of Inquiry, 15 August 1945, pp. 68–71]

At this stage of the proceedings it appeared to the court that Eugene S. Morgan, boatswain’s mate second class, U.S. Naval Reserve, had an interest in this subject matter of the inquiry. He was accordingly called before the court and advised to that effect, and that he would be allowed to present during the course of the inquiry, examine witnesses, and introduce new matters pertinent to the inquiry in the same manner as a defendant. With the permission of the court, he introduced Commander Frank E. Bollman, U.S. Naval Reserve, as his counsel.

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1.Q. State you name, rank, and present station.

A. Harlan Malcom Twible, Ensign, U.S. Navy, survivor of the U.S.S. Indianapolis.

2.Q. Where were you at the time of the explosion?

A. Sky amidships.

3.Q. Where did it appear to you that the explosion or explosions occurred?

A. Well, the first one I thought occurred forward and the second one I knew must have occurred forward of the second stack as soot and steam and sparks came out of that stack.

4.Q. What did you judge to be the nature of the explosion?

A. At the time of the explosion I had no idea what the explosion was caused by. I thought it might be boilers blowing.

5.Q. How long had you been on watch at the time of the first explosion?

A. About four hours and fifteen minutes.

6.Q. Please state the condition of visibility existing in the five minutes prior to the explosion as respects atmospheric conditions, the condition of the moon and the direction of the moon and the distance which you could observe a dark object on either side.

A. Well, the moon wasn’t out, or else it was covered up by clouds, and I remember looking down towards the quarterdeck to see if my relief was coming. We were relieved late that night. I could make out motion down there, but could not tell who the men were. That night we had a check to see if the men we had on lookout duty were relieved, by phoning to the men who had charge of the guns.

7.Q. What was the state of elevation and direction of the moon at the time of explosion?

A. Well, the moon wasn’t out, it might have risen.

8.Q. What visibility did you have to starboard at about the time of the explosion, visibility based on your ability to sight a darkened ship?

A. I don’t know about that, sir. I don’t know how far you could have seen that night. The only thing I could say is that I could make out motion on the quarterdeck. You couldn’t make out anything on the horizon.

9.Q. Were you using binoculars?

A. No, sir.

10.Q. Were the lookouts using binoculars?

A. Yes, sir.

11.Q. What check were you making on the lookouts?

A. We had instructed the men in charge of the mounts to report lookouts on the shields every half hour.

12.Q. While you were in the water, if you observed any irregularities connected with the use of emergency rations and water, please state them.

A. There was one raft that did have food and they were eating it after they had been ordered not to use food not rationed. Although I didn’t see any specific person taking the food, several of the men complained that the raft was in charge of Morgan, and that he was stealing the food. I, thereupon, reported this to Mr. Redmayne. He put the food in the charge of Chief Benton. Later on we got complaints again, whereupon I said in a clear voice, “The first man I see eating food not rationed, I will report if we ever get in.” Wednesday afternoon I swam to one of the rafts and found them eating food. I asked them if they hadn’t heard the order I previously gave. They said if Morgan could eat it, why couldn’t they, whereupon I went to Morgan’s raft and found no food. But later on I found that the food in the cans was sunken by punching holes in the top of the inner lid. I then went back to the two rafts, Morgan’s and this other one, and got both cans of food. I also got floating water casks. I can’t say where they came from. The water casks were then put in the charge of myself and Sergeant Greenwald. We rationed the water after that, and I am sure, none of it was stolen from that time on.

13.Q. You mentioned Morgan, can you identify him more fully?

A. Yes, sir, this is the man right here.

The witness pointed to the interested party, Eugene S. Morgan, boatswain’s mate second class, U.S. Naval Reserve.

14.Q. What do you mean by saying that you found tins punctured below the water? Do you mean empty cans, or hoarded and hidden rations?

A. Hoarded and hidden rations.

15.Q. How far away from the raft in which Morgan was located were you when you gave the instructions regarding what you would do if you found anyone eating food without being properly rationed?

A. I was in the nets.

16.Q. Is there any doubt in your mind as to whether Morgan heard that remark?

A. No, sir, there is no doubt in my mind. Furthermore, I went up to the group of rafts, and said that they weren’t acting like seamen, but like a bunch of boots. That alone, I think, should have made those men think a little about their status.

17.Q. Had you heard Morgan receive orders from anyone else in authority relative to the manner of handling emergency rations and water?

A. I believe Chief Benton did. I couldn’t swear to that.

18.Q. My question was, did you hear anyone?

A. No, sir. There is doubt in my mind.

19.Q. About how many men did you have in the raft and about how many in the water in your group?

A. Well, I spent the last night in one of the rafts, and I should say that there must have been nearly sixty in the three rafts we had. On Wednesday night one of the rafts had left to see if they could attract help.

20.Q. How many men do you estimate were on the rafts and how many in the water, in your group, on the second day?

A. On the second day, I should say about sixty on the rafts and about sixty in the water.

21.Q. What was your policy on who should be in the rafts and who should be in the water?

A. We tried to put all injured and ill men in the rafts and those who didn’t have life belts. However, we found that some men were getting rid of their life belts so that they could get into the rafts.

22.Q. In this connection, did the actions of Morgan come to your attention?

A. I believe he was in the rafts all the time and some of the men with him were in the rafts all the time.

23.Q. Was he so badly injured that he should have been in the raft all the time, or should he have taken his turn?

A. I don’t think he was any worse off than any of the rest of us, and was capable of hanging on to the nets. Therefore I don’t think he should have been in the raft all of the time.

24.Q. Did you hear anyone order him to take his turn being in and out of the raft?

A. No, sir.

25.Q. What other persons to your knowledge have definite information on the actions of Morgan at this time?

A. Chief Benton, Mr. Redmayne, Mr. Blum, Mr. Howison, and Sergeant Greenwald.

26.Q. What other men do you refer to as seemingly in the same unit with Morgan, eating rations and drinking water when they shouldn’t, and staying on the raft without taking their turn?

A. I don’t know the names of any of the others due to my short time on the ship. However, I do recognize Morgan because I was the recorder on a summary court martial, and it was he who brought the accused so that I could read the specifications to them.

27.Q. At what time did you first observe the moon on the night of the explosion?

A. I was in the water, sir. After 1225.

28.Q. If the moon had risen earlier, why would you not have observed it earlier?

A. The clouds were the only hindrances of visibility.

Cross-examined by Eugene S. Morgan, boatswain’s mate, second class, U.S. Naval Reserve, an interested party:

29.Q. You say that there was no food in the raft in which Morgan was in?

A. None that I could see.

30.Q. Did you see Morgan eating at any time?

A. I never saw Morgan eating food.

31.Q. How far away were you from Morgan’s raft when you gave this order?

A. I was on the net, the nearest side of which was to the raft.

32.Q. Approximately how far from Morgan?

A. I can’t say, exactly, just how many feet it was from his raft, even at the greatest distance, the farthest raft could not have been, well, over forty or fifty feet away.

33.Q. What time of day was it?

A. Afternoon.

34.Q. Was Morgan visible to you when you gave that order?

A. Morgan was not visible to me.

35.Q. Do you know whether Morgan was sleeping or not?

A. No, I do not know whether he was sleeping or not.

36.Q. You didn’t recognize any of the individuals by name in that raft?

A. I did not recognize any of the individuals in the raft by name.

Re-examined by the judge advocate:

37.Q. When you discovered that the tinned food was being hidden, was Morgan present at the time, and aware of your discovery?

A. Morgan was present on Wednesday when I discovered food in that raft.

38.Q. Was there any intimation that he was connected with the hiding of the food?

A. No, sir. All I know was that the men complained about his stealing food.

39.Q. Was Morgan the senior person on his raft at that time?

A. I cannot say, because I did not know the rest of the men. I would like to add that Thursday morning a man came down with cans of crackers, and told me that Morgan had sent the crackers.

40.Q. Do you recognize that man?

A. I cannot recognize him.

Recross-examined by Eugene S. Morgan, boatswain’s mate second class, U.S. Naval Reserve, an interested party:

41.Q. All of the testimony is by speech of others?

A. Complaints of others. I never saw him eating.

Re-examined by the judge advocate:

42.Q. Was Morgan present when those complaints were made?

A. Morgan was never present. The men would swim up to me on the nets and tell me. That was the reason for the order I gave that morning.

43.Q. On your observations, during the time you were receiving those complaints; do you consider that the men were irrational?

A. The men were not irrational at that time.

44.Q. Were any irrational?

A. Some were irrational.

Examined by the court:

45.Q. Did you retain full possession of your sense during the entire ordeal?

A. Yes, sir.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he tough should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

[Testimony of William Edward Simpson, Boatswain’s Mate Second Class, U.S. Naval Reserve, at Court of Inquiry, 16 August 1945, pp. 87, 90–93]

Eugene S. Morgan, boatswain’s mate second class, U.S. Naval Reserve, an interested party, moved to strike out all testimony which had been introduced regarding Morgan on the ground that it was hearsay, and that the precept did not cover the offenses concerning which Morgan was accused.

The judge advocate replied.

The court announced that it did not sustain the motion to strike.

Eugene S. Morgan, boatswain’s mate second class, U.S. Naval Reserve, an interested party, moved to strike the words, “the ringleader seemed to be a man by the name of Morgan, boatswain’s mate second class,” which words had appeared in the testimony of Lieutenant Richard B. Redmayne, U.S. Naval Reserve, on the grounds that it was improper opinion of evidence.

The judge advocate replied.

The court announced that it did not sustain the motion to strike.

[…][15]

A witness called by Eugene S. Morgan, boatswain’s mate second class, U.S. Naval Reserve, an interested party, entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1.Q. State your name, rate, and present station.

A. William Edward Simpson, boatswain’s mate second class, U.S. Naval Reserve, survivor of the U.S.S. Indianapolis.

Examined by Eugene S. Morgan, boatswain’s mate second class, U.S. Naval Reserve, an interested party:

2.Q. From the time that the Indianapolis was sunk until you were rescued, did you see Morgan, the interested party?

A. Yes, I saw Morgan every day.

3.Q. Continuously?

A. He was right close by me. He swam around the floater net that I was in, and I was on the floater net for the first two days. The third day I saw him in the life raft. On the afternoon of the third day I saw him swim about 200 yards without a life jacket after a bag of rations, he brought it back and turned it over to the people on the life raft who had charge of all the rations.

4.Q. Did you hear an order issued that all rations should be placed in one raft?

A. I did.

5.Q. When was that order issued?

A. On the afternoon of the third day.

6.Q. Was that Wednesday?

A. Yes.

7.Q. Was that before or after Morgan swam out and got the bag of rations?

A. That was after.

8.Q. Did you ever see Morgan eating any improperly issued rations during that period?

A. No, sir.

9.Q. Did you ever see Morgan on the raft which held the rations?

A. No, sir.

Cross-examined by the judge advocate:

10.Q. What happened to the bag of food which you say that Morgan brought back this 200 yards?

A. He brought it back, and one of the cans had slipped out of the bag, and one of the fellows brought it back. There were three cans in the bag and one of them slipped out, and some other fellow brought the bag back and Morgan brought the other can back.

11.Q. Did Morgan deliver the part which he recovered to the controlling officer?

A. He brought it up to the raft where the officers were.

12.Q. How well did you know Morgan?

A. I was in the same division with him for about two years. I used to work for him.

13.Q. Was Morgan so much under your observation during this period in the water that you could have detected any incidents of his partaking of food or water which was not properly rationed?

A. I couldn’t see him at night; at night I couldn’t see anything.

14.Q. Were you in charge of the raft on which Morgan was located?

A. No, sir.

15.Q. Was Morgan on any special raft?

A. Not that I know of.

16.Q. Was he in any one particular raft?

A. I saw him in just one raft and that was on the afternoon of the third day.

17.Q. Was that where the corpsman was?

A. Yes.

18.Q. Was there anything the matter with Morgan at that time?

A. There was one of his eyes all fouled up.

19.Q. You say that you have known Morgan for two years?

A. I have known him for two years.

20.Q. Do you know his reputation for obedience to orders?

A. Yes.

21.Q. What is it?

A. Good.

22.Q. What was Morgan, acting master at arms?

A. Yes, on board ship.

23.Q. In your observations, did you see chief Benton?

A. Yes.

24.Q. Was chief Benton sick at any time?

A. I would say he was.

25.Q. When was that?

A. That was now and then throughout all the time we were in the water.

26.Q. Was his mind affected, do you think?

A. I couldn’t say about his mind; I know he put up a “holler” about his stomach hurting him.

Examined by the court:

27.Q. Did you hear any men make a complaint or claim to anybody with regard to the issue of food or water?

A. Not concerning any one particular person. I heard there was always a big growl about the time chow was to be issued.

28.Q. Did Morgan take charge at the time food was regularly rationed?

A. Not that I know of.

29.Q. Did you hear any man complain about Morgan?

A. No, sir.

30.Q. Or make any remarks about Morgan?

A. No, sir.

31.Q. Did any officer come to the raft at any time and caution you about not using rations which had not been properly issued?

A. I did not hear anything regarding that.

32.Q. Did you hear any orders issued by any officer with regard to the rationing of food?

A. It was all to be turned in to one raft was all that I heard.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.[16]

[Testimony of Eugene S. Morgan, Boatswain’s Mate Second Class, U.S. Naval Reserve, at Court of Inquiry, 16 August 1945, pp. 94–96.]

Eugene S. Morgan, boatswain’s mate second class, U.S. Naval Reserve, an interested party, requested that he be sworn as a witness. His request was granted and he was duly sworn, having been informed by the court that his examination would be governed by the same rules as govern the examination of an accused who takes the stand at his own request in a trial by court-martial.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1.Q. State your name, rate, and present station.

A. Eugene Stanley Morgan, boatswain’s mate second class, U.S. Naval Reserve, survivor of the U.S.S. Indianapolis.

Examined by Eugene S. Morgan, boatswain’s mate second class, U.S. Naval Reserve, an interested party:

2.Q. You were afloat from the time of the sinking of the U.S.S. Indianapolis until you were rescued, on Thursday?

A. Until Friday morning, about 2:30.

3.Q. Were you in the same group with these boys that have testified?

A. Yes.

4.Q. Did you, or did you not, have any unissued rations for your own use?

A. No, I did not.

Cross-examined by the judge advocate:

5.Q. During that period of little over four days that you were in the water until you were rescued, did you obey all orders given to you by officers who may have addressed you and whom you recognized as such?

A. I could hardly make out anybody to recognize them, my eyes were bad, and as far as I know, if there were any orders issued to me, I obeyed all orders.

6.Q. Do you remember Ensign Blum swimming close to your raft and admonishing you regarding the use of rations?

A. I heard somebody yelling when they were passing out rations. They were passing out rations and I knew that cans were coming around. I heard somebody yell, I don’t know who they were yelling at.

7.Q. Who was passing out rations?

A. I don’t know, it was the third time they passed out rations.

8.Q. Was it somebody in your raft who was controlling the issue of rations?

A. Cans were just passed around the rafts, to be passed around to the ones in the rafts, and if there was any left, to be passed on to the next raft. The pharmacist’s mate was in charge.

9.Q. Were you ever told that you were to be considered in the category of those who would stay on your raft at all times?

A. The pharmacist’s mate on the third day when I got in took care of me. We were re-shuffled, and I was put on this small raft. The pharmacist’s mate said that I belonged on this raft.

10.Q. What did the pharmacist’s mate tell you?

A. In what way do you mean that?

11.Q. About your staying on the raft all the time.

A. He said, “You belong in here,” and he started naming the men who would be in that raft.

12.Q. What did you understand about taking turns being in the raft and being in the water?

A. The first day and the second day men were complaining about not being able to get on a raft. I was complaining because we could not get into a raft. The floater net was difficult and hard and I just had a life jacket and it was always slipping down to my legs, and I was having a hard time keeping from going down. I remember I was complaining we wanted to take turns on the raft, so we could have some time out of the water. Finally, on the third day the pharmacist’s mate got me on this raft which they claimed had the broken bags.

13.Q. You stayed on the raft from the third day on?

A. No, not all the time.

14.Q. Please explain the circumstance, as you understand them, surrounding the use of partially filled ration cans.

A. The pharmacist’s mate was talking about that. He said he had read in Popular Mechanics that taking two cans, filling one of the with salt water and somehow filling the other around it, and then holding it in some way for the sun to evaporate the salt water and make fresh water for drinking. I don’t know whether he got any, but he tried it.

15.Q. Do you know anything about the use of cans partially filled with rations being used for purposes other than the storage of rations?

This question was objected to by the interested party, Eugene S. Morgan, boatswain’s mate second class, U.S. Naval Reserve, on the grounds that it went beyond the scope of the direct examination, and that if answered would be originating evidence.

The judge advocate replied.

The court announced that the objection was sustained.

16.Q. What is the name of the pharmacist’s mate to whom you refer?

A. All I know is that he was Anthony.[17] I don’t know what the rest of his name is.

17.Q. What rate?

A. Pharmacist’s mate first class, I believe.

18.Q. Was there a medical officer in your group?

A. No, there was no medical officer. The pharmacist’s mate was the only corpsman in the group. He was the one and only one as far as pharmacist’s mates was concerned.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness; he resumed his seat as an interested party.

[…][18]

The interested party, Eugene S. Morgan, boatswain’s mate second class, U.S. Naval Reserve, made a motion to have his name withdrawn as an interested party on the ground that the evidence produced before the court in no way involves him.

The court announced that the motion was denied at the present time, but that the court would give the motion further consideration and inform the interested party if it should reverse its present decision at a later time.[19]

Source: TD; Records of Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry Convened at Headquarters, Commander, Marianas, Guam by order of Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas to Inquire into all the Circumstances Connected with the Sinking of the USS Indianapolis (CA-35) and the Delay in Reporting the Loss of that Ship, 13 August 1945 (Volumes One and Two and Papers Concerning), CINCPAC 1945 Flag Files, RG 38, Box 45, NARA II, College Park, MD. COI testimony took place between 13–20 August 1945.

The following account of Water Tender Second Class George G. Stevens, USNR, stands out among similar survivor accounts in the Navy’s investigation file. Stevens’ succinct, but detailed, testimony imparted the sense of urgency he faced during his ship’s quick sinking. Many of the men’s accounts in this collection did not discuss the time in the water. In a few short sentences, Stevens described the totality of misery his group of 100–150 swimmers faced, with only 17 surviving. Stevens’ recounting of sharks plaguing his group indicated that his was one of the most affected groups.

Document 2.9: Written Account of Water Tender Second Class George G. Stevens, USNR, Post-Rescue

I was sleeping in living compartment D.202L Annex. The explosion through me around in my sack. Then I climbed out of bunk & dress rapidly putting my dungrees trowsers on wrong side out then when noticing them changed them around. Then waited in the compartment & trying to find out where the hit was for a couple minutes. Then started for Fire room #4 I was stop in #3 mess hall & I talked to a few fellow’s who were sleeping on the quarter deck. Then ship was listing to starboard so bad that I decided it was time to hit the water. I left #3 mess Hall and went to the port side of fan tail just aft of motor whale Boat where every body was going over the side & yelling jump, when I climbed through the life line I slid down the side hitting the shaft forward of the screw gard. hurting my back. then splashed down in the water with some one jumping right on top of me. I then blew up my rubber life belt which was straped around me using my hand to get away from the ship. I swam for a bunch of men who were on a cork life netting where I caught hold of. I then turned around & the ship was going down with fantail sticking straight out of the water & she sunk fast. we spent the night floating & spiting fuel oil which some swolled a great deal of. The water was rather rough. & they were from 100 to 150 men in the bunch on the netting with me, then the rest of the days in the water was miserable, The first day we had water & some food rationions, but during the night some one tried to get in the water & ruined all we had. We all prayed sang some religious song’s. The sharks started bothering the third day & killed a queit a few men. a lot of the men went crazy or out of ther head due to the hot sun & scare & wouldnt try to live. Planes spotted us the evening of the fourth day. when they droped three rubber life rafts, one raft contained a radio, but didn’t do us much good all there was to try to radio was water tenders & sea men, we were rescued by a tin can[20] around 0830 the next morning. There were around 17 of us who lived out of about a 100 or a hundred & fifty,

[signed]

G.G. Stevens WT2/c

Source: ALS; “Account of Survivor G. G. Stevens, WT2, USNR,” Correspondence Relating to the Sinking of USS Indianapolis, RG 24, Box 1, NARA II, College Park, MD. These are handwritten letters of survivors shortly after rescue prepared for the Navy’s initial investigation into the loss. Spelling and punctuation kept original.

Figure 2-4. Willie Hatfield, S2, and Cozell Lee Smith, COX, (shark bite on left hand) at Naval Base Hospital #20, Peleliu Island, 5 August 1945. In the series of nearly 100 photographs taken of survivors, the only reference to a shark attack wound is in this image. Because Captain McVay was taken to the same hospital as Smith, it is likely that he was one of the two survivors with shark bites that McVay mentioned.

Navy Photograph 80-G-336770, NARA II, College Park, MD

As a senior officer in his group, and the ship’s doctor, Lieutenant Haynes was an individual who men in the water looked to for leadership and counsel. Haynes’ group of survivors, the largest and only one with no rafts or provisions, went through one of the most difficult ordeals. Haynes’ recollections below describe the sense of helplessness he faced in the situation. Haynes could provide no medical relief as the Sailors and Marines that he had grown to know through his extended time on Indianapolis succumbed. Personal advice, decent burials, and self-preservation replaced medical treatment. This account from Haynes captures the totality of the misery his group faced in the water.

Document 2.10: Oral History with Captain (Ret.) Lewis Haynes, MC, USN [Extract]

All the men were at their guns.

There were the 5-inch mounts?

Yes. All the men were at their stations at general quarters. We got a whole bunch of life jackets and went back down and started to put them on the patients. I remember I was putting it on a warrant officer. I never used his name because I didn’t want his family to know. His skin was hanging in shreds and he was yelling “Don’t touch me, don’t touch me.” I kept telling him we had to get the jacket on. And I was putting the jacket on when the ship lurched right over. And he just slid away from me, he and all the patients and the plane on the catapult all went down in a big, tangling crash to the other side, which was now the low end of the ship. I was standing right alongside the lifeline and I grabbed it and climbed through. And by the time I did, the ship was on its side.

They all disappeared over the side?

They probably all died. The plane came down on top of them, all the rescue gear and everything we had out went down, patients and everything together.

I stood up on the side of the ship and slowly walked down the side. Another kid came and said he didn’t have a jacket. I had an extra jacket, I handed it to him, and he put it on. He was ahead of me. He went to jump and he hit something on the side of the ship and fell in the water. I went down and jumped into the water which was just fuel oil.

Was the ship still moving at this point?

The ship was still going forward so when it started to go it went fast. It was 12 minutes from the time we were hit until the ship went down.

You literally walked down the side of the ship, past the boot top and onto bottom paint.

Yes. I was walking on red paint.

Was there enough light to see very well?

There was enough light from the moon that you could see. It kept coming in and out.

As it rolled and you were walking down the side what could you see?

I wasn’t alone. It was covered with people climbing down.

Could you see the screws from where you were?

Not then, but when I jumped in the water and grabbed hold of my life jacket and held myself, I didn’t want to get sucked down so I kicked my feet to get away. And then the ship rose up like the ceiling there. I thought it was going to come down and crush me. And the ship kept leaning out away from me, the aft end rising up and leaning over as it stood up on its nose. And as the screws went by, I vaguely remember seeing someone standing on the screws but I can’t be sure.

Was there still forward motion?

Yes. The ship was still going forward at probably 3 or 4 knots. When it finally sank, it was over a hundred yards from me. Most of the survivors were strung out for a half a mile or a mile behind the ship.

You said earlier that when you poked your head through the porthole, it felt like a deep freeze. What did the water feel like when you went into it?

I don’t remember. Being in the water wasn’t an unpleasant experience except that it was black fuel oil and you got it in your nose, and you got it in your eyes. As the ship went up, I thought I would be sucked down with it but it had just the opposite effect. Because the ship went down so fast because of the forward momentum, the air burst out of the compartments and there were explosions of air that turned you end over end and kept blowing us all farther away. I went tumbling ass over teakettle in the fuel oil and water. And the ship was gone. And suddenly it was very quiet.

Did you hear anyone yelling at that point?

No. There were people all around me but nobody was yelling.

At this point, then, everyone was a swimmer.

As the ship rolled, the swimmers all walked down the side like I did. The captain and a lot of the men and perhaps those people on the afterdeck—the gunnery crew that was up there—when the ship rolled, they all fell off on that side. And as it rolled over all the liferafts and all the floater nets went off on that side, opposite to our side. Capt. McVay and 10 men had two liferafts and two floater nets between them. And another group had four or five rafts and floater nets. There were another 145 of them on that side who were thrown into the water with the rafts.

They were the lucky ones. Everything ended up in the water near them and the guys on your side ended up with nothing.

Nothing. And when the ship went down so fast and the air blew out of the compartments like explosions, they went that way and we went this way and never the twain would meet. We never saw them again. When you’re in the ocean at sea level and there are big waves you can’t see very far.

We started to gather together. We all looked the same, black oil all over—white eyes and red mouths. No personalities at all. You couldn’t tell the doctor from the boot seaman. Everyone swallowed fuel oil which made everyone sick. And then everyone began vomiting. And it was in your eyes, it was in your nose. Later, when the sun came up the covering of oil was a help. It kept us from burning. But at that time, I could have hidden but somebody yelled, “Is the doctor there?” And I made myself known. From that point on—and that’s probably why I’m here today—I was kept so busy I had to keep going. But without any equipment, from that point on I became a coroner.

The vomiting further dehydrated everyone.

Sure. And this was midnight and most of the men were probably dehydrated to start with because they’d been asleep. A lot of them hadn’t had fluid for some time. And they began to get very thirsty. And that was the big problem I had as time went on. Trying to keep them from drinking saltwater.

A lot of the men were without life jackets. The kapok life jacket is designed with a space in the back. Those who had life jackets that were injured, you could put your arm through that space and pull them up on your hip and keep them up out of the water. And the men were very good about doing this. Those with jackets supported men without jackets. They held onto the back of the jacket, put their arms through there and held on floating in tandem.

When daylight came and we began to get ourselves organized into a group and the leaders began to come out, and they knew I was the doctor, I began to find the wounded and we began to find the dead. And when we got to the dead, the only way I could tell they were dead was to put my finger in their eye. If their pupils were dilated and they didn’t blink I assumed they were dead. We would then laboriously take off their life jackets and give it to men who didn’t have jackets. In the beginning I took off their dogtags and said “The Lord’s Prayer” and let them go. Eventually, I got such an armful of dogtags I couldn’t hold them any longer. Even today, when I try to say “The Lord’s Prayer” or I hear it, I simply lose it.

What happened when the sun came up?

When the sun came up it reflected off the fuel oil and was like a search light in your eyes that you couldn’t get away from. And everyone got photophobia. So I had all the men take their clothes off and we tore them into strips and tied them around our eyes to keep the sun out.

When first light came we had between three and four hundred men in our group. I would guess that probably seven or eight hundred men made it out of the ship.

The second night, which was Monday night, we had all the men put their arms through the life jacket of the man in front of him and we made a big mass so we could stay together—Capt. Parke and the others swam around the outside and we supported one another. Some of the men could doze off and sleep for a few minutes. We kept the wounded and those who were sickest in the center of the pack and that was my territory. The next day we found a life ring with a long line attached to it floating and I could put one very sick man across it to support him. All the others would grab a hold of the line and it would curl around so they would just curl around the center.

There was a man in the water with you named Cdr. [Stanley W.] Lipski. Could you tell me about him?

Stan Lipski and I were good friends. He was very badly burned. His hands were burned down to tendons and his face was badly burned by the flash fire. He had burned his eyes so he couldn’t see and he had to be supported, held out of the water. All of us in my group ended up with a huge ulcer on our thigh where you supported a man and the waves rubbed your skin away. Stan took a long time to die. That was one message he gave me for his wife. He said he loved her and wanted her to marry again.

Did she?

I don’t know but I did tell her. She was a lovely woman; I hope she did.

Your own injuries, the burns you had, the saltwater must have been quite irritating.

It was at first but then the fuel oil acted like a protective covering after you got over the pain of the thing. If I tried to touch or grab something there was pain but most of the time I was comfortable in the saltwater.

You said that because you had no medical equipment or anything you acted as an advisor to the men.

There was nothing I could do but give advice, bury the dead, and save the life jackets, and try to keep the men from drinking the saltwater when we drifted out of the fuel oil. When the hot sun came out and we were in this crystal clear water, you were so thirsty you couldn’t believe it wasn’t good enough to drink. I had a hard time convincing the men that they shouldn’t drink. The real young ones—you take away their hope, you take away their water and food, they would drink and then would go fast. I can remember striking men who were drinking water to try and stop them. The saltwater acted like a physic. The men would get diarrhea, then get more dehydrated, then become very maniacal. In the beginning, we tried to hold them and support them while they were thrashing around. And then we discovered we were losing a good man to get rid of one who had been bad and drank. As terrible as it may sound, towards the end when they did this, we shoved them away from the pack because we had to.

Wasn’t hypothermia another problem?

The water in that part of the Pacific was warm and good for swimming. But body temperature is over 98 and when you immerse someone up to their chin in that water for a couple of days, you’re going to chill him down. So at night with everybody tied together we would take the strings from the leg part of our jackets which normally kept the jacket from riding up, and we would tie it to the man next. Everybody was tied together and they all had severe chills. And after they were chilled, they ran a fever and then they all became delirious. On Tuesday night, in my group, some guy began yelling, “There’s a Jap here and he’s trying to kill me.” And then everybody started to fight. They were totally out of their minds. A lot of men were killed that night. A lot of men drowned. We untied ourselves from the man next and shoved him away and everybody scattered in all directions. And when we got back together the next day there were a hell of a lot fewer. But you couldn’t blame the men. They weren’t attacking their buddies. They were fighting Japs. It was mass hysteria. You became wary of everyone. It was a beautiful moonlit night and we were drifting in these big seas. You’d see somebody and back off, and they’d back off. Till daylight came, you weren’t sure.

In fact, there were mass hallucinations. It was amazing how everyone would see the same thing. One would see something, then someone else would see it. One day everyone got in a long line. I said, “What are you doing?” Someone answered, “Doctor, there’s an island up here just ahead of us. One of us can go ashore at a time and you can get 15 minutes sleep.” They all saw the island. They also saw the ship just beneath the surface, and the scuttlebutt[21] down there. And they would dive down to get a drink of water and the salt water killed them. They could see it. You couldn’t convince them. Even I thought I saw the ship once. I fought hallucinations off and on. Something always brought me back.

There was an incident when one of the men began hitting you.

I thought someone was splashing water in my face and I got very angry with him and told him to stop. It was a hallucination. What actually was happening was that the water was splashing in my face from breaking waves. It wasn’t always calm.

Can you talk about Father Conway? You mentioned earlier how he had selflessly loaned you the money so you could go home to Connecticut.

Father Conway was a big help. He took part in burying the dead and he gave a lot of solace. He like Capt. Parke and all the rest totally exhausted themselves. He finally died. [Rich?] was supporting Father Conway and he called me and said he couldn’t hold him any more. And I took over holding the father. He was delirious and out of his head. He was blessing me and hitting me on the forehead and chest. We tried to hold him and eventually he went into a coma and we let him go.

You were in the water for 4 1/2 days without water or food. In some of the books I’ve read, they talk of these casks of water that floated by. What was the story on that?

Those were the raft people. We had nothing. I think I saw one potato float by once. There was nothing to eat or drink for 4 1/2 days.

One of the most horrifying aspects of the Indianapolis disaster was the fact that sharks were a constant menace. Did you have any encounters with them?

I saw one shark. He was about this long and he went around in front of me in the afternoon. I remember reaching out trying to grab a hold of him. I thought maybe it would be food. However, when night came, things would bang against you in the dark or brush against your leg and you would wonder what it was. But honestly, in the entire 110 hours I was in the water I did not see a man attacked by a shark. However, the destroyers that picked up the bodies afterward found a large number of those bodies—in the report I read—56 bodies were all mutilated by fish. Maybe the sharks were satisfied with the dead; they didn’t have to bite the living.[22]

Source: TD; Extract of “Oral History with Capt. (Ret.) Lewis Haynes, MC, USN, U.S. Navy Medical Department Oral History Program,” interview conducted by Jan K. Herman, Historian, 5, 12, 22 June 1995, BUMED Archives. The remainder of the interview deals with Haynes’ naval experience prior to and after the Indianapolis sinking. He also covers in detail his experience during the torpedo attack, the sinking, and his time in the water.

After the war, the U.S. Navy interrogated Commander Mochitsura Hashimoto, who had commanded I-58 when it sank Indianapolis. This memorandum in the Bureau of Ship’s War Damage Reports on Indianapolis gives the enemy combatant’s perspective, perhaps the best account of the specific damage done to the ship. As the Japanese destroyed many official records during the final stages of the war, Hashimoto’s testimony provides the most immediate and reliable information. The U.S. Navy had a keen interest in the type of ordnance used to sink Indianapolis. I-58 carried six Kaiten torpedoes and, according to Hashimoto’s memoir Sunk: The Story of the Japanese Submarine Fleet, 1941–45, had unsuccessfully used two of them in an attack on an enemy tanker two days before encountering Indianapolis. Commander Hashimoto adamantly held throughout investigations that he deployed no Kaiten against Indianapolis because the situation did not require their use.

Document 2.11: Memo on USN Interrogation of Commander Hashimoto on 2 November 1945

NAVY DEPARTMENT

BUREAU OF SHIPS

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

26 March 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

Subj: Loss of Indianapolis

Ref: (a) Interrogation of Comdr. Hashimoto, XIJN, Tokyo on 2 November 1945.

1. Comdr. Hashimoto interrogated 2 Nov. 1945. He was the Commanding Officer of XIJN submarine I-58 on the night of 30 July 1945 when the Indianapolis was torpedoed and sunk.

2. It was reported that he fired six torpedos, four of which hit and two missed. These torpedos were 53cm diameter, Type 95, with warhead charge of 500 kilograms, with 60% TNT and 40% Hexa. The depth setting was 4 meters. Five of the torpedos had combination magnetic and inertia type pistols with a charge of 470 kilograms and the sixth torpedo had a simple inertia pistol with a full charge of 500 kilograms.

3. The range was 1,500 meters and the target angle was 60° on the starboard bow of the Indianapolis. All six torpedos were fired using periscope control with the Indianapolis actually in sight.

[signed]

E. C. HOLTZWORTH

Commander, USN

FROM BUREAU OF SHIPS, NAVY DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

Source: TDS; “Interrogation of Comdr. Hashimoto, 2 November 1945” from “Bureau of Ships War Damage Report for the USS Indianapolis,” signed by E. C. Holtzworth, CDR USN, RG 19, Entry P1, Boxes 30-31, NARA II, College Park, MD.

Commander Hashimoto wrote this account either during the war or shortly after. This description of the attack provides more detail than Hashimoto’s court-martial testimony and his 1954 memoir, Sunk. Hashimoto described how he kept a visual of Indianapolis throughout his attack maneuvers, that he scored at least two hits, that he used conventional torpedoes rather than Kaiten, and that he did not encounter survivors when he resurfaced to verify the sinking. The scenario recounted by Hashimoto, from making contact with Indianapolis through the sinking, was ideal for a submarine commander. Hashimoto’s account also highlighted the incredible role of luck in the sinking; he surfaced close by his target, poor visibility improved and left his target perfectly silhouetted by the moon, and he launched a full-spread of six torpedoes at point-blank range. Being completely unaware of the enemy’s presence, the crew of Indianapolis stood little chance against a competent enemy commander in such a situation. This account has been translated from the original Japanese by Mr. Yutaka Iwasaki. A similar version of Hashimoto’s after-action report is also available in the National Archives at College Park, Maryland, in the volume of the U.S. Navy’s Technical Mission to Japan dealing with Japanese Submarine Operations.

Document 2.12: Commander Hashimoto’s Recollection of the Attack[23]

Captain Hashimoto’s Report

July 29th, 1945 Summary of combat action by submarine I-58 against U.S. battleship

July 28th, 1945

PM 14:00/ At the point of Palau 20 degree and 410 nautical miles distance, we attacked a large oiler and one destroyer by Kaiten[.] Thereafter move toward west by surface running.[24]

July 29th, 1945

19:52/ Visibility was low. Therefore we had stayed under water.[25] Did careful sonar monitoring, had no contact. Then after the moon rise, observed through periscope and found no target.

23:05/ Surfaced. (note: The moon rise at 21:56, the age 20.6) Soon by binoculars with a magnifying power of 10, under east moon, we found something that was high at middle most alike surfaced submarine. Quick dive to depth 19m. At this time, the target angle on the bow was 0 degrees, bearing range 10,000 meters. Soon after the dive, we could catch the target through night periscope.

23:08/ Ordered ‘Torpedo battle station and Kaiten battle station.’ Turned to the left and went toward the target, set attack course. The target came below the moon, the celestial phenomena aided us. Keep the periscope up and observing, waiting the target approach. Though the type of target still unidentified.

23:09/ [Ordered] ‘Shooting method number six.’[26] ‘Action torpedo battle’ ‘Aboard skipper, Kaiten boat number six.’

PM 23:18/ ‘Aboard skipper, Kaiten boat number five.’ Meanwhile set the sub condition against depth charge attack, except Kaiten fitting. The target was still coming under the course near 0 deg. angle on the bow. Though we heard no sonar pinging, therefore I judged the enemy did not have hostile intention, Kept approaching. At about 3,000 meter distance, I knew the target coming toward the right. At the same time the target had fore and aft mast, it meant the target was heavy cruiser or bigger ship.

23:26/ Began shooting.

23:32/ Complete six torpedoes shooting. (As shown in attached figure of battle.)

Torpedo data and etc.

Track angle : right 60 deg.

Firing bearing : 1,500 meter

Gyro angle : right 28 deg.

Torpedo spread angle : 3 deg.

Shooting interval : 3 seconds

Torpedo type : torpedo TYPE 95 Mark 2

War head type : One was Mark 2, Five were Mark 5.

Target speed : 12 knots, straight ahead.

23:33/ While periscope watching, hit one torpedo. By this torpedo I saw a flame rise at No.1 turret, also three large water columns.

23:34/ Heard four torpedo hit sounds. Soon propeller sounds ceased. Therefore we see the ship stopped.

23:51/ At center flash light broke up. Before and after this event, we heard some series of explosion sound ten times. (In them, four to five were more loud than torpedo hit sound). Furthermore before and after this time we heard sonar ping, therefore I feared counterattack and turned to show our own stern. Continuously waiting for the finishing of next torpedo attack.

July 30th, 1945

00:00/ Because of the cease of the explosion sounds, I did periscope observation and knew there was nothing of a surface ship. Immediately turned [toward the enemy]. Returned back to sank ship by submerging running. Though we saw no target. Surfaced around 0030. Moon bright, visibility good. Some waves. We spotted no floating debris, but based on the circumstances before and after, concluded that the sinking was a certainty. I feared the threat of escort vessel and alert airplane, decided as soon as possible to leave current position. Running toward north-East by surface running, speed 13 knots.

[02:30] After we had ran about two hours, then saw enemy airplane. Therefore dived. Since then we ran toward north-west. While going away, Aug. 1st, 1945 01:15 I had radioed following combat report:

July 29th, 1945 PM 23:33 At the point xxxx we had sank Idaho class battleship (confirmed). Three torpedoes must hit.

At that time, sonar condition was not good, therefore at the range 1,000 meters the device could catch the target sounds. Enemy did nothing effective counterattack. We had no damage. Kaiten was only stand by, no chance to attack.

Source: TD; Mochitsura Hashimoto, “Documents Related to I-58 Submarine between the Showa 19 and 20 Periods,” accession date 9 October 1958, reference code 04 Sensuikan 58, Military History Research Center, National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, Japan, assisted by historian Kiyoshi Yamada. The document, prepared shortly after the war, was processed into the archives in 1958. Documents provided by Dr. Jun Kimura, Tokai University. Translation given to the U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command by Japanese naval architect Yutaka Iwasaki. Glynne Walley, assistant professor of Japanese literature and East Asian languages and Literatures at the University of Oregon, also contributed in translating portions of this document. U.S. Navy’s translation available in U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan: Ship and Related Targets, Japanese Submarine Operations (Index No. S-17), “Japanese Technical Mission to Japan,” RG 38, Box 5, NARA II, College Park, MD.

Figure 2-5. Commander Hashimoto’s sketch of the attack. Translation done by naval architect Yutaka Iwasaki. Battle diagram of I-58 Submarine 20th Year (Showa) July 29th. The diagram has magnetic north, and then depicts the location of the moon to the east. The scale in the corner is in meters (the scale is 50,000 to 1). The submarine was headed on course 190 at time 2305 on the 29th when it surfaced and saw the silhouette of a target at approximately 10,000 meters off its starboard side. Apparent course and speed of the target was 260 at 11 knots. The submarine maneuvered into position 1,500 meters off the starboard beam where it took 6 shots at time 2332. The dotted line is the apparent location of where the ship was sunk. The submarine performed a starboard, then port, then starboard turn before setting out on course 045 at approximately 0030 on the 30th. From same source as Document 2.12 note. Mochitsura Hashimoto, “Documents Related to I-58 Submarine between the Showa 19 and 20 Periods,” accession date 9 October 1958, reference code 04 Sensuikan 58, Military History Research Center, National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, Japan, assisted by historian Kiyoshi Yamada. The document, prepared shortly after the war, was processed into the archives in 1958.

Documents provided by Dr. Jun Kimura, Tokai University

Figure 2-6. View in the forward torpedo room of I-58, showing 21-inch torpedo tubes and three crew members. Taken at Sasebo, Japan, 28 January 1946. This submarine torpedoed and sank Indianapolis (CA-35) on 30 July 1945.

U.S. Marine Corps Photograph. NHHC Photo Collection, USMC 139986

U. S. intelligence intercepted Commander Hashimoto’s message of his successful attack but could not identify the type of ship reported sunk or its location. Skepticism of the authenticity of such Japanese reports was also high as they frequently were exaggerated or were made falsely to bait additional targets to the area in a rescue attempt. The summary of incoming intelligence from JICPOA noted the report from I-58; however, it questioned the accuracy of Hashimoto’s report due, in part, to previous intelligence that had reported that I-58 had been sunk on 22 July (see Chapter 1, Document 1.9).

Document 2.13: U.S. Intercept of Hashimoto’s Sinking Confirmation and Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area 29 July 1945 Summary of ULTRA Intelligence

30 July/0048

JN-25-P-91

62

From: SA TE KO 4

To: Navy Vice Minister; Combined Naval Force Headquarters; Commander Advance Expeditionary Force

From Captain Submarine I-58 (16595).

29th at 2332 attacked and sank one [blank]. Sinking confirmed. [blank]. Position of hits (unrecovered grid).

(FRUPAC-300756-DISC-DI)

GI Comment: Despatch of 29 July/2238 (item 36 page 20, RI Summary 300500/Q July) ordered Subs I-58, I-53, I-47, and I-367 to carry out attacks against the supply line between Leyte and Okinawa and also to intercept Blue striking force if it should return.

NEGAT identifies: RI KU O 0- Tokyo Bureau of Military Preparations.[27]

Page 41, 31 July P.M.

[END]

[. . .]

Summary of Ultra Dispatches
0000/29-2400/29 July 1945

Jap Subs Scope
292100 July—1-53 reports that at 1442/24 she fired #1 Kaiten, and at 1515 heard an explosion. (Comment: This attack sank the DE Underhill.) At 1446/29 she sent #2 Kaiten against and AP and DD and at 1715 observed a loud explosion. Patrol comparatively uneventful.”

300848 July—Sub I-58 reports that at 29/2332 she attacked and sank one blank, at blank posit. (Comment: did someone say the I-58 was sunk?)

Sources: TDC; ULTRA Extracts, Photocopies in USS Indianapolis file, Box 396B, Naval History and Heritage Command Archives, WNY. Originals from COMNAVSECGRU File 5830/114. Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Areas Summary of ULTRA Traffic, 1 July–31 August 1945 [SRMD-007, Part IV]. Located in Navy Department Library Special Collections, WNY.

The special enemy submarine summary from the JICPOA estimates section and the reply from CINCPAC HQ the days prior to the discovery of Indianapolis crew in the water presented doubt about the report of a successful sinking from I-58 on 29 July. It is evident from the summary that the earlier report of I-58’s sinking continued to confound analysts. CINCPAC HQ desired that the report be expanded to include other Japanese submarines and also wanted additional similar reports prepared and disseminated in the future. The thorough, but routine, tone of the documents reflected the always evolving nature of intelligence collection and analysis.

Documents 2.14 and 2.15: Special Submarine Summary Prepared by JICPOA Estimates Section 1 August 1945 and Reply from CINCPAC Advanced Headquarters

1 August 1945

From: Johnson

To: Showers

Special submarine summary. On 22 May a Kaiten Special Attack Unit was organized consisting of I-36, I-361, and I-363 to which the I-165 was added on 13 June. They proceeded to the area east of Marianas, 400 miles southeast of Okinawa, 400 miles northwest of Marianas and east of Marianas respectively. Subsequently I-165 was directed to patrol west of 155-00E and I-36 east of 155-00E.

On 21 June I-36 torpedoed Endymion (ARL-9) at 12-41-N., 156-30E and on 28 June launched two Kaitens but was unable to confirm any damage (believe intended victim was Antares (AKS-3) at 13-10N., 154-57E). I-36 arrived back in Kure on 10 July, and I-363 arrived Empire on 28 June.

On 30 July Japs admitted nothing had been heard from I-361 or I-165 since they sortied. They were to have returned to Yokosuka on 15 June and Kure on 13 July respectively. (Good indications I-361 was sunk 31 May at 22-22N., 134-09E., by USS Anzio, and I-165 was sunk 27 June at 15-28N., 153-39E., by NAB Tinian Plane.)

On 31 July C of S 6th Fleet reported that nothing had been heard from I-13 since she sortied from Ominato on 11 July. Consider I-13 definitely sunk by USS Anzio on 16 July at 34-20N., 151-12E.

Now confirmed that I-53 sank Underhill. I-58 reported making an attack at 2332/29 sinking one blank. Position of hits unknown. Am still of opinion that I-58 was the submarine attacked off Amami O Shima on 21/22 July from which attack she escaped apparently undamaged.

On 29 July I-53, I-58, I-47, and I-367 were ordered to proceed to station operation within 50 miles of blank positions to destroy shipping RPT shipping on the Leyte-Okinawa supply route and to intercept and attack enemy returning task forces. Using tentative solution grid, FRUPAC gets approximate position 19-50N., 128-SoE for positon assigned to I-367. On 31 July I-363 were added to this Kaiten Force. I-366 carrying 5 Kaitens sorties after 1 August for patrol station 500 miles North of Palao. (Presumably relieving I-58). I-363 carrying 5 Kaitens sorties after 6 (?) August for patrol station 450 miles northwest RPT northwest of Marianas. (Believe station same as that formerly assigned to I-367 and that I-363 is relieving the I-367).

CCN: Line six last paragraph
“to I-367. On 31 July I-363 and I-366 were added to this Kaiten force.

2 August 1945

From: Showers

To: Johnson

Submarine summary your number 315 much appreciated here. Captain Layton suggests that current information on I-14, I-400, and I-401 be included that that summary then be given to Commander Hudson for dissemination to all holders 35-S. Further suggests that similar special submarine situation summaries be similarly handled from time to time when available information warrants. That is all.[28]

Sources: TDC; Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Areas. United States Navy File of SIGTOT Messages From JICPOA Estimates Section to CINCPAC Advanced Headquarters, March–August 1945 [SRMD-005] and [SRMD-006]. Located in Navy Department Library Special Collections, WNY.

Commander, Amphibious Forces U.S. Pacific Fleet desired to test the new RATT (radio teletypewriter) technology and asked that Indianapolis participate in a communications test on the morning she was to arrive in the Philippines on 31 July, using the call sign KTIA. The dispatch below shows Indianapolis’s failure to participate in the scheduled test and indicates that the Navy had little idea that Indianapolis had been missing for more than 24 hours. Failure to make further inquiry into why Indianapolis did not participate in the test was investigated at the Court of Inquiry into the loss. Ultimately, since the technology was so new and required such highly skilled operators, the failure to establish communications caused little alarm. The equipment was newly installed on Indianapolis and untested.

Document 2.16: Failed Attempt to Contact Indianapolis on High Frequency Radio Teletypewriter the Day After Sinking

31 July 1945/0908

From: COMPHIBSPAC 310620

Action: CINCPAC ADV HQ

Info: Indianapolis (CA 35), COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT

Precedence: Priority

My 300320 unable to contact Indianapolis. On HF RATT or cue circuit either directly or by relay through RDO Guam. Request Indianapolis advise at what time she will be ready for further test. Will discontinue cue circuit until that time.

REF: Your 290027. Unless other directed following procedure will govern HF RATT test.....

CORRECTED COPY: CW in 1st and 4th lines changed to cue per 311020[29]

Source: TD; “Dispatches Dealing with Departure and Arrival of Indianapolis,” 26–28 July 1945. These were submitted as evidence to the Court of Inquiry convened to investigate the loss. In CINCPAC 1945 Flag Files, RG 38, Box 45, NARA II, College Park, MD. The entire collection spans approximately 150 dispatches covering 26 July 1945-16 August 1945.

Army Air Force Captain Richard LeFrancis and the crew of his C-54 flying east from the Philippines to Guam likely viewed flares fired by those survivors of Indianapolis fortunate to be in rafts during their first full night in the water. They apparently fired so many as to give the appearance of a small naval engagement. Had further investigation or an inquiry to the Navy regarding the perceived naval battle taken place following the report of LeFrancis, the possibility might have existed for a faster realization of the nonarrival of Indianapolis. This report was forwarded from the Fourth Air Force HQ, Office of the Assistance Chief of Staff, A-2, San Francisco, California, to the Office of Naval Intelligence, Western Sea Frontier, Federal Building, San Francisco, California, on 21 August 1945. It subsequently went from Commander Western Sea Frontier to COMINCH Pacific on 23 August. It reached the office of the CNO as part of COMINCH Pacific’s 14 December 1945 Action Report. Captain LeFrancis’s report, paired with the conflicting intelligence about I-58 and the failed RATT test with Indianapolis showed how confused things were in the massive Pacific Theater in 1945. Allied leaders were planning for the final stages of the war—preparations for the delivery of atomic bombs and an invasion of mainland Japan were ongoing when Indianapolis went down. Communications between the different services were less than ideal during the war, but it is not surprising for the Army Air Forces to make the assumption that the U. S. Navy would be aware of one of its ships being in an engagement. Captain LeFrancis was not aware that Indianapolis had not been reported overdue and that the U.S. Navy had failed to keep track of one of its own ships.

Document 2.17: Army Air Force Report Regarding Possibility of Viewing Naval Action Involving Indianapolis on Night of 31 July 1945

AIR BASE HEADQUARTERS

Base Intelligence Office

Hamilton Field, California.

15 August 1945

Date

SUBJECT: Naval Action Possibly Involving U.S. Cruiser Indianapolis, 430 Miles East of Manila, 30 July 1945.

Summary of Information:

Captain Richard G. LeFrancis, ASN: 0-729029, Sq. “G”, 1503rd AAF Base Unit, ATC Hamilton Field, California, reported to the Counter Intelligence Office on 15 August 1945 that in view of reports in the press about the U.S. Cruiser Indianapolis this information is submitted. Captain LeFrancis was pilot of C-54E #070 on a flight from Manila to Guam at approximately 430 miles east of Manila at approximately 1900 hours GCT on 30 July 1945. He and his crew saw Naval Action and the fire of star shells, tracers, and heavier Naval Artillery. One passenger aboard on this flight was a Brigadier-General who was in command of the artillery of the 33rd Infantry Division. This General’s name is unknown but thought to be either Paxton or Buxton. This General also witnessed this action and expressed the opinion to Captain Le Francis that it appeared two ships engaging one.

Captain Joe Parshall of the 1504th AAF Base Unit, Fairfield-Suisun AAB was Navigator on this flight and his log, on file at the Fairfield-Suisun AAB, should record this information in more detail. This information was turned over to officers at Operations and Navigation at Guam but no record or report was made and Captain Le Francis was dismissed with the statement that if it was Naval Action the Navy knew about it. Captain Le Francis states that he turned this information in again in view of the press reports that it is not known as to the action which caused the loss of the Cruiser Indianapolis.

Source: TD; “Summary of Information Available in Regard to the Sinking of the USS Indianapolis (CA-35) Based on the Interrogation of Survivors,” within Action Report, Island Commander Peleliu, Loss of the USS Indianapolis, 6 August 1945, “Action Reports Peleliu Island Command,” RG 38, Box 70, NARA II, College Park, MD.

Figure 2-7. Chart of the Western Pacific, showing Indianapolis’s (CA-35) track from Guam to her reported sinking location, with a dashed extension showing her intended route to the Philippines.

Official U.S. Navy Photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives. NHHC Photo Collection, 80-G-701777

The “action report” submitted by Commander, Peleliu Island, on 6 August, days after the rescue, provided critical details of Indianapolis based on testimony from her recently rescued crew. The summary gave details of the final day of the voyage, the attack, and the experience of survivors in the water. Many of the key points raised in this document, such as the failure to recollect the exact position of the sinking, potential sightings of a surfaced Japanese submarine, and the inability to signal patrol planes, served as the focus of subsequent investigations and studies of the sinking.

Document 2.18: Summary of Sinking Based on Interrogation of Survivors Prepared by Office of Island Commander Peleliu Island Command, 6 August 1945

1. At the time of the attack, the USS Indianapolis (CA-35) was travelling on a course approximately due west at 17 knots, not zigzagging. The degaussing coils were not turned on. The ship was completely blacked out. The weather was good, with general unrestricted visibility. There was some cloud cover, which obscured the moon part of the time. Captain McVay reports that there was a peculiar, confused sea, with trough which he later estimated to be about 10 feet deep.

2. There was no contact made either visually or by radar prior to the attack. The ship was not equipped with sound gear. Radio silence had not been broken prior to the attack, but an LST had been spoken visually at about 1400 (-9 ½) on Sunday, 29 July. The Indianapolis had passed this vessel on approximately the same course.

3. The attack occurred at about 0015 (-9 ½) at a position estimated to be approximately 11°46’ N., 133°25’ W. (This estimate is based on the position of survivors when picked up.) Captain McVay states that he felt two distinct explosions, which were almost simultaneous. Two survivors (Kemp, D.P. Jr. SC3c and Kenly, O.W., RdM3c) who were on deck at the time report seeing two distinct flashes on the starboard bow of the ship. Other survivors also testify that there were two explosions. Captain McVay also states that there was acrid, white smoke on the navigating bridge and in the captain’s emergency cabin immediately after the explosions, causing him to believe that one of the eight inch magazines may have exploded.

4. The first explosion threw Captain McVay out of his bunk in his emergency cabin just off the navigating bridge. He states that the explosions had a whipping action on the ship, giving it an effect similar to that caused by a bomb exploding under the surface close to the ship. He went out on the navigating bridge, noticed that there was water on the bridge and in the chart house, and returned to his cabin for his shoes and some clothing. Power had failed and all communications on the ship were out. A few minutes later the damage control officer reported to the captain that the ship was settling by the head very fast and that the situation looked serious. Soon afterward the executive office reported to the captain that he did not believe the ship would stay afloat much longer and that he recommended that the ship be abandoned. The order to abandon ship was then given by the captain and was passed verbally.

5. Attempts were made to transmit distress signals on both 4235 kc and 500 kc. Moran, J.J., RM1c, states that he attempted to send the following message on 4235 kc “NQO V XVML HIT BY @ TORPEDOES I POSITION LONG______LAT______NEED IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE”. (He does not recall the exact position sent.) However, the pilot light on the key was not burning, and he does not believe the transmitter was functioning. Hart, F.J., RT2c reports that Chief Radio Electrician Woods sent “SOS: repeatedly on 500 kc from Radio 2, and that both he and Woods believed the transmitter was functioning properly. Hart confirms Moran’s opinion that the remote key in Radio 1 was not operating the transmitter, which was located in Radio 2.

6. After Captain McVay had given the order to abandon ship, he started down the ladder to the signal bridge with the intention of ascertaining whether a distress signal had been sent. At this point the ship, which had been listing about 5° to starboard, took a decided list of about 60° to starboard, and soon afterward was listing 90°. The captain seized a life line, crawled up to the port side of the ship, and walked along the side to a point about 150 feet from the stern where he was sucked off the ship into the water by a wave.

7. Captain McVay reports that although the ship was first reported settling by the head, this was not immediately apparent from the bridge. However, as the list increased, the head settled lower, and before the ship finally sank it had rolled over on its starboard side. The captain and other survivors estimate that the entire elapsed time from the first explosion until the ship disappeared did not exceed fifteen minutes.

8. A majority of the survivors were unable to find life rafts and spent the entire time in the water in life jackets until they were sighted and rafts were dropped by aircraft. These men were in considerable worse shape than the others when rescued. A large number of men who had only life jackets died of exposure before they were found.

9. Captain McVay saw no evidence of any enemy craft in the area at any time after the sinking. However, a group of officers and men who were a number miles from the captain report that after dark on the night of 30 July red and green lights were seen which appeared to be one or more craft on the surface. Lt. Commander L. L. Haynes (MC) who was with this group states that the lights blinked back and forth as if signaling, then moved rapidly apart and disappeared. One of the men in the water blinked a flashlight at the red light and Dr. Haynes believes it flashed back. Dr. Haynes is of the opinion that these lights may have been on two enemy submarines.

10. Dr. Haynes states that after the second day most of the men who were near him were subject to fantastic hallucinations. These were contagious, so that a hallucination which started with one man was quickly accepted and shared by others. For example, one of the men told the others that he had located the stern of the Indianapolis just below the surface, and that he had dived down, entered the ship, and drank a large quantity of fresh milk. This report was accepted as true by a large number of men, all of whom attempted to locate the vessel by diving.

11. All of the survivors report that a large number of aircraft passed over or near them before they were finally sighted and rescue operations commenced. Their efforts to signal these planes both with signaling mirrors in daylight and Very pistols at night were apparently unsuccessful.

Source: TD; “Summary of Information Available in Regard to the Sinking of the USS Indianapolis (CA-35) Based on the Interrogation of Survivors,” within Action Report, Island Commander Peleliu, Loss of the USS Indianapolis, 6 August 1945, “Action Reports Peleliu Island Command,” RG 38, Box 70, NARA II, College Park, MD.

CHAPTER THREE

Rescued

This extract from Captain McVay’s oral history interview describes his rescue. Among the last to go into the water from Indianapolis, McVay was also one of the last to be rescued. McVay’s life raft group drifted considerably farther north than the men floating in the water, and the captain did not know if anyone other than those with him survived the sinking until he witnessed the airplanes maneuvering for rescue operations. The difficulty of spotting objects in the water from the air meant that McVay’s group went undetected by aircrew involved in the search and rescue effort, but an ammunition can on their raft was picked up by the radar of the high-speed transport ship Ringness (APD-100) that was vectored to the search area. McVay’s description details his leadership of the group of survivors, taking a realistic view of potential rescue and the need to ration supplies accordingly.

Document 3.1: Oral History of Captain Charles B. McVay III, Describing His Rescue [Extract]

Of course, we knew later that they didn’t know that we were missing, so consequently, they didn’t expect to see anything. It’s the same old thing, if an aviator doesn’t expect to see anything, he doesn’t see it. He’s too busy trying to fly his plane.

I was not particularly perturbed by not being picked up by planes, nor were the people with me, because I had told them that they probably couldn’t see us or wouldn’t see us until they had really discovered we were missing. And I was basing my hopes on ships. I did not believe that any ships could reach the area prior to about sometime Thursday.

Well, around Thursday noon, we did see quite a ways to the south of us a plane circling and later some other planes circling. I didn’t know what they were doing down there, and then that night we saw some searchlights of ships down there, so we naturally thought, well, there must be other survivors. They were quite a ways south of us and we said, “Well, I guess we do have other people than just this small group that is apparently is quite a ways up north here.” But the planes kept getting further away from us and I must admit I had several misgivings, I commenced to think I was north of the northern limit of their search. I thought that “We are in a fine fix now. If they’re going south all the time and we’re going north, why, it looks as though they’ll miss us.”

Well, on that assumption, I decided to cut the rations in half. We had been getting 1.2 ounces of spam, the two crackers, the two malted milk tablets, which seemed to sustain us. Nobody seemed to be particularly hungry, but that night when I saw the ships down there, I decided that I would let them have the normal ration. We had been too excited during Thursday to eat. We didn’t eat until after dark, by that time we had seen the searchlights so I said, “Well, I’ll give you the normal ration again. We won’t cut it in half.”

The next morning we saw planes quite a ways to the north of us. It was making a box search and it was gradually getting closer to us, so we felt a lot better. It made this very wide search, would disappear and come back again, then go way north and then come back on a westerly leg and fly its easterly leg fairly close to us. Just about the time that we had figured out the next sweep he should see us, somebody said, “My God, look at this, there are two destroyers bearing down on us. Why, they’re almost on top of us.”

So one of the kids said, “Well, the hell with the planes, we know these people will pick us up.” They were almost on top of us when we saw them.

When one of them, the USS Ringness, the APD 100, picked me up and the group on my raft, the other one the USS Register, APD 92, went on north and we discovered there was another raft north of us which we had suspected, and picked up that small group. We were never sighted by a plane.

The Ringness picked us up by radar. We had a 40 mm, empty ammunition can which I had spent a good deal of energy and time trying to get to, thinking it was an emergency ration, but we picked it up anyhow and saved it and she apparently got a pip from this can. She picked us up at only 4,046 yards, but she had not seen us visually at that distance, and the only reason she knew something was there was because of the radar pip. So it goes to show how difficult it is to see anybody in the water, when you have a large ground swell, or a heavy ground swell.

She came along side and, as I say, picked us up. We were all able to crawl aboard on our own power. People were pretty well exhausted, I think more or less nervous exhaustion. I think we had lost probably about 15% of our weight and I was naturally so elated to get on the ship, as were the others that we didn’t turn in at all. We were given something to eat, ice cream, coffee, such as that. The doctor said, “You can eat all you want,” which most of us did. We drank quite a bit of water. Nervous energy kept us going. I did sleep quite a bit that night and the next morning, let’s see, that was the morning of the 3rd that we were picked up. We sort of lolled around all day of the 5th and we got into Palau on the 6th when we were put in the hospital.

Source: TR; Extract from “Oral History of Charles B. McVay III, Captain USN,” recorded 27 September 1945, transcribed 1 October 1945, 34 pp. Copy of original in Indianapolis Ship History Files, Naval History and Heritage Command Archives, WNY.

Figure 3-1. Ringness (APD-100) photographed in about 1945, flying a long homeward bound pennant.

Courtesy of Donald M. McPherson, 1971 U.S. NHHC Photograph, NH 73857

Dispatches to and from air and surface units involved in the Indianapolis rescue operation were submitted as evidence during the Court of Inquiry held in late August 1945. The following dispatches provide an overview of the entire rescue effort, from its launch on 2 August to the 9 August conclusion. While the Navy failed to notice or act on Indianapolis’s failure to arrive at Leyte, it did mount a speedy and thorough rescue immediately after aircraft spotted survivors. Coordination between surface, air, and shore establishments worked to locate survivors and diverted needed assets to the scene as quickly as possible. Prioritization of rescue based on conditions of survivors in the water, availability of rafts, and proximity to other survivors undoubtedly saved lives. Almost all survivors were out of the water within 24 hours of the initial sighting by Lieutenant (j.g.) Chuck Gwinn, and the hospital ship Tranquility rushed to Peleliu to treat and transport survivors arriving there. Once all survivors were out of the water, the arduous task of body recovery, identification, and burial began. The search was discontinued only after surface and air units felt that they had exhausted all efforts and no more bodies were being found.

Document 3.2: Dispatches Regarding Discovery of Indianapolis Survivors and Rescue Operations, 2–9 August 1945

2 AUG 45/0244

From: PLANE 19 of FLIGHT 258

Action: COMMARIANAS, COMFAIRWING 18, RDO GUAM, OINC FLIGHT A258, COMWESCARSUBAREA, RDO HONO

Precedence: Urgent

Sighted 30 survivors 011-30 North 133-30 East dropped transmitter and lifeboat emergency IFF on 133-00.[1]

2 AUG 1945

From: ONIC FLIGHT 258

Action: PLANE 19 of FLIGHT 258

Dumbo enroute ETA 1500K. Remain on station.[2]

2 AUG 45/0344

From: PLANE 19, FLIGHT 258, 02045

Action: COMMARIANAS, COMFAW 18, COMWESCARSUBAREA, CINC FLIGHT 258

Precedence: Urgent

Send rescue ship 11-54 N 133-47 E 150 survivors in life boat and jackets dropped red ramrod.[3]

2 AUG 45-0414

From: COMARIANAS 020409

Action: CTG 94.5

Info: CINCPAC ADV HQ, CTU 94.6.2

Precedence: Urgent

Order two destroyers at best speed to 11-54N 133-47E. Rescue 150 survivors in lifeboats.[4]

2 AUG 45/0714

From: COMPHILSEAFRON 020516

Action: CTU 95.2.16, CTU 75.2.15

Info: COM7THFLT, COMMARIANAS, NOB LEYTE, COMWESCARSUBAREA

Precedence: Urgent

Bassett APD 73 proceed to vicinity 11-54N 133-47E to search for 150 survivors. Dufilho DE 423 proceed to 11-30N 133-30E to pickup 30 survivors in lifeboat. They have transmitter and emergency IFF on 133. Keep origination advised and ETA.[5]

2 AUG 45

From: READD by RDO ULITHI

Action: Madison DD 425, Ralph Talbot DD 390, 6NE (Don’t break)/6UK2 (Don’t break)

Info: COMMARIANAS, ATCOMULITHI, COMPHILSEAFRON

2DDs enroute from Ulithi to assist in rescue. 8 planes will drop more than sufficient boats and life rafts between 1800 and 2000K. Latest position reported to be Latitude 11-45 North Longitude 133-35 East.[6]

2 AUG 45

From: CINCPAC ADV HQ

Action: Ringness (APD 100), Register (APD 92)

Info: COM7THFLT, COMMARIANAS, COMPHILSEAFRON, COM3RDFLT, COMSERVDIV 102, CTU 30.9.15

Precedence: Urgent

Proceed immediately to pick up survivors reported at lat 11-54 north long 133-47 E from unknown ship. Report results by dispatch.[7]

2 AUG 45/0756

From: COMWESCARSUBAREA

Action: Cecil J. Doyle (DE 368)

Info: COMMARIANAS, ATCOM ULITHI, CTU 94.11.2, CTG 94.11, Plane 19 of Flight 258, VPB 152

About 30 survivors sighted by 19v258 approximate latitude 11-30 N longitude 133-30 E. PV remaining vicinity until 1500 K (-10) and Dumbo enroute to circle until rescue effected. Proceed maximum practical speed to rescue survivors. On completion reutnr [return] Peleliu. Use airsea rescue procedures and communications any info addee having ships in vicinity requested to assist GO.[8]

2 AUG 45/1523

From: COMPHILSEAFRON, 021342

Action: CTU 35.2.15, CTU 75.2.16

Info: CINPAC ADV HQ, COMARIANAS, COMWESCARSUBAREA, ATCOM ULITHI, COM7THFLT, COM3RDFLT

Precedence: Urgent

1st vessel on scene advise originator and all addees identity of ship survivors are from and cause of sinking.[9]

Figure 3-2. Lieutenant Commander Graham Claytor Jr., skipper of Cecil J. Doyle (DE-368), was the first to arrive to scene of the Indianapolis (CA-35) survivors, around 0000 3 August. Doyle was thus the first to notify higher command that the survivors being picked up by planes since earlier in the day were Sailors and Marines from Indianapolis. This dispatch from Doyle sent shockwaves through the Navy. Note the messages written on the dispatch and the sense that individuals were trying to piece the situation together.

Scan from COMINCH Chart Room, Pacific Dispatches, 1 July–15 August 1945, RG 38, NARA II, College Park, MD. Declassified, Authority [NND917001]

2 AUG 45 From: CTG 75

Action: PD Guam

Info: CTG 95.7, CTG 95, CINCPAC ADV, COMMARIANAS, COM5THFLT, COMWESTCAROLINES, CINCPACPEARL, SCOMA, Indianapolis

Your 280032 July. Indianapolis (CA 35) has not arrived Leyte. Advise. REF: 280032 (12466-B) USS Indianapolis (CA 35) departed Guam 2300Z 27 July. SOA 15.7 knots. Route Peddie thence Leyte. ETC...[10]

2 August 1945

From: CINCPAC ADV HQ

Action: COMINCH

Precedence: Routine

Survivors being picked up in position Lat. 11-54 N Long. 133-47 E. State that Indianapolis (CA 35) was torpedoed and sunk 29 July while en route Guam to Leyte. Fragmentary reports indicate at least 200 survivors many of whom injured. Many rescue ships in position. No report thus far of Captain McVay. Will forward information as received.[11]

3 AUG 45

From: COMWESCARSUBAREA

Action: ATCOM Ulithi

Info: COMMARIANAS, CO VPB 152, USS Madison (DD 425), USS Doyle DE 368, PLAYMATE 3

Order all available Dumbos to conduct expanding square search to locate additional survivors. Use origin lat 11 deg 45 min N long 133 deg 35 min E. Keep clear of center of square area 10 miles on each side to avoid interference with forces now in center rescue area. Also keep voice transmissions to minimum reporting only when new groups of survivors sighted. At such times circle survivors until surface ship gets in position to take survivors aboard then resume search. Determine search interval by weather condition in area DND knowledge that many single survivors may be located by careful search. Search to be extended to distance 75 miles from origin. Dumbos search as long as endurance permits and resume search daylight 4 August on same plan. Voice calls SOPA Mahogany. Dumbo circling area Playmate 3. PV Gambler 5 and 6.[12]

3 AUG 45

From: CO VPB 23

Action: CNO (DCNO) AIR

Information: COMMARIANAS, CTG 94.11, COMAIRPAC, COMAIRPACSUBCOMFWD, COMFAW 2, COMWESCAROLINES

PBY-5A en bound trip 6472 landed at scene of Indianapolis sinking to take men aboard who might not have survived until ship arrived. Suffered damage on water during night due to heavy load of survivors and sea conditions. Unable to take off so abandoned and destroyed. Replacement required.[13]

3 AUG 1945

From: Ringness (APD 100)

Action: CINCPAC ADV. HQ

Information: CTU 95.7.5, COM3RDFLT, COM7THFLT, COMPHILSEAFRON, COMSERVDIV 101, DDPELELIU, COMWESCARSUBAREA

Precedence: Operational Priority

UR 020740. Proceeding Peleliu 030700 with Register (APD 92). Have 37 survivors aboard including Captain Charles McVay 3RD USN CO. Register 37 survivors including ensign Ross Rogers Junior USNR 440725. Lieut. Howard Bruce Frieze USN died and buried at sea from life raft on Tuesday 31 July.[14] Captain picked up Lat. 11-35 Long, 133-21 with 9 other rafts within radius of four miles and states believes ship hit 0015 sank 0030 I zone minus nine one half 30 July position on tract exactly as routed PD Guam. Speed 17 not zigzagging. Hit forward by what is believed to be 2 torpedoes or mine followed by magazine explosion.[15]

3 AUG 45

From: USS Bassett (APD 73)

Action: COMPHILSEAFRON

Info: COMAIRPAC, CTG 95.7, COMMARIANAS, SOCMA, COMWESCARSUBAREA, CTU 94.11.1

USS Bassett departing for Leyte 00530. ETA 040700. All times I (-9). 145 survivors aboard. USS Madison recovered 90. USS Dufilho 1. Ships remaining to form scouting line and search during daylight.[16]

3 August 1945

From: CINCPAC ADV HQ

Action: CTG 94.5, TRANQUILITY

Info: PD ULITHI, SOPA SERON 10 ULITHI, CINCPAC Pearl, COMWESCARSUBAREA, ISCOM PELELIU, COMMARIANAS, COMDESPAC, COMSERVPAC, PD GUAM, COMSERON 10, ISCOM GUAM

Tranquility (AH 14) report PD Ultihi for routing and when RFS[17] earliest possible proceed immediately Peoeliu [Peleliu] at best sustained speed. On arrival report by dispatch to CTG 94.5 for duty connection loading, care and hospitalization Indianapolis survivors as may be direct. When Tranquility (AH 14) no longer required in Palaus CTG 94.5 sail ship to Guam for discharge survivor patients and further orders by CINCPAC AD. HQ.[18]

4 AUG 45

From: CNS SAMAR 040753

Action: COMMARIANAS, COM SW CAROLINES, SUBCOM CAROLINA AREA, COMINCH, COMSERVDIV 101, COMPHILSEAFRON, CTG 95.7, CTU 95.7.5, COMSERON 10, CTF 95, CINCPAC/POA PEARL HQ, CTG 94.5, CTU 94.5.3, CTU 94.5.1

Info: NOB LEYTE, COMSERVPAC

Precedence: OP OP OP

5 Officers, 144 enlisted survivors ex USS Indianapolis at Flt. Hosp. 114. Senior survivor Lt. Richard Banks Redmayne USNR. 2 deaths en route to hospital. Regular report on two being made Flt. Hosp. 114.[19]

3 AUG 45

From: USS Madison (DD 425) 030250

Action: COMPHILSEAFRON, COMWESCARSUBAREA, CTU 94.6.2

Precedence: OP OP OP

Bassett returning Leyte with about 150 survivors. Cecil J. Doyle to Peleliu with about 93. Talbot 22, Ringness 37 including CO. Rafts and survivors scattered 50 miles. Additional survivors in view of planes. Surfaced Dumbos 1 returning other crew removed Dumbo destroyed. Continue air search 100 miles from 11-42 133-20 strongly recommend. Will continue search until relieved.[20]

From: CINCPAC ADV HQ

Action: COMWESCARSUBAREA

Info: COMMARIANAS, ISCOM PELELIU

12 male war correspondents, 1 female correspondent, LT CDR Harold Requa USNR Public Information Officer, and 2 enlisted photographers will arrive Peleliu about 1200 Sunday 5 August 1945 to interview Indianapolis survivors. Arrange for accommodations as practicable. Group will return about 6 August.[21]

4 AUG 45/1212

From: COMWESCARSUBAREA, 040741

Action: CINCPAC BOTH HQ, COMMARIANAS

Information: COMPHILSEAFRON

Precedence: OP OP OP 164060

170 survivors Indianapolis have been hospitalized at Peleliu. Bassett (APD 73) delivering 145 survivors to Leyte. Report of results today’s search not yet received. Am making thorough surface and air search of all possible area during daylight tomorrow for survivors and to clear area of floating objects and to identify and bury floating dead. Captain McVay in excellent physical and mental condition.[22]

5 AUG 45/0214

From: Madison 042350

Action: COMWESCARSUBAREA

Precedence: OP OP OP

One half sweep completed. Strongly recommend moving line 75 miles westward on return sweep. This area thoroughly covered. Continuous movement southwest of flotsam has been noticed. Request additional air coverage. Bodies now reported by plane at posit MN1-40N 133-10E.[23]

6 AUG 45/1002

From: French (DE 367), 060651

Action: COMWESCARSUBAREA

Info: COMMARIANAS, CINCPOA/PAC ADV HAQ, VPB 23, 152

Precedence: OP OP OP

Between 25 and 30 bodies will have been recovered by dark with no more in sight. Recommend that search continue with planes tomorrow but that if no further recoveries are made by noon vessels return to base. Believe about half identifiable.[24]

6 AUG 45/ 1344

From: CTU 94.7.1, 08230

Action: COMMARIANAS

Precedence: Priority 165949

Your 052341, searched area 10 miles square centered at lat 13-30 north long 145-07 east. Results negative. Search abandoned at dark.[25]

7 AUG 45

From: French (DE 367)

Action: COMWESCARSUBAREA

Recommend search continue at least till darkness today in view of fact 10 more bodies just found.[26]

7 AUG 45/1153

From: COMWESCARSUBAREA, 070825

Action: French (DE 367)

Info: COMMARIANAS, CINCPAC ADVHQ, ATCOM ULITHI, CTG 94.1, VPB 152, VPB 23

50 life rafts yellow and gray reported on bearing 020 degrees from point Princeton spread out between 11-25 N 135-52 E and 11-55 N 136-04 E. No survivors sighted. 1 DE proceed area reported to arrive daylight 8 AUG. Investigate identify and pick up or sink rafts. Look for survivors and report. If you consider present mission completed both DE proceed. 2 airplanes will arrive daylight new search posit. Advise if 1 DE will remain present location.[27]

8 AUG 45/0902

From: COMWESCARSUBAREA, 080604

Action: French (DE 367)

Info: CINCPAC ADV/HQ, COMMARIANAS, CTU 94.6.1

Precedence: OP OP OP

If results todays search negative discontinue search return to port. If positive continue search at daylight advise.[28]

9 AUG 45

From: French (DE 367)

Action: COMWESCARSUBAREA

Info: COMMARIANAS, CTU 94.6.1, CINCPAC ADV HQ

Precedence: Priority

No rafts sighted. ETA Peleliu 9 August 1500 K.[29]

Source: TD; “Rescue Dispatches, 2–9 August 1945. These were submitted as evidence to the Court of Inquiry convened to investigate the loss. In CINCPAC 1945 Flag Files, RG 38, Box 45, NARA II, College Park, MD. The entire collection spans approximately 150 dispatches covering 26 July 1945–16 August 1945. See Figure 3-10 in this chapter for an example of original format.

The 6 August after-action interviews of U.S. naval aviators Lieutenant (j.g.) Wilbur Gwinn, Lieutenant Commander George Atteberry, and Lieutenant Robert Adrian Marks vividly describe the discovery of Indianapolis survivors and the first attempts at rescue. Gwinn spotted the survivors on a routine patrol for enemy ships from his twin-engine Lockheed Ventura only by accident. A malfunctioning antenna led him to move from his usual position in the plane and in doing so brought his attention to a large oil slick on the surface of the sea below. Upon following the slick with hopes of encountering a damaged Japanese submarine, the crew spotted splashing swimmers in the water. Gwinn immediately worked to get rescue ships on the scene, and his commander George Atteberry was quickly en route to the scene in another PV, with Adrian Marks in a PBY shortly behind. Atteberry relieved Gwinn and worked with Marks to support his landing and locate survivors in the water. A steady flow of Navy and Army [30] rescue planes remained on the scene and aided the surface rescue for the duration of the operation. According to the 9 August report submitted by Lieutenant Commander Atteberry, Commander, Patrol Bombing Squadron 152, to the Commander of Western Carolines Sub Area during the six days of rescue operations, 63 flights were dispatched to the search area and 260.1 total hours were spent over the rescue grid.

Document 3.3: 6 August 1945 Correspondent Interviews of Lieutenant (jg) Wilbur Gwinn and Lieutenant Robert Adrian Marks

6 August 1945

Questions asked by Correspondents of Lieut. (jg) W.G. Gwinn, USNR., Lieut. R.A. Marks, USNR., and Lt. Commander G.C. Atteberry.

Questioning and narrative of Lt. (jg) Gwinn:

Q: Was [sic] you the first person to sight the survivors?

A: Yes I was.

Q: Will you describe how it happened?

A: I took off at 0910 on my regular sector search, carrying a crew of five men. While flying at 3000 feet I noticed an oil slick on the water, and went down to 900’, following the oil slick to a group of survivors in the water. We estimated the first group seen as totaling about 30.

Q: How long did it take you to reach the first group of survivors, by following the oil slick?

A: The oil slick covered a radius of about 30 miles.

Q: What time did you spot the oil slick?

A: We spotted the survivors at 11:18 and got dispatch off at 11:25.

Q: Could you see the survivors waving?

A: Yes, very easily. At 900’ we could see them waving. From that time on until about 12:45, we investigated the whole area, finding up to 150 personnel in the water. We dropped emergency rations and equipment.

Q: Did you drop the equipment to the first group or to another group?

A: We dropped them to the men who seemed to be swimming free of any rafts.

Q: Were the first 30 you spotted on a raft?

A: They were hanging on the side of a raft.

Q: What was your first impression when you saw these first survivors?

A: I don’t know—it was a funny feeling. The oil slick was large, seeming to indicate a large vessel having been sunk, but I didn’t know of any large craft being lost or going down, and didn’t know just what kind of vessel it was.

Q: Was there any doubt in your mind as their being our people?

A: No.

Q: What information was in the message that you sent back?

A: 30 survivors sighted—position—send assistance.

Q: What was the position?

A: About 280 miles north.

Q: After 12:45 what happened?

A: After that we circled surfaced survivors until first assistance came, which was at 14:15. First plane to the scene was a Ventura piloted by Lt. Commander George C. Atteberry.

Q: Were there any PBYs there at the same time as Commander Atteberry?

A: Lt. Marks arrived shortly afterwards in a PBY.

Q: Your job was to stay around the survivors until rescue came?

A: Yes, the idea was to have someone there at all times.

Q: Did they wave when you went over?

A: Yes, they hit the water with their hands, so that they could easily be seen clearly. They were pretty well covered with oil and difficult to see otherwise.

Q: Did you go back to the scene at any time?

A: I was scheduled to go back, but didn’t have the aircraft available. I went back on the 4th, but didn’t pick up any more survivors.

Q: The first word they had from you was at 12:05 is that right?

A: Transmission went on the air at 11:25 and another one at 12:45. Both messages were “Rogered”.

[Lieutenant Commander Atteberry explained that it takes considerable time to decode and process these messages through the regular communications center, and therefore they had decoded the message themselves and had taken action immediately as they deemed necessary.]

Q: What time did you get to the area?

A: At 12:15 and Gwinn left immediately.

Questioning and narrative of Lt. Marks:

Q: Were you in the stand-by plane at the field?

A: The stand-by plane was already out on another strike—I happened to be around at the time is all.

Q: Were you on duty?

A: Yes, I was on duty. As soon as Commander Atteberry got the message, he saved several minutes by by-passing the official word and saving time in getting out. First word that we had was a PV circling a life raft. I presumed that a plane had been ditched and I took off at 12:42. Commander Atteberry took off about a minute after I did, but his plane was capable of greater speed and he arrived at the scene ahead of myself. I was to go up and relieve the PV on station and keep the survivors in sight, and drop emergency equipment.

Q: What kind of plane did you have?

A: PBY – amphibious aircraft.

Q: You got there at what time?

A: After take off at 14:10, I received second message from the PV about the report of 150 survivors—I at first thought the message was garbled up, but thought it would be a good idea to get to the scene as quickly as possible. At 15:03 I began picking up signals from the PV; at 15:50 I made visual contact with Commander Atteberry and established voice communication with him via voice radio. I sighted the survivors at once and the Commander advised me that there were a great number of survivors scattered around, and asked me not to drop any equipment until I was shown the whole area. Otherwise, I might have dropped the whole lot to the first group, not realizing there were anymore. So I followed him on a tour of the area and looked over the situation.

Q: How long did it take you to patrol this area?

A: About a half an hour. Scattered small groups were everywhere, without any help except life jackets, and I thought that they needed the assistance more than the ones on the rafts. I knew that no ship would be on the scene until midnight, so after looking the area over, at 16:05 I commenced dropping survival equipment with the end in view of getting assistance to the small groups who had nothing but life jackets.

Q: Did you have any extra survival equipment?

A: Yes, I dropped all extra equipment and also dropped all of my plane’s equipment, except one life raft, necessary for emergency.

Q: Did you make up your mind to go down at that time?

A: I figured that the only way we could save the single groups would be to land near them if possible. At 16:25 I sent a message to the base advising of the number of survivors, asking for survival equipment, etc., about 16:30 I decided a landing would be necessary to gather in the single ones. This decision was based partly on the number of single survivors and the fact that they were bothered by sharks. We did observe bodies being eaten by sharks.

Q: At this time you did not know how long they had been in the water?

A: No. So accordingly, at 16:30 I notified Commander Atteberry that I was going to attempt an open sea landing. I made all the necessary preparations for landing.

Q: Was this your [first] open sea landing?

A: Yes—an area for landing was selected with the purpose of picking up the most survivors and Commander Atteberry was to fly above me to assist in this. At 17:05 a power stall was made into the wind. The wind was due North, swells about 12 feet high. The plane landed in three bounces, the first bounce being about 15 feet high.

[Lieutenant Commander Atteberry explained here how dangerous it is to make an open sea landing in this kind of plane.]

Immediately after landing a survey of damage done to the plane exposed rivets pulled loose and some seams ripped open. My plane captain and navigator effected emergency repairs, plugging rivet holes with pencils and stuffing the seams with cotton. The radio compartment took on water slowly and would have to be bailed out during the night – 10 to 12 buckets of water per hour. The hull of the ship survived very well. While the Navigator was inspecting the damage, my Co-Pilot went aft to organize the rescue party. We proceeded to locate survivors, the single ones, being aided by Commander Atteberry advising me via voice radio just where to go. It was very difficult to see good because of the high swells and without a doubt we would have missed many if it hadn’t of been for Commander Atteberry directing our actions. We tried to bring the survivors close to the port side and throw a life raft to them. Considerable difficulty was had because of the speed of the plane taxiing and the survivors were dragged through the water. We had to cut the plane’s motors quite a few times and considerable time was lost in starting and stopping. We got better at picking the people up as time went by. We had the ladder out and I had a man on the ladder to grab any men who drifted by. The survivors could not help themselves very much, as most of them were weakened terribly and could not grab the ladder and climb up by themselves. Further difficulties were caused by the fact that the men were burned and every time we grabbed them it caused extreme pain. Some of them had broken arms, legs, etc., and extreme care had to be used in handling them. Every effort was made to pick up the single ones, and it was necessary to avoid passing near the ones on life rafts because they would jump on the plane. Between the time of our landing and darkness, we picked up over 30 single survivors, most of them were in critical condition and would probably not have survived the night. Men brought aboard were issued water and given limited first aid treatment by our first aid group. Just before total darkness we headed for group of men on life rafts, which had been dropped to them. We were later told by the Doctor from the Indianapolis that it was very fortunate that we had headed for this particular group of survivors, as they were the ones who were in the worst shape, and had been put on life rafts by the Doctor because of their serious condition. We brought the plane alongside of the rafts and took the men aboard. They were put on the wing and issued water and covered by parachutes. There were about 25 men on the wing. During the process of bringing the men up on the wing, the fabric was broken in many places. After dark, several shouts for help were heard near by and my radioman and another crew man volunteered to go out in a rubber boat to pick them up. I wished them good luck and they cast off. It wasn’t long until they were back with two additional men. It was very difficult for them to locate the plane after they had shoved off because of the fact that the auxiliary unit had gone out and we had no lights on the plane. We did have some carbide lights that worked to a good advantage. About 23:15 we sighted the search light of the Destroyer Escort Doyle. There was a plane circling us at the same time dropping parachute flares near us so that the Doyle could locate us. We tossed the carbide lights out to help location. The ship came up to us immediately upon arriving on the scene, which was about 0015. They dispatched a motor whale boat with a Doctor and first aid party and commenced transferring survivors. From 0045 to 0330 this transfer in progress. Due to the heavy swells, the process was difficult. A number of cases were stretcher cases and most of them were only able to stand with assistance. The men from the Doyle displayed high skill and seamanship in the entire job. We counted 56 survivors in all who were transferred to the Doyle. In order to execute the transfer of the survivors, it was necessary for the Doyle’s boat to lay next to the plane, and the boat did considerable damage to the plane. I inspected the plane and decided that a take off was extremely hazardous and was not justified. I requested that all salvageable gear be removed and ordered that the aircraft be destroyed. At 0600 the crew and myself were picked up at 0800 the plane was destroyed by 40mm gun fire from the Doyle.

Q: Who was it that first identified and advised the base that the survivors were from the Indianapolis.

A: I think the Doyle sent the first message. I was too busy to code a message of this nature.

Q: This word did not get back here until Friday morning then?

A: That is right.

Q: Did you get much time to talk to the men?

A: Yes, we talked to a large number of them.

Q: What was their first reaction?

A: Their first one was to ask for water. Every man in the water would be yelling for water as we went past them. The details of the ship’s sinking were varied, because the men were off their head and gave various stories such as: An LCI had picked up 30 men on the day after the sinking and had left the rest of them: A PBY had landed and picked up several men, and then took off without offering any assistance at all to the rest of the survivors. Such stories as these were listened to all night long.

Q: Were there any deaths on your plane?

A: No, all of the survivors on my plane survived. I think two of them died since, but at the time we put into port with the DE they were all living.

Q: Were you pretty crowded on the DE coming back?

A: The crew had to give up their quarters, but they were pretty well organized. It was very fortunate that the Doyle carried a Doctor – most DE’s do not, but he surely saved a lot of lives by being aboard.

Q: The Doyle had other survivors besides yours didn’t she?

A: Yes, she picked up over 30 more – I don’t know the exact number.

Q: Did you see many dead in the water as you patrolled around?

A: We saw some dead in life jackets – most of them that died had slipped their life jackets and sunk. We were only looking for live ones of course.

Q: Was this when you saw the sharks?

A: Yes, we saw them when we first arrived.

Source: TD; “Action Reports Western Carolines Sub Area,” RG 38, Box 80 NARA II, College Park, MD. Interview comes from “Identification of Bodies” portion of report, dated 15 August 1945.

Figure 3-3. Lieutenant (j.g.) Wilbur G. Gwinn, USNR, was the pilot of the Ventura patrol bomber that sighted the survivors of Indianapolis (CA-35) in waters of the Philippine Sea.

Navy Photograph 80-G490324, NARA II, College Park, MD

Figure 3-4. Lieutenant Robert Adrian Marks of VPB 23 standing next to a Consolidated PBY-5A Blackcat, 8 August 1945. Marks’ was the first Catalina plane to the scene of survivors on 2 August, and he determined it necessary to make an open sea landing to save lives. His plane was too badly damaged on the landing to attempt a takeoff the following day and was scuttled by the guns of Cecil J. Doyle (DE-368).

Navy Photograph 80-G-364866, NARA II, College Park, MD.

Lieutenant Commander Graham Claytor Jr., skipper of Cecil J. Doyle, arrived at the location of Indianapolis survivors in the first minutes of 3 August. Claytor’s ship was the first on the scene and the first to identify the survivors as being from Indianapolis to area commanders. Claytor made the dangerous decision to shine his ship’s searchlight into the night sky to help pilots get a fix on his location and inspire the men in the water, many of whom were on the brink of death. Cecil J. Doyle deployed its whale boat by 0010 to bring survivors off of Adrian Marks’ disabled PBY. The first survivors were lifted onto the deck of Doyle at 0300. At 0720, after unloading all survivors, crew, and salvageable gear, Doyle’s 40mm guns sank Marks’ Catalina, which had been damaged during its landing and the rescue operations. Doyle departed the scene for Peleliu midday on 3 August with 93 survivors on board. After refueling on 4 August, Doyle arrived back on the scene of the Indianapolis rescue at 0600 5August and continued the search and recovery mission until 8 August, when it departed with French for Peleliu.

Document 3.4: After-Action Report of Cecil J. Doyle (DE-368)

COPY

DE 368/A16

U.S.S. CECIL J. DOYLE (DE 368)

c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif.

SECRET

Memorandum Report on Rescue of Survivors of USS Indianapolis (CA 35) August 2–4, 1945.

1. At 1405 King, while en route to Kossol Passage from vicinity of 10° 57’N, 136° 23’E after completion of an unsuccessful JASASA operation, ComWesCarSubArea’s secret despatch 020245, ordering air-sea rescue of survivors sighted by 19V258, at position 11-30 North 133-30 East, was received. This message was decoded and course reversed at 1418 King, and speed gradually increased to 22 ½ knots. At this time the ship’s position was 08°-34’(N) 135°-10’ (E). At 1435K communication was established on 4475 KC with Gambler Leader, the VPB 152 search plane who was already at the scene. This vessel assumed the call of Birddog One and thereafter maintained continuous communication with search and rescue planes engaged in the operation.

2. At about 1830 King a despatch giving further details obtained from planes was forwarded to ComWesCarSubArea by 2716 KC voice. Several corrected positions were received, both from PELELIU and planes, and slight course corrections accordingly made. Information from the planes was received that first one and then two dumbos had made successful water-landings and had gathered near them a large number of survivors, many of them in a critical condition. At 1633 King ComWesCarSubArea’s despatch 020601 was received, indicating that USS Ralph Talbot (DD 390) and USS Madison (DD 425) were en route. At 1856K voice communication was established with the Madison on 2716 KC and his ETA determined to be about 0345 King; at 2000 King, voice communication was established on the same circuit with the Ralph Talbot, and his ETA determined to be 0400 King. Both DD’s were informed that this ship’s ETA was 0000 King.

3. At 2149 King, the loom of an aircraft flare was sighted ahead and verified by voice radio with planes at the scene. From this time until arrival at the dumbos on the surface, flares were continuously visible. At 2242 King, this ship illuminated the sky with 24” searchlight to give planes our position and to encourage survivors in water. Later reports indicated that this beam was sighted at the scene and was helpful for this purpose. From this time on, searchlight was used intermittently and frequent sweeps ahead were made to avoid possibility of running down survivors. At this time it was thought that the majority of the most critically injured survivors were near the planes on the water, and it was determined to proceed directly to them first and to return to search for other groups later. A Very’s pistol flare was seen at some distance shortly before reaching the planes on the water, but its investigation was deferred for this reason.

4. At 0000K the planes in the water were sighted and at 0010K the ship’s motor whaleboat was lowered and proceeded to the nearest dumbo, Number B-72. The position of the planes at this time was 11°45’ (N), 133° 35’ (E). Wind was from NNW, about 8–10 knots, and the planes were drifting steadily in a direction of about 160°T. The first survivors were brought on board at 00300K, and as soon as details could be determined urgent secret despatch 021500 was forwarded to ComWesCarSubArea, reporting arrival on scene and identity of survivors.

5. Thereafter the whaleboat continued to shuttle between ship and plane with survivors, and the ship cruised slowly in the vicinity searching with searchlights and aircraft flares for other groups. At 0300K two rubber liferafts with seventeen (17) survivors were located (first indication was hearing whistle blown by one of the survivors) and ship maneuvered alongside. At 0443K, two more rubber rafts were found by searchlight and twenty-two (22) more survivors taken aboard. In the meantime, fifty-three (53) survivors had been ferried from the first dumbo (B-72), nearly two-thirds of whom were stretcher cases, and one from the other dumbo on the water. At this time a total of ninety-three (93) survivors had been taken on board. Search was continued throughout the night without further success, the motor whaleboat remaining in the water and investigating all objects located by searchlights. The B-72 dumbo had been so damaged that the pilot thought a take-off impracticable, and at his request, after no further survivors were located in the area, the motor whaleboat returned to the plane and removed the remaining crew and all salvageable gear. This was at 0600 King. The boat was then hoisted aboard and search continued in the vicinity to the south of the dumbos, where the pilots reported other survivors had been seen before dark. Planes still flying in the area were unable to locate any further groups of survivors in the darkness.

6. In the meantime, other ships had arrived in the area. At 0110K, a searchlight was observed to the north and the ship identified by exchange of signals as the USS Bassett (APD 73). She was asked by signal to close this ship and assist with her four LCVPs, and warned to proceed cautiously to avoid running down survivors. She soon encountered several groups of survivors whom she picked up. TBS voice communication could not be established with her, but she remained within visual signaling distance. She was subsequently asked to send a boat when possible to take off crew and gear of Dumbo B-72, but this was cancelled when she reported all her boats engaged with survivors and when this vessel found its boat free and no more survivors in the vicinity.

7. At about 0315 King, a second ship arrived in the area and was identified as the USS Dufilho (DE 423). Communication was established on TBS and MAN (34.8 MC), and she was informed that the survivors were from the USS Indianapolis and were scattered over a large area. She was also notified that both surfaced planes had been investigated and survivors in the immediate area picked up. At 0353K the USS Dufilho reported a good underwater sound contact, and all lights were extinguished and the ship maneuvered until the contact was classified as probably non-sub a short time later. The USS Dufilho proceeded to search north and east of the surfaced planes, in an area which had not been covered, but found no more large groups. She picked up one (1) survivor before daylight.

8. Between 0130K and 0230K, calls were exchanged on 4475 KC and 2716 KC with the destroyers Madison and Ralph Talbot. In answer to questions, they were informed that this ship was at the scene and picking up survivors, and that searchlights were being used. The number of survivors on board at that time and the ship’s position were reported to the USS Madison. Subsequently searchlights were seen over the horizon, which were believed to come from these two ships, and communication was established with them also by MN (30.14MC). The TBS receiver of this ship was giving difficulty and had to be secured for several hours for repairs but communications were maintained on other circuits. The USS Madison asked for and received reports from all ships present on the number of survivors each then had on board. In answer to another question, Madison was informed that none of this ship’s survivors was then in critical condition, and that this ship would be able to remain in the area for a daylight sweep. At about 0615K, as soon as the crew from the abandoned dumbo B-72 had been taken aboard, a report was made by MN to Madison stating that one dumbo would attempt take-off at dawn and that the other had been abandoned and received from Madison to stand by the plane which was to take off until it was airborne, and to sink the other at discretion. Thereafter, further search for survivors was made south of the two planes, without success, and at 0720K the B-72 was burned and sunk by 40MM Fire. The other dumbo thereafter made a successful take-off.

9. Just prior to this, shortly after dawn, visual contact was first made with the two destroyers. The USS Madison was advised that the dumbo pilot on board reported survivors had been seen well to the south of him the previous night, and a scouting line was accordingly formed by Madison with this ship as at which the dumbo was destroyed. Several planes were in the vicinity, and, after discussing the matter with the dumbo pilot, it was suggested to the Madison that at least two of them be sent off to search at some distance from the ships. This was done, and later in the morning two other rafts of survivors were found by these planes and closed and picked up by the destroyers. During this daylight search this ship passed from twenty-five (25) to fifty (50) individual bodies floating in lifejackets, and investigated and picked up a number of rubber rafts, all empty. The location of the bodies was reported to Madison, but the search was not stopped to recover them as it was still believed that more survivors could be found. At 1220K, Madison ordered this vessel to proceed to Peleliu to discharge survivors, and course was set direct to Peleliu, speed 22 ½ knots. Several more empty rubber rafts were located and recovered shortly thereafter, but no further survivors were seen. Peleliu was reached at 0200K on August 4th, and survivors discharged.

10. It is believed that once the survivors were discovered, everything was done to recover them that could have been done by planes or ships. No difficulty was experienced in communicating with planes, and very little with other ships, in spite of temporary TBS failure. Considerable difficulty was had in communicating with Peleliu and most messages required one or more relays with considerable delay. Until the USS Madison arrived shortly before dawn and took charge, this vessel as the first on the scene gave instructions and information to planes and the other ships as they came up, although no time was taken in the short time before the Madison arrived to determine which of the three ships was actually the senior. (The USS Ringness (APD 100) was not in the immediate area and had no contact with this vessel prior to dawn). Each was engaged in searching an area not previously covered by any other and it was felt that more could be accomplished by giving each ship all the available information and having him search independently until daylight than by attempting to prescribe what each should do. Planes in the air seemed unable to locate any more groups of survivors at this time. This vessel was preparing to send an amplifying report to ComWesCarSubArea on the ships present and total number of survivors picked up when the Madison arrived; thereafter all reports were made to him as SOP.

/s/ W.G. Claytor, Jr./t/ W.G. CLAYTOR, JR.,

Lt. Commander, USNR,

Commanding Officer

Source: TDSC; Action Reports Western Carolines Sub Area, “USS Cecil J. Doyle (DE-368) Memorandum Report on Rescue of Survivors USS Indianapolis (CA-35) 2–4 August 1945,” RG 38, Box 80 NARA II, College Park, MD.

Figure 3-5. (L to R) Huie H. Phillips, S2, USNR; John Oligar, S1, USNR; and Glenn L. Milbrodt, S2, recovering in Naval Base Hospital #20 Pelelieu, 5 August 1945.

Navy Photograph 80-G-336776, NARA II, College Park, MD

Figure 3-6. Indianapolis (CA-35) survivors receiving glucose and saline. Illustration by U.S. Navy combat artist Alexander Russo.

Navy Art Collection, 88-198-bo

Figure 3-7. Funeral of Fred Elliot Harrison, S2, at U.S. Army Forces (USAF) cemetery, Peleliu No. I, Grave No. 150, Row 10, Plot No. 6. C.D. Denham, ChC USNR officiating. 6 August 1945. Fred Harrison, S2, USN, and Robert Shipman, GM3, USNR, survived the ordeal in the water and were rescued but arrived to the hospital at Peleliu in critical condition. They succumbed to exhaustion from overexposure on the morning of 5 August.

Navy Photograph 80-G-336754, taken by Bureau of Aeronautics. NARA II, College Park, MD

Figure 3-8. Survivors of Indianapolis (CA-35) are taken aboard the landing craft at Peleliu that will transfer them to Tranquility (AH-14), 6 August 1945.

Navy Photograph 80-G-336740, NARA II, College Park, MD

Figure 3-9. Transfer of survivors of Indianapolis (CA-35) from landing craft to Tranquility (AH-14), 6 August 1945.

Navy Photograph 80-G-336734, NARA II, College Park, MD

Figure 3-10. “Rescue Dispatches,” 2–9 August 1945. In Commander-in-Chief, Pacific 1945 Flag Files, RG 38, Box 45, NARA II. The entire collection spans approximately 150 dispatches covering 26 July 1945–16 August 1945.

NARA II, College Park, MD. The above image is a scanned portion of the dispatch collection from the Court of Inquiry file at NARA II. Declassified, Authority [NND917001]

Figure 3-11. An unidentified survivor of Indianapolis (CA-35) aboard Tranquility (AH-14), 6 August 1945.

Navy Photograph 80-G-336733, NARA II, College Park, MD

Figure 3-12. Tranquility (AH-14) arrives in Guam with survivors of Indianapolis (CA-35). Joseph Jacquemot, S2, a survivor, listens to one of the ship’s radios, 8 August 1945.

Navy Photograph 80-G-326949 taken by J. G. Mull, PHoM1, NARA II, College Park, MD

Figure 3-13. Survivors of Indianapolis (CA-35) are brought ashore from Tranquility (AH-14) at Guam, 8 August 1945. Nurses and Sailors are watching from the hospital ship’s deck. Note Tranquility’s nested lifeboats and busses on the pier.

Official U.S. Navy Photograph, now in the collections of the U.S. National Archives. NHHC Photo Collection, 80-G-K-5986

Figure 3-14. Commander Eugene Own examines dressings of Lieutenant Commander L. L. Haynes (MC) at Naval Hospital Guam. Captain Charles B. McVay III stands at right.

Courtesy of BUMED Archives

Figure 3-15. Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, commander of the Fifth Fleet, pins a Purple Heart on Clarence E. McElroy, S1, survivor of the cruiser Indianapolis (CA-35), at Base Hospital # 18 Guam, Marianas, on 13 August 1945.

Navy Photograph 80-G-490312, NARA II, College Park, MD

Accusations of four-flushing,[31] cowardice, and incompetency and malingering during the rescue of Indianapolis survivors were brought against the skipper of Basset, Commander Harold J. Theriault, USNR, by his executive officer, Lieutenant J. W. Henderson. The CNO ordered a special investigation by the Navy Inspector General and it was determined that there were no serious faults of which Theriault was guilty and that the accusations primarily stemmed from personal differences between the two officers. The findings of the Inspector General investigation are presented in this volume because they offer a sense of how ships actually conducted operations during the Indianapolis rescue and the many difficulties crews faced. This extract shows the seamanship needed to deploy small boats in high seas, approach survivors in the water, and return them safely to the ship. It did not escape rescue crews that Indianapolis was sunk by enemy torpedoes and that they were traversing the same waters. Although committed to rescuing the crew of Indianapolis, those who participated in the rescue effort acutely felt the need to avoid becoming casualties themselves. According to its records, Basset left the scene with 148 survivors.

Document 3.5: Description of Bassett Rescue of Indianapolis Survivors from Navy Inspector General Investigation [Extract][32]

(C) RESCUE OF SURVIVORS OF THE INDIANAPOLIS:

10.Allegation: “Inexperienced boat crews were used although more experienced personnel were available.”

Findings: When the Bassett reached the location of the survivors of the Indianapolis and commenced rescue operations, three LCVP’s were put in the water. The regular boat crews, composed of men who were normally assigned to these boats and who were the most experienced men available for this purpose, were the first crews assigned to these boats. Each boat was in charge of an experienced boat officer. Additional personnel were assigned to each boat to assist in handling the survivors. As the rescue operations progressed, the enlisted personnel assigned to the boats became exhausted from their physical efforts and required replacement. It soon became necessary to assign to the boats men with little or no small boat experience, but in all cases, the most experienced men were used first.

11.Allegation: “The third boat was lowered away improperly and dangerously.” Findings: There is no evidence that the third boat was lowered away improperly and any more dangerously than was occasioned by the heavy rolling of the ship due to the deep swells which were then running. There does appear to have been some confusion connected with getting the boat clear of the side but Ensign Wren, the boat officer, displayed little or no initiative in taking charge and “laying off” with his boat to await orders.[33]

12.Allegation: “Rescue work was carried on without advance instructions or orders from the Commanding Officer.......”

Findings: While en route to the designated location of the survivors, the Commanding Officer of the Bassett selected his boat officers, made provision for his CIC “set up” and reviewed the general plan of rescue operations with the interested officers.

13.Allegation: “. . . , there was no coordination between ship and boats through CIC and boat radios.”

Findings: The coordination between the ship and boats through the CIC and boat radios was, at the commencement of rescue operations, good; however, as the evening wore on, the handling of survivors in and out of the boats under decidedly adverse conditions, damaged the antennas and radio sets in the boats to the extent that communication between the ship and boats by this means was virtually impossible.

14.Allegation: “No vectors to and from survivors and other boats were furnished, even when specifically requested.”

Findings: Throughout the rescue operations, the CIC experienced difficulty in identifying on their radar screen, the various groups of survivors. These groups of men in the water and on rafts had no radar wave reflecting material and showed up on the screen as a scarcely identifiable “pip,” when seen at all. The CIC was manned by the normal “general quarters” detail, all of the members which were experienced in their duties. It must be borne in mind that radio voice communication between the ship and the boats was not of the best, except in the initial stages of this operation, which fact is no doubt responsible, in part at least, for any failure on the part of CIC to vector the boats on their missions.

15.Allegation: “No answer was received to a specific request for instructions as to whether the first officer rescued should be immediately returned to the Bassett, to the end that higher authority might be more promptly advised as to details of the casualty, or whether further rescue work should precede return to the ship.”

Findings: The Commanding Officer of the Bassett did not reply to the request from Ensign Wren as to whether he, Ensign Wren, should return to the ship with the first officer rescued (who strongly demanded that he be taken at once to the Bassett) because he considered the request to be a foolish one in that such procedure would necessitate an extra round trip for the boat, leaving men in the water in the dark with the increased possibility of losing contact with these survivors.

16.Allegation: “Upon return to the ship, Ensign Wren was ordered to make the windward side, but finally came along quarter to leeward on his own initiative, after perceiving the extreme difficulty and danger involved in attempting to unload survivors on the windward side.”

Findings: At the time of the rescue of the survivors, heavy swells were running but there was little or no wind. Neither side of the Bassett could, under the condition then pertaining, be considered as being the lee side and every effort was made by the Commanding Officer to keep the ship on a course which would cause a minimum of rolling. As operations progressed, it was frequently the case that boats were discharging alongside both sides of the fan tail simultaneously.

17.Allegation: “When difficulty was experienced in taking aboard at the fantail survivors from Ensign Wren’s LCVP, the Commanding Officer ordered the boat, containing about 25 survivors, to be hoisted to the rail. Lieutenant Commander (then Lieutenant) Reginald R. Axtell, (D), USNR, First Lieutenant, advised against this procedure, and, after the boat very nearly capsized while an attempt was being made to secure the falls, informed the Commanding Officer that he would continue only upon orders issued upon Commander Theriault’s own responsibility. The boat was then ordered to resume unloading at the fantail.”

Findings: After rescue operations had proceeded for some time and with much difficulty, in that each survivor presented an individual problem while being handled from the bouncing small boat to the rolling ship, the Commanding Officer decided, in the interest of expediting matters, to attempt to hoist a boat containing survivors, to the rail for discharging.

There were approximately sixteen persons in the boat in question and, since the boat handling gear of vessels of this class is designed to handle boats when fully loaded with combat personnel, no difficulty from this source was anticipated. The crew were, in the main, at battle stations, some men were away in the small boats, and a large group of men were on the fan tail assisting with the survivors. Under the existing circumstances, the men most experienced in hoisting the boats under adverse conditions were not then all available. The attempt to hoist the boat was made, but after experiencing difficulty securing the falls and lacking a full crew of experienced winchmen on deck, the effort was abandoned. Had this scheme proved successful, much time would have been saved.

18.Allegation: “The Commanding Officer argued for about one-half hour with then Lieutenant Axtell concerning the order of the former that two dead bodies be brought aboard prior to a boatload of survivors in grave physical condition.”

Findings: At one time, a small boat containing several survivors and two bodies was towed to the ship. The survivors were removed and the bodies were left in the boat which was tied up astern. There was some conversation between the Commanding Officer who was then on the bridge, and the First Lieutenant, who was on the fan tail, as to whether the two bodies in the boat should be taken on board at that time. This conversation was conducted through the telephone talkers who were assisting these officers and intermittently covered a period of approximately ten minutes. During this conversation, the handling of survivors from an LCVP alongside continued without interrupting and no delay was experienced from this source. The small boat containing the bodies broke away before the bodies were removed and was not recovered by the Bassett.

19.Allegation: “The Commanding Officer denied . . . request for permission to make an additional trip to pick up three life rafts full of survivors sighted while returning to the ship on what proved to be the last trip. No other vessels nor boats appeared to be near these survivors, and Commander Theriault ordered the LCVP to be hoisted aboard, and left the area without directing other vessels to these survivors.”

Findings: As one of the rescue boats was returning to the Bassett with survivors, on what proved to be its last trip, Ensign Broser, the boat officer, thought that he saw at a distance, flares which appeared to indicate a group of survivors. No life rafts, boats, or nets were sighted on that occasion, nor were any survivors actually sighted. Their presence was only assumed. Ensign Broser reported this sighting of flares to the Commanding Officer who took no action on the information and left the scene under the following conditions:

(a) There were already on board the Bassett 148 survivors, some of whom were in need of immediate hospitalization, and no more survivors could be handled by the ship’s medical officer.

(b) At least one destroyer was in the immediate vicinity and, if keeping a proper lookout, was in position to sight the survivors in question.

(c) There were seventeen rescue vessels at the scene and a box search of the area was then being “set up.”

(d) Day was breaking and there should have been no difficulty in contacting the survivors in question with the rescue facilities then available.

20.Allegation: “The Commanding Officer did not carry out his intention, announced in a dispatch to Commander Philippine Sea Frontier, to pick up 200 survivors and return to Leyte, instead hurriedly departing the area with approximately 148 survivors. The Commanding Officer is alleged to have expressed fear of being torpedoed, which was considered to be the motive prompting precipitate departure of the vessel.”

Findings: Although the Commanding Officer had informed ComPhilSeaFron in his despatch 021903 August, that he was departing the scene for Leyte when he had taken on board 200 survivors, when 148 survivors had been received on board, some of whom were in urgent need of hospitalization, and when it was ascertained that ample vessels and planes were in the area to complete the rescue, it was decided to depart immediately for Leyte in the interest of attending to the survivors then on board. Commander Theriault stated that he was concerned as to the possibility of being torpedoed as he had on board insufficient life saving equipment to take care of the personnel then in the Bassett. This concern had no bearing on his decision to depart the area when he did, as was evidenced by the fact that his ship had been steaming through the night at a speed of less than four knots on a comparatively steady course and that searchlights, deck lights and signal lights had been freely used through the rescue operations.

[…][34]

Source: TDS; “Investigation of Alleged Inefficiencies and Ineptitude on the part of Certain Officers in Connection with the Rescue of Survivors of USS Indianapolis,” signed by Felix Johnson, RA, USN, Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel. From SECNAV General Correspondence, RG 50, Entry UD 16, Box 2696, NARA II, College Park, MD. Extract selected for detailed description of rescue operations, omitted sections include findings of investigation, general chronology of Bassett’s service, and biographies of officers.

Once it became known that the survivors in the water discovered on 2 August were the crew of Indianapolis, the headquarters of Admiral Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief Pacific, contacted subordinate Pacific commands to determine if an overlooked transmission from Indianapolis went out the night she was sunk. Dispatches submitted as evidence in the Court of Inquiry showed that, between 4–7 August, the following commands responded to the CINCPAC directive as receiving no transmissions: Tinian, Guam, Saipan, Iwo Jima, Ulithi, Peleliu, and Canberra. No reports of any reception of a distress signal were brought to light in the Court of Inquiry or subsequent investigations of the loss of Indianapolis. Reports of reception of a distress signal eventually came to light, but no substantiated evidence of receiving a distress message was provided.

Document 3.6: Command Responses to CINCPAC Inquiry About Possible Reception of S.O.S. Transmission from Indianapolis

3 AUG 45

From: CINCPAC ADV HQ

Action: COMMARIANAS, COM7THFLT

Info: COMPHILSEAFRON

Precedence: Routine

Request RADSTAS be directed check radio logs of ship shore circuits and 500 KCS for any possible transmissions from INDIANAPOLIS (CA 35) on night of 29 July KLD.[35]

Source: TD; “Dispatches Dealing with Departure and Arrival of Indianapolis,” 26–28 July 1945. These were submitted as evidence to the Court of Inquiry convened to investigate the loss. In CINCPAC 1945 Flag Files, RG 38, Box 45, NARA II. The entire collection spans approximately 150 dispatches covering 26 July 1945–16 August 1945.

As the Indianapolis crew was being pulled from the water, Navy intelligence sought an answer to why they did not know their location. The Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Areas (JICPOA) Summations from the United States Navy File of SIGTOT Messages to CINCPAC Advanced Headquarters, offer a high-level conversation between the offices of Captain Edwin T. Layton, intelligence officer CINCPAC; Captain John S. Harper, officer-in-charge, Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific (FRUPac); and Captain Thomas H. Dyer, FRUPac’s chief cryptoanalyst. The messages show three of the Navy’s most important crpytological officers attempting to figure out why Navy intelligence failed to recover the Japanese location of the Indianapolis attack. This exchange again shows that clear answers are not always present in fragmented intelligence.

Document 3.7: Conversation Between CINCPAC HQ and JICPOA Regarding Indianapolis Loss

[CINCPAC Advanced HQ to JICPOA Estimates Section]

No. 277

3 August

From: Captain Layton

To: Captain Harper

In view of Indianapolis repeat Indianapolis sinking probably by Japanese submarine I-58 and probability that there will be some looking into matters here, desire your opinion on probable reason we have no Dog Fox positions in view of at least one known transmission from this submarine to deliver message time 300048 and earlier transmission from submarine I-53 (message time 292100). Are submarines using unknown frequencies which previeeee [sic] prevent interception of original transmissions? Also desire that we be informed of any other known transmission from I-58 since arriving in patrol sector. Will appreciate prompt reply.[36]

[JICPOA Estimates Section to CINCPAC Advanced HQ]

CIC NR 321

3 August 1945

From: Capt. Dyer

To: Capt. Layton

Harper not presently available. Cannot state positively but consider RPT consider likely I-58 and I-53 transmissions on other than regular sub frequency as it was not picked up by sub search watch at either Able or Hypo. Message was copied on Empire Broadcast. Regular search watch occasionally picks up subs on other frequencies but chances are slim of picking up any special frequency used for occasional RPT occasional short transmission unless we have information from decrypt. No additional I-58 message or transmissions can be found.[37]

Source: TDC; Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Areas. United States Navy File of SIGTOT Messages From JICPOA Estimates Section to CINCPAC Advanced Headquarters, March–August 1945 [SRMD-005] and CINCPAC Advanced Headquarters to JICPOA Estimates Section, March–August 1945 [SRMD-006]. Located in Navy Department Library Special Collections, WNY.

Figure 3-16. Captain Edwin Layton commanded the Combat Intelligence Unit on the Staff of Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.

NHHC Photo Collection, L38-51.04.01.

This memorandum providing a summary of ULTRA intelligence regarding the loss of Indianapolis was passed to Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations, on the day that major rescue operations took place. It was prepared by Lieutenant Commander William R. Smedberg III, an aide to the CNO. This memorandum shows the pieces of intelligence falling into place for the Navy, unfortunately much too late.

Document 3.8: Indianapolis Intelligence Memorandum to Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral King

[TOP SECRET ULTRA]

United States Fleet

Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief

Navy Department

Washington 25, D.C.

3 August 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR F-00

Subject: U.S.S. Indianapolis, Sinking of.

1.The following information derived from ULTRA sources indicates that four Japanese submarines were known to be operating between Okinawa and Leyte Gulf, and that I-58 probably was responsible for the sinking of subject ship

a.On 13 July, CINC 6th Fleet organized a Kaiten Suicide Attack Force comprising submarines I-53, I-58, I-47, and I-367. These submarines were directed to sortie from Bungo Suido between 14 and 19 July to patrol assigned areas in the Philippine Sea. The first 3-named submarines were to carry 6 Kaiten each, the I-367 was to carry 5. The patrol areas assigned were as follows:

•I-53 – Vicinity of midpoint between Leyte Gulf and Okinawa. (Kaiten from this submarine probably sank Underhill (DE) on the 24th.)

•I-58 – Vicinity of a point 500 miles north of (Palau?).

•I-47 – On a line between Okinawa and the Marianas, about 350 miles from Okinawa.

•I-367– On a line between Okinawa and the Marianas, about (450?) miles from Marianas.

b.At 292238I, these submarines were ordered to shift their patrol areas in order to attack the Blue supply line between Leyte Gulf and Okinawa and to intercept the Blue Striking Force, should it return through this area.

c.At 300048I, I-58 reported that at 292312I, she attacked and sank one______. She also states that the sinking was confirmed. (The position was included, but has not been recovered as yet.) Comment: The dispatch reporting the sinking of Indianapolis states that she was torpedoed and sunk on Sunday night (29th). Available information indicates that she was northeast of Leyte Gulf. Of the four submarines operating between Leyte Gulf and Okinawa, I-58 is estimated to be in the southernmost position and nearest to Leyte Gulf.

Very respectfully,

W.R. Smedberg, III.

Source: TDC; Declassified. Original classification, Top Secret ULTRA. “ULTRA Extracts,” Photocopies in USS Indianapolis file, Box 396B, Naval History and Heritage Command Archives, WNY. Originals from COMNAVSECGRU File 5830/114.

All Indianapolis survivors were rescued by day’s end on 3 August. The operations in the days following were almost purely body recovery, identification, and burial. The extract from the after-action report of Helm shows the gruesome nature of this work. The bodies of most Sailors were in advanced stages of decomposition, and many had been mangled by sharks. The condition of bodies made identification nearly impossible unless physical items present on the body could provide a clue to the wearer’s identity. Deceased crewmen were buried at sea following the identification attempt. The pervasiveness of sharks during the rescue most likely contributed to their presence in all aspects of the Indianapolis story.

Document 3.9: After-Action Report of Helm (DD-388) Regarding Body Recovery [Extract]

U.S.S. HELM (DD388)

6 August 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.

To: The Commander Western Carolines Sub-Area

[…][38]

4. All bodies were in extremely bad condition and had been dead for an estimated 4 or 5 days. Some had life jackets and life belts, most had nothing. Most of the bodies were completely naked, and the others had just drawers or dungaree trousers on—only three of the 28 bodies recovered had shirts on. Bodies were horribly bloated and decomposed—recognition of faces would have been impossible. About half of the bodies were shark-bitten, some to such a degree that they more nearly resembled skeletons. From one to four sharks were in the immediate area of the ship at all times. At one time, two sharks were attacking a body not more than fifty yards from the ship, and continued to do so until driven off by rifle fire. For the most part it was impossible to get finger prints from the bodies as the skin had come off the hands or the hands lacerated by sharks. Skin was removed from the hands of bodies containing no identification, when possible, and the Medical Officer will dehydrate the skin and attempt to make legible prints. All personal effects removed from the bodies for purposes of identification, and the Medical Officer’s Reports are forwarded herewith to you in lieu of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and the Personal Effects Distribution Center, Farragut, Idaho, on the assumption that you will assemble such effects from all ships recovering them. After examination, all bodies were sunk, using two inch line and a weight of three 5″/38 cal projectiles. There were still more bodies in the area when darkness brought a close to the gruesome operations for the day. In all, twenty-eight bodies were examined and sunk. The last bodies were picked up in position Lat. 11°26’ N, Long. 132°37’ E.

[…]

Source: TDSC; Action Reports Western Carolines Sub Area, “USS Helm (DD388) Memorandum Report on Search of Survivors USS Indianapolis CA-35) 4–5 August 1945,” 6 August 1945, signed by A. F. Hollingsworth, RG 38, Box 80 NARA II, College Park, MD.

As the search for Indianapolis survivors ended and the crew convalesced in hospitals at Samar and Peleliu, the cargo that they delivered to Tinian on 26 July was used in the war effort. Captain William Parsons, USN, was weaponeer and bomb commander aboard the Enola Gay during its 6 August mission over Hiroshima. Parsons was an innovator in ordnance and radar, and critical to the development of the atomic bomb. He was head of Ordnance Division in Project Y of the Manhattan Project as well as officer-in-charge of the overseas technical group of the Los Alamos Laboratory. Additionally, he served as Dr. Robert Oppenheimer’s technical deputy. After witnessing the successful detonation of the uranium bomb at the 16 July Trinity Test in Alamogordo, New Mexico, he was flown to Tinian to await the Indianapolis’s delivery. In the following weeks, the bomb was assembled and preparations for the mission took place. The fate of Indianapolis was known prior to the Hiroshima mission. Some viewed the success of the mission as fulfillment of Indianapolis’s delivery and as retaliation for I-58’s attack. The documents below detail the first intercepted reports from Japanese sources of the effects of the bomb on Hiroshima and Captain Parson’s description of the mission to the U.S. media. A second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki 9 August, before Imperial Japan surrendered on 15 August. With the war concluded, many of the Indianapolis survivors travelled home in late September on board Hollandia (CVE-97). At 1400, on 24 September, they were mustered on deck during the transit home and paid their semi-monthly wage.

Document 3.10: Descriptions of 6 August Atomic Bomb Dropping on Hiroshima from U.S. Intelligence and Captain William Parsons, USN

General Headquarters

United States Army Forces in the Pacific

Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

ULTRA Intelligence Summary

No. 118

9/10 August 1945

Contents and Significant Items

[…][39]

Par. 6 Hiroshima: Japs rpt atomic bomb dam.

[…]

II AIR

6. On 7 Aug, 12 Army Flying Div (Ozuki, SW Honshu) rptd to C/S Air General Army, Vice C/S Air HQ…15 Army C/S as follows:

“Eye witness account of 6 Air Army and this Div in regard to bombing of Hiroshima.”

“Bomb used . . . resulting conditions: A violent, lrg, special-type bomb giving appearance magnesium was dropped over center of city this morning by a formation of 3 or 4 planes (also said there was only one plane) (some say it was attached to a parachute). Est that, having been dropped fr a plane, it exploded at a certain altitude above ground.”

“There was a blinding flash and a violent blast (over city center, flash and blast were almost simultaneous but in vicin of the airfield blast came 2 or 3 second later), and a mass of white smoke billowing up into the air.”

“Flash was instantaneous, burning objects in immediate vicin, burning exposed parts people’s bodies as far as approx 2 mi away and setting fire to their thin clothing.”

“Blast levelled completely or partially as many as 50,000 houses within radius of 2 mil and smashed glass blocks (sic) etc.”

“Losses: Majority of houses within city were completely or partially levelled. Conflagration spread all over and many important areas were dest by fire. Majority of Government buildings were either levelled or dest by fire. Many people were injured by burns fr flash or by objects shattered by blast, particularly glass fragments and as far as was obsvd . . . one-third of residents were either seriously or slightly injured.”

“Countermeasures: Personnel, a/c, etc have been moved underground (partially underground) . . . walls if they are strong are alright.”

“We must keep a strict watch even for small nbrs of planes.”

(GIW 65)

[…]

[END]

Meet Your Navy

Capt. W. S. Parsons

August 13, 1945

ANNCR: As the entire world stands by while the Japanese Government deliberates the problem of war or peace, the minds of statesmen, armchair strategists, soldiers and sailors turn toward the staggering fact that a weapon now exists which, in a matter of seconds, can wipe cities from the map. One of the few men in the world to understand the secrets of the atomic bomb is Captain William Sterling Parsons, United States Navy, who has been engaged in its development for the past two and a half years. Captain Parsons is an Associate Director of the Los Alamos Project, which is the name given to the organization set up near Santa Fe, New Mexico, for the development of atomic power as a weapon of war. In addition to his experiences in the beginnings of the bomb, Captain Parsons has seen the practical demonstration of it when he flew over the city of Hiroshima on the morning of August 6th. Captain Parsons is at our microphone here on Guam now to tell us something about his experience as a weaponeer harnessing the basic power of the universe. Captain, what has been your part in the development of the atomic bomb?

Captain: You have correctly described me as a weaponeer. It is a coined word which might mean part physicist part engineer and part weapons tester.

ANNCR: Can you tell us something of the early days at the Los Alamos Project?

Captain: The project itself was and is under the direction of Dr. J.R. Oppenheimer, a renowned professor of physics at the University of California and Cal Tech. Although our director is a civilian and we are not strictly speaking a military organization, we have been under the closest military guard, and our work has been carried out in great secrecy. Until recently our families, who were living at the project, were not even permitted to visit elsewhere.

ANNCR: And now, Captain, will you describe for us your historic attack on the city of Hiroshima?

Captain: Well, it began something like a Hollywood premiere with flash bulbs and cameras firing away at us before we took off in the darkness of an airfield in the Marianas. We flew northward to Japan, passing Iwo Jima in the morning light. As we approached the Japanese home islands, the weather began to clear and my hopes rose with the sun. I can remember thinking to myself—and believing it—we’re in for a lucky day.

ANNCR: Did the crew of your plane know what you had aboard?

Captain: They knew we had something new and very powerful in the way of a bomb, but they did not know any details about it.

ANNCR: And from what we have heard, your lucky day hunch was correct.

Captain: It certainly was. As we approached the city of Hiroshima, I had approximately six minutes to look before we dropped our bomb. I could see the green lawns of the army division headquarters and docks and streets. And best of all, I could see that there was not a cloud over the target. Because of excellent work by the navigator and the bombardier we made a perfect approach.

ANNCR: And then came the crucial moment—“Bomb Away.”

Captain: Right. And as soon as our bomb was away, our bomb bay doors slammed closed to permit the high speed required to get away from the area as quickly as possible. We had just rolled out of a turn when the bomb exploded. All of us, who had been waiting tensely, saw what appeared through our dark goggles to be a huge blue flash. This meant the bomb had functioned. The next crucial question was what would happen when the blast struck us. This was answered seconds later when we received two sharp jolts very much like close ack-ack bursts. We were then free to turn and look at the city which had been Hiroshima. As we did so, each crew member saw the results of our bomb and there was a spontaneous exclamation of “My God!” A huge white mushroom cloud had risen three or four miles in less than two minutes. At the base of the mushroom stem there was an even more sinister cloud which was boiling, and practically covered the entire city. It was dark brown and must have consisted of pulverized buildings and smoke. We had seen enough, and headed for home.

ANNCR: Captain Parsons, what was the feeling you had on the Hiroshima Mission, one of great excitement?

Captain: No. To all outward appearances the bomb was the same as the test models we had dropped so many times in the States and out here. The principal emotion was an overpowering sense of responsibility for the proper delivery of this greatest weapon of all time.

ANNCR: Thank you, Captain William Sterling Parsons, United States Navy. From the Island of Guam we return you now to Great Lakes.

[END]

Source: TDC; Declassified. General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area, Military Intelligence Section, G-2, ULTRA Intelligence Summaries, No. 1-137, 15 April–29 August [SRH-203, Part 6]. Located in Navy Department Library Special Collections, WNY. AND, TR; “Papers of Rear Admiral William S. Parsons,” 1943–1952, NHHC Archives, WNY.

Figure 3-17. Captain William “Deak” Parsons (kneeling right), the weaponeer for the Hiroshima mission, supervises the loading of the “Little Boy” uranium bomb into the bomb bay of the B-29 Enola Gay on Tinian, 5 August 1945.

Photograph in RG 77-BT, NARA II, College Park, MD

Figure 3-18. The “Little Boy” bomb being lifted into the bomb bay of Enola Gay, 5 August 1945.

Photograph in RG 77-BT, NARA II, College Park, MD

CHAPTER FOUR

Moving Forward—Condolences and Investigations

Captain McVay, in this extract from his oral history, described his disbelief and embarrassment that he was the only senior officer to make it off of the ship. He related how he felt a great responsibility for the loss of his ship and crew, and how several times throughout the ordeal he pondered if survival was his best option. This short, but powerful, testimony shows how the tragedy weighed on him and would continue to do so for the remainder of his life.

Document 4.1: Oral History of Captain McVay Describing Loss of Officers and Thoughts on Future [Extract]

All my other heads of departments, except the senior doctor and the chief engineer, are missing. I talked to the damage control officer; the navigator; to Captain Crouch, a passenger; to my executive officer; and in fact talked to all the heads of departments except the chief engineer and the gunnery officer before the ship went down. I talked to them on the bridge. Whatever happened to those people, I haven’t the faintest idea. I can only say that, as somebody put it, maybe they went back to their room to get a flashlight, a knife, or some money or something else. That’s the only thing that would make any sense to me.

I can’t believe that they got in the water and were never seen and it’s true that we did not see any of them, so they must have gotten caught and not gotten off. It was very embarrassing to me, being the old fud on the ship, to find out that there is nobody between me and, well, the doctor’s about 31 or 32, but I have no line officer above a reserve lieutenant. I can’t account for that in any way except possibly the fact that when I thought I was going to be sucked under with the ship, I tried to swim away.

You have rather peculiar thoughts that go through your mind. I thought that, well, it may be embarrassing if I’m the only one left, or at least if I, as a Captain, am left and my ship is gone. But, I decided that I would attempt to save myself. I must admit that I had the thought that it would have been much easier if I go down, I won’t have to face what I know is coming after this. But, something stronger within me decided that, spurred me to get out of the way, at least to attempt to save myself.

And, on the raft, of course, I had a great many hours to think of the disaster and I knew of some of the people I had lost. I hated to think of having to see their wives and a great many of them I knew quite well, having been in the States over two months just previously. Most of them had been up at Mare Island. I knew there was nothing I could say to them, and I think probably the fact that I enjoyed life, that I thought of many a cocktail hour that you have at home after you have an exhausting day and you come back and take a bath and can relax for a few minutes and get away from the worries of the office. I thought I would certainly like to repeat some of those evenings and I guess that’s what kept a good many people going. They just thought of some of the happiness that had been theirs in life and decided they’d stick it out.

On the other hand, we know of many people who apparently just decided it wasn’t worth it.

Source: TR; Extract from “Oral History of Charles B. McVay III, Captain USN,” recorded 27 September 1945, transcribed 1 October 1945, 34 pp. Copy of original in Indianapolis Ship History Files, Naval History and Heritage Command Archives, WNY.

Figure 4-1. Last photo of officers of Indianapolis (CA-35) before leaving California with atomic bomb components. L to R—front row: Commander Johns Hopkins Janney (killed), Captain Charles B. McVay III (survived), Commander Joseph Ambrose Flynn (killed), Commander Glen F. DeGrave (not on ship/left ship at Hawaii). Back Row: Thought to be Lieutenant Commander Charles Monroe Christensen (not on ship), Lieutenant Commander Kyle Campbell “Casey” Moore (killed), Lieutenant Commander Lewis Leavitt Haynes, MC (survived), Lieutenant Commander Earl O’Dell Henry (killed), Lieutenant Commander Charles David Hayes (killed).

Courtesy of United States Naval Institute—A. J. Sedivi Collection

Figure 4-2. Indianapolis’s (CA-35) last Commanding Officer, Captain Charles B. McVay III, tells war correspondents about the sinking of his ship. Photographed on Guam in August 1945, following the rescue of her survivors.

Official U.S. Navy Photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives. NHHC Photo Collection, 80-G-490321

Captain McVay’s first after-action Report was submitted on 12 August. The more detailed 26 August report is provided below. The investigation into what exactly happened to Indianapolis had just begun when these reports were submitted. McVay’s reports themselves served as the foundation upon which the investigation would be built. He was unaware of what awaited him when these reports were prepared, and he primarily focused on determining the final whereabouts of surviving crew. All details of McVay’s report would be heavily scrutinized in the upcoming months and revisited during the Court of Inquiry called for by Fleet Admiral Nimitz. McVay’s description of visibility conditions the night of the sinking given in this report became a particularly troublesome issue for him—although he later clarified that he described visibility as it was in the water after the sinking, not on the ship immediately after the torpedo hits. Much of the final report was devoted to recommending improvements in lifesaving equipment to the Navy.

Document 4.2: Captain McVay’s After-Action Report

Naval Base Hospital #18, Navy 926

26 August 1945[1]

From: The Commanding Officer.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Via: Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

Subject: Action Report U.S.S. Indianapolis 450 miles east of Leyte Gulf 30 July 1945, Including Circumstances of the Resultant Sinking of the Ship.

Part I. General Narrative

1.The Indianapolis on 30 July 1945 was enroute GUAM to LEYTE GULF under orders to report on arrival to Commander, Task Group 95.7. The ship was steaming singly on course 262° T, making revolutions for 17 knots. Zig-zagging had been discontinued at 2000, 29 July. [All times used are zone (-9 ½)].

2.At 0005, 30 July 1945 a violent underwater explosion occurred in the vicinity of frame 7 starboard side followed immediately by a second similar explosion in the vicinity of frame 50 starboard side. These explosions were believed to have been caused by two torpedoes fired from an enemy submarine. A terrific blaze shot through the entire forward half of the ship immediately following the explosion, and the ship commenced flooding rapidly forward to list to starboard. Because the second torpedo hit was in the vicinity of the I.C. room[2], all ship’s service telephones, M-C circuits, and all sound powered circuits with the exception of a few AA battery circuits and part of the 2JV circuit were put out of commission. Due to the lack of communications and the fact that the explosion caused the engine order telegraph to go out of commission, the OOD was unable to stop the engines. At 0008 the Commanding Officer instructed the Navigator to deliver the following message to Radio I: “We have been hit by two torpedoes, Latitude____N, Longitude____E, we are sinking rapidly and need immediate assistance.” It is now known this message did not get out due to loss of power. Radio II transmitted an S.O.S. call on 500 K.C. which also apparently failed to get out due to antenna grounds. There was no electric power in the forward half of the ship.

3.All attempts to fight fire were unsuccessful due to loss of pressure on the fire main which is believed to have been caused by a ruptured fire main. By 0010, the list had increased to approximately 12° and at this time the Damage Control Officer reported to the Commanding Officer that the damage was serious. The Damage Control Officer was then directed to investigate the damage more thoroughly and to keep the Commanding Officer informed. At approximately 0015 the Executive Officer reported to the Commanding Officer that the damage was extremely serious, the ship was going down rapidly by the head, and recommended that the ship be abandoned. The Commanding Officer immediately gave the order to abandon ship, this order was passed orally. The ship took a decided starboard list to about 30°, about a minute later another decided list to about 65° continuing to 90° where she remained about two minutes then plunged down by the head rolling completely over as she sank out of sight.

4.There was a 10 knot wind from the south west and a slight swell from the West. The current set south west, drift a little under one knot. The sky was cloudy with intermittent moonlight.[3] It is estimated that 700 men got off the ship, and it is believed that about 60 of these men drowned the first few hours that they were in the water. The remainder of the men formed into the 7 following groups: (practically all men had either Kapok life jackets or pneumatic life belts).

a.150 on 4 floater nets with no food or water.

b.150 on 2 floater nets and 3 rafts with 9 standard ration cans and 2—3 gallon water breakers.

c.300 without benefit of rafts, food, or water.

d.50 without benefit of rafts, food, or water.

e.19 on 4 rafts with food and water.

f.10 on 4 rafts and 1 floater net, with 1–3 gallon water breaker, 1 can rations, and 1 box cigarettes.

g.2 men on one floater net, no rations.

h.1 man on 1 raft, 1 can ration, no water.

These groups were not visible to one another.

5.During the following 4 days approximately 8 aircraft were sighted. All attempts to attract attention by use of flares, reflecting mirrors, one green marker dye, and yellow cloth were futile. Many men died from one or more of the following causes:

i.Injuries received aboard ship.

ii.Dehydration and exhaustion.

iii.Drinking of salt water.

iv.Miscellaneous-Sharks, drowning and pneumonia.

At about 1130, 2 August the southern group of survivors were sighted by a Navy Ventura search plane. At 1230 other Navy planes began arriving in the area to search and aid in rescue operations. One whaleboat and several rubber life rafts were dropped. The following rescue ships arrived on the scene at approximately 0030, 3 August:

v.U.S.S. Register ( APD 92)

vi.U.S.S. Bassett (APD 73)

vii.U.S.S. Ringness (APD 100)

viii.U.S.S. Cecil Doyle (DE 368)

These four ships commenced rescue operations immediately. By noon 3 August, all survivors had been picked up. 149 were taken to Fleet Hospital #114, Samar by Bassett. 169 were taken to Base Hospital #20 Peleliu Island, Palau Group by Cecil Doyle, Ringness, and Register.

6.The treatment given the survivors aboard the aforementioned ships was excellent and in keeping with the highest traditions of the naval service.

Part II. Preliminaries

1.Although the explosions were believed to have been caused by two torpedoes fired by an enemy submarine, no submarine was seen and no torpedo wakes were observed. Nothing was on the radar scope.

Part III. Chronological Order of Events

0005 Ship struck by one torpedo starboard side.

0005+ Ship struck by second torpedo frame 50 starboard side.

0008 Contact report sent to Radio I. (This did not go out due to power failure).

0009 S.O.S. Sent by Radio II. (This did not get out due to antenna being grounded).

0013 “Abandon Ship”.

0020 Ship Sank.

Part IV. Ordnance

No comments.

Part V. Damage

1.Ship sank.

2.Summary of damage.

a.Torpedo hit in the vicinity of frame 7, starboard side.

b.Torpedo hit in the vicinity of frame 50, starboard side.

c.Forecastle deck ruptured athwartships in the vicinity of frame 50.

d.Communications deck ruptured athwartships at forward stack.

e.Fire throughout forward half of ship.

f.Immediate flooding by water and fuel oil of second deck from bow to frame #78.

g.Bow broken and bent to starboard at approximately frame #9.

3.Damage control.

a.All communications were lost.

b.Central station destroyed.

c.Patrol I abandoned due to loss of communication.

d.Repair II abandoned due to fire, smoke, and fumes.

e.Fire fighting and damage control measures were attempted by Repair III, General Quarters Damage Control Personnel, and volunteers surrounding the entire damaged area. Cessation of these measures was necessitated by rapid flooding and burning oil.

f.All pressure was lost on the fire main.

Part VI. Special Comments

1.Communications:

a.Receiving apparatus destroyed in Radio I.

b.Power lost in Radio I.

c.Radio II transmitted messages keyed by Radio I.

d.Fire crept into Radio I from above at 0010 causing abandonment.

e.Radio II abandoned at about 0017.

2.Navigation:

a.Steering control was lost immediately.

3.Engineering:

a.Circuit breakers on forward distribution board tripped out.

b.Steam pressure was lost immediately in the forward engine room, causing No. 1 and No. 4 main engines and all auxiliaries forward to stop.

c.Forward engine room abandoned at about 0010.

d.Immediately after the explosion vacuum was lost on No. 3 engine but 25 inches of vacuum was maintained on #2 main engine. 160 r.p.m. was made.

e.No. 2 fire and flushing pump was running at maximum speed maintaining a fire main pressure of 10lbs in the after engine room.

f.No. 3 & No. 4 main generations continued to run.

g.No. 4 fireroom continued to supply after engine room with full steam pressure (300 lbs).

4.Medical:

a.The explosion caused a large number of casualties, exact number not known. The majority seen before the ship sank suffered from severe flash burn and fractured extremities. Very few of these survived the period of immersion. First aid treatment was being given up to the time the ship sank.

Part VII. Personnel Performance and Casualties

No Comments. Submitted in separate correspondence.

Part VIII. Lessons Learned, Conclusions, and Recommendations

1.Recommend following:

a.Hydrostatic releasing device for all life rafts and floater nets.

b.Abolishment of pneumatic life belts.

c.Abolishment of horsecollar type Kapok jacket.

d.Provide pocket in Kapok jackets containing sun hood and 11 oz. sealed can of water.

e.Replacement of wooden water breakers with 11 oz. sealed cans of water.

f.Men expend minimum amount of energy in water. Men should stay in groups even though no rafts are available.

g.Smoke pots for use in daytime.

h.Leave cardboard separators out of flare containers and use space gained for more flares. Parachute flares replace present type so time of burning will be prolonged.

i.Several reflecting mirrors be furnished to each raft. j. All rafts be equipped with radar reflectors.

k.All life rafts be “flat top” and “flat bottom” type because of discomfort in sitting on round type.

2.Again it has been demonstrated that a ship with such a small GM[4] cannot survive underwater damage even though over sixty percent of the ship remains undamaged. List cannot be controlled fast enough to prevent her capsizing.[5]

Chas. B. McVay 3d [signed]

Chas. B. McVAY III.

Cc: CominCh (Advance copy), CinCPac (3 advance copies), ComCruPac, ComCru Division FOUR

From: CinCPac

To: CominCh

1.Forwarded.

2.If comment is considered appropriate, it will be included in CinCPac’s Monthly Report of Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas for the month concerned.

G.E. Prall, By direction

Source: TDSC; “USS Indianapolis After Action Report,” 26 August 1945, Navy Retain File, NARA II, College Park, MD. Copies of the 12 August 1945 and 26 August 1945 after-action reports are also available in Indianapolis Ship History Files, Box 396A, Naval History and Heritage Command Archives, WNY.

The “Opinions” and “Recommendations” of the Court of Inquiry Board came after hearing five days of testimony from crew, port authorities, rescue pilots, and representatives from Admiral Nimitz’s HQ and Rear Admiral McCormick’s CTG 95.7. Convening just a week after the rescue for the purpose of broadly figuring out what happened to Indianapolis, the inquiry testimony is one of the best sources available to researchers. The proximity to the sinking and ongoing war also means that some facts related to intelligence, as well as Japanese accounts, were not available. The court identified the primary points of failure in the sinking of Indianapolis and the rescue effort—-failure of Captain McVay to zigzag during good nighttime visibility, lack of a distress signal, misinterpretation of 10CL-45’s directive of reporting combatant ship arrivals, failure of Port Director Tacloban to bring non-arrival to the attention of higher command, failure of CTG 95.7 to inquire into Indianapolis’s non-arrival for training, and search and reconnaissance planes flying too high to spot small objects in the water. The court also recognized that faulty lifesaving equipment and vague operational procedures contributed to the loss of lives and recommended corrections. The court found that through his command decisions Captain McVay “incurred serious blame” for the loss and recommended that he face trial by general court-martial. It was recommended that disciplinary letters be placed in the files of Port Director Operations Office Tacloban and Commander CTG 95.7 for failure to communicate that Indianapolis was overdue.

Document 4.3: Opinions and Recommendations Presented by Court of Inquiry Board for Indianapolis Sinking

The court, having thoroughly inquired into all the facts and circumstances connected with the allegations contained in the precept and having considered the evidence adduced finds as follows:

FINDING OF FACTS

[…][6]

OPINIONS

1.That the Operations Officer, on staff of Commander Marianas, considered the danger from submarines along the route “Peddie” practically negligible at the time Indianapolis sailed from Guam.

2.That visibility on night in question was good with intermittent moonlight.

3.That in view of all attendant circumstances including Fleet doctrine, sound operational practice required Indianapolis to zigzag on the night in question.

4.That regular patrols for damage control were maintained in Indianapolis on the night of her sinking.

5.That an adequate bridge watch and lookouts were stationed aboard Indianapolis on the night in question.

6.That the ship was in normal wartime cruising condition, condition of readiness THREE, material condition YOKE modified, immediately prior to the explosions.

7.That it cannot definitely be determined whether or not condition of water tight integrity prescribed by material condition YOKE modified, was being strictly observed.

8.That there is conflicting testimony as to whether there were one or two explosions, but the court is of the opinion that two major explosions occurred within in a matter of seconds, one forward of frame 15, the other at about frame 55.

9.That the origin of the explosions cannot be clearly established since testimony of survivors is contradictory and inconclusive.

10.That, due to the violence of the explosions, with resulting damage to radio installations, radio personnel were uncertain as to whether or not a distress signal actually left the ship.

11.The court is of the opinion that no distress message did leave the ship.

12.The court is of the opinion that delay in attempting to send a distress message was caused by:

(a)Loss of internal communications

(b)Damage to radio installations

(c)Some uncertainty regarding proper frequency to be used.

13.That deficiencies in life saving equipment reported by some of the survivors were in part due to conditions beyond the control of the ship, i.e., design and type of equipment furnished by the Department.

14.That first aid kits did not contain sufficient quantities of remedies for burns and for eye trouble caused by the salt water and fuel oil.

15.That insufficient or brackish water found in breakers might have developed after they were cast loose from the ship, or might have been the result of inadequate or insufficient inspections.

16.That standard life rafts and kapok jackets, due to their neutral color, are difficult to sight.

17.That testimony of Lieutenant Richard B. Redmayne, U.S. Naval Reserve, regarding immoral conduct of unnamed man in the “sick bay raft” was based on hearsay[7] and, due to mental condition of that officer at that time, may have been imagined.

18.That certain testimony tending to incriminate Morgan, Eugene S., boatswain’s mate second class, U.S. Naval Reserve, regarding unauthorized use of water and rations which has been introduced is largely refuted by witnesses in Morgan’s behalf.

19.That failure of search planes on July 30 and August 1 to sight survivors in water in area where ship sank, while regrettable, cannot be attributed to carelessness or inattention to duty on the part of the plane crews in question.

20.That normal search and reconnaissance of the area where ship sank was being conducted at altitudes in accordance with prescribed doctrine, from which altitudes it was extremely unlikely that small objects on the surface of the water could be detected.

21.That the sighting of the survivors of Indianapolis was accidental.

22.That failure to inquire into the reason for non-arrival of Indianapolis at Leyte on schedule was primarily due to a faulty system which had grown up. This led to resultant complacency on the part of responsible personnel by reason of the instructions contained in Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 10CL-45 and Commander Seventh Fleet Confidential Letter 2CL-45, pertinent paragraphs of which are quoted:

“The Commander of a Fleet Unit making a movement will not originate a movement report. He shall, however, when the military situation permits, issue such supplementary reports as may be required to apprise those who need to know of:

(1)Changes in orders or corrections of erroneous information contained in movement reports; and

(2)Deviations from prescribed routing of more than 40 miles or changes in prescribed ETA of more than three hours.”

and

“Arrival reports shall not be made for combatant ships.”

23.That directive in Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 10CL-45 regarding non-reporting of arrivals of combatant ships was intended to reduce heavy communication load and for security purposes.

24.That there was a definite belief in the minds of responsible personnel of Commander Philippine Sea Frontier and Port Director, Tacloban, that the prohibition contained in the directives regarding not reporting arrivals of combatant likewise prohibited, by implication, reporting of non-arrivals.

25.That the intent of Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 10CL-45, paragraph 3(b), is that port authorities and others concerned be kept advised of prospective arrivals of combatant Fleet units. In case of unexplained non-arrival, the court is of the opinion that Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, expected action to be initiated by those concerned.

26.That it should be the duty of the Port Director to whom a ship is routed to account for her arrival or non-arrival.

27.That failure of communication personnel on CTG 95.7 staff to correctly decode Cincpac dispatch 260152 prevented CTG 95.7 having all possible information regarding employment of Indianapolis in the immediate future.

28.That attention might have been drawn to failure of Indianapolis to arrive at Leyte Gulf at appointed time, if those in charge of radio teletype tests had endeavored to communicate with her by other means.

29.That the most probable cause of the explosions was that the ship had been struck almost simultaneously by two torpedoes from an enemy submarine.

30.That the next most probable cause of the explosions was that the ship struck one or more mines.

31.That the least probable cause of the disaster was a series of explosions within the ship.

32.Although the court has been unable to establish the fact that the ship was torpedoed, it has expressed its opinion that the most probable cause of the explosions was torpedo hits. It has also expressed its opinion, in spite of conflicting testimony, that visibility on night in question was good with intermittent moonlight. The moon, in last quarter of its phase had risen at about 2205 ITEM.[8] The court is, therefore, of the opinion that failure of the ship to be zigzagging at the time of the explosions occurred was a contributory cause of the loss of the ship. This opinion, however, cannot be given full weight for the following reasons:

(a)Possession of radar by the enemy makes tracking and accurate attack relatively simple, whether a ship is zigzagging or not, unless, in the case of a ship making fifteen knots or more, the submarine happens to be in poor initial position.

(b)If the ship struck mines or was sunk by internal explosions, zigzagging made no difference.

33.The court is of the opinion that failure or inability of the ship to transmit a distress message was the primary cause of delay in connection with reporting the loss of the ship and delay in initiating rescue operations.

34.The court is of the opinion that failure of any naval activity in Leyte Gulf to inquire into the reason for the non-arrival of Indianapolis was a contributory cause of the delay in reporting the loss of the ship and delay in initiating rescue operations.

35.The court is of the opinion that instructions contained in Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 10CL-45 and Seventh Fleet Confidential letter 2CL-45, with particular reference to the following:

“The Commander of a Fleet Unit making a movement will not originate a movement report.

He shall, however, when the military situation permits, issue such supplementary reports as may be required to apprise those who need to know of:

(1)Change in orders or corrections of erroneous information contained in movement reports; and

(2)Deviations from prescribed routing or more than 40 miles or changes in prescribed ETA of more than three hours.”

and

“Arrival reports shall not be made for combatant ships.” were the primary cause of the failure of any naval activity to inquire into the reason for non-arrival on Indianapolis at its ETA.

36.That CTG 95.7 and Port Director, Tacloban, were action addresses on Port Director, Guam, dispatch 280032 announcing ETA of Indianapolis and, therefore, the court is of the opinion that responsibility rested upon these officers regarding arrival of Indianapolis at Leyte, or her failure to arrive. However, responsibility of CTG 95.7 regarding arrival of Indianapolis at Leyte was lessened because of his absence from port at the ETA of Indianapolis. The concern which he otherwise might have felt was further lessened by his failure to receive Cincpac dispatch 260152.

37.That although responsibility of Port Director, Tacloban, with respect to reporting non-arrival of combatant ships was not clearly laid down either in his orders or in any instructions or directives issued by higher authority, the court is of the opinion that responsibility did exist which is implicit by the nature of his duties.

38.That responsibility for delay in connection with reporting the loss of Indianapolis rests with the following:

(a)Lieutenant Stewart B. Gibson, U.S. Naval Reserve, for failure to bring to the attention of the Port Director, Tacloban, the fact that Indianapolis was overdue and that he had received no supplementary movement report setting a new ETA, or announcing a change of orders.

(b)Communication staff of CTG 95.7 for failure to decode Cincpac Secret dispatch 260152 which directed that officer to arrange ten-day training period for Indianapolis in Leyte area.

39.The court is of the opinion that a contributory responsibility for loss Indianapolis rests upon Captain Charles B. McVay III, U.S. Navy, for failure to order zigzag courses to be steered.

40.The court is also of the opinion that a contributory responsibility rests upon Captain Charles B. McVay III, U.S. Navy, for delay in connection with reporting the loss of that ship, due to failure to send out a distress message.

41.The court is of the opinion that no offenses were committed except as indicated in opinion 42.

42.The court is of the opinion that no blame for loss of Indianapolis, or for delay in reporting loss of that vessel, attaches to any officer or man except as follows:

43.(a) Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Indianapolis incurred serious blame for failure to order zigzag courses to be steered on the night in question.

44.(b) Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Indianapolis incurred serious blame for failure to send out a distress message.

(c)Operations Officer, Port Director, Tacloban, incurred blame for failure to bring to the attention of Port Director, Tacloban, the fact that Indianapolis was overdue.

(d)Communications staff of CTG 95.7 incurred blame for failure to decode Cincpac Secret dispatch 260152.

45.The court is of the opinion that the record of this inquiry contains matter of interest in the cases of the following officers, but not of sufficient interest to make them defendants or interested parties or to warrant further proceedings against them:

(a)Rear Admiral Lynde D. McCormick, U.S. Navy;

(b)Commodore Norman C. Gillette, U.S. Navy;

(c)Commodore Jacob H. Jacobson, U.S. Navy;

(d)Captain Alfred M. Granum, U.S. Navy;

(e)Lieutenant Commander Jules E. Sancho, U.S. Naval Reserve.

46.That all personnel losses and injuries were incurred in line of duty, and not as a result of their own misconduct.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1.The court recommends that further proceedings be had as indicated below:

A. That Captain Charles B. McVay III, U.S. Navy, be brought to trial by general court-martial on the following charges:

I. CULPABLE INEFFICENCY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY

under Article 8, Section 10, articles for the government of the Navy,

II. NEGLIGENTLY ENDANGERING LIVES OF OTHERS under Article 22, articles for the government of the Navy.

B. That a letter of admonition be addressed to Lieutenant Stewart B. Gibson, U.S. Naval Reserve, based upon Opinion 38(a) of this record of proceedings.

C. That CTG 95.7, Rear Admiral Lynde D. McCormick, U.S. Navy, be directed to take necessary disciplinary action with regard to blame incurred by his communications staff.

2.That no further proceedings be had in the case of Morgan, Eugene S., boatswain’s mate second class, U.S. Naval Reserve.

3.That Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, include in Confidential Letter 10CL-45, instructions regarding reports of non-arrival of any vessel routed to the Port Director at port of destination.

4.That since the rescue of the survivors in areas under search is an important wartime mission, altitudes at which aerial searches are flown should be adjusted with due regard to changing military situations which develop in the area under search.

5.That in enemy submarine waters, ships without anti-submarine escort zigzag at all times without regard to state of visibility.

6.That life rafts be provided with bright yellow tarpaulins for protection from sun and weather and also to attract attention.

7.That first aid kits for life rafts, etc., be packed in watertight containers and that adequate quantities of remedies for burns and for eye troubles caused by fuel oil and salt water be provided.

8.The court recommends that subject to the foregoing, no further proceedings to be had.

Charles A. Lockwood Jr.,[9]
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy, President,

George D. Murray,[10]
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy, Member,

Francis E. M. Whiting,[11]
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Member.

Source: TD; “Findings and Facts of from 13 August 1945 Court of Inquiry into Loss of Indianapolis” in CINCPAC 1945 Flag Files, RG 38, Box 45, NARA II, College Park, MD.

Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, disagreed with the court that the Indianapolis skipper should be court-martialed. While he felt that blame rested on McVay, he viewed a letter of reprimand as sufficient punishment. Nimitz also moved to file disciplinary letters to the Operations Officer and Port Director at Tacloban. He desired additional information from CTG 95.7 before choosing a course of disciplinary action for Rear Admiral McCormick. Nimitz also supported the court’s recommendation to clarify instruction 10CL-45 and implement a more rigid movement reports instruction to prevent such mishaps from happening in the future. On 11 August 1945, Nimitz had also increased escort requirements in his theater, reporting to Admiral King that “since Indianapolis all ships with over 500 persons aboard are escorted between Ulithi and Philippines regardless of speed.”[12]

Document 4.4: Admiral Chester Nimitz’s Disagreement with Court of Inquiry Findings

DECLASSIFIED

A17-24

United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas

Headquarters of the Commander in Chief

Serial 006596

c/o Fleet Post Office

San Francisco, California

6 SEP 1945

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, does not agree with the court in its recommendation that Captain Charles B. McVay III, U.S. Navy, be brought to trial by general court-martial. He did incur blame for failure to order zig-zag courses steered on the night in question, and for failure to send a distress message immediately after the explosions. His failure to order a zig-zag course was an error in judgment, but not of such nature as to constitute gross negligence. Therefore, a letter of reprimand will be addressed to Captain McVay in lieu of a general court-martial.

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, considers that blame was also incurred by Lieutenant Stewart B. Gibson, U.S. Naval Reserve, Port Director Operations Officer, Tacloban, Leyte Area, for his failure to bring to the attention of the Port Director, Tacloban, the fact that the Indianapolis was overdue and that he had received no supplementary movement report setting a new ETA, or announcing a change of orders. A letter of reprimand will, therefore, be addressed to Lieutenant Gibson. Blame was also incurred by Lieutenant Commander Jules E. Sancho, U.S. Naval Reserve, Acting Port Director, Tacloban, for not reporting the fact that Indianapolis was overdue. Although he was only acting Port Director at the time of this incident, he cannot escape responsibility. A letter of admonition will be addressed to Lieutenant Commander Sancho.

It is noted that Captain McVay and Lieutenant Gibson were not designated defendants, as required by Section 734, Naval Courts and Boards. However, the court did accord them all the rights of defendants, including the right to make an argument in their own behalf, which Lieutenant Gibson did. Since they were each accorded all the rights of defendants, they were not prejudiced by the court’s failure to refer to them as such. It is also noted that the court is of the opinion that the record contains matter of interest in the cases of the following: Rear Admiral Lynde D. McCormick, U.S. Navy, Commodore Norman C. Gillette, U.S. Navy, Commodore Jacob H. Jacobsen, U.S. Navy, Captain Alfred M. Granum, U.S. Navy, and Lieutenant Commander Jules E. Sancho, U.S. Naval Reserve. The court erred in failing to accord the rights of defendants to the above named officers. Statements have been obtained from each of the above, except Rear Admiral McCormick, and are attached as a part of the record in accordance with 736 (c), Naval Courts and Boards. It is not considered practicable to hold the record longer for receipt of the statement from Rear Admiral McCormick. When received by the convening authority, it shall be forwarded to the Judge Advocate General with a copy of this record.

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, is of the opinion that the court should have further investigated the matter of the receipt of CINCPAC dispatch 260152 of July by Commander Task Group Ninety-Five Point Seven on 26 July 1945, which ordered Commander Task Group Ninety-Five Point Seven to arrange a ten day training period for the Indianapolis in the Leyte Area. However, it is not considered practicable to return the record for such action. By copy of this endorsement, Commander Task Group Ninety-Five Point Seven is directed to take necessary disciplinary action with regard to blame incurred by his communications staff regarding above dispatch.

Recommendation number three is approved in principle.[13] A revision of PacFleet Letter 10CL-45 providing for peacetime movement reports is soon to be published, and this revision will include specific instructions as to action to be take in the case of non-arrival vessels.

Subject to the foregoing remarks, the proceedings, findings, opinions, and recommendations of the Court of Inquiry in the attached case are approved.

C. W. Nimitz

Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy

Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

Source: TDC; “Letter from Admiral Nimitz to Admiral King disagreeing with recommendation of Court of Inquiry to bring Captain McVay to trial by Court-Martial,” 6 September 1945, Copy in CINCPAC 1945 Flag Files, RG 38, Box 45, NARA II, College Park, MD.

Figure 4-3. (L to R) Admiral Raymond Spruance, Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher, Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, and Vice Admiral Willis Augustus “Ching” Lee Jr. photographed on board Indianapolis (CA-35) on 3 February 1945. The original photograph has been autographed by Admiral Spruance and Fleet Admiral Nimitz. Collection of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN.

Official U.S. Navy Photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives. NHHC Photo Collection, NH 49705

The Navy launched a service-wide effort to learn from the Indianapolis tragedy. The extract from the Navy Bureau of Ships’ report below provides its expert analysis on how the ship responded to the torpedo hits, the progression of flooding, and ultimate reason for sinking so quickly. The report determined that there was nothing that the crew could have done to save the ship given its cruising condition and where it was hit. The liability of the older cruiser classes in comparison with those built during the war was also mentioned. The crew of a newer three-deck cruiser at General Quarters might have been able to save their ship under circumstances similar to those faced by Indianapolis.

Document 4.5: Bureau of Ships 2 October 1945[14] Report on Indianapolis [Extract]

Navy Department

Bureau of Ships

Washington 25, D.C.[15]

2 October 1945[16]

Subject: Loss of U.S.S. Indianapolis (CA 35)

Encl: (H.W.)

(A) Marked up Booklet of General Plans.[17]

[…][18]

F. Indianapolis capsized and plunged by the bow as a result of progressive flooding forward. At the time of the damage, the ship was in material condition modified YOKE which provided for all second deck doors and certain hatches to spaces below to be open. Although survivors reported that attempts were made to close the W.T. door, frame 14, on the main deck and the armored hatch leading to the forward engineroom, it is doubtful whether any doors or hatches in flooding areas were closed after damage.

Displacement at the time of damage at the reported mean draft of 23½ feet was slightly less than 15,000 tons. Corresponding GM as shown in the latest inclining experiment booklet was 3.31 feet, corrected for free surface.

The initial list presumably was caused by off-center flooding of stowage spaces on the second platform and the turn to port immediately following the hits. No explanation was given for the turn to port as no orders for a left turn had been given. As flooding progressed, water pocketed on the low side thus increasing the starboard list and at the same time the ship quickly changed trim by the bow. Although little definite information as to flooding below the second deck is available, the fact that the ship went down by the bow so rapidly is sufficient evidence of extensive flooding.

[…][19]

Undoubtedly a majority of spaces forward of frame 59 (which includes the forward fireroom) actually flooded. Spaces directly in way of the hits flooded rapidly from the sea, while others flooded relatively more slowly. As flooding progressed, free surface effect[20] in the various compartments, including fireroom No. 2 and the forward engineroom, probably was sufficient to produce a condition of negative GM which was the real cause of capsizing.

Thus with unrestricted flooding forward it was inevitable that the ship would capsize and plunge by the bow. If the second deck had not flooded, it is reasonable to assume that a state of longitudinal equilibrium would have been reached and transverse GM would have remained positive. The forecastle would have been under but the ship would have remained afloat.

G. The fact that Indianapolis was lost under such tragic circumstances was unquestionably due to the fact that doors in second deck bulkheads were open at the time of damage.[21] The initial flooding undoubtedly was extensive, but could progressive flooding have been stopped on the second deck even as far aft as bulkhead 59 (the extension of the bulkhead separating the two forward firerooms) as assumed in Condition A described above and shown on the enclosure, the ship would have gone down much more slowly, if at all. It will be recalled that of the older heavy cruisers which survived one or two torpedo hits, including Minneapolis, New Orleans, Portland, Pensacola, and Chester, all were in Condition ZED with all General Quarters stations manned at the time of damage.

No criticism of the ship’s personnel is implied in the above statements. She was traveling in an area presumably safe from submarines under conditions where General Quarters and Condition ZED were not warranted. It is a fact that for purposes of access in manning General Quarters stations the majority of doors on the second deck must be open when not in condition ZED.

H. This case serves to emphasize that the three deck cruisers of later classes have measurably greater power of survival under conditions of heavy damage than the earlier CAs with only two complete decks.[22]

E. C. HOLTZWORTH [signed]

Cdr., USN.

D. B. RIVES, [signed]

Lt. Cdr., USNR.

[END]

Source: TDS; “Bureau of Ships Report on Loss of USS Indianapolis,” 2 October 1945, War Damage Reports, Entry P1, RG 19, Boxes 30-31, NARA II, College Park, MD.

The Navy sent out notices to families that their Sailor or Marine on Indianapolis had been missing in action on 12 August. Many families could not accept what they were hearing as the news arrived over the following days. Charles and Ruth Donnor in Big Rapids, Michigan, were one of those families. The notification about their son, Radio Technician second-class Clarence Donnor, USNR, was especially confounding. The Donnors had spoken to Clarence since the Navy said that he had gone missing and knew that he was in the United States. Clarence’s mother, Ruth, wrote directly to the Chief of Naval Personnel, Vice Admiral Randall Jacobs, to help the Navy resolve the error.

Clarence had been ferried to Indianapolis the day before she departed Mare Island, but within an hour of arriving onboard, he was ordered to return to shore. There Clarence learned of his acceptance into an officer training school at Fort Schuyler, New York. The new orders directed Clarence to arrive in New York no later than 7 September, superseding his former assignment to a radar center in the Pacific. Despite Mrs. Donnor’s efforts to correct the record in Washington, errors crept into personnel records. Clarence’s arrival as a passenger on Indianapolis was recorded, but his departure apparently was not. When the ship’s final roster was recreated following the sinking, Clarence was the only enlisted Sailor on board listed as a passenger. Because he did not show up among the survivors in hospitals at Samar or Peleliu, Clarence was listed as one of the 880 killed on Indianapolis.

Because he was listed as killed on Indianapolis, when the Navy discovered that he was alive, Clarence’s status was switched from “missing” to “survivor.” This clerical error contributed to long standing discrepancies in Indianapolis casualty numbers.

The correspondence below from Clarence Donnor’s personnel file, accessed by Naval History and Heritage Command in late 2017, finally brought the casualty questions to a conclusion.

Three hundred-sixteen Sailors and Marines survived the Indianapolis tragedy. Donnor’s presence on the Navy’s 1945 tabulations of missing and total onboard changed those totals from 880 to 879 and 1,196 to 1,195 respectively. This case is representative of the fog of war and inherent difficulties in casualty calculations. It must be remembered that 879 families did not escape the devastation that the Donnor family did.

Document 4.6: Letters Concerning Indianapolis Passenger RT2c Clarence W. Donnor

PERS 53211-RMS

35815-A-877-209

12 August 1945

TELEGRAM

Mr. and Mrs. Charles Donnor

Big Rapids, Michigan

I deeply regret to inform you that your son Clarence William Donnor Radio Technician Second Class USNR is missing in action on 30 July 1945 in the service of his country. Your great anxiety is appreciated and you will be furnished details when received. To prevent possible aid to our enemies please do not divulge the name of his ship or station unless the general circumstances are made public in news stories.

Vice Admiral Randall Jacobs

The Chief of Naval Personnel

[END]

Big Rapids, Mich.

Aug. 13, 1945

Vice Admiral Randall Jacobs,

Chief of Naval Personnel,

Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

You sent us a telegram stating that our son, Clarence W [illiam]. Donnor R.T. 2/c [USNR], was missing in action July 30.

We are pleased to inform you that we have talked with our son since that date and also had a postal card and letter. He is now enroute to a naval school in New York.

We think that some mistake was made because of the change made in his plans at Shoemaker, California. He was taken to Treasure Island and from there ferried to the Cruiser Indianapolis to be a passenger to some island base in the Pacific. He had been on the ship but a half hour when the call came through for him to take his gear and go back to Shoemaker. There he was finally told of the further training he was to receive and to report to a naval school in New York on Sept 7.

We are surely happy to know he is safe and well. Perhaps this will help to keep your records straight.

Yours truly,

Mrs. Charles Donnor

[Ref 35815-A-877-209, Missing, Received Aug 17 1945]

[END]

Pers 5323a eq

24 August 1945

Mrs. Charles Donnor

Big Rapids, Michigan

Dear Mrs. Donnor:

This Bureau is pleased to confirm the information contained in your letter of 13 August 1945 concerning the welfare of your son, Clarence W. Donnor, Radio Technician second class, United States Naval Reserve.

Any anxiety you may have been caused by the telegram stating that your son was missing, is deeply regretted.

The Navy Department joins in your pleasure that your son is safe. By direction of the Chief of Naval Personnel.

Sincerely yours,

H. B. Atkinson

Commander, U.S.N.R.

Officer in Charge

Casualty Section

[END]

Source: TL & TLS [Mrs. Donnor’s letter was a signed original]; “Correspondence Relating to Casualty Status of RT2c Clarence W. Donnor,” Navy Personnel File of Clarence William Donnor, National Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, MO. Street addresses have been removed from all family correspondence.

As Captain McVay faced a thorough Navy investigation and scrutiny of his conduct, he also had a responsibility to survivors and families of his lost crew. Captain McVay signed over 800 condolence letters in the months following the loss of his ship. McVay’s letters came to families after notification from the Navy that their loved one was confirmed killed or missing in action. This letter to the parents of Seaman Second Class Alfred Patterson is representative of those posted by Captain McVay. A sampling of the responses to McVay’s letters shows that many families felt gratitude that McVay contacted them regarding their loss. Frequently, families initiated follow-up correspondence, requesting further information on their loved ones and specific information on their service and death. Families also expressed their shock that the Navy had allowed such a disaster to happen. Sometimes they expressed disbelief that their Sailor had been lost.

Document 4.7: Example of Condolence Letter from Captain McVay

Pers-8249-LK

September 29, 1945

PATTERSON, Alfred Thompson, S2c, USN-I

My dear Mr. and Mrs. Patterson:

It is with great sorrow that I, as Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. Indianapolis, write you concerning your son, Alfred Thompson Patterson, Seaman second class, United States Navy, who lost his life as a result of the sinking of the Indianapolis in the early morning hours of July 30, 1945.

The Indianapolis was enroute to the Philippines from Guam after a run which set a new speed record from San Francisco, and after delivery of an atomic bomb she was approximately 450 miles from Leyte when two heavy under-water explosions occurred on the starboard side forward. She filled rapidly with water through the gaping holes in her under-water body caused by this explosion and within fifteen minutes sank. Many men lost their lives almost instantaneously. The exact manner in which your son met his death is not known, but it is believed that he went down with his ship.

The first group of survivors were picked up Thursday, August 2, 1945, and the rest, of which I was one, the next morning, bringing the total to fifteen officers and three hundred one enlisted men. For days there-after the area where the ship went down, and where any possible survivors could be, was searched by ships and planes but no other survivors were picked up.

Nothing that I can say will lighten the burden which is yours at this time, but I do want you to know that your son had done his part in the team-work which made the Indianapolis an efficient fighting unit of the fleet.

The surviving officers and men of my command join me in the expression of wholehearted sympathy to you in the great loss which you have sustained.

Very sincerely,

Chas. B. McVay III

Captain, U. S. Navy

Mr. and Mrs. Alfred T. Patterson

Lorado, West Virginia

Source: TL; “Records Relating to the Sinking of USS Indianapolis,” Condolence Letters, RG 24, Box 1, NARA II, College Park, MD. Street addresses have been removed from all family correspondence.

Carmellia Neu, the widow of Seaman Second Class Hugh Herbert Neu, corresponded with Captain McVay several times following his initial condolence letter. The loss of S2 Neu left a hole in the life of his wife and also left her with many unanswered questions. She saw her husband’s skipper as the best source of information, but he was able to offer her little other than a photo and assurance that her husband could not still be alive. The correspondence continued into the period that McVay was undergoing court-martial proceedings in Washington DC. Mounting frustration came with each of Mrs. Neu’s letters.

Document 4.8: Correspondence between Captain McVay and Carmellia Neu, a Wife of Deceased Crewman

Denver. Colo[23]

Chas. B. McVay III

Captain US Navy.

Dear Captain.

you just dont know how much I have appraceate hearing from you.

It seem like yesterday that my husband and I has left Mare Island Calif. I still Can believe that Hugh is gone its one of the hardest thing too do. But I still have hope that he’ll shew up some-place.

I just Can tell you how I feel. Sometimes life isnt worth living for. And I know that you understand Also know how you feel but those are thing that Can be helped.

Now Captain McVay if it isnt too much trouble for you I Could like to have a picture of Indeanoplois Cruiser also a picture of Hugh Class picture. My mother in law has a picture of his class on it 43-436 the number. Ill be more than glad to pay you for these picture for theyll mean so much to me.

I really would like to know more about the boys and just what took place. Their was so many defferent stories about the USS. Indeanoplois that I can hardly believe it. But if you find out more about please let me.

And I sure do thank you lot hoping to hear from you soon.

Your truly:

Mrs. Carmellia Neu

Denver Colo

[END]

Pers-8249-adc

October 17, 1945

My dear Mrs. Neu,

Today I received your letter requesting a picture of the Indianapolis and also a class picture of Hugh’s.

Enclosed is the picture of the ship, but I regret to say that I do not know what could be meant by “class picture” unless it was taken when Hugh attended some service school. We do not have a copy here in the Bureau and we do not know where to obtain one.

I am sorry that I can give you no further information concerning your husband. All available information was contained in my letter to you of September 28, 1945.

Again may I express my deepest sympathy to you.

Very sincerely,

CHAS B. McVAY, III

Captain, U.S. Navy

Mrs. Carmellia Neu

Denver, Colorado

[END]

Denver. Colo

October 28. 1945

Chas B McVay III

Captain U.S. Navy.

Dear Chas:

I sure do thank you for the picture of U.S.S. Indianoplois.

Ill not be satisfied until you Will Answer my questions. I just Can believe And wont believe that my husband is at the botten of that terrible sea:

Now you said that you were 450 miles from Leyte. Was their Any Island near by that their was a chance of boys swimming to it. Was it nite or day time? If it was nite were the boys sleeping? And just where was Hugh at. I also would like to know, what was Hugh in. Top deck or botten Deck.

And you also said that most mens lost their lives instantaneously.

Now was Hugh one of these or was one of boys that died third or fourth days.

And you said also that their was no other survivors Picked up.

May I write too some of those survivors that were picked up, if they knew my husband. Are these survivors now in States or still in hostipal. And I also would like to know how Come that Indianoplois Cruisers was not escorted.

I wished I could talked too you instead of writing because their is lot more I like to know. It just dont seem right for so many boys losing their lives for something that they havn’t done.

Mr. McVay you just dont know how its hurts to see the boys Coming home that my husband used too around with, and him not do. I just can tell you I feel. And if Hugh has lost his life “has you say” What have I too live for? this war will never be over with, if Hugh dont come home. I know you Can understand and know just how I feel. Because it hasn’t been too easy for me, To think that he had to come war and lose his life

I just have a feeling that Ill hear from him soon.

I really dont think that no one know what become of all those boys. And beenging you were one I just know what a feeling you had and still you dont knew if all those boys when down with this ship.

I have heard different storyis about U.S.S Indeanoplois. And it really Ashamed that it had too happen.

I hope I hear from you soon, and I am still in hopes and have lot of faith that some of those boys will shewed up.

Your sincerely:

Mrs Carmellia Neu

Denver. Colo

[END]

Pers-8249-LK

Neu, Hugh Herbert, S2c, USNR

November 9, 1945

My dear Mrs. Neu,

Your letter of October 28th in which you ask for further information concerning the loss of the U.S.S. Indianapolis has been received.

I will attempt to answer all of your questions as best I can from the known facts.

The Indianapolis was over three hundred miles from the nearest island when she sank and the water was over 1200 fathoms deep so I do not believe anyone could have reached land.

The ship sank shortly after midnight and so most men were asleep when the explosion occurred. Since all records went down with the ship, to my knowledge not even a scrap of paper was saved. I have no way of determining whether your husband was on the upper deck or below deck at the time the ship went down.

My statement about survivors meant to convey that in my opinion there could be no survivors other than the fifteen officers and three hundred one enlisted now known to be alive. That these officers and men were picked up over a twenty-four hour period and though a search was continued for many days thereafter by both ships and planes covering a wide area no other person was even found.

There is enclosed a copy of the list of survivors and there home addresses. All survivors have been returned to the mainland.

I can fully understand how hard it is for you to overcome your grief and in this you have my heartfelt sympathy. I also know how difficult it is for you to believe I have told you all I know but when you realize that all this happened in a few minutes in the middle of the night and that we saved no records of any description maybe that will help explain why no more is known.

Very sincerely,

CHAS. B. McVAY, III

Captain, U.S. Navy

Mrs. Carmellia Neu

Denver, Colorado

[END]

Denver. Colo

Dear Captain McVay III

I thank you very much for list of survivors you send.

Now Captain McVay thier still is a few thing I like to know on till than Ill not be satisfied.

What is the mystery behind U.S.S. Indianoplois Cruiser.

Why is pag 2 missing and thier are suppose to be 316 survivors and their 308.

your storys to not Click together, their is something funny. Now if my husband is gone has you say. I want more details about him beinging missing. And if he is in hostipal someplace, I also want too knew.

I knew you feel the same way has I do if you were in my places.

I dont see why tham poor boys had to suffer for something that they weren’t to blame.

Yours truly?

Mrs Carmellia Neu

Denver.Colo

[END]

Pers-8249-LK

Neu, Hugh Herbert, S2c, USNR

December 10, 1945

My dear Mrs. Neu,

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter received several days ago concerning your husband, Hugh Herbert Neu.

All possible information concerning your questions were furnished in my letters to you dated October 17 and November 9. I regret there is nothing I can add to the information contained in my letters of said dates.

It is difficult I know for you to understand why we cannot furnish more information. However, when it is realized the ship sank in the middle of the night in a very short time and that no records whatsoever were saved, that may explain our difficulty in piecing together a coherent story.

I am enclosing a complete list of survivors with red underscoring at top of list that I hope will clear up the misunderstanding you have in mind regarding the survivors.

Very sincerely,

CHAS. B. McVAY, III

Captain, U.S. Navy

Mrs. Carmellia Neu

Denver, Colorado

[END]

Source: ALS and TL [all letters from Mrs. Neu are handwritten and signed, McVay’s letters are typed]; “Records Relating to the Sinking of USS Indianapolis,” Miscellaneous Letters, RG 24, Box 1, NARA II, College Park, MD.

Other families voiced frustrations and pressed Captain McVay for explanations. Letters from families asked McVay to explain how the ship sank, why it sailed alone, and why it took the Navy so long to mount a rescue. These frank and pointed questions capture the main controversies of the event. Because many bodies could not be recovered, many of the initial notifications gave a missing-in-action rather than killed-in-action status. This classification sometimes gave families a false sense of hope that their loved one might have been misidentified somehow, survived by being captured by a Japanese ship, or swam to a deserted island. The letters below provide examples of these types of questions and McVay’s responses.

Document 4.9: Examples of Common Questions for Captain McVay in Next-of-Kin Correspondence[24]

Oct 1st 1945

Charles B. McVay III

Captain U.S. Navy

Re: Pers-8249-eid

Robert Craig Barker RT 1/c

U.S.S. Indianapolis

Dear Capt. McVay:

Thank you kindly for your most welcome letter. It contained the most information I’ve received from the Navy.

The first week my husband was in Boot Camp we talked over the changes Navy Life would mean to us and that is when I learned to never say why. So now that the Navy says my Darlin is gone I feel I have a right to ask a few whys.

Why was the Indianapolis sent from Guam to Leyte alone? Why was she so long over due and no action taken? What caused the explosions?

I realize I’m only one of hundreds of thousands that are wondering what happened to their loved ones, I don’t mean to be selfish or unreasonable, I’d just like the truth of the circumstances. If it cannot be told I’d appreciate knowing and you need not say why.

I know how you must feel living thru such a terrible experience and my heart goes out to you.

Thank you again

Very truly,

Mary Lou Barker

Los Angeles, Calif.

[END]

BARKER, Robert Craig, RT1c

Pers-8249-LK

October 8, 1945

Dear Mrs. Barker:

Your letter of October 1st which contained certain questions relative to the Indianapolis reached me this morning - I will answer such of your queries as I can.

It is my personal opinion that the ship sank as the result of two under-water explosions. These explosions could be the result of the ship hitting mines or by being hit by torpedoes - I have no facts and therefore can only guess as to which it was that struck the ship.

The other questions you have asked are matters of policy of which I have no knowledge and consequently would not have any information on which to base and answer.

I am sorry not to be able to help your further and am most appreciative of the kind and sympathic vein in which your letter was written.

Very sincerely,

CHAS. B. McVAY, III

Captain, U. S. Navy

Mrs. Mary Lou Barker

Los Angeles, California

[END]

Mon Oct 1: 1945

Okemah, Okla

Capt. Charles McVay 3.

Dear Commander of the USS Indianapolis, received your letter of the 25th of Sept, the 29th. We know you are honest and sincere, about our son Wayland Dee Campbell shipfitter third class U.S.N.R. believed to have lost his life on July 30-45; But we are inclosing you a picture, taken from “The Grit Magazine of Aug. 26” in which we are sure that one of the survivors shown in this picture is our son we are marking with a cross on left sleeve now if it is possible we would like for you to investigate, the place and date and names of survivors shown in this picture.

We wrote the managing Editor of this magazine and he said because of censorship, he could not give places and dates, we are inclosing a clipping of the address of this paper, we will be very thankful if you will do what you can in this matter. Hoping to hear from in the future.

Respectfully

Mr. & Mrs. Alph Campbell

Okemah, Okla

[END]

Pers-8249-adc

October 5, 1945

My dear Mr. and Mrs. Campbell,

Your letter of October 1st, enclosing the newspaper clipping showing some of the survivors of the Indianapolis, reached me to-day.

The picture was taken on the Island of Peleliu the morning of August 6th, when all of us were transferred from the Fleet Hospital there to the hospital ship, U.S.S. Tranquility, which carried us to Base Hospital #18 on Guam.

I was among the survivors on Peleliu and I regret to state that your boy was not there with us.

There is enclosed the newspaper clipping and a copy of the original picture which shows more clearly the features of the man you apparently have mistaken for your boy.

Very sincerely,

CHAS. B. McVAY, III

Captain, U. S. Navy

Mr. and Mrs. Alph Campbell

Okemah, Oklahoma

[END]

Source: ALS and TL [letters from families handwritten and signed, McVay letters typed]; “Records Relating to the Sinking of USS Indianapolis,” Miscellaneous Letters, RG 24, Box 1, NARA II, College Park, MD.

Catholic chaplain Lieutenant Thomas Conway, USNR, came on board Indianapolis in August 1944. He was well liked and respected by the crew for his kind heart and steadfast demeanor in battle. Conway conducted the funeral services on the deck of Indianapolis for the nine crewman killed in the kamikaze attack off Okinawa on 31 March 1945. During the ship’s overhaul in the United States, Conway traveled across the country to visit personally the families of all nine Sailors. He made it off the ship when it sunk and was part of the largest group of survivors. Conway pushed his physical limits while in the water. For three days, he continually swam between groups providing spiritual solace, encouragement, and last rites. Delirium overtook Father Conway in the early morning hours of 2 August. After a period of wildly thrashing against fellow survivors, he slipped into a coma and was released into the sea while his shipmates prayed over him. This letter from Father Conway’s brother mentions his piousness, an attribute that McVay also notes. This correspondence also addresses the timing of the Navy’s announcement of the loss of Indianapolis, which came on the same day as the announcement of victory over Japan. Many viewed this timing as an effort to bury the Indianapolis tragedy under V-J Day headlines. Captain McVay acknowledges the unfortunate timing, but shed light on the decision-making process behind the announcement and its poor timing.

Document 4.10: Correspondence Relating to the Death of Thomas Conway, Chaplain, USN

Mr. William J. Conway

Glendale 8, California

Oct. 18, 1945

Dear Captain McVay:

Thank you very much for your kind letter concerning my brother, Father Conway. I have been trying for some time to obtain some details, particularly from some of the survivors, but your letter was the first to throw any light on them.

I am still quite confused, however, since you didn’t give the date of his death and you did say that he received a Christian burial at sea. Tom’s record also states that he received the Purple Heart. Does this mean that he was wounded and died shortly after the ship sunk? If so, this isn’t consistent with the report given by the news, nor a letter forwarded by the Military Ordinariate which gave his death as Aug. 2, from drownding.

Tom, wasn’t just my brother, he was much more than that. Through every stage of my life he has been there sharing the joy and carrying most of the burdens. It is difficult to imagine that his physical presence is gone. It is more difficult to sustain the manner in which the Bureau of Naval Personell handled the whole situation. Although Tom never cared to be a hero, and cared less to have me make him one, I do beleive that he deserved a little more timely recognition than a nameless “Catholic Chaplain.” The fact that the “Catholic Chaplain” had died was public knowledge two weeks before I had received any word other than he was missing. The fact that our greatest Naval Catastrophe came along with the announcement of VJ day indicates that the Navy is most anxious to cover up.

It isn’t Tom’s death that hurts so much, for I know that death must eventually come to all of us, and there couldn’t be a more fitting way for a priest to die than along with those for whom he had been ordained to serve. I beleive I have a right to know more of the facts leading up to his death after the ship sunk. So please, as soon as you have the time availabel, will you give them to me.

I have another favour to ask and I hope you will grant it. The last time Tom was here he mentioned a letter you had written to the Bureau regarding the trip he made to the next of kin of the casualties of the Kamikaze attack. Would you please send me a copy of that letter if it is available?

I am enclosing some of Tom’s memorial cards which I would like you to pass on to his fellow Officers (and to yourself of course), since I don’t know how I can reach them. I have many more of them and will gladly send them to any of the enlisted men that would like one. I would very much appreciate hearing from any of the men.

Thanks again for your kind letter, and I hope that you have completely recovered from your ordeal. I am

Very sincerely,

William J. Conway[25]

[END]

Pers-8249-LK

CONWAY, Thomas Michael, Lt., USNR

November 2, 1945

My dear Mr. Conway,

Your letter of October 18th in which you ask for certain information concerning your brother, Chaplain Conway, reached me a few days ago. I will attempt to shed what further light I can from the facts as I know them. First let me thank you for the Memorial Cards which I will forward on to the surviving officers as you suggested.

From what several of the survivors who were in the same group with your brother have said, it was concluded that he died from exhaustion, in his sleep, on the second day of August and the group said prayers as his body was committed to the seas. Commander L. L. Haynes (MC), United States Navy, our senior doctor whose home address is Fairfield Connecticut,[26] was in the group with your brother and may be able to give you further details.

Concerning the award of the Purple Heart. It is the policy of the Navy Department that the Purple Heart will be awarded posthumously by the Secretary of the Navy in the name of the President to any person who, while serving in any capacity with the United States Navy, since December 6, 1941 is killed in action or dies as the direct result of wounds received in action with an enemy of the United States or as a result of an act of such enemy. The underlined phrase would cover your brother’s case.

I believe I can explain the coincidence of the announcement of the sinking of the Indianapolis on V-J Day. When the ship went down all our records went with her, to my knowledge we did not save even a scrap of paper. Thus a ship’s muster roll of the crew had to be made up at Pearl Harbor, T.H., along with a roster of the ship’s officers. This was done and the completed lists were handed to an officer who was flown to the forward area where he checked the lists with the survivors at the hospital on Samar, P.I. He then flew to Palau and checked the survivors there thence to Guam where I went over the list with him. This officer immediately left Guam by air for Washington where he arrived late Saturday, August 11th. The casualty section then prepared all telegrams completing them Sunday, August 12th when they were sent out. To be certain that the next of kin had received official notification that their loved ones were missing prior to learning through the press that the ship to which they were attached had been sunk thus leaving them in complete ignorance, forty-eight hours was allowed to elapse prior to releasing the story to the press. Thus it was I believe merely an unfortunate coincidence that caused the release to the press of the sinking of the Indianapolis to fall on V-J Day and not an attempt on the part of the Navy to cover up.

I have not been able to locate the letter you asked for and do not wish to wait any longer so will mail this to you and continue a search for the other letter which when found I will have copied and forwarded on to you.

With renewed sympathy.

Very sincerely,

CHAS. B. McVAY, III

Captain, U. S. Navy

[END]

Source: TLS; “Records Relating to the Sinking of USS Indianapolis,” Miscellaneous Letters, RG 24, Box 1, NARA II, College Park, MD.

Figure 4-4. Father Thomas Conway delivers a sermon to Sailors on the deck of Indianapolis (CA-35), undated, USN.

Courtesy of United States Naval Institute—A. J. Sedivi Collection

The correspondence from Seaman Second Class Vernon Fleshman’s family described how they dealt with their grief. It reminds readers that the Indianapolis loss came so close to the war’s end. Fleshman’s family wished Captain McVay no ill will, but instead acknowledged the enormous burden he carried for each lost crewman.

Document 4.11: Correspondence to McVay from Family of Seaman Second Class Vernon Fleshman, USN

Sunday P.M.

Sept 30th, 1945

Dear Capt. MacVay III and those men you command.

Your kind and thougtful letter came to us Sat. and usually I can sit down and write most any kind of a letter, but yours finds me not only at a loss of words, but a quiet feeling comes over me, so to speak; I feel my son or rather I feel a sense of nearness you understand? that something anyway I have been waiting for; call it contact or whatever you may care to name the reason, but I have read over fifty letters & cards, papers and neighbors and close friends and until yours came I couldn’t be sure I mean. “Hope burned low, being his mother, I am quite proud of my son and he rode, safely a dangerous cargo, fate took him on the return trip,” Please accept my small effort to convey my full meaning and appreciation of your letter.

I am aware that you may have written hundreds of such letters and many more yet perhaps, but the fact remains I have my assurance at last from the only one left to write me.

Capt. MacVay, his youth and it being his first boat and sea Voyage does hurt me thru & thru, yes, our Blue Star has turned to gold and it had to happen the last week in the war; No doubt you have felt the agony of losing such a number of your command and seeing such a grand old Cruiser go down in a few minutes; Many a night you probably wake up and still see those, “port hooks” and that potatoe crate and it all.[27] I have reviewed it from every angle, my clippings came from several states and so far I beleive I was priviledged to read most of the true accounts of this tragedy in your life and mine.

Our boy was baptized in the Bethany Baptist Church in K. C. Mo. while on his last visit and you may realize how I feel about that; he was saved by water; “Greater love hath no man than to give his life that others might live”, just a boy, but he died like a man and Capt. MacVay all you and I can do is, Watch and Pray for we never know whose next, do we? Christ said he would come again & he will, the dead shall rise out of the sea also,

Vern’s father spent 22 months in World War I in France.

May I close, hoping you are in fair health at this time and able to take up your official duties and how I hope your next assignment will sail under a luckier star or may we say a more Peaceful ocean.

Would you grant me a very special favor, that is of course, granting it is in your power. Could you locate me a picture of the boat that won that terrible war and took my boy. I want to frame it by his Photo either to hang up or stand near it in our home here.

Again I thank you,

Vernon’s Mom and

Dad, Alva L. Fleshman

And Mae Fleshman

[END]

FLESHMAN, Vern

Pers-8249-LK

October 12, 1945

My dear Mr. and Mrs. Fleshman,

Your very kind letter reached me today. I appreciate more than words can express the understanding manner in which you have written.

I am enclosing a picture of the Indianapolis as you requested.

In closing, may I again express my deepest sympathy to you.

Very sincerely,

CHAS. B. McVAY, III

Captain, U. S. Navy

Mr. and Mrs. A. L. Fleshman

Raymondville, Missouri

[END]

Source: ALS and TL [letter from Fleshman family handwritten and signed, McVay letter typed]; “Records Relating to the Sinking of USS Indianapolis,” Miscellaneous Letters, RG 24, Box 1, NARA II, College Park, MD.

CHAPTER FIVE

Conviction and Clemency

The question of zigzagging became the central piece of the prosecution’s case that Captain McVay had hazarded his ship, despite ample testimony that zigzagging would not have made a difference. An extract of McVay’s testimony at his court-martial opens this chapter. Documents showing the (decision to convene the court-martial and then sort out the findings are presented. McVay gave his testimony at the end of the nearly two-and-a-half week trial. Prior to McVay’s testimony, Mochitsura Hashimoto, the Japanese commander of submarine 1-58, testified that zigzagging would have made no difference in the outcome of his attack on Indianapolis. Decorated U.S. submarine captain Glynn Donaho, qualified by the court as an expert witness, similarly testified that if faced with a zigzagging enemy in the same situation as I-58, he would have merely altered his calculations slightly before launching his torpedoes and sinking the ship. He himself had sunk 23 enemy vessels during the war, all of which had been zigzagging. Extracted below is the portion of McVay’s testimony dealing with his decision to cease zigzagging at nightfall, his understanding of U.S. Navy tactical doctrine, and his trust in his officers. McVay clearly felt that his officer-of-the-deck would have resumed zigzagging should he have felt the weather conditions required it, as had been done in the past. When pressed to answer if he specifically gave this order prior to retiring for the night, McVay answered in the negative because he thought it had been covered by standing orders. A statement made by McVay in his response to question 68 below ultimately foreshadowed the decision on the case, “I know I can not shirk the responsibility of command.”

Document 5.1: Captain McVay’s Testimony at His Court-Martial, 18 December 1945 [Extract]

The accused was, at his own request, duly sworn as a witness in his own behalf.

[...][1]

Cross-examination of Captain McVay by judge advocate:

42.Q. Were you proceeding singly and unescorted?

A. I was.

43.Q. Did you have any standing orders for the officer-of-the-deck to start zigzagging in case of clear weather and good visibility?

A. I did. I had in my standing orders the conditions under which the ship should zigzag. I did not specifically have in there to start zigzagging when the moon shown, when the visibility was good—I didn’t have in there to start anything at any particular time. They were instructions as laid down in U.S.F. 10 Baker[2], the war instructions and such.

44.Q. Will you give the court the reasons for not zigzagging or causing a zigzag course to be steered on the night in question?

A. Will you read that again, please?

45.Q. Will you give the court the reasons—your reasons for not zigzagging or causing a zigzag course to be steered during the night in question?

A. To answer that question fully, I would like to go back to about 2100 when I was on the bridge, and the fact that I was on the bridge when the moon rose. The visibility was poor, and conditions were such that in my opinion we did not—conditions were such as not to require the ship to zigzag.

46.Q. If I understood your direct examination correctly, your order to the navigator to get off a distress message was given before the Executive Officer reported to you after the explosions occurred; is that correct?

A. I think you misunderstood—a distress message—

47.Q. I will withdraw that question, and make it a direct question. Was the order to get off a distress message given before the Executive Officer reported to you after his inspection of damage below?

A. The navigator did not—was not ordered to get a distress message off; the officer-of-the-deck had ordered that previously. The navigator was told, when I knew the ship had to be abandoned, which was when the Executive Officer told me—he was told, as an added precaution, to send out that message because I could not determine whether a message had been sent or not.

48.Q. Did your watch standers have any orders, subsequent to your leaving Guam, with regard to zigzagging, other than what you have stated were contained in your standing night orders?

A. Well, we zigzagged on the 29th during the daytime and until it became dark.

50.Q. To whom did you give orders for such zigzagging?[3]

A. I can’t recall to whom I gave them. It was routine to zigzag.

51.Q. By that I mean, what official capacity would the officer have been holding on the ship to whom you gave them?

A. Well, it was so routine to zigzag during daylight in good visibility, that I can not recall as—of course, the officer-of-the-deck would be responsible for it; is that what you mean?

52.Q. Yes. I am trying to establish to whom you issued the chain of orders from you—you make the decision and eventually the ship zigzags; to whom are those orders given?

A. I would tell the officer-of-the-deck, or if conditions were such that he thought the ship should zigzag, he would notify me that he had commenced zigzagging on his own initiative.

53.Q. You just said that if the OD thought the conditions required zigzagging, he could do it on his own initiative and then report to you?

A. Yes, if I wasn’t out on the bridge where he could ask me.

54.Q. Did he have any specific orders which required him to do what you just said he would do—that is, the OD?

A. The standing orders required him to do that. Naturally, under conditions laid down in Fleet Orders and Doctrines.

55.Q. Did you at any time after the explosions send any messenger to the engine room with instructions?

A. I did not. I presume the officer-of-the-deck did.

56.Q. Did you tell the OD, Lieutenant (junior grade) McKissick, to cease zigzagging during the second dog watch on 29 July?

A. I told him he could cease zigzagging when it became dark. That was routine. I told him that.

57.Q. What orders regarding zigzagging did you normally put in your night order book?

A. Ordinarily, in the night order book, I would put moonrise: such and such a time; usually fifteen or twenty minutes prior to that time, commence zigzagging.

58.Q. Do you remember what specific orders, if any, you gave on the night of 29-30 July in that regard?

A. As I stated before, I told the officer-of-the-deck, I think Lieutenant McKissick, that he could cease zigzagging at dark, and there were no other specific orders given.

59.Q. Were any of the ship’s papers saved?

A. None whatsoever.

60.Q. Did you put the time of moonrise in your night orders on 29-30 July 1945?

A. I can not recall whether it was in there or not. I myself did not put it in.

61.Q. Wasn’t it customary for the navigator to actually write the orders; you inspected them, and then if you approved, without any corrections, you signed them; was that customary?

A. That was customary.

62.Q. Did you cause a course to be plotted on a chart relative to your projected track, called “Contact Reports”?

A. I did, or rather, the navigator did, and we went over them together.

63.Q. Did you examine your routing instructions carefully before you departed from Guam?

A. I did.

64.Q. You did not, then, include in your night order book, as well as you can remember, any specific orders regarding zigzagging during moonlight on the night of 29-30 July?

A. You mean was it written in pen and ink that they should?

65.Q. Yes.

A. As far as I can recall—no.

66.Q. Was the OOD required to zigzag unless you specifically ordered it?

A. The standing night orders covered that, as I have said before, that you zigzag during good visibility, bright moonlight, and the substance of that paragraph regarding zigzagging in the U.S.F. 10 Baker.

67.Q. If the OOD did not zigzag during good visibility, and it was your opinion that he should have, would the blame be on the OOD?

A. Will you repeat that, please?

68.Q. It has been established that it was a standing order and doctrine, if it was good visibility and the OOD didn’t zigzag, and you came out on the bridge and noticed that—would you hold the OOD at fault?

This question was objected to by the accused on the grounds that it was a question of law and immaterial to the charges and specifications for which the accused was on trial.

The judge advocate replied.

The court announced that the objection was not sustained.

A. I don’t understand the first part of that question.

The reporter read the question last numbered 68.

A. Well, I would probably censure the officer-of-the-deck for not zigzagging under those conditions, or ask him why he had not notified me if there was some question in his mind about whether he should zigzag or not. I know I can not shirk the responsibility of command.

69.Q. In your opinion, your standing orders were sufficiently explicit without an additional notation in your pen and ink night orders, to require the officer-of-the-deck to zigzag if the moon rose and visibility conditions were good?

A. They are the summation of U.S.F. 10 Baker regarding zigzagging, if that is clear.

70.Q. I believe you testified, Captain, that you went out on the bridge about the time the moon should have risen, and that you did not see it rise; did you leave any instructions to be called when the moon was visible?

A. No, I left instructions that I was to be called if any changes occurred in the weather conditions.

71.Q. Did you know that in condition YOKE modified on the Indianapolis all the watertight doors on the second deck were open?

A. I not only knew it, but was quite perturbed about it. It was an accepted risk that BuShips was also upset about.[4]

72.Q. When you arrived on the bridge after the explosion, what did the damage control officer report to you?

A. He did not have time to make a thorough inspection below decks. He had the supervisory watch and he left immediately and went down below, to the main deck, took a look, and came up and notified me that we were badly damaged in his opinion.

73.Q. Do you recall whether he said anything further to you—anything further than that you were badly damaged?

A. He said we seemed to be down by the head.

74.Q. After you gave the order to abandon ship, did you believe there was time and adequate means for the order to have been passed throughout the ship?

A. Since the public address system was out and all forms of communication were out, it would be, in my opinion, impossible to get word to every part of the ship by word of mouth in the short time available. We knew that there had been some flooding forward; we knew that people couldn’t get access to places, and I, naturally, do not think so with the condition of communications that you could get word to every part of the ship in that short time.

75.Q. At what time did you make up your mind the ship was lost?

A. When the Executive Officer reported to me on the bridge that, in his opinion, she was sinking and that we should abandon ship.

76.Q. Did you personally order the word passed, “All hands abandon ship”?

A. I told the officer-of-the-deck to pass the word, “All hands abandon ship.” I personally told him that when the Executive Officer was standing along-side of me.

77.Q. Do you know what means he utilized to carry out your orders?

A. He had no means other than messenger.

78.Q. Was the boatswain’s mate there?

A. Well, I meant he had no means other than word of mouth to get that word about the ship. I don’t recall who was there at that time.

The accused did not desire to reexamine this witness.

Examined by the court:

79.Q. In your recollection, had the officer-of-the-deck on the Indianapolis ever started zigzagging when the need for that became apparent and then notified you of it?

A. Yes, not once but several times; they were brought up to do that.

80.Q. Then your doctrine as laid out in your standing night orders had been demonstrated effective; is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Neither the accused, the judge advocate, nor the court desired further to examine this witness.

The witness made the following statement:

I only want to reemphasize the fact that I considered the supervisor and officer-of-the-deck on the 8 to 12, and on the midwatch that night, competent officers, and I believe that if conditions had been such as to require them to zigzag they would have done so and informed me—that is, in their opinion if conditions were such as to warrant it, they would not have hesitated to notify me that they considered that they should.

Source: TDC; Extract from Court-Martial of Captain Charles B. McVay III, held in Navy Retain File, NARA II, College Park, MD.

Chief of Naval Operations Ernest King did not concur with the recommendations of Fleet Admiral Nimitz to place a letter of reprimand in Captain McVay’s file in lieu of going forward with a general court-martial. He felt that Captain McVay’s decision not to zigzag given the weather conditions at the time of the attack on Indianapolis was negligent enough for him to face trial. Initially, he decided to wait until the Navy Inspector General (NIG) could conduct a more thorough investigation into the loss before he made a decision on whether or not to have McVay court-martialed. The NIG investigation was launched mid-October 1945 and expected to last approximately a month. It is not known why, but Admiral King reversed course and moved forward with the court-martial prior to the completion of the NIG investigation. The orders placing Captain McVay under arrest and directing him to report to the president of his court-martial, Rear Admiral Wilder D. Baker, were issued on 29 November 1945. His trial was to be held on the third deck of what are now the offices of the Naval History and Heritage Command on the Washington Navy Yard in a room overlooking the parade ground of Admiral Leutze Park and what was then the commandant’s residence. The charges and specifications of the case are presented below.

Document 5.2: Official Charges Brought Upon Captain McVay

NAVY DEPARTMENT

HOLD FOR RELEASE

UNTIL READ IN OPEN COURT MARTIAL

EXPECTED DECEMBER 3, 1945

To: Captain Thomas J. Ryan, Jr., U.S. Navy

Judge Advocate, General Court Martial, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.

Subject: Charges and specifications in case of Captain Charles B. McVay III, U.S. Navy

1. The above-named officer will be tried before the general court martial of which you are judge advocate, upon the following charges and specifications. You will notify the president of the court accordingly, inform the accused of the date set for his trial, and summon all witnesses, both for the prosecution and the defense.

CHARGE I

THROUGH NEGLIGENCE SUFFERING A VESSEL OF THE NAVY
TO BE HAZARDED
SPECIFICATION

In that Charles B. McVay, III, Captain, U.S. Navy, while so serving in command of the USS Indianapolis, making passage singly, without escort, from Guam, Marianas Islands, to Leyte, Philippine Islands, through an area in which enemy submarines might be encountered, did, during good visibility after moonrise on 29 July 1945, at or about 10:30 p.m., minus nine and one-half zone time, neglect and fail to exercise proper care and attention to the safety of said vessel in that he neglected and failed, then and thereafter, to cause a zigzag course to be steered, and he, the said McVay, through said negligence, did suffer the said USS Indianapolis to be hazarded; the United States then being in a state of war.

CHARGE II

CULPABLE INEFFICIENCY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY SPECIFICATION

In that Charles B. McVay, III, Captain, U.S. Navy, while so serving in command of the USS Indianapolis, making passage from Guam, Marianas Islands, to Leyte, Philippine Islands, having been informed at or about 12:30 a.m., minus nine and one-half zone time, on 30 July 1945, that said vessel was badly damaged and in sinking condition, did then and there fail to issue and see effected such timely orders as were necessary to cause said vessel to be abandoned, as it was his duty to do, by reason of which inefficiency many persons on board perished with the sinking of said vessel; the United States then being in a state of war.

JAMES FORRESTAL

[END]

Source: TDC; The Sinking of USS Indianapolis: Navy Department Press Release, Charges and Specifications in Case of Capt. Charles B. McVay III, USN, 3 December 1945, Copy in Navy Department Library, WNY.

Figure 5-1. Crowd at a rally in Leutze Park on the Washington Navy Yard during World War I. View looking south, with Building 58 at left, and Building 57 at right. Captain McVay’s trial was held in a makeshift courtroom on the 3rd deck of Building 57, upper left section. At the time of the trial, Building 57 was used for ordnance inspection and instruction. It currently serves as the office space for the Naval History and Heritage Command. The view from the window of the courtroom overlooked Leutze Park and the residence of the Navy Yard commandant, once occupied by Captain McVay’s father, Admiral Charles McVay Jr.

NHHC Photo Collection, NH 79428

Captain McVay’s court-martial was open to the public and widely covered by the press. The most attention grabbing headline of the 16-day trial was the testimony of Commander Mochitsura Hashimoto, captain of I-58, the Japanese submarine responsible for sinking Indianapolis. It is unclear exactly who in the Navy led the movement to bring in an enemy combatant to give testimony against the U.S. captain whose ship he sank. Revelations of despicable acts done to Americans by the Japanese during the war led to a heated public outcry in the United States for bringing Hashimoto to Washington, D. C. Over 150 people packed into the courtroom the day of Hashimoto’s testimony. When it was announced that Hashimoto would take the stand, McVay’s counsel, Captain John P. Cady, gave an impassioned objection. Judge Advocate of the court-martial, Captain Thomas Ryan Jr., acknowledged the objection, but allowed Hashimoto to testify after taking an oath both in Japanese and English to ensure that he could face prosecution for perjury.

Document 5.3: Navy Press Release Announcing Hashimoto’s Upcoming Testimony

NAVY DEPARTMENT

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

PRESS AND RADIO

DECEMBER 12, 1945

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESS:

Commander Iko (also spelled Machitsura)[5] Hashimoto of the Japanese Navy is scheduled to appear as a witness tomorrow in the General Court Martial of Captain Charles B. McVay III, U.S.N., former commanding officer of the USS Indianapolis (CA 35).

Commander Hashimoto, former commanding officer of the Japanese submarine I-58, was summoned from Japan by the Navy Department. He was unable to bring with him any official documents from the submarine because, he said, they had all been destroyed before the surrender of I-58 to the United States forces at Sasebo about the middle of November.[6]

Commander Hashimoto will be asked to take two oaths when he appears in court. The first oath will be the one usually taken by witnesses, as provided by Article 41, Articles for the Government of the Navy, with the word “affirm” substituted for the word “swear,” and the words, “This you do under pain and penalty of perjury,” substituted for the words, “So help you God.”

The Japanese oath, administered in Japanese court martials, follows: “I swear to tell the truth, neither adding thereto nor concealing any matter whatsoever.”

Commander Hashimoto had been in command of the I-58 from the time of her commissioning in September, 1944, until her surrender. He described the submarine as about 300 feet long, with maximum surface speed of 16 knots and maximum speed submerged about seven knots. The I-58’s complement was 119 men and 11 officers.

The I-58 at first carried one aircraft but it was never used. Commander Hashimoto said the I-58 later discontinued carrying it.

The Japanese Commander said that his submarine was never under attack from surface craft, but was bombed by American planes at Kure in the middle of June, 1945. He said the bombs fell fairly close, but the submarine was not seriously damaged. He said that he never suffered personal injury at any time during the war.

Commander Hashimoto is 36 years old, married, with three children, all boys, ages six, four, and two. His home is at Kure. The Commander was graduated from the Ita Jima Naval Academy[7] in 1931. He then served on a destroyer and a cruiser, and in the so-called China incident in 1937, saw service aboard a gunboat and a minesweeper. In 1939, he went to a gunnery and torpedo school for three months then entered the submarine service where he remained throughout the war.

The Commander, who does not speak English, had never been in the United States before. He described his visit as “pleasant.”

[END]

Source: TDC; “Official Navy Press Releases Dealing with Loss of Indianapolis and Trial of Captain McVay.” Copies of originals are available in the Naval History and Heritage Command Archives, Washington Navy Yard, and Navy Department Library, WNY.

Hashimoto’s testimony was somewhat anticlimactic. The slight and unassuming commander entered the courtroom wearing an ill-fitting blue-black suit, but gave a poised testimony. With no official records in his possession, Hashimoto, purely from memory, answered questions and marked coordinates on charts when requested. The critical piece of his testimony at the court-martial is presented below. When asked if it would have made any difference to him if Indianapolis had been zigzagging when I-58 encountered her, Hashimoto responded in the negative. Given the perfect attack position he found himself in, and within point-blank range, any competent submarine captain would have found success.

Document 5.4: Commander Hashimoto’s Testimony at Captain McVay’s Court-Martial, 13 December 1945 [Extract]

[...]

68.Q. Was the target zigzagging at the time you sighted it?

A. (As given by interpreter Commander Bromley[8]) At the time of the sighting of the target, there was an indistinct blur, and he is unable t—was unable to determine whether or not it was zigzagging.

69.Q. Was it zigzagging later?

A. (As given by interpreter Commander Bromley) There is no question of the fact that it made no radical changes in course. It is faintly possible that there was a minor change in course between the time of sighting and the time of attack.

70.Q. Would it have made any difference to you if the target had been zigzagging on this attack? [The question was repeated.]

A. (As given by interpreter Commander Bromley) It would have involved no change in the method of firing the torpedoes, but some changes in the maneuvering.

71.Q. How long was she on the surface when you testified that you first sighted a dark object? You said you crash-dived; how long do you estimate you were on the surface?

A. (As given by interpreter Commander Bromley) He estimates the time that elapsed from the sighting of the target until the time he was completely covered as fifty seconds.

Reexamined by the judge advocate:

72.Q. Did you use radar which was in your ship at any time in relation to the sinking of this ship about which you have testified?

A. (As given by interpreter Commander Bromley) The radar was not used from the time he submerged until the time – from the time he submerged, that is, until after the attack was completed.

73.Q. Please repeat that.

A. (As repeated by interpreter Commander Bromley) The radar in his ship was not used from the time he submerged until he had completed the attack.

74.Q. Which submerging do you mean?

A. (As given by interpreter Commander Bromley) The reference was intended to mean from the time he submerged after having sighted the target.

75.Q. Did the radar assist you in any way to pick up this target?

A. (As given by interpreter Commander Bromley) Prior to surfacing, the visibility was good. Because the visibility had improved, radar was used to search for planes and for a limited time to search for surface craft with no contacts.

The accused did not desire to recross-examine this witness.

Examined by the court:

76.Q. You testified earlier that your first estimate of the target speed was twelve knots; did you make an estimate in order to fire torpedoes?

A. (As given by interpreter Commander Bromley) He used the speed of twelve knots to fire his torpedoes, sir, a target speed of twelve knots. Subsequent to the firing, when a chart was made up, he revised his estimate of target speed down to eleven knots.

77.Q. Were any observations made of the target after crash-diving?

A. (As given by interpreter Commander Bromley) The target was observed after he crash-dived.

78.Q. By what means?

A. (As given by interpreter Commander Bromley) He made continuous observation using a night periscope.

Neither the judge advocate, the accused, nor the court desired further to examine this witness.

The witness said that he had nothing further to state.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

At this point the judge advocate stated that he had no more witnesses present to testify for the prosecution at this time. The judge advocate further stated that none of five men who had been expected to arrive this morning had reported in, but that at least one or two other witnesses would be present to testify in the morning.

The court then, at 2:35 p.m., adjourned until 10 a.m., tomorrow, Friday, December 14, 1945.

Source: TDC; Extract from Court-Martial of Captain Charles B. McVay III, held in Navy Retain File, NARA II, College Park, MD.

Figure 5-2. Commander Hashimoto’s signed oath. From exhibits section of court-martial.

Extracted from Court-Martial of Captain Charles B. McVay III, held in Navy Retain File, NARA II, College Park, MD

This report, published days after the trial, described its conclusion and what was to be expected in the months to come. At the end of closing arguments, and before deliberations began, Captain McVay’s commendations and citations were read aloud, with the only blemish on his record the loss of Indianapolis. During deliberations, Captain Ryan recorded that the charge of negligence by failing to zigzag was proven and that culpable inefficiency by not issuing a timely order to “abandon ship” was not proven. Only the acquittal on the charge of culpable inefficiency regarding the timely order to abandon ship was announced. Silence on the first charge meant that a conviction for negligence pended review by higher authorities. McVay left the courtroom knowing that his career was effectively over. The next step was waiting to find out his sentence.

Document 5.5: Report on the Conclusion of McVay’s Trial

Army and Navy Journal

December 22, 1945

McVay Trial Ends

Finding that a charge of culpable inefficiency was “not proved,” a Navy court-martial on 19 Dec. concluded the trial of Captain Charles B. McVay, 3rd, charged with negligence in the loss last 30 July of his command, the cruiser Indianapolis.

The Indianapolis was sunk by a Japanese submarine in the Philippine Sea. She went down within 15 minutes after being hit, with the loss of 860 men of her complement of 1,196.

The court in its findings did not specifically state that it had found Captain McVay guilty on the charge of neglect. Sentence on the single conviction was not announced. It will be referred to the Secretary of Navy, who will make it public. This announcement is expected within a month or six weeks. Should the sentence as approved by the Secretary of the Navy carry a penalty of dismissal, it will be reviewed by the President and announced by him.

Meanwhile it is entirely possible that counsel for Captain McVay may submit a brief to the Secretary of the Navy in mitigation of the implied conviction and sentence. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy may also find errors of the law which would alter the court’s findings. The court, or any member or any number of members may recommend clemency.

Finally, the Secretary of the Navy himself may set aside or mitigate the court’s findings. The court rendered its verdict after deliberating two hours and 34 minutes, during which time it had lunch. Its findings were announced by its president, Rear Admiral Wilder D. Baker, who asserted that the court had found “the specifications under the second charge not proved.” He then said the court was open to hear any evidence in aggravation, mitigation or extenuation.

Capt. Thomas J. Ryan, Jr., judge advocate, said he had no evidence of aggravation. Capt. John P. Cady, defense counsel, then offered in mitigation Capt. McVay’s record, and asked that commendations and citations it contained be read.

“I can say off-hand that the only unfavorable entry pertains to the loss of the Indianapolis,” Capt. Ryan said. “In general this record deserves the classification of an outstanding record during the entire period of the accused’s service.”

He then read three commendations for McVay’s service in connection with training of the District Naval Reserve in 1936-1937, and commendations from J. Weldon Jones and Francis B. Sayre for his services as aid to the high Commissioner of the Philippines in 1938-1939.

The prosecution contended that Navy regulations did not attempt rigidly to prescribe precisely what a commander’s actions should be under all conditions requiring a zigzag course to be steered. Regulations are for guidance only, it was contended, the responsibility for their application being that of the commander.

It is understood that the court’s failure to state findings on the charge of negligence is tantamount to an announcement of conviction, although there has been announced no official conviction as yet.

In his defense Capt. McVay testified that he gave no specific orders to zigzag the cruiser to escape enemy submarines the night it was sunk because in his opinion visibility was poor and conditions were such that he did not believe zigzagging was necessary.

Source: TD; “McVay Trial Ends,” Army and Navy Journal, 22 December 1945, 558. Navy Department Library, WNY.

Many in the public closely watched the outcome of the McVay court-martial and called for leniency from Secretary of Navy Forrestal in the interim period between the judge advocate’s verdict and the approval/sentencing from the highest levels of the Navy. Republican New York City Mayor Fiorello La Guardia shared his feelings about the case to Forrestal by forwarding the SECNAV a letter he had written to Captain McVay. The letter from Mayor La Guardia to Captain McVay showed an awareness of the internal punishment McVay must have faced in addition to whatever disciplinary decision might come from the Navy.

Document 5.6: Thoughts on the McVay Court-Martial from New York City Mayor Fiorello La Guardia

CITY OF NEW YORK

OFFICE OF THE MAYOR

NEW YORK 7, N.Y.

PERSONAL

December 26, 1945. A

Honorable James V. Forrestal
Secretary of the Navy
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Jim:[9]

This is how many of us feel about the McVay case.

Sincerely,

Fiorello [signed]

Enclosure[10]

Discuss with Adm Nimitz and Adm Denfeld[11]

[END]

PERSONAL

December 26, 1945. A

Captain Charles B. McVay, 3rd
Navy Department
Washington, D.C.

My dear Captain McVay:

This is from just one American, and there are millions of others like me, who continue to have confidence in you as a sailor, Commander and an American. I am at a loss to understand the entire proceeding. Had you been zigzagging in low visibility and your ship attacked, it would have been just as logical to blame you for lack of discretion in following a General Order. All I know of the hearing is what was reported in the press and I fail to find any affirmative proof that there were no enemy ships in waters where a zigzag course would have brought your ship. I suppose it’s all in the game but not according to the rules as we have been taught to understand them. It must be hard to take.

You must consider yourself a casualty of the war, caught in a misdirected barrage. Your injury, though, is where it hurts the most and the Navy medics have no drug to deaden the pain. There is no penicillin to heal the wound. You will have to take it philosophically.

Best wishes to you and please re-learn how to smile.

Sincerely,

Mayor[12]

Source: TLSC; “Fiorrelo La Guardia to James Forrestal” with enclosure “Fiorrelo La Guardia to Charles McVay,” 26 December 1945, SECNAV Public Correspondence Files, copies of originals in Indianapolis ship history files, Naval History and Heritage Command Archives, WNY.

A letter from wartime Captain Thomas G. Murrell[13] to Forrestal suggested that many U.S. Navy officers made similar command decisions as Captain McVay, thinking that they were in the right, but were fortunate to avoid the worst-case scenario situation that McVay found himself in on the night of 30 July 1945.

Document 5.7: Appeal for Clemency to SECNAV Forrestal from Captain Thomas Murrell

Thomas G. Murrell

San Francisco, California[14]

January 11, 1946

Honorable James A. Forrestal, Sect’y of the Navy

Navy Department

18th and Constitution Avenue

Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Capt. Charles McVay, U.S.N. is not a friend of mine; I know him. I doubt whether he knows me. He has always impressed me as being an unusually capable officer.

I am writing as a civilian with the background of service in World Wars I & II and as a war-time Commander of a combatant ship and later as a Division Commander.

I urge clemency for Capt. McVay. If he was guilty, most of your war-time Commanders were guilty, I among them. Even the Type instructions left, as I remember, some latitude for judgment as to when ships should zig-zag. As you know the evasive effect of zig-zagging was bought at the expense of reduced advance.

After twenty-eight years duty in the Navy and Naval Reserve the Navy is close to my heart. The civilians to whom I have talked have gathered the impression that Capt. McVay never would have been tried had it not been for the deplorable loss of life following the torpedoing of his ship. Punishment of Capt. McVay will do nothing to bring back those who are lost, as you well know. Civilians with whom I have talked feel that others who were unfortunate in the early days of the war went unpunished and were even commended in situations where there was just as much culpability.

I hope that you will feel that my service in the Navy entitles me to express a hope of clemency for Capt. McVay.

Very respectfully,
T. G. MURRELL [signed]

[END]

22 January 1946

Dear Captain Murrell:

This is to acknowledge your letter of January 11th and to express my appreciation of the motives which prompted you to write as you did in urging clemency for Captain McVay.

The record of the General Court Martial of Captain McVay is still in process of review and has not yet reached me for action. Therefore, you can appreciate how inappropriate it would be for me to express an opinion at this time.

I am sure you can understand that during the time we were actually at war, it was impracticable to order court martials for all the cases where ships or lives were lost in circumstances where negligence might have been involved. This does not imply, however, that punishment was not meted out when considered warranted, although it did not acquire the unfortunate publicity which attached to Captain McVay’s trial by General Court Martial.

I personally know of no similar case where the responsible individual was commended and sincerely hope that such was not the case.

In closing, let me assure you that Captain McVay’s case will receive careful consideration by me.

Sincerely yours,
JAMES FORRESTAL

James Forrestal

Captain T. G. Murrell, USNR,
San Francisco, California.

Source: TLSC and TLC. Murrell letter signed, Forrestal letter typed with signature stamp; “T.G. Murrell to Forrestal,” 11 January 46 and “Forrestal to T. G. Murrell,” 22 January 46, SECNAV Public Correspondence Files, copies of originals in Indianapolis ship history files, NHHC Archives, WNY.

The findings of the Navy Inspector General investigation into the loss of Indianapolis launched by Chief of Naval Operations Ernest King were submitted to him and his successor, Admiral Chester Nimitz, two weeks after Captain McVay’s court-martial ended. Days before, Secretary Forrestal had inquired as to the status of the report as well. The most extensive and thorough of all the Navy investigations into the loss, the NIG looked not only at fault for the sinking, but also for answers as to why the ship went unreported for so long. The investigation ultimately confirmed the verdict from the court-martial but more broadly assigned blame for the loss of life associated with the Navy’s failure to to notice that Indianapolis was missing. Perhaps the most important aspect of the report is in point 1of its recommendations: “that the lessons now learned be disseminated to the naval services.”

Document 5.8: Navy Inspector General Report on Loss of Indianapolis [Extract]

This report will not be issued to anyone without permission from administrative aide (now Capt. Dietrich) or Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Refer all inquiries to Off. In Chg. PO.[15]

1/23/46, Capt. McDill collected green & pink copies and said they would be in custody of Adm. Ramsay, VCNO.[16]

DUPLICATE COPY FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON

7 January 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS:

1. This report is submitted in duplicate in order that a copy may be supplied at once to the Secretary of the Navy, who has expressed his desire to see it as soon as it is completed.

2. The duplicate copy is supplied direct to the Secretary through the Chief of Naval Operations in order that he may secure the comments of Fleet Admiral King upon this report. It is believed that the Secretary will desire Admiral King’s comment as he, King, prepared the original endorsement on the court of inquiry in this case, in which endorsement the suggestion was made that the Inspector General be directed to secure the additional information desired.

C. P. SNYDER [signed][17]

[END]

Op-08 /OK

(SC) A17-25

Serial: 006p08

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON

7 JAN 1946

From: The Naval Inspector General.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Investigation of the Sinking of the USS Indianapolis, and the Delay in Reporting the Loss of that Ship.

References:

(a) CNO’s directive to NIG, Serial 009p03, of 18 Oct. 1945.

(b) NIG’s Confidential Memo. to CNO, Serial 01p08, of 19 November 1945.

(c) NIG’s Secret Letter, Serial 001P08, to CNO, of 30 November 1945.

Enclosure:

(A) Facts and Discussion of Facts.

1. By reference (a), the Chief of Naval Operations directed the Naval Inspector General to:

(a) Inquire fully into the routing chosen for the USS Indianapolis from Guam to Leyte and considerations governing the escorting of the ship on this trip;

(b) Take testimony from certain additional survivors;

(c) Investigate further the matter of the receipt of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet’s despatch 260152, of July, by Commander, Task Group 95.7.

2. By references (b) and (c), the Naval Inspector General reported progress in the investigation, which is now completed. During the progress of the investigation, senior assistants to the Naval Inspector General proceeded to Pearl Harbor, Guam, San Pedro, and Marietta, Pennsylvania, and have examined 50 witnesses, many of whom were brought from considerable distances to Washington. The record contains over 600 pages of sworn testimony which is exclusive of that taken by the Court of Inquiry previously held in this case. Among the witnesses interrogated have been: Vice Admiral C. H. McMorris, Chief of Staff to CinCPac; Vice Admiral J. D. Murray, Commander, Marianas; Vice Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf, Commander Task Force 95; Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick, Task Group 95.7; Commodore N. C. Gillette, Chief of Staff, temporarily in command of the Philippine Sea Frontier; Commodore E. E. Stone, Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications, CinCPac’s Staff; Commodore J. B. Carter, Assistant Chief of Operations, CinCPac’s Staff – as well as key officers in various organizations concerned, including Captain C. B. McVay, eight surviving officers, and 21 key men of the USS Indianapolis.

3. The Naval Inspector General has reached the following conclusions in the premises enumerated in part (a) above:

CONCLUSIONS

(a) Routing chosen and considerations given to the escorting of the ship:

(1) Route “Peddie”, the only direct route established from Guam to Leyte, and which was used in routing the Indianapolis, was set up in a current directive issued by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, which appears to take due regard of the existing war situation and accepts certain risks as necessary. No other route was considered. Circuitous routes were available but were considered no more safe. The policy with regard to escorting was also set up by the Commander in Chief, Pacific, and was based on supplying escorts where most needed. In routing, escorting, briefing of commanders of routed units, and diverting of vessels, in the Marianas Area, the constantly changing war intelligence situation was given consideration by the Staffs of Commander, Marianas, and the Commander, Naval Operating Base, Guam. In the case of the Indianapolis, there appears to have been a failure on the part of the Surface Operations Officer, Captain O. F. Naquin, on the Staff of ComMarianas, to cause to be passed on to the Office of the Port Director, Guam, certain information of enemy submarine activity which was necessary in connection with the routing of vessels and the briefing of their commanding officers. Inasmuch as this failure of Captain Naquin prevented this information from reaching the Routing Officer and Captain McVay, it may be considered as a contributory cause to the loss of the Indianapolis. (See Facts, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 17).

(b) With regard to: (b) – Testimony from additional witnesses (survivors):

(1) The Indianapolis was well manned and organized, her officers were in the main experienced and competent and her crew well disciplined and as well trained as was possible under the conditions prevailing at the time. (See Facts, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 16, 18, 19, 21, 23, 25).

(2) The Communication Department of the ship was properly organized to meet this emergency and functioned as well as was possible under the circumstances. All reasonable means were employed to transmit distress messages but it is doubtful if these attempts met with any degree of success. (See Facts, 19).

(3) The Commanding Officer of the Indianapolis, Captain Charles B. McVay, III, USN, failed to exercise due diligence to safeguard his vessel and its personnel in the following particulars:

a. His failure to zigzag at night during partial moonlight and good visibility. (See Facts 11, 17).

b. His failure to exhaust all possible sources of intelligence regarding enemy activity in the waters through which he was about to pass. There was at least one message received in his ship regarding submarine activity, with which he was not familiar. (See Facts 9, 17).

c. Failure in the Indianapolis to use all possible means of passing emergency orders to its personnel; that is, by bugle and by the employment as messengers of all persons available on the bridge. (See Facts, 20).

(4) There were material deficiencies in emergency equipment under the cognizance of various bureaus of the Navy Department. Examples are:

a. Life rafts: No automatic or mechanical releases; no radar markers on rafts; no colored markers furnished.

b. Water supply: Outmoded wooden water breakers subject to leakage and difficult to prevent contamination of fresh water with salt water.

c. Medical supplies: Poorly packaged and in many cases water-soaked and useless.

d. Food supplies: Poorly suited to emergency conditions.

e. Probable cause of failure to communication distress message – failure of power to radio transmitters. (Material deficiencies covered by facts 19, 20, 22, 23, 24).

(c) With regard to: (c) CinCPac’s Despatch 260152 of July, and the delayed search for survivors:

(1) Communication failures played a vital part in the delayed search for survivors. Some of these were due to the fortunes of war, others were due to the rapid increase in the size of the Navy and the consequent inexperience and lack of training of personnel involved. Examples are:

a. The basic failure of the Indianapolis to successfully communicate to any vessel or station a distress message. This failure, while it must be ascribed to the fortunes of war, nevertheless should be considered in developing emergency radio transmitting equipment and in considering means for preventing loss of life at sea. If a distress message had been communicated, the loss of life and suffering of survivors would have been greatly reduced. (See Facts 19).

b. The failure to deliver to Commander, Task Force 95, Vice Admiral Oldendorf, despatch 280032 of July, from the Port Director, Guam, which left Commander Task Force 95 not completely supplied with information concerning the movements of the Indianapolis. He took no action because there was none he could intelligently take. (See Facts 31, 36)

c. The garbled transmission or reception the Flagship of Commander, Task Group 95.7 (Rear Admiral McCormick), of CinCPac Advance Headquarters despatch 260152 of July, which left this officer incompletely supplied with information regarding the orders given the Indianapolis and no reason to inquire where she was. (See Facts 30, 32).

d. The faulty general practice of ordering combatant units to one destination and then diverting them to another without giving information of the change to all interested commands, which fault was aggravated by communication failures. (See Facts, 39).

(2) The Combat Intelligence Unit on the Staff of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, failed to correctly evaluate an enemy report of an undetermined sinking in the area then being traversed by the Indianapolis. This report was completely processed about 16 hours after the actual sinking of the Indianapolis, but little credence was given the report as it was believed it was intended to deceive. There was no substantiation until the survivors of the Indianapolis were sighted. This Combat Intelligence Unit under Captain E. T. Layton performed brilliantly during the war. Evaluating enemy reports into combat or operational intelligence is not an exact science. Errors will occur. (See Facts 7, 27).

(3) The Philippine Sea Frontier organization failed to follow up on the movement of an important unit of the fleet when that unit became overdue at a port under the cognizance of that command. The specific instances are:

a. The plot of vessels at sea was maintained at Tolosa, Leyte, for the Headquarters of the Philippine Sea Frontier, and at Guam for the Headquarters of Commander, Marianas. The Indianapolis was correctly carried on both plots and was scheduled to have arrived at Leyte at 1100, 31 July, Leyte time and date. Her marker was removed from the Guam plot when no news was heard from her and time had expired for her normal presence in the Marianas area, which is considered normal procedure with no blame attached. Under normal conditions no concern as to her non-arrival at Leyte would be felt until she was 8 or 9 hours overdue. Several additional hours would elapse incident to despatch traffic necessary to check her movements, so that in all probability search for her would normally not have commenced until she would have been approximately 24 hours overdue – that is, the forenoon of 1 August. The survivors of the Indianapolis were actually sighted at about 1025 on 2 August, Leyte time and date. Search action was never instituted by the Philippine Sea Frontier Command. However, her marker was left on the plotting board as having arrived in Leyte Gulf. (See Facts 26, 29).

b. Lieutenant Stuart B. Gibson, USNR, the Operations Officer under the Port Director, Tacloban, was the officer who was immediately concerned with the movements of the Indianapolis. He was cognizant of the fact that the Indianapolis was overdue but made no report of the fact to his superiors. (See Facts, 33).

c. The Acting Port Director, Lieutenant Commander Jules C. Sancho, USNR, at Tacloban, was not aware that the Indianapolis had not arrived and that she should be considered as being overdue. This was a dereliction of duty on his part. In his capacity as Acting Port Director it was his responsibility to keep himself informed on such matters. (See Facts, 33).

d. This lack of appreciation of responsibility in this case on the part of these two officers, was largely occasioned by a directive of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, then current, which specifically prohibited the reporting of the arrival of combatant vessels. This was interpreted by Lieutenant Gibson as also prohibiting the reporting of the non-arrival of vessels of this category.

e. Provisions for the directive in question, which was prepared in CinCPac’s Headquarters and issued by the Chief of Staff, Vice Admiral McMorris, USN, referring to reports of the movements of combatant ships, have subsequently been clarified by competent authority. (See Facts, 34).

f. While not excusing the failure of Lieutenant Commander Sancho and Lieutenant Gibson to use the initiative and good judgment expected of naval officers, the dereliction may be partly attributed to the weakness of organization which has been brought on by the exceedingly rapid expansion of the Navy to meet its wartime requirements. (See Facts, 33, 34).

g. In view of the volume of shipping which was being handled at the Port of Tacloban, it would appear that the important assignments of Acting Port Director and of Operations Officer of the Port should have been given to more experienced officers than was the case. Bearing in mind the lack of experience of these officers, it was incumbent upon their superior officers to exercise closer personal supervision over the manner in which their duties were performed than was actually the case (See Facts, 33).

h. The Commander, Philippine Sea Frontier, Vice Admiral James L. Kauffman, USN, had been absent from his command since the first of July, 1945, on temporary duty status in the United States. Commodore N. C. Gillette, USN, was in temporary command, and therefore responsible for operations pertinent to his assignment; it was incumbent upon him to check up on the efficient operation of the organization set up by his superior whom he had temporarily relieved. The Operations Officer of the Headquarters Staff, Captain A. M. Granum, USN, was intensively occupied in diversion of shipping in typhoon areas and other operations. (See Facts, 35). These facts do not, however, relieve Commodore Gillette and Captain Granum from their responsibility connected with the failure of their subordinates to take appropriate action to ascertain the whereabouts of the overdue Indianapolis. The junior officers, who were directly concerned with this failure, were members of the organization which was being administered by these officers. For this demonstrated weakness in the organization under their control, brought on through their failure to give closer personal attention to the work of these inexperienced juniors, Commodore Gillette and Captain Granum must bear the responsibility, with Vice Admiral Kauffman, sharing the responsibility for any basic defects in the organization which were developed by events. (See Facts, 35).

i. The responsibility for the ambiguous order with regard to not reporting the arrival of combat vessels (10CL-45), which was prepared in the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and signed by Vice Admiral McMorris, Chief of Staff, must rest with that Headquarters. (See Facts, 33, 34).

(4) Planes on anti-submarine patrol are not effective as general lookouts for personnel adrift unless life rafts are provided with radar reflectors. (See Facts, 40, 41).

RECOMMENDATIONS

4. From the Facts, and conclusions drawn therefrom, there is no doubt that there were faults of omission and commission contributory to the loss of the Indianapolis and the subsequent suffering and loss of life due to delay in rescuing survivors. Responsibility extends from the Commander in Chief, Pacific, to the Lieutenant Operations Officer, Tacloban, and into the Bureaus of the Navy Department. It must be borne in mind that planning and preliminary work connected with impending operations of great moment were under way and occupied the attention of all senior commanders, and they could hardly be expected to personally concern themselves with the constant whereabouts of a single vessel making passage from Guam to Leyte, although the organization and standing orders of the command and all its ramifications should have provided for all contingencies.

The undersigned has refrained from making any definite recommendations in this case as he was charged primarily with securing additional and clarifying information and amplifying the work of the original Court of Inquiry. He believes the task has been performed in an exhaustive manner and that subsequent action must be taken by high executive and administrative authority, after study of the subject matter submitted herein. They only must decide whether the exigencies of the situation require more than:

(1) That the lessons now learned be disseminated to the naval service;

(2) That the public be informed of the reasons surrounding the loss of the Indianapolis and the delay in rescuing her survivors; or

(3) Whether admonishment or even punitive action be taken in the case of those responsible.

In any case, it is recommended that the Facts, appended hereto, be studied carefully before action is taken. The Assistants to the Naval Inspector General who made this investigation, and who are thoroughly informed of the subject matter of the testimony, including that contained in the record of the Court of Inquiry, are available to answer questions which may be raised in the study of the case.

C. P. SNYDER [signed]

[...][18]

Source: TDS; “Navy Inspector General Report of USS Indianapolis Sinking,” 6 January 1946, SECNAV/CNO General Correspondence Files, Entry UD16, RG 50, Box 2696, NARA II, College Park, MD.

Captain McVay’s conviction stood and the sentence given was for him to lose 100 numbers in his temporary grade of captain and to lose 100 numbers in his permanent grade of commander. The seven members of the court unanimously remitted the sentence, however. They recommended that due to the “outstanding previous record of the accused, and our belief that no other commanding officer who lost his ship as a result of enemy action has been subjected to a court-martial, we strongly recommend Charles B. McVay, 3rd, captain, U.S. Navy, to the clemency of the reviewing authority.” The appeal for clemency gained ground with higher authorities, and ultimately the same individuals who called for Captain McVay to face general court-martial chose to remit his sentence.

Document 5.9: Admiral King’s Recommendation to Remit McVay’s Sentence[19]

25 January 1946

From: Fleet Admiral E. J. King, U.S. Navy.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Record of Proceedings in the General Court-Martial in the Case of Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Indianapolis – Captain Charles B. McVay III, U.S.N.

Enclosure: (A) Record of Proceedings.

1. The record of proceedings of the subject General Court-Martial is returned herewith.

2. I concur in the recommendation of the Chief of Naval Personnel that the sentence awarded Captain McVay be remitted on the ground of his excellent record and the unanimous recommendation to clemency made by the members of the Court.

E. J. KING

FILE COPY

OPNAV-211-106 REV. 10-45

US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10–46338-1

Source: TD; “King’s Recommendation to Remit McVay Sentence,” Papers of Ernest J. King, Box 16, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

Figure 5-3. Court’s recommendation for clemency, page 384A of Court-Martial.

Extracted from Court-Martial of Captain Charles B. McVay III, held in Navy Retain File, NARA II, College Park, MD

The outgoing CNO, Admiral Ernest King, used the findings of the NIG investigation to draft a final statement on the loss of Indianapolis for SECNAV Forrestal to make. King’s statement reinforced the findings of the Court-Martial Board, but also assigned blame to individuals for the non-reporting of Indianapolis. Fundamentally, King believed that a key point of failure was the placement of inexperienced naval reservists in billets that, ideally, needed individuals with years of naval experience. The rapid expansion of the service due to the demands of a two-ocean war and mounting casualties made such personnel decisions a necessity. Comments on Admiral King’s draft were made by Edward Hidalgo,[20] Secretary Forrestal’s special assistant. Hidalgo proposed some changes to the text below in a memo written on 2 February. He reasoned that Admiral King might feel differently about some of the points that he made if it were known to him that the statement might be released to the press.

Document 5.10: Draft of Proposed Statement for the Secretary of the Navy by Admiral King

26 January 1946

Memorandum for Secretary Forrestal

Subject: Loss of U.S.S. Indianapolis.

References: (a) Court of Inquiry re subject.

(b) Reports of Naval Inspector-General in amplification of reference (a).

(c) General Court-martial of Captain C. B. McVay, 3d, Commanding Officer.

1. My comments to you on reference (a) were submitted while I was Chief of Naval Operations. References (b) and (c) have become available since I was relieved as Chief of Naval Operations on 15 December 1945. This comment on all three references, in combination, is submitted at your oral direction.

It is inherent in organizations, large and small, that their efficiency depends on the efficiency of their personnel, individual and collective. The corollary is that the larger the organization the greater the number of its component parts and the more likely that human errors will occur. The head of an organization has authority that carries with it the concomitant responsibility but he is, inevitably, dependent upon his subordinates to perform their assigned duties with intelligence and common sense. This whole matter of the unfortunate and regrettable loss of life in the Indianapolis can be attributed to a combination of “sins of omission” on the part of a few people. Any one omission, by itself, would not necessarily have had serious results but taken together these omissions had the gravest consequences.

While not excusing the failure of subordinates to use the initiative and ordinary good judgment expected of naval officers, derelictions during the war are, in some measure, attributable to the rapid expansion of the Navy which made necessary the use of reserve and of temporary officers in positions of considerable responsibility. Seventy-eight percent of the naval officers in the Pacific were reserves who, lacking the seasoning of experience that can be acquired only by years of service, could not be expected always to deal capably with all non-routine situations that confronted them. The consequent burden on officers of the regular Navy was tremendous and did not always permit the close supervision or the thorough indoctrination and training of subordinates that is essential to efficiency.[21]

Three matters connected with the loss of Indianapolis are pertinent. These matters are the absence of escort craft, the situation in Indianapolis and the long period (over 3 days) that elapsed before survivors were discovered and rescued.

Indianapolis was ordered to proceed from Guam (in the Marianas) to Leyte (in the Philippines) without escort, primarily because those available were needed for duties regarded as of greater urgency. Escort ships, particularly the larger types suitable for ocean service, were in great demand throughout the war. They were needed not only for antisubmarine protection, but also for use in antiaircraft defense screens. Accordingly, it was the practice in certain areas (where air attack was unlikely) to sail cruisers and other combatant vessels unaccompanied, thus conserving available escorts for the protection of the more vulnerable ships, particularly troop transports. This was done in the Atlantic as well as in the Pacific. In the circumstances that existed at the time of her sailing I consider that application of the practice to Indianapolis was justified, though, of course, hindsight makes clear that the absence of an accompanying vessel in this instance was a grave misfortune.

The commanding officer, Captain McVay, was tried by general court-martial and was acquitted of failing to issue and to see effected such timely orders as were necessary to cause the vessel to be abandoned, and was found guilty of “through negligence suffering a vessel to be hazarded”, in that, when torpedoed, Indianapolis was steering a straight course in violation of current United States Fleet Tactical Orders, applicable to all ships, which required that vessels zigzag during good visibility, including bright moonlight, in areas where submarines may be encountered. Indianapolis was within an area in which it was known that Japanese submarines might be encountered; the moon was up; the visibility was good enough for the Japanese submarine to make a successful attack, as demonstrated by events. While the general circumstances should have made it unnecessary for Captain McVay himself to order a zigzag course or to take specific measures to insure that his officer of the deck did so, the fact remains that the ship was not zigzagging and Captain McVay must, in the nature of things, be held responsible. The court therefore properly found him guilty of negligently exposing his vessel to an unnecessary hazard.

Account must be taken of the fact that the two officers who knew most about the matter did not survive the disaster. One of these officers was on watch as officer of the deck from 8 P. M. to midnight, the other was officer of the deck from midnight until 15 minutes after midnight, when the ship was torpedoed. Captain McVay had retired to sleep while the night was very dark and the ship was the, permissibly, on a straight course. Captain McVay in his written instructions (“night orders”) to the officer of the deck did not direct zigzagging if visibility improved. After visibility had improved some time after moonrise (10:30 P.M.), the officer of the deck did not so inform the Captain (it was among his duties, as specified in Navy Regulations, to report changes in weather), nor did he himself initiate a zigzag course. One can only speculate as to the reasons. Both officers concerned (the two that had the deck watch before and after midnight respectively) were experienced and presumably knew what should be done. However that may be, Captain McVay need not be condemned too severely for trusting experienced watch officers to take proper action without specific orders, nor an officer of his outstanding record be punished too greatly in the absence of any knowledge of why neither of the two officers of the deck did anything when visibility improved.

The gist of the circumstances attending the delay in discovering the survivors is as follows: Indianapolis left Guam on 28 July, routed (by the Port Director at Guam) to Leyte. The Port Director at Leyte was informed that she was due on the morning of 31 July. When she failed to arrive, the operations officer in the Port Director’s Office (Leyte)—Lieutenant Stuart B. Gibson, U.S. Naval Reserve—who was plotting the to-be-expected progress of the vessel, made no report to his superiors, who naturally assumed she had reached port on time. Two reasons were advanced for failure to report the vessel overdue. The first reason was that instructions issued by the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet contained the phrase that “arrival reports shall not be made for combatant ships.” Lieutenant Gibson singularly interpreted this to mean that no report should be made if a vessel failed to arrive. The second reason advanced was that ships were at times diverted at sea without notice being given to the scheduled port of destination. It is a fact on the occasions a vessel, meeting a task force at sea, would be absorbed into the force without there being an opportunity to report the fact at once because of radio silence. Further, at times, vessels deviated from assigned courses to detour around typhoon areas (in response to broadcast storm warnings), or for other reasons, with ensuing delay in arrival. Consequently, the failure of a vessel to arrive on time was not necessarily an indication that anything had happened to her. However, failure of a ship to arrive as scheduled was not a matter that could be disregarded, and Lieutenant Gibson was at fault in not reporting to his immediate superior the fact that Indianapolis was overdue. Lieutenant Gibson’s immediate superior (Lieutenant Commander Jules C. Sancho, U.S. Naval Reserve, who was acting Port Director) shares in the fault in that he was responsible for the proper functioning of the Port Director’s organization.[22]

The survivors of Indianapolis were discovered by a reconnaissance plane on 2 August. The plane was one of a number that were engaged in antisubmarine search between Guam and the Philippines. Due to the fact that these planes were flying high in order to make the best use of radar in detecting submarines, several passed near the survivors without seeing them before they were finally found on 2 August. Rescue operations proceeded promptly after the first sighting of the survivors. Aircraft dropped additional rafts and picked up some of the men. A number of fast vessels were hurried to the scene to pick up the rest and to search the wide area through which survivors had scattered. Rescue of the living was completed on 3 August.

There was also criticism of life saving equipment. This equipment has been under constant improvement during the war. As a general rule it has been found adequate in other cases where ships have sunk. However, the experience of the Indianapolis crew demonstrated the need for further improvement. This matter has been, and is being, given the continuous attention of the Navy Department.

After review of the record of the general court-martial in the case of Captain Charles B. McVay 3rd, Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. Indianapolis at the time she was sunk by a Japanese submarine on 30 July 1945, and of all the attendant circumstances including his excellent record and the unanimous recommendation for clemency made by the members of the general court-martial, I think it would be appropriate to remit the sentence.

The Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet has reprimanded Lieutenant Gibson and admonished Lieutenant Commander Sancho, which appears to require no further action in their cases.

I speak for all hands of the Navy in expressing deep regret at the loss of life incident to the sinking of the Indianapolis, and in extending heartfelt sympathy to the families of those who were lost.

Source: TD; “Memorandum from CNO King’s Office to SECNAV Forrestal Regarding Loss of Indianapolis,” Papers of Ernest J. King, Box 16, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

After the Chief of Naval Operations and Navy Chief of the Bureau of Personnel endorsed the recommendations of the Court-Martial Board to remit McVay’s sentence in its entirety, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal concurred. Captain McVay’s conviction of negligence would forever be present in his personnel file; however, no official punishment came. McVay was released from arrest and restored to active duty. Once Forrestal’s decision was made and no presidential action taken, the conviction became permanent. The non-sentence, the conviction of negligence, and its contributory association with the loss of a U.S. warship, meant that McVay would never command at sea again. The positive trajectory of his career was over. McVay’s next assignment was as chief of staff and aide to Rear Admiral Aaron Stanton Merrill, Commandant, Eight Naval District, New Orleans and Commander Gulf Sea Frontier. He served in this capacity until his retirement in 1949. Upon retirement, McVay received a “tombstone” promotion to rear admiral.

Document 5.11: Forrestal’s Remittance of McVay’s Sentence

THE SECRETARY OF NAVY

WASHINGTON

20 February 1946

The record of proceedings in the foregoing general court-martial case of Captain Charles B. McVay 3rd, U.S. Navy shows that he was acquitted of (II) Culpable Inefficiency in the Performance of Duty, and convicted of (I) Through Negligence Suffering a Vessel of the Navy to be Hazarded. He was sentenced to lose one hundred (100) numbers in his temporary grade of Captain and to lose one hundred (100) numbers in his permanent grade of Commander.[23]

The proceedings, findings and sentence are approved. In view, however, of the recommendations of the Chief of Naval Personnel and Fleet Admiral E.J. King, based upon the outstanding record of Captain McVay, which clearly evidences his long and honorable service, performance of duty of the highest order including combat service in World War II, numerous commendations, and the award of the Expeditionary, China Service, Silver Star and Purple Heart Medals, and further, in view of the unanimous recommendation to clemency signed by all members of the court, the sentence is remitted in its entirety.

Captain McVay will be released from arrest and restored to duty.

James Forrestal [signed]
Secretary of the Navy

Source: TDSC; “Forrestal’s Remittance of McVay Sentence,” Attachment to McVay Court-Martial,” Navy Retain File, NARA II, College Park, MD.

Figure 5-4. On 21 November 1945, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal (center) announced that Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz (right) would replace Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (left) as Chief of Naval Operations.

Official U.S. Navy Photograph. NHHC Photo Collection, 80-G-701553.

SECNAV Forrestal and his staff scrutinized the technicalities of the McVay case closely before deciding the final outcome (see document 5.11 above) and announcing that outcome to the public. Multiple drafts of the Navy’s official press release regarding the conviction of Captain McVay and decision to remit his sentence went through the offices of Admiral King and Secretary Forrestal. Included here are comments from Forrestal’s special assistant, Edward Hidalgo, on the press release and the final press release distributed by the Navy. The thought process revealed in this memo to Forrestal demonstrated the technical legal issues involved in the McVay case, and the difficult decision that Forrestal ultimately needed to make about the case. Hidalgo made it clear in his comments that Captain McVay was not charged by the Navy for losing his ship, but for hazarding it by not zigzagging the night she was lost. The Court of Inquiry, Court-Martial, and the Navy Inspector General investigation all concurred on the issue of zigzagging. Forrestal apparently agreed with Hidalgo’s opinion that it was not for him to overturn a decision made by the Navy Judge Advocate and approved by the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Naval Personnel. The final press release made clear that McVay was found guilty only of not zigzagging during a time when Navy doctrine said that he should have been. Forrestal’s decision to uphold the conviction while remitting the sentence has consistently been the most controversial piece of the Indianapolis story. The notion that Captain McVay was the Navy’s scapegoat for the tragedy is largely unfounded, as efforts were made to make sure the public knew that the captain was not to blame for the great loss of life.

Documents 5.12 and 5.13: Notes on Proposed Navy Press Release Regarding McVay Court-Martial and Final Press Release

13 February 1946

MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY:

Attached is a revised draft of the McVay release. The changes appear in paragraph one. Additional thought indicated the necessity of clarifying the point covered by the sentence “He was neither charged with nor tried for causing the loss or sinking of the Indianapolis” strictly from the viewpoint of fairness, it seemed reasonable to foresee an interpretation in certain quarters that the conviction on the second charge (as approved by all the endorsements) implied that McVay had been convicted for the loss or sinking of the ship.

In line with the foregoing the record has again been reviewed with particular emphasis on whether the alternative should be adopted of reversing the conviction on the second charge. Although the problem is not an easy one, it is believed that this alternative is not expedient. Although you have it in your power to reverse the conviction without advancing any particular reasons therefor, I consider this to be strictly a legal problem in which the Secretary of the Navy acts in a capacity comparable with that of an appellate court. Measured by this test there seems to have been sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding:

1.That McVay was responsible for the safety of his ship;

2.That the ship was not zig-zagging;

3.That in accordance with the U. S. Fleet Orders it should have been zig-zagging.

It is true that the causal nexus between the failure to zig-zag and the loss of the ship appears not to have a solid foundation. In fact, a good percentage of the testimony on this issue was given by a witness for the defense (Captain Donaho) who in effect stated that Zig-zagging merely increased the difficulty of an attack. The fact remains, however, that the technical charge on which McVay was convicted (as now further clarified in the attached draft) was that of “hazarding” his ship—not of causing its loss or sinking.

I discussed the attached statement with Mr. Hensel before his departure. I believe he would favor additional language to the effect that McVay was convicted of a super-technical charge, etc. It is felt, however, that such language would tend to lead into implications of apology for ever having tried McVay. I still feel strongly that we ought to stick to bare-bone facts without indulging in opinions.

Mr. Hensel[24] also felt that the release should be by the Secretary of the Navy rather than the Navy Department. I can’t feel very strongly either way on this point.

I favor omitting the words in the last paragraph —“Prior to the loss of the Indianapolis”—as carrying a possible implication concerning his conduct during the disaster.

Admirals Gingrich, Colclough, Sherman, Ramsey, and Radford have approved the attached.[25]

Your approval is attached for signature.

Respectfully,

Edward Hidalgo [signed]

[END]

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

PRESS AND RADIO FEBRUARY 23, 1946

REPORT ON COURT MARTIAL
OF
CAPTAIN CHARLES B. McVAY, III, U.S.N.
COMMANDING OFFICER, USS INDIANAPOLIS

Captain Charles B. McVay, III, U.S. Navy, was tried on December 3–19, 1945, by a Naval Court Martial composed of seven members. His trial followed the sinking of the USS Indianapolis by a Japanese submarine and was based upon two charges: First, inefficiency in failing to issue and insure the execution of orders for the abandonment of the USS Indianapolis: Second, Negligence in “Suffering a Vessel of the Navy to be Hazarded” by neglecting and failing to cause a zigzag course to be steered when visibility conditions and information concerning enemy submarines required him under current United States Fleet Tactical Orders to zigzag in order to minimize the danger from submarine attack. Captain McVay was acquitted of the first charge and therefore was cleared of responsibility for the loss of lives incident to the abandonment of the ship. He was convicted of the second charge. He was neither charged with, nor tried for, losing the Indianapolis. The sentence imposed by the court decreed the loss of one hundred numbers in his temporary grade of Captain and one hundred numbers in his permanent grade of Commander. In view of his outstanding previous record, the court unanimously recommended clemency.

The proceedings, findings and sentence were found legal by the Judge Advocate General and were approved by the Chief of Naval Personnel. This approval, however, was accompanied by the recommendation that in view of Captain McVay’s excellent record and the unanimous recommendation for clemency by the court, the sentence should be remitted and he should be restored to duty. Fleet Admiral King, Commander in Chief and Chief of Naval Operations at the time of the disaster in July 1945, concurred in the recommendation by the Chief of Naval Personnel. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal has approved these recommendations and has remitted the sentence of Captain McVay in its entirety, releasing him from arrest and restoring him to duty.

Captain McVay has a record of capable and gallant service to his country. During World War II he had extensive combat duty; he received numerous commendations and the award of the Silver Star Medal for heroism in action and the Purple Heart Medals.

[END]

Source: TLSC; “Memo from Edward Hidalgo to James Forrestal Regarding Edits to Navy Press Release on McVay’s Conviction,” 13 February 1946. Photocopy of original from Indianapolis Ship Files, Box 396A, NHHC Archives, WNY. Originals in RG 80, NARA II, College Park, MD. And, TDC; “Indianapolis Press Releases,” Navy Department Library, WNY.

The press conference held on a Saturday in the Pentagon marked the culmination of the Indianapolis ordeal for the Navy. It coincided with the final release of McVay’s conviction and sentence remittance and the U.S. Navy’s final report of the loss, Narrative of the Circumstances of the Loss of the USS Indianapolis.[26] In the press conference below, CNO Admiral Nimitz along with his Deputy CNO, Vice CNO, and Chief of Naval Personnel walked reporters through the Navy’s final report and fielded questions. The type of questions asked by the press foreshadowed the lingering questions that the Navy continues to face to this day—namely circumstances of McVay’s conviction. Nimitz assumed some responsibility for his role in the disaster as Commander, Pacific Fleet. He also reiterated points that he made at the very start of the investigations he initiated with the Court of Inquiry on Guam. He acknowledged that he had only recommended that Captain McVay receive a letter of reprimand instead of facing trial by general court-martial. Acting Port Director Tacloban, Lieutenant Commander Jules Sancho, USNR, received a Letter of Admonition and Port Director Operations Officer Tacloban, Lieutenant Stewart Gibson, USNR, received a Letter of Reprimand for their failure to bring the non-arrival of Indianapolis to light. These disciplinary actions were recommended by Admiral Nimitz following the Court of Inquiry. Two more punishments were announced by the Navy the day of the press conference. Operations Officer Philippine Sea Frontier, Captain Alfred Granum, and acting Commander Philippine Sea Frontier, Commodore Norman Gillette, both learned that they would receive Letters of Reprimand for not applying closer supervision to the inexperienced junior officers under their command.[27] On 9 December 1946, Secretary Forrestal made the decision to remove the disciplinary letters from the four censured officers’ files, sending them all an identical letter of notification.

Document 5.14: CNO Admiral Chester Nimitz’s Press Conference on McVay Decision and Closing of Indianapolis Investigations

MINUTES OF PRESS CONFERENCE

HELD BY FLEET ADMIRAL CHESTER W. NIMITZ

23 February 1946 – 0945

(Guests: Admiral D.C. Ramsey,

Vice Admiral L.E. Denfeld, and

Vice Admiral F.P. Sherman)[28]

CAPTAIN CHAMBLISS: We are all in, Admiral Nimitz.

FLEET ADMIRAL NIMITZ: Well, gentlemen, we asked you to meet with us this morning so that we can tell you all we know about the loss of the Indianapolis and to give you an opportunity for asking questions.

I will lead off with a letter which I received from E. Connelly, Burlingame, California.[29] Apparently it wasn’t dated. Do you happen to know? I got it about two weeks ago.

THE PRESS: It’s dated February 6. Copies were issued to us.

FLEET ADMIRAL NIMITZ: Yes. Well, they left it off of mine. It’s addressed to me and says:

“Dear Sir:

We have searched the press and other publications diligently for acknowledgement by you, for your part in the mistake and inefficiency connected with the sinking of the USS Indianapolis. To date we have seen nothing.

On behalf of the 1,203 bereaved families [you] owe to us, and yourself to make a Public Statement.

We hold the Navy responsible for the loss of our son, which they refuse, so far, to do. When does the Admiral and officers at Guam and Leyte go on trial, or is this thing being whitewashed.

Sincerely,”

And then signed “E. Connelly.” That was the name. Now, my reply to that—and both of these are released for publication is:

“My dear Mr. Connelly:

I share profoundly your sorrow that your son was lost with the USS Indianapolis, as you informed me in your letter February 6.

As Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet and the Pacific Ocean Area, I carried the broad responsibility for all operations of the Pacific Fleet in the areas under my command. This included, of course, responsibility for both successes and failures. To the extent that a Commander in Chief should be held responsible for failures or errors of judgment on the part of subordinates, I must bear my share of responsibility for the loss of the Indianapolis.

There is no thought of exonerating anyone in the Navy who should be punished for his performance of duty in connection with the sinking of the Indianapolis and the attending loss of life.

I wish again to express my sympathy and to assure you that I am deeply sensible of your personal loss. In view of the large number of our citizens who have suffered deeply as a result of the sinking of the Indianapolis, I am authorizing the publication of your letter February 6 and this reply.”

In addition to the Court of Inquiry that was held subject to my order, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral King, sent the General Inspector and several assistants into the Pacific to make an exhaustive inquiry into this whole matter. As a result of his investigation, we have prepared a narrative which gives to the best of our knowledge all the facts in connection with the loss.

Admiral Sherman, instead of reading the narrative, will go over it page by page to give you an opportunity to answer questions, and we will endeavor to give you all information in our possession. We have no desire whatever, no intention, to hide anything or to prevent disclosure of our mistakes. I now turn the meeting over to Admiral Sherman.

THE PRESS: Admiral, according to this narrative, it says that within 16 hours of the actual sinking of the Indianapolis there was an indication that the Japanese had sunk a ship in the location where the Indianapolis was presumed to be. Was that indication from magic messages?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: What page is that?

THE PRESS: Page 5.

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Before answering this, I’d like to suggest that after I answer this, that we then revert and go through it consecutively because I think we will clear things up better.

That indication was a partial breaking of a Japanese code as where something appears that was a word or a phrase that we could not break at that time. In the breaking of codes, it is not a complete job. We will often get one piece and won’t get the other, and then two weeks later you may pick up another code group and you go back and you find that message you only got a little sense out of now begins to make more sense.

THE PRESS: Presumably, that message or clause had come from the sub which she had contacted a little while ago?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Yes.

THE PRESS: Would you think it is a safe assumption that it did come from the sub?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: I know that it came from the sub.

THE PRESS: Regardless of –

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: It came from a sub. Which one at that time – we didn’t know that he’d sunk something and what that was we didn’t know.

THE PRESS: He had sunk –

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Yes. In other words, it was a report from a Japanese unit in that location, which had to be a submarine, and said that he had sunk something, and that was about all we could get out of it at that time.

Now, if we can, does anybody have anything on the – any question to ask about the first page?

FLEET ADMIRAL NIMITZ: In connection with the opening part of this narrative, I think it’s important to understand the background of the situation as it existed at the time and the background under which we were working, rather sitting here in hindsight and looking at this thing with all the cards laid up. It always meets with different and perhaps better conclusions. Go ahead.

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Well, let’s turn to page 2 then.

THE PRESS: I think we are all pretty familiar with this because this was told in the court-martial, until we get down to the point where you explain the reasons behind it.

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Page 3? Page 4?

THE PRESS: Admiral, at the bottom of page 3, I see they say the attack occurred during “good conditions of visibility.” As I remember it at the court-martial, there was some dispute about that. I remember Captain McVay said he came out from his cabin on the bridge and couldn’t see the deck even. Apparently, the Navy feels visibility was perfectly good.

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: I think it would be more accurate to say that after having the benefit of the inquiry, the Inspector General’s further investigation, and the evidence before the court-martial, that it seems to be well established that the visibility was actually good for that time of night and good within the accepted meaning of the tactical orders which differentiate between good visibility or high visibility at night and low visibility.

THE PRESS: Wouldn’t that make it all the more important the man should have zigzagged?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Well, as you know, the finding of the court-martial was that the visibility was such that the requirements of the U. S. Fleet tactical orders which required zigzagging were applicable. That is the finding of the court.

THE PRESS: Well, this report, then, that is the final finding, as related to the narrative here, would seem to strengthen that direct fact.

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Well, that is the opinion of the Court of Inquiry. That is the finding of the Inspector General and also the finding of the court-martial.

THE PRESS: Sir, what was the recommendation of the Court of Inquiry? Was it that Captain McVay should be court-martialed, or that he should be reprimanded?

FLEET ADMIRAL NIMITZ: The recommendation of the Court of Inquiry was that he should be court-martialed.

THE PRESS: Admiral Sherman, on page 3 here, this phrase, “At the time of her departure from Guam, the Indianapolis was not at peak efficiency” – does that mean mechanically the ship, or its personnel, which?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Its personnel. You see, the Indianapolis had been in the Navy Yard and it was our practice, whenever a ship finished an overhaul and then had a considerable personnel turnover, to give her a period of about ten days to two weeks of operational training back on the coast – target practices and damage control exercise under way, and things of that sort. We did that wherever possible before the ships got out into the combat area where they couldn’t get that training as efficiently. In the case of the Indianapolis, it was decided to omit that training on the coast and to conduct it later so that we could expedite the arrival in the Marianas of the bomb which was dropped on Hiroshima.

FLEET ADMIRAL NIMITZ: And furthermore, it took into account the long passage at sea during which she could do a very considerable amount of training, not as effectively as they could with services on the coast, but they could do a great deal within their own resources to train themselves to meet ordinary emergencies that a single ship encounters.

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Is there anything else on that third page that anybody wants to explore? How about page 4?

THE PRESS: There was no confirmation needed, Admiral, to remove a ship from its board (at the bottom of page 4) of arrival at Leyte – no confirmation needed to declare that it had arrived – say, assume it had unless information to the contrary was received – in the absence of information to the contrary?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Well, that is what actually happened in Leyte. It was a fair assumption that a vessel had arrived as scheduled, that no information was received to the contrary providing that you could also assume – which was the case – that if the vessel failed to arrive, that you’d be informed. The assumption that you can depend that a ship has arrived is necessarily dependent on the other assumption that if she does not arrive, you will be told.

THE PRESS: Sir, what is the value of this daily plotting? Is it purely an exercise in arithmetic? I mean, it is based on no known facts except the presumptive speed of the ship and route she’s going on. I mean, what is the value of having the pin on the board for the Indianapolis if you’re just basing it on the arithmetic of some junior officer in fleet headquarters?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Well, to conduct operations at sea with the large numbers of ships that were operating then, and even in conducting our operations now, you cannot do it intelligently unless you have laid down on a plot the position of each unit as you estimate it. Now, during the war, it was always necessary to know where each unit would be under the orders that it had so that, for instance, if a submarine contact was made in the Atlantic or that one convoy got into trouble, then you could divert the other convoys, and without having daily reports as to where they are, you had a plot which showed the complete relative position. For instance, in conducting operations in the Pacific, we plotted not only the positions of our own forces, using the best information available, but we also plotted the position of enemy forces, using the best information available, and from that plot we could then make decisions as to what orders should be given that pertain not only to the handling of convoys, but to the handling of fighting forces at sea.

Now, the only bar to having more complete reports is, first, that if ships at sea open up and use their radios, they reveal their position, and secondly, that in order to get the most important messages, you have to screen out and eliminate all unnecessary radio traffic, and in a headquarters where messages are piling up in great numbers, if you can have a system by which you are informed where there is a change in plan for a particular unit, then you do not need to have them sending in messages which merely say that they are continuing to do what was planned for them.

THE PRESS: Sir, if you had decided when the Indianapolis was halfway to Leyte to divert her to Okinawa, let’s say, would the Philippine Sea Frontier have been informed of that change?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Very definitely.

THE PRESS: Where were the headquarters of the Sea Frontier – Manila?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: No. The headquarters of the Philippine Sea Frontier were at Tolosa, which is on the island of Leyte, about twelve to fourteen miles south of Tacloban.

THE PRESS: Would there have been a security problem involved in notifying the Commander, Philippine Sea Frontier, since he’s on the same island, that the Indianapolis had arrived in Leyte, if she had? What I am getting at is, unlike Cincpac at Guam, a message back to Guam saying, “The Indianapolis has arrived,” does present a security question?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Yes.

THE PRESS: But on the same island and the distance not being great and communications presumably being land-borne, by then would there have been security involved in reporting, well, from Guam to Cincpac, for example, from Yap to Cincpac, that the Indianapolis had arrived?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: No.

THE PRESS: Conversely, would there have been a security problem in a telephone call from the Leyte Port Director to the Commander, Sea Frontier?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: No. Actually what happened was that daily a list of arrivals and expected arrivals went from the Port Director’s office at Tacloban, went by jeep, down to the Sea Frontier office apprising them of what was going on, and it was the failure of the Sea Frontier office to do anything about the fact that the Indianapolis was listed as due to arrive on two successive days and never did arrive. That failure is one of the contributing causes for the delay in realizing that something had gone wrong and that is the basis for the action taken in connection with the Sea Frontier.

THE PRESS: I can understand removing the pin from the board in the Marianas on the basis of your arithmetic, but I don’t quite understand why they would remove the pin in Leyte purely on the basis of arithmetic.

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: They shouldn’t have.

THE PRESS: I see it later says, “This was the routine method of handling the plot of combatant vessels.” That’s why I raised that question so specifically.

FLEET ADMIRAL NIMITZ: That is on the assumption that the people on that end are doing what they were supposed to do. They didn’t do it.

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: To elaborate a little further, you have asked about the security considerations. The one thing that we do not want to have happen – for instance, in connection with security – we did not want the Port Director at Ulithi, for instance, to recite the list of the units of a carrier task force when they arrived because the codes available to a Port Director are a little lower grade than the ones that a task force commander uses, and there’s no reason for having him put out a lengthy message when a task force comes into port.

THE PRESS: Well, Admiral, in view of the fact most of the lives lost in the Indianapolis were as a result of delay in picking up the survivors and not as a result of the sinking of the ship, is this considered a closed case, or will there be a further action against that Port Director?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Well, this closes the action in that the operations officers in the Port Director’s offices, and the Acting Port Director, and the operations officers directly above him, and the Acting Sea Frontier Command have all been reprimanded or admonished.

THE PRESS: What will that mean then? Does that preclude any further promotion of these officers? I don’t quite understand what a Letter of Reprimand is going to mean.

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Well, a Letter of Reprimand is a serious affair and it is made a part of the official record in the case of that officer, and it is one of the documents which is considered in connection with the further advancement or the employment of that officer. It is considered along with letters of commendation and other reports on his performance of duty.

THE PRESS: Well, is that in practice now? Is that going to mean that this officer probably will not get any decent commands in the future, or won’t get any further promotions, or is that to be decided without looking over his complete record?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: That is something which would have to be decided at the time by the officers who have to make such decisions, and they must take into account all of the circumstances and everything that is known about the officer.

THE PRESS: Sir, I notice that these last two, Sancho and Gibson, are Naval Reservists. Are they still on active duty?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Gibson, definitely not. I am not sure about Sancho. It is my impression that he is not.

THE PRESS: Sir, I wonder if we could be told what these letters say? – I mean, how harsh a reprimand is and what is said precisely as to their responsibility.

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Well, these letters of Reprimand and Admonition, like all others, recite the circumstances, point out the errors made, and state precisely the responsibility that exists. They then state that the document be made part of the official record and make reference to other provisions which entitle an officer who receives such a letter to file any statement that he cares to make and that also will become part of his record.

THE PRESS: Sir, who signs the Letters of Reprimand and Admonition?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: They may, in ordinary custom, be signed by the Secretary, by the Commander in Chief, or by other officers in similar positions. In this case, the letters to the two Reservists were signed by the Commander in Chief. The letters to the two regular officers were signed by the Secretary of the Navy.

THE PRESS: Which Commander in Chief?

FLEET ADMIRAL NIMITZ: I signed them.

THE PRESS: Admiral Nimitz, the then Commander, is what I was getting at.

THE PRESS: Who was Chief of Naval Personnel? I notice in recommending action here he is not named. Who was it then?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: That was Admiral Denfeld. You are referring to the recent action recommending clemency?

THE PRESS: Yes.

THE PRESS: Admiral, what is Commodore Gillette’s current duty, do you know?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: He is in the – is it the Mare Island Hospital?

VICE ADMIRAL DENFELD: He’s at Long Beach.

ADMIRAL RAMSEY: He is attached to Terminal Island. He is under –

VICE ADMIRAL DENFELD: –awaiting assignment.

ADMIRAL RAMSEY (Continuing): Rear Admiral Wilson.

THE PRESS: I didn’t catch that, Admiral.

ADMIRAL RAMSEY: I say he is attached to an activity at Terminal Island in California.

THE PRESS: What kind of an assignment is he likely to get?

FLEET ADMIRAL NIMITZ: I would suggest we let Denfeld, the Chief of Personnel – Denfeld, suppose you give the group – go back a little bit – go back to our promotion system, which is by selection, and the effect of Letters of Reprimand and Admonition, how such letters affect their future assignments.

VICE ADMIRAL DENFELD: Of course, in normal selection processes in peacetime, everything goes before the selection boards – all their records, anything for them or against them, their physical records, their health records – and everything is taken into consideration, and under normal circumstances I would say that anybody who had a letter of Reprimand similar to the ones that these officers had received, that they would not be selected for promotion.

THE PRESS: Well, does the letter contain anything precisely, as the Secretary’s letter did in the cases of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark, which is a statement by the Secretary that never again shall they hold positions involving responsibility, I think?

VICE ADMIRAL DENFELD: No, as far as I know, these letters do not contain anything like that.

THE PRESS: Admiral Denfeld, my specific question on both Gillette and Granum is what future assignments are they likely to get? What kind of assignments? Will they get command of ships or will they be out in the sticks some place?

VICE ADMIRAL DENFELD: I think they will be in the continental United States on some duty. I don’t think they will get any –

THE PRESS: Admiral Denfeld, would you say that Captain McVay’s record has suffered more seriously than that of these other gentlemen?

VICE ADMIRAL DENFELD: Well, that’s all relative. I think that Captain McVay’s as a result of this, will probably. While he will be restored to duty and subject to any assignment which we might give him, I question that he will ever get a command of great responsibility as a result of this.

THE PRESS: The effect of remitting a hundred numbers doesn’t make it any more likely that he will get a flag, does it?

VICE ADMIRAL DENFELD: Oh no, no.

THE PRESS: Admiral, comparatively speaking, how severe is the dropping of a hundred numbers as a sentence?

VICE ADMIRAL DENFELD: Well, the dropping of a hundred numbers in the case of a captain going up to promotion of rear admiral - in normal times, it would mean that he wouldn’t be considered for probably three or four years beyond the time of when he would normally be considered for selection.

THE PRESS: I was thinking, sir, rather of other cases - I mean other court-martials. Is a hundred numbers a rather severe sentence?

VICE ADMIRAL DENFELD: It is a severe sentence for a captain. Of course, it’s all relative in different ranks. In the junior rank it wouldn’t mean so much as it would in the senior rank.

THE PRESS: Sir, it is my understanding that he is not going to be set back a hundred numbers.

VICE ADMIRAL DENFELD: That is correct.

THE PRESS: Did you ever know of a captain who had a court-martial record who got a flag?

VICE ADMIRAL DENFELD: I think we have had cases.

FLEET ADMIRAL NIMITZ: Here’s one right here! (Laughter).

VICE ADMIRAL DENFELD: It all depends on how serious the court-martial is.

FLEET ADMIRAL NIMITZ: I was court-martialed as an ensign for running the USS Decatur, an old destroyer, ashore.

THE PRESS: Where was that, sir?

FLEET ADMIRAL NIMITZ: In the Philippines, in the Batangas Harbor, about 1908.

THE PRESS: Sir, to return to the narrative account –

FLEET ADMIRAL NIMITZ: I was reprimanded for that. My ship was not damaged, but I was reprimanded.

THE PRESS: To return to the narrative account, all the way though – this is quite apart from the normal expected arrival time of the Indianapolis – there’s been at issue a dispatch sent from Guam, requesting a plane to come out with a target so the Indianapolis could shoot her way into port. Remember, we asked you about that on Guam the first time we talked to you after the Indianapolis went down? Was that message sent? Did it arrive? Did the aircraft go out? Obviously, it didn’t find her.

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Well now, first there was a message which was sent from Guam which did reach Admiral Oldendorf at Okinawa, which should have reached Admiral McCormick off Leyte, which contained the instructions from Cincpac for the movements of the ship, and that message failed to reach Admiral McCormick because the address was garbled. If the text had been garbled, he could have asked for a repeat on it, but the address was garbled. Therefore, it was not even decoded on his ship. Now, the message which asked for the specific arrangements, as far as I know, there is no record of that message actually ever being sent, and that message was to have originated, I believe, from the Indianapolis.

THE PRESS: She was to have broken radio silence?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: It was Captain McVay’s intention that that message be sent.

THE PRESS: Be sent from the Indianapolis after she left?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: It is my belief – and if you want precise information on this, I will dig it out for you, but it is my belief that the message actually never was sent, although it had been Captain McVay’s intention that such a request should be made.

THE PRESS: Well, after he was picked out of the water, he talked as though it had been sent.

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Yes.

THE PRESS: And he expressed at that time the feeling that the fact that the target plane did not find him, quite apart from arithmetic again, certainly indicated to Leyte or somebody that he wasn’t around, and I notice that is not mentioned at all in the summary, though it is mentioned in the early part of his dispatching orders.

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Dispatch? There is no record that any such message was sent, and I have discussed that personally with Captain McVay, and my impression that the message actually was not sent was confirmed.

THE PRESS: Of course, there was no aircraft sent out?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Yes. I may say that Captain McVay has seen this narrative. I showed it to him before it was used and told him I did not want inadvertently to have anything in there which he would take issue with or which would in any way place him unnecessarily in an unfavorable light, or his ship, or any of his officers or men, and he has been through this and did not take exception to any of it except, of course, that we had the understanding that he had plead “Not guilty” and was not agreeing to the finding of the court and that sort of thing, but I mean this accessory thing.

THE PRESS: There was no aircraft out looking for the ship at 6 a.m. the morning of the 31st?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: No.

THE PRESS: Admiral Denfeld, I notice you say there is a question whether McVay will be given an important position. Does that hold, despite the fact that the whole sentence was remitted and still stands as a black mark against him?

VICE ADMIRAL DENFELD: Well, of course, anybody that has a court-martial and has lost his ship –there is always a question whether he will give him another one or not.

FLEET ADMIRAL NIMITZ: He was convicted on one charge there, I believe. The conviction was not remitted; the sentence was remitted.

THE PRESS: Admiral Sherman, what was the relationship of the Philippine Sea Frontier in the chain of command?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Well, to explain that properly, I will have to go back to the beginning because there were some changes made during the period of the war. The Philippine Sea Frontier was originally established shortly after we retook the Philippines as a part of Admiral Kinkaid’s command, Admiral Kinkaid then being the Commander of the Seventh Fleet. Now, for purposes of naval administration, Admiral Kinkaid was responsible directly to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, in Washington. Operationally, Admiral Kinkaid was responsible to General MacArthur, as Commander in Chief of the Southwest Pacific, and General MacArthur again was operationally responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Then, in early April, a general administrative reorganization took place by which the Seventh Fleet and the Sea Frontier which had then been set up and organized were transferred to the Pacific Fleet for purposes of administration. For purposes of operation, however, they remained under General MacArthur, and the Philippine Sea Frontier is still operationally under General MacArthur and has been ever since it was established, but for purposes of naval administration it passed under Admiral Nimitz as of the twentieth of April, which was about the same date that General Richardson and his Army Forces in the Central Pacific passed to General MacArthur for purposes of Army administration. Those changes were made in order to get a more extensive control of the Army under General MacArthur, of the Navy under Admiral Nimitz, in order that we might husband our resources and make the maximum available for the invasion of Japan that we were preparing for.

The only visit that I ever made to this headquarters at Tolosa was made – Admiral Nimitz and I went there together on I would say roughly the 27th of December, because we spent Christmas Day with Admiral Halsey at Ulithi. We went over then to visit General MacArthur who had headquarters at Tacloban, and we went down to the beach on a very rainy day and inspected the buildings – not inspected them, but visited them, where Admiral Kinkaid’s and the Sea Frontier’s headquarters were then being erected. After they passed to Cincpac for purpose of naval administration, General MacArthur’s headquarters and Admiral Kinkaid’s headquarters had moved up to Manila, and I never saw them after that.

THE PRESS: It is accurate to say then that you uphold the court’s finding of ‘Guilty.” You do, however, remit the recommended sentence, but he’s guilty; he stands guilty as charged?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: (nodded affirmatively).

THE PRESS: I’d like to ask also the current assignment of Captain Granum. Do you have that, Admiral Denfeld?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Captain Granum is on duty in the Navy Department, and I am not sure as to which office. That we can find out for you if you would like the have it.

THE PRESS: I would like to.

THE PRESS: Admiral Nimitz, would you expand on one sentence of your letter to Mr. Connelly, which says, “I must bear my share of responsibility for the loss of the Indianapolis”? To what extent was the Philippine Sea Frontier under your control at the time of the incident?

FLEET ADMIRAL NIMITZ: Only administratively, not operationally, and “administratively” there is meant to mean I was responsible for keeping them up in personnel and for general matters of administration.

THE PRESS: Does the Commander, Marianas, have any responsibility once a ship leaves his port about her getting there or about searching for survivors in case they’re lost?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: He has full responsibility for matters like that within his area.

THE PRESS: Had she crossed the line?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: She had not crossed the line, and the search that found her was the Commander, Marianas, search.

THE PRESS: As long as the ship was lost in the territory of the Commander, Marianas, did he have any responsibility of keeping in touch with her until she got out of this territory? I am not trying to convict him, just asking a general question.

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: No, because under the system prevailing when the ship went to sea, he was entitled to assume that she was undamaged unless he heard otherwise. That system is approximately parallel to the one that we use in the case of aircraft. If I take off from Anacostia, bound for Norfolk, and I don’t show up, it’s Norfolk’s responsibility for detecting that fact and doing something about it even though I may have had a forced landing only ten miles south of Anacostia. If I don’t tell them about it, they are entitled to assume I am doing all right, but the failure to arrive is required to be corrected immediately.

THE PRESS: Admiral Sherman, in the final analysis of this whole thing, in addition to the black mark on Captain McVay’s record, hasn’t the same thing been accomplished by all of these months of trial and everything as when Admiral Nimitz sought to close the case out months and months ago in the Pacific with a letter of Reprimand, and it was reopened here in Washington?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Well, we’re dealing with intangibles there to a degree. I would say that certainly from the point of view of what the officer concerned has undergone, that he has had a much harder time than – he has undergone greater mental hardships than would have been the case of if the subject had been closed with the reprimand by the Commander in Chief, Pacific.

THE PRESS: Could we confirm for quotation that the Admiral did recommend that the Court of Inquiry’s recommendation for court-martial should be set aside and that the case should be closed with a reprimand?

FIRST ADMIRAL NIMITZ: The reprimand is not a bar to further action by the higher authorities through which the papers pass. In other words, my recommendation in the matter had to go to the Secretary, and my action had to be reviewed by the Secretary.

THE PRESS: But that was your recommendation, sir?

FLEET ADMIRAL NIMITZ: My action was to give him a Letter of Reprimand instead of a General Court and to take action, one, with a Letter of Reprimand to Gibson, and I think, a Letter of Admonition to Sancho – that is correct? – which was the recommendation of the Court of Inquiry.

THE PRESS: Is it the feeling – was it the feeling of the Department that Captain McVay’s lapse in failing to zigzag in disputed weather was more serious than the failure of Commander, Philippine Sea Frontier, to notice that the ship was not in their port?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Of course, I can’t speak for the things that caused the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, and the Secretary of the Navy to arrive at the conclusions that they did. However, as a result of the further investigation undertaken by the Inspector General of the Navy and the further information which was brought out in the General Court, the Philippine Sea Frontier was shown to be more involved than had been shown in the Court of Inquiry.

THE PRESS: Well, I am wondering why Captain McVay was court-martialed, and the officers responsible either directly or indirectly for the unusual length of time in which a search was not instituted were let off, so to speak, with a reprimand, rather than a finding of “Guilty” in a court-martial?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Well, I can’t say as to the reasons which led to that decision.

THE PRESS: Who makes the decision now affirmatively that Captain Granum and Commodore Gillette and the two Reserve lieutenants shall not be subject to court-martial?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Well, that decision is made by the Secretary of the Navy with the advice of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Naval Personnel, and the Judge Advocate General of the Navy.

THE PRESS: The now Chief of Naval Operations, or the then Chief of Naval Operations?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: The now Chief of Naval Operations. In other words, the action represented by the conclusion of this narrative has been taken by the Secretary of the Navy with the advice of his present principal subordinates in light of all the information now available.

THE PRESS: Admiral, can you tell us, sir, how this Jap sub commander was located and who made the decision to bring him here to testify? His appearance seemed to come as quite a surprise to the defense.

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: I don’t know the details of how he was located, and I do know that his being brought here was a result of a request by the defense that he be brought.

THE PRESS: Request by the defense?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: By the Judge Advocate.

THE PRESS: Are we satisfied that he is the exact commander of the sub that did sink the Indianapolis? I mean, his plotting was about 75 miles from where he hit it.[30]

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Well, I think so. I think it is reasonable to accept that he is.

THE PRESS: Was he ever asked if he sent a message to home base reporting that he had got a cruiser or a battleship, or whatever he may have claimed? I never saw the communiques about that time. I mean, I never saw the Jap communiques. We are referring now to the intercepted messages Hashimoto has had - if he had seen the report to fleet headquarters?

VICE ADMIRAL SHERMAN: I believe that would verify it but can’t say that positively. I have read all these papers, but I have read so many of them I’d have to check that by going back to the record.

THE PRESS: Well, thank you, Admiral.

Source: TRC; “Transcript of Press Conference with Admiral Nimitz Regarding Final Word on Indianapolis Investigations,” 26 February 1946, copy from NHHC Archives, WNY, original from RG 80, NARA II, College Park, MD.

The Navy resolved to learn from Indianapolis and took steps to assure that the circumstances would not be repeated. The Bureau of Ships “Lessons Learned” report below addressed all criticisms of life-saving equipment brought up in the Indianapolis investigations. Extracted below is the portion dealing with communications, as it was determined that the failure to get out a distress signal was the primary contributor to the great loss of life. To address these issues, BuShips placed battery powered emergency radio transmitters on U.S. Navy combatant ships and also placed Army model hand powered transmitters on the life rafts of all vessels of the Navy’s active and reserve fleet ship of the LCI type and larger. These steps were taken to make sure that rescue ships would quickly arrive at the location of a ship in distress or Sailors in the water.

Document 5.15: Bureau of Ships Report on Lessons Learned from Indianapolis, 7 March 1946 [Extract]

Code 5811

C-CA35/382 (5811)

CONFIDENTIAL

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Bureau of Ships

WASHINGTON, D. C.

7 – MAR 1946

To: The Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: Abandon Ship Equipment – Criticisms of in Connection with Loss of USS Indianapolis.

Ref: (a) CNO ltr. Op-09-OG; Serial 34P09 of 23 January 1946.

(b) INSGEN ltr. Op-08/OK; (SC) A17-25; Serial 017P08 of 1 February 1946.

[…][31]

(e) Criticism:

“Ship’s radio: Apparently because of loss of power to all available radio apparatus, it was impossible for the ship to send a radio distress message in the period of about 30 minutes that elapsed between the time Indianapolis was torpedoed and the time she sank.”

Reference (b) comments further as follows:

“3. With regard to the ship’s radio, the fundamental failure which resulted in the delay in rescue and the large loss of life was in radio communications. The ship’s Communication Department was well organized and manned. The radio equipment was modern, and believed to be efficient. There were many manned receiving stations in easy range of the equipment for both 500 and 4235 kilocycles. Survivors believed they transmitted messages on both of these frequencies, but no record has been received of a receipt of a message, which leads to the inescapable conclusion that the emergency radio provisions were not all that could be desired for life-saving purposes.”

Comment:

According to the radio plans available in the Bureau of Ships, the USS Indianapolis had three radio rooms located as follows:

(1) Radio Central (Radio I) – Communication Platform, frames 47 to 53, centerline.

(2) Radio Transmitter Room (Radio II) – Third Superstructure Deck, frames 88 to 92, centerline.

(3) Emergency Radio Room (Radio III) – First Superstructure Deck, frames 63 to 66, centerline.

Radio Central was equipped with no transmitting facilities except remote keys for control of the transmitters in the Radio Transmitter Room. Both the Radio Transmitter Room and the Emergency Radio Room were fitted with transmitters capable of transmitting distress signals on the proper frequency. Actually the Indianapolis had transmitting equipment on board far in excess of the vessel allowance by reason of her being flagship for Commander, Fifth Fleet. Each Radio space was provided with a primary and emergency source of power as follows:

Radio Central – Primary power from the forward turbo generator switchboard located in the forward engine room. Emergency power from the forward diesel generator switchboard in the forward diesel generator room.

Radio Transmitter Room – Primary power from the after-turbo generator switchboard in the after engine room. Emergency power from the forward diesel generator switchboard in the forward diesel generator room.

Emergency Radio Room – Primary power from the after turbo generator switchboard located in the after engine room. Emergency power from the after diesel generator switchboard in the after diesel generator room.

The forward diesel generator required manual starting but the after diesel generator was fitted for automatic starting on loss of the primary source of power. According to an analysis of the damage to the Indianapolis made in the Bureau of Ships on the basis of written statements of the survivors supplemented by informal interviews with the Commanding Officer, all power would have been lost to Radio Central but power would have been available to the Radio Transmitter Room from the after turbo generator switchboard in the after engine room and to the Emergency Radio Room from both the after turbo generator switchboard and from the after emergency diesel generator switchboard. The Bureau of Ships considers that the generator power supply arrangements on the Indianapolis possessed a degree of flexibility that would assure some power supply under almost any probable condition of damage. Since the records of the various investigations into the loss of the Indianapolis and the testimony before the court-martial of the Commanding Officer have not been made available to the Bureau of Ships, the Bureau cannot comment further as to whether or not power was actually available to these spaces. It is requested that the testimony in this regard be furnished to the Bureau of Ships for study and further comment.

In order to permit transmissions of distress signals from a ship in which all generated power to the radio rooms has been lost by reason of damage, the Bureau of Ships has recently authorized a rearrangement and relocation of two model TCS radio transmitter-receiver equipments allowed for large combatant ships to provide battery power for continuous operation in excess of two hours. One of these transmitters will be located in the forward part of the ship and will be operated from the primary conning station; the other will be located from in the after part of the ship and will be operated from the after conning station. In addition, the Bureau has obtained oral approval from the Chief of Naval Operations for the fitting of life rafts with Army Model SCR-578 transmitters, which are available in surplus Army stock. These will be furnished to all vessels of the Active and Reserve Fleets of the LCI type and larger. They are capable of transmitting a distress signal by the use of hand power and are to be considered an immediate interim measure until a better and more suitable equipment can be obtained.

3. The Bureau of Ships considers that a recurrence of the circumstances of the survivors of the Indianapolis, their lack of sufficient rafts with attached supplies and the long delay in their rescue, is not likely. It is unlikely that some generated power supply will not be available to the ship for distress signals, but, in that event, two battery-powered TCS will be available in large combatant ships to start rescue vessels to the scene. Emergency distress transmitting radio units as part of the life raft equipment will assure communication after a sinking. The lack of authorized automatic release devices and the failure to release toggles or to cut the lashing of the rafts during the 30 minutes elapsing between the torpedoing and the sinking need not be repeated in any future disasters. The failure and unsatisfactory condition of abandon ship supplies and equipment was due in large measure to the overcrowding of the few rafts floated and the circumstances noted above.

4. The Bureau of Ships will continue the development of improved abandon ship equipment.

B. L. Osborne [stamped]
Chief of Bureau[32]

Source: TD; “Bureau of Ships Report to CNO regarding Lessons Learned from Loss of USS Indianapolis,” 7 March 1946, War damage Reports, RG 19, Entry P1, Boxes 30–31, NARA II, College Park, MD.

CHAPTER SIX

Remembering Indianapolis

Twenty-three years of internal torment caused by the loss of his ship and crew ended for Rear Admiral Charles B. McVay III, (Ret.) on 6 November 1968. On this date, the last skipper of Indianapolis fatally wounded himself outside of his Connecticut home. He was seventy years old. The circumstances of McVay’s death served as a reminder of the continuing tragedy of the Indianapolis and led to increased efforts from many survivors to clear their former captain’s name of any wrongdoing.

Document 6.1: Obituary of Rear Admiral Charles B. McVay III

Adm. McVay, 70, Commander of Torpedoed Ship

Morris, Conn. (AP)—Retired Rear Admiral Charles McVay III, who commanded the cruiser Indianapolis when it was sunk by a Japanese submarine with a loss of 880 lives in World War II, has died at the age of 70. Police said he died of a “self-inflicted” gunshot wound.

McVay, who was court-martialed for failing to keep the ship on a zig-zag course in enemy waters, but was later exonerated, wept at the first reunion of survivors of the Indianapolis in 1960.

He died Wednesday at Charlotte Hungerford Hospital in Torrington, Conn., about three hours after police, responding to a call, found him lying in the yard outside his home.

The 1960 reunion was exactly 15 years after the cruiser was torpedoed by a single Japanese submarine, on July 30, 1945, after carrying vital parts of the atomic bomb to Tinian for the final crushing blows of World War II.

The cruiser sank in 12 minutes. It was the last major U.S. loss of the war. Only 316 survived out of the crew of 1,196. By “pure chance” according to the pilot of a Navy patrol plane, the aircraft’s crew spotted the survivors of the Indianapolis on rafts four days after the sinking. The torpedo had knocked out the cruiser’s electricity and no distress signal could be sent out.

Source: TDC; “Obituary of Rear Admiral Charles B. McVay III” from the Washington Star in Indianapolis Ship Files, Box 396D, NHHC Archives, WNY.

The Indianapolis story largely slipped out of public focus following 1946, only gaining attention on anniversaries, the death of Captain McVay, and the release of the 1975 blockbuster Jaws. Hunter Scott, a middle school student from Pensacola, Florida, made the story of Indianapolis and the perceived injustice of McVay’s conviction the focus of a History Day project in 1997.[1] Scott’s project relied heavily on interviews with the some 150 survivors still alive at the time of his project, and his project turned into a mission to exonerate Captain McVay. It ultimately gained national attention. His work convinced legislators that Captain McVay had been unfairly convicted, and legislation with exoneration language and a recommendation for a Presidential Unit Commendation to the final crew of Indianapolis moved through both houses of Congress. Scott himself testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee as a 12-year-old in September 1999. His prepared statement is presented below.

Document 6.2: Statement by 9th-Grade Student Hunter S. Scott before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 14 September 1999

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HUNTER SCOTT

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Armed Services Committee.[2] Thank you for the opportunity to testify here today in support of Senate Joint Resolution 26.

My name is Hunter Scott, I am a ninth-grade high school student from Pensacola, Florida. My journey to this Committee as a witness began over 3 years ago when I saw the motion picture “Jaws” in which one of the actors portrayed a survivor of the U.S.S. Indianapolis and described in chilling detail how he and other survivors floated for 5 days in shark-infested waters before they were spotted by accident and rescued.

When that scene was over, I asked my dad if the story was true. He said it was and suggested I research the story for a sixth grade history fair project. I was amazed how little information I found about the U.S.S. Indianapolis in history books.

I put an ad in our local Navy Newspaper asking for information about survivors of the Indianapolis. A call led me to Maurice Glenn Bell, who lives in Mobile, Alabama. In the fall of 1996 I met with Mr. Bell and heard the Indianapolis story first hand. The story was as chilling as what I had heard on Jaws. Mr. Bell gave me a list of all 154 remaining survivors. Over the course of the next year I called, or wrote, every one of them. Over 80 responded to my request for information and filled out a questionnaire I sent them. One of the questions was whether they felt Captain McVay’s court-martial was justified and his conviction fair. All the responses I got back were unanimous, and most were strongly worded in outrage and anger over the court-martial and conviction of their captain.

It seemed to me that after doing so much to help shorten the war and after the nightmare of his ship being lost, his crew being killed and drowned around him, and his own struggle for survival for days in the open sea-the court-martial of Captain McVay was not right. Then I learned that hundreds of Navy ships were lost in combat during World War II, but none of their captains were court-martialed. I wondered why Captain McVay was the only one, and I found that others have wondered too. The three major books written about the disaster and virtually every television documentary all concluded that Captain McVay’s treatment by the Navy was shameful. Even naval historians tend to agree.

Abraham Lincoln once said, “The probability that we may fail in a struggle ought not to deter us from the support of a cause we believe to be just.” I began this “just cause” to exonerate Captain McVay and to gain a Presidential Unit Citation for the U.S.S. Indianapolis and her crew when I was 11 years old. What started as a school history project has now turned into a mission to right a wrong that was inflicted 54 years ago. I know you are here today because you believe deeply in American democracy and in the fact that you can make a difference for the constituents you represent. I am no different than you in this belief, and that is why I have journeyed here, as a representative for my heroes, the men of the Indianapolis. Through this journey I have learned the great price my presence here today has cost. I have learned that democracy is a treasure so valued, men and women are willing to give their lives in its pursuit. I know 880 men of the U.S.S. Indianapolis made the supreme sacrifice. I pray some of those who gave their lives are looking down on what we are doing at this moment with a smile knowing their sacrifice was not in vain.

I am sure each of you have something of special meaning in your office that reminds you why you entered politics. In my pocket I carry one of my most precious possessions. Captain McVay’s dog tag he received when he was a cadet at the Naval Academy. As you can see it has his thumb print on the back. I carry this as a reminder of my mission, and in memory of a man who ended his own life in 1968. I carry this dog tag to remind me that only in the United States can one person make a difference. I carry this to remind me of the privilege and responsibility I have to seek truth and carry forward the torch of honor passed to me by the men of the Indianapolis.

In 1806 Thomas Jefferson wrote, “Political interest can never be separated in the long run from moral right.” Fifty-four years after the court-martial of a man who should never have been brought to trial, we are now in the “long run,” and you have the opportunity to do what is “morally right.” You can set the historical record straight concerning Captain McVay. When I started this mission there were 154 living survivors. Today there are only 134 still with us. Please honor these men passage of Senate Joint Resolution 26. Please restore the reputation of their captain which was taken from him. Please restore the honor of their ship while some of these men are still alive to see this dream become a reality. Don’t forget about the men of the U.S.S. Indianapolis for the second time in 54 years.

Thank you for allowing me the privilege to speak before you today, on behalf of my heroes, the men of the U.S.S. Indianapolis. Some of my heroes, are here today. You should hear their story rather than mine. But, on their behalf and in the name of justice, I thank you for sponsoring Senate Joint Resolution 26 and urge you to do all you can to obtain its passage.

Source: TD; Extract from The Sinking of the USS Indianapolis and the Subsequent Court-Martial of Rear ADM Charles B. McVay III, USN—Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, 14 September 1999 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2000).

The Navy’s response to legislation introduced in 1998 appears below. The letter to the Chairman of Senate Armed Services Committee from the Office of the Secretary of Navy made its way through the offices of the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Legislative Affairs. It summarized the actions taken by the Navy regarding Indianapolis in the fifty years since McVay’s court-martial. It also presented the Navy’s stance on why it could not support awarding a Presidential Unit Commendation to the crew, as well as why the Navy’s original decision on the McVay case had been upheld.

Document 6.3: Navy Response to Senate Resolution Calling for Presidential Unit Commendation to Indianapolis Crew, May/ August 1998[3]

The Honorable Strom Thurmond[4]

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

Washington, DC 20510-6050

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your request for the Secretary of Defense for the views of the Department of the Navy on S. 2177 and S.J. Res. 53, “To express the sense of Congress that the President should award a Presidential Unit Citation to the final crew of the USS Indianapolis, which was sunk on July 30, 1945.”

Department of the Navy strongly opposes the bills.

The circumstances surrounding the sinking of USS Indianapolis have been reviewed extensively since 1945. Navy examined the history of the USS Indianapolis in August 1975, as a result of requests from Senators Hartke and Eagleton[5] that USS Indianapolis be awarded the Presidential Unit Citation. An independent legal study of the court-martial of Rear Admiral McVay was conducted in 1992 at the request of Senator Richard Lugar.[6] In June, 1996, Navy prepared an extensive legal review of Rear Admiral McVay’s court-martial in response to congressional inquiries from, among others, Representative Floyd Spence,[7] Chairman of the House National Security Committee. The conclusions of the respective reviews are that awarding of the Presidential Unit Citation to USS Indianapolis is not appropriate and that the court-martial of Rear Admiral McVay was legally sound, no injustice was done, and no remedial action is warranted. No new facts or circumstances have arisen that were not previously considered in reaching our position on these issues.

To justify the Presidential Unit Citation, a unit must clearly render itself conspicuous by extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy. The sacrifices of the crew of Indianapolis are most conspicuous in enduring the aftermath of enemy action. The United States Navy lost many fine ships in World War II, such as those at Pearl Harbor, which did not receive unit recognition. More than fifty submarines were lost with all hands during the war, yet they were not recognized with a unit award. Not awarding the Presidential Unit Citation does not reflect on the heroism of the many brave men who went down with the ship, or who subsequently perished at sea, or those that survived the sinking and were rescued. The criteria for the unit award simply are not met. It is appropriate that the sacrifices these men made be acknowledged and honored, but this unit award is not the appropriate means to do so.

Legislation similar to S. 2177 and S.J. Res. 53 has been introduced in the House as H.R. 3710. The House bill goes further than S. 2177 and S.J. Res 53 by proposing to exonerate Rear Admiral McVay from responsibility for the sinking of the Indianapolis in addition to providing a sense of Congress regarding the award of a Presidential Unit Citation for the crew. The House bill may eventually come before the Senate or its provisions be considered in conference. Navy strongly opposes H.R. 3710 in part for the same reasons we oppose S. 2177 and S.J. Res. 53—the criteria for award of the Presidential Unit Citation have not been met in the case of the USS Indianapolis. Additionally, Navy opposes H.R. 3710 because the court-martial of Rear Admiral McVay was consistent with all applicable law, Navy regulations and the tradition of a commanding officer’s ultimate accountability for his ship. We believe these decisions, and the ancient traditions and customs on which they are based, should not be disturbed.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the standpoint of the Administration’s program there is no object to the presentation of this report for the consideration of the Committee.

Sincerely,

Copy to:

The Honorable John W. Warner

Ranking Minority Member

Source: TLC; Copy of letter “Chief of Naval Operations to Chief of Legislative Affairs,” 11 May 1998, Indianapolis Ship Files, Box 396D, NHHC Archives, WNY.

The letter from Senator Bob Smith, member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, to his colleagues seeking co-sponsors for legislation regarding the exoneration of Indianapolis Captain McVay showed the political momentum generated by the Hunter Scott project. Public debate about the controversies of Indianapolis would continue for several years and ultimately be addressed by the U.S. Navy.

Document 6.4: Letter from Senator Bob Smith to Colleagues Seeking Co-sponsors on Indianapolis Legislation, 20 April 1999

United States Senate

Washington, DC 20510-2903

April 28, 1999

Dear Colleague:

I am writing to seek your support for the attached joint resolution regarding the U.S.S. Indianapolis. It commends the crew of the U.S.S. Indianapolis for selfless and heroic service to the United States during World War II, and restores the reputation of Captain Charles Butler McVay III.

Days before the end of World War II, the United States Navy heavy cruiser U.S.S. Indianapolis was torpedoed and sunk by a Japanese submarine. Only 316 of the 1196 crew members survived this attack and the subsequent fight for survival in the Pacific Ocean. During this five day ordeal they endured shark attacks, exposure, and lack of food and water. This was the greatest sea disaster in the history of the United States Navy. In December 1945 the ship’s commander, Captain McVay, was court-martialed and convicted for failing to zigzag the night of the torpedo attack. He later committed suicide.

For many years the crew of the Indianapolis have fought to restore his good name. They believe that evidence at the time and materials declassified in recent years prove that Captain McVay was not at fault. Indeed, they have maintained that their ship was sent into harm’s way without proper escort and that Captain McVay’s court-martial was held to divert attention from the mistakes of others, including shore-based personnel who failed to notice that the ship had not arrived on schedule. Their cause has gained momentum with the assistance of 13 year old Hunter Scott, who has helped to bring national attention to this crusade. His efforts have been reported by a number of national media outlets, and he has been named by George Magazine as one of the “20 Most Influential People in American Politics.”

This legislation expresses the sense of the Senate that Captain McVay’s conviction was a miscarriage of justice, and also encourages the President to award a Presidential Unit Citation to the crew of the U.S.S. Indianapolis. Congressman Joe Scarborough[8] will be introducing this legislation in the House of Representatives. If you would like to be an original co-sponsor of this Senate joint resolution, please contact Jim Dohoney in my office by close of business on Thursday, April 29th. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Bob Smith, U.S.S. [signed]

Source: TLSC; “Letter from Senator Bob Smith Seeking Co-sponsors for Indianapolis Legislation, 28 April 1999,” Indianapolis Ship Files, Box 396D, NHHC Archives, WNY.

In 2001, the Navy decided to award the crew of Indianapolis the Navy Unit Commendation for its 16–26 July 1945 mission to deliver the atomic bomb components to Tinian. The Presidential Unit Commendation asked for by Congress was denied because the requirements for the award were not met—primarily “heroism in action against an armed enemy.” Indianapolis faced no enemy action during the bomb delivery, nor did the ship have a chance to take action against the submarine that sank them on 30 July 1945.

Document 6.5: Awarding of a Navy Unit Commendation to Final Crew of Indianapolis

Department of the Navy

Office of the Secretary

NAVY PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

1650

Ser NDBDM/0409

30 January 2001

From: Secretary of the Navy

To: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: RECOMMENDATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION

Encl: (1) OLA ltr LA-62/62S set 115 of 25 May 99 with ends

(2) OLA ltr LA-62 of 9 Sep 99 with ends

1. After considering the recommendations contained in the enclosures (1) and (2), the awarding of the Navy Unit Commendation, as the more appropriate award, vice the Presidential Unit Citation to USS Indianapolis (CA 35) is approved. In addition, it must be noted that award is approved for the period 16 July 1945 to 26 July 1945, vice the recommended period of 7 December 1941 to 30 July 1945.

Robert B. Pirie, Jr. [signed]

Secretary of the Navy

Acting

Copy to:

OLA

[END]

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in presenting the NAVY UNIT

COMMENDATION to USS INDIANAPOLIS (CA35)

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For exceptionally meritorious service in support of operations against the enemy in the Pacific Theater from 16 through 26 July 1945. USS Indianapolis (CA 35) demonstrated unparalleled success by independently traversing the theatre at a record-setting, high speed of advance. The critical military components that she delivered significantly contributed to the specific mission accomplishment and ultimately were used to end the Second World War. By their truly distinctive achievements, unrelenting perseverance, and unfailing devotion to duty, the officers and enlisted personnel of USS Indianapolis (CA 35) reflected great credit upon themselves and upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

Secretary of the Navy

Acting

Source: TDSC; “Navy Unit Commendation Decision,” 30 January 2001 Indianapolis Ship

Files, Box 396D, NHHC Archives, WNY.

The 11 July 2001 letter from Secretary of Navy Gordon England signified accomplishment of the mission launched by Hunter Scott in 1997 and Indianapolis survivors in 1946. The congressional action, supported by President Bill Clinton and the American public, led the Navy to place a letter of exoneration in the personnel file of Charles McVay along with the text of a congressional provision added to the 2001 Defense Authorization Act that provided a sense of McVay’s lack of culpability in the loss of so many of his crew. Largely a symbolic gesture, the exoneration did not overturn McVay’s conviction.

Document 6.6: Exoneration Letter Placed in Captain McVay’s File by SECNAV Gordon England

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

11 July 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Subj: ADDITION TO THE MILITARY PERSONNEL RECORD OF

REAR ADMIRAL

CHARLES B. MCVAY, III, USN

1. In 1945, then-Captain Charles B. McVay, III, USN, was the Commanding Officer of USS Indianapolis (CA35). During a transit from Guam to the Philippines, USS Indianapolis was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine and sank. Captain McVay and just over 300 of his men were rescued after five days in the water. Following investigation by a Court of Inquiry, a General Court-Martial convicted Captain McVay of negligently hazarding his vessel by failing to steer a “zig-zag” course. He was sentenced to the loss of 100 lineal numbers. The Secretary of the Navy approved the findings and sentence, but remitted the sentence in its entirety. Captain McVay was advanced to the grade of Rear Admiral upon retirement in 1949.

2. Following extensive review, including testimony in 1999 before the Senate Armed Services Committee by then-Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Pilling,[9] and then-Judge Advocate General, Rear Admiral Hutson,[10] Congress included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 a “Sense of Congress” provision. This provision, at Section 545, states, in pertinent part, that:

1.[t]he American people should now recognize Captain McVay’s lack of culpability for the tragic loss of the USS Indianapolis and the lives of the men who died as a result of the sinking of that vessel; and

2.Captain McVay’s military record should now reflect that he is exonerated for the loss of the USS Indianapolis and so many of her crew.

3. In recognition of this Sense of Congress, insert into Rear Admiral McVay’s military personnel record a copy of Section 545, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001.

Gordon R. England [signed]

[END]

Source: TLSC; “SECNAV Gordon England’s McVay Exoneration Letter,” 11 July 2001, Indianapolis Ship Files, Box 396D, NHHC Archives, WNY.

Below is the text from the FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act added to McVay’s file. The addition to the file, coming 55 years after McVay’s conviction, has not ended public interest in the Indianapolis. The complicated nature of the story, legal technicalities, conspiracy theorists, and the shark-centric focus on the story generated by Jaws obfuscates an episode in the history of U.S. naval history that needs to be told accurately.

Document 6.7: Indianapolis Extract from Fiscal Year 2001 National Defense Authorization Act

SEC. 545. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE COURT-MARTIAL CONVICTION OF CAPTAIN CHARLES BUTLER McVAY, COMMANDER OF THE U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS, AND ON THE COURAGEOUS SERVICE OF THE CREW OF THAT VESSEL.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Shortly after midnight on the morning of July 30, 1945, during the closing days of World War II, the United States Navy heavy cruiser U.S.S. Indianapolis (CA 35) was torpedoed and sunk by the Japanese submarine I—58 in what became the worst sea disaster in the history of the United States Navy.

(2) Although approximately 900 of the ship’s crew of 1,196 survived the actual sinking, only 316 of those courageous sailors survived when rescued after four and a half days adrift in the open sea, the remainder having perish[ed] from battle wounds, drowning, predatory shark attacks, exposure to the elements, and lack of food and potable water.

(3) Rescue for the remaining 316 sailors came only when they were spotted by chance by Navy Lieutenant Wilbur C. Gwinn while flying a routine naval air patrol mission.

(4) After the end of World War II, the commanding officer of the U.S.S. Indianapolis, Captain Charles Butler McVay, III, who was rescued with the other survivors, was court-martialed for ‘‘suffering a vessel to be hazarded through negligence’’ by failing to zigzag (a naval tactic employed to help evade submarine attacks) and was convicted even though—

(A) the choice to zigzag was left to Captain McVay’s discretion in his orders; and

(B) Motchisura Hashimoto, the commander of the Japanese submarine that sank the U.S.S. Indianapolis, and Glynn R. Donaho, a United States Navy submarine commander highly decorated for his service during World War II, both testified at Captain McVay’s Court-Martial trial that the Japanese submarine could have sunk the U.S.S. Indianapolis whether or not it had been zigzagging, an assertion that has since been reaffirmed in a letter to the Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate dated November 24, 1999.

(5) Although not argued by Captain McVay’s defense counsel in the court-martial trial, poor visibility on the night of the sinking (as attested in surviving crew members’ hand written accounts recently discovered at the National Archives) justified Captain McVay’s choice not to zigzag as that choice was consistent with the applicable Navy directives in force in 1945, which stated that, “During thick weather and at night, except on very clear nights or during bright moonlight, vessels normally cease zig-zagging.”

(6) Before the U.S.S. Indianapolis sailed from Guam on what became her final voyage, Naval officials failed to provide Captain McVay with available support that was critical to the safety of the U.S.S. Indianapolis and her crew by—

(A) disapproving a request made by Captain McVay for a destroyer escort for the U.S.S. Indianapolis across the Philippine Sea as being “not necessary”;

(B) not informing Captain McVay that naval intelligence sources, through signal intelligence (the Japanese code having been broken earlier in World War II), had become aware that the Japanese submarine I–58 was operating in the area of the U.S.S. Indianapolis’s course (as disclosed in evidence presented in a hearing of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate conducted September 14, 1999); and

(C) not informing Captain McVay of the sinking of the destroyer escort U.S.S. Underhill by a Japanese submarine within range of the course of the U.S.S. Indianapolis four days before the U.S.S. Indianapolis departed Guam for the Philippine Islands.

(7) Captain McVay’s court-martial initially was opposed by his immediate command superiors, Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz (CINCPAC) and Vice Admiral Raymond Spruance of the 5th Fleet, for whom the U.S.S. Indianapolis had served as flagship, but, despite their recommendations, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal ordered the court-martial, largely on the basis of the recommendation of Fleet Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations.

(8) There is no explanation on the public record for the overruling by Secretary Forrestal of the recommendations made by Admirals Nimitz and Spruance.

(9) Captain McVay was the only commander of a United States Navy vessel lost in combat to enemy action during World War II who was subjected to a court-martial trial for such a loss, even though several hundred United States Navy ships were lost in combat to enemy action during World War II.

(10) The survivors of the U.S.S. Indianapolis overwhelmingly conclude that Captain McVay was not at fault in the loss of the U.S.S. Indianapolis and have dedicated their lives to vindicating their Captain McVay.

(11) Although promoted to the grade of rear admiral in accordance with then-applicable law upon retirement from the Navy in 1949, Captain McVay never recovered from the stigma of his post-war court-martial and in 1968, tragically, took his own life.

(12) Charles Butler McVay, III—

(A) was a graduate of the United States Naval Academy;

(B) was an exemplary career naval officer with an outstanding record (including participation in the amphibious invasions of North Africa, the assault on Iwo Jima, and the assault on Okinawa where the U.S.S. Indianapolis under his command survived a fierce kamikaze attack);

(C) was a recipient of the Silver Star earned for courage under fire during the Solomon Islands campaign; and

(D) with the crew of the U.S.S. Indianapolis, had so thoroughly demonstrated proficiency in naval warfare that the Navy entrusted him and the crew of the U.S.S. Indianapolis with transporting to the Pacific theater components necessary for assembling the atomic bombs that were exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end the war with Japan (delivery of such components to the island of Tinian having been accomplished on July 25, 1945).[11]

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING CHARLES BUTLER MCVAY, III.—With respect to the sinking of the U.S.S. Indianapolis (CA 35) on July 30, 1945, and the subsequent court-martial conviction of the ship’s commanding officer, Captain Charles Butler McVay, III, arising from that sinking, it is the sense of Congress, based on the review of evidence by the Senate and the House of Representatives—

(1) that, in light of the remission by the Secretary of the Navy of the sentence of the court-martial and the restoration of Captain McVay to active duty by the Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, the American people should now recognize Captain McVay’s lack of culpability for the tragic loss of the U.S.S. Indianapolis and the lives of the men who died as a result of the sinking of that vessel; and

(2) that, in light of the fact that certain exculpatory information was not available to the court-martial board and that Captain McVay’s conviction resulted therefrom, Captain McVay’s military record should now reflect that he is exonerated for the loss of the U.S.S. Indianapolis and so many of her crew.

(c) UNIT CITATION FOR FINAL CREW OF U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS.—The Secretary of the Navy should award a Navy Unit Commendation to the U.S.S. Indianapolis (CA 35) and her final crew.

Source: TD; “Text from 2001NDAA,” copy in Indianapolis Ship Files, Box 396D, NHHC Archives, WNY.

The remarks given by Rear Admiral (Ret.) Samuel J. Cox, Director, Naval History and Heritage Command, to the Indianapolis survivors and their families at the 71st reunion in Indianapolis, Indiana, are a fitting conclusion to this volume.[12] Ten of the remaining 23 survivors were present for the remarks. The mission of the Naval History and Heritage Command is to enhance the war fighting effectiveness of the U.S. Navy, using the power of history and heritage to pass on hard-won lessons and to inform the American people of the great sacrifices made on their behalf. Director Cox’s remarks demonstrate the application of this mission. He placed the Indianapolis in the broader context of its World War II service and he addressed the controversies surrounding the sinking. His conclusions show that the U.S. Navy endeavors to learn from the episode so that such a tragic story will not be replicated. Only by telling the full story of Indianapolis can her final crew be properly commemorated.

Document 6.8: Keynote Remarks by Rear Admiral Samuel Cox, USN (Ret.), Director, Naval History and Heritage Command at 71st Anniversary Reunion of USS Indianapolis Survivors’ Group, 9 July 2016

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Those two essays are going to be a very tough act to follow.[13] They are both incredibly moving, and I would very much like to get a copy of both if I may.

Words will fail to adequately express the incredible honor it is to have been invited here to speak tonight. I think everyone in this room knows that there is an increasingly fleeting chance to say thank you to those who served, sacrificed, and persevered during the time of our nation’s greatest peril, World War II. So I would like to take this opportunity to offer my deepest gratitude and respect to the survivors and their families, and especially to the loved ones of those lost at sea.

I knew the USS Indianapolis story before I was in kindergarten. My grandfather and my father both served as enlisted Sailors in the U.S. Navy. I grew up surrounded by ship models, Jane’s Fighting Ships, and just about every book published on the U.S. Navy in World War II. My punishment for being bad was to not be allowed to watch re-runs of the TV show, Victory at Sea.[14] And it just so happened that as I came of age to first be aware of the outside world, the U.S. Navy, and the concept of history, I was living right here in Indianapolis. So although other kids identified with home sports teams, I always viewed the USS Indianapolis as “my ship.” And I followed developments over the years very closely.

This is now bookended by that fact that in my headquarters in the Washington Navy Yard, one floor above my office, is the room in which Captain McVay’s court-martial was held (December 1945). I also remember clearly that when Captain McVay took his own life in 1968, it was the subject of discussion in our home, and sadness. Both my father and grandfather strongly believed that the court-martial of Captain McVay was unfair.

There is no question that the loss of USS Indianapolis is one of the blackest episodes in the history of the U.S. Navy. But I also believe that even in loss and tragedy, there are examples of extraordinary valor and sacrifice that deserve to be remembered, that serve as an inspiration to Sailors today and in the future, and there are lessons learned that must be preserved and passed on, and are relevant even now. The Indianapolis story has these in abundance.

Our current Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral John Richardson[15], has stated that we must “know our history” so as to not re-learn the lessons of the past, the hard way. He has also stressed not only the importance of personal integrity, but also institutional integrity. Or put another way, we must not lie to ourselves. So I am not the Minister of Propaganda. My mission as the Director of the Naval History and Heritage Command is to preserve and present as accurate an accounting of the history of the U.S. Navy as humanly possible. And to be blunt, there is much about the sinking of the USS Indianapolis and the aftermath that I would not choose to characterize as the Navy’s finest hour.

Even after congressional exoneration of Captain McVay and Secretary of the Navy Gordon England’s decision (in 2001) to place the congressional resolution in Captain McVay’s service record, the controversy, and cloud of misunderstanding, persists to this day.

As recently as a few weeks ago, someone in the Navy expressed to me the opinion that, “the Navy doesn’t give awards for getting sunk.” This resulted in significant separation between my seat and my chair and a “Whoa! Foul!” Let’s start with ten battle stars in some of the most crucial and brutal combat across the entirety of the three and a half years of the Pacific War. The crew of the USS Indianapolis distinguished themselves with great courage and fighting skill long before the first Japanese torpedo hit, much of it as the flagship for Admiral Raymond Spruance and the Fifth Fleet, the flagship for the largest armada of warships ever assembled in the history of mankind, probably forever.[16] I am not going to go through the entire war history of the USS Indianapolis, but I do intend to cover it in some detail, because I think it important. To the extent that anyone remembers and talks about the USS Indianapolis today, it is almost always exclusively focused on the sinking, and the long litany of miscommunication, misinterpretations, missed intelligence reports, and other mistakes ashore that resulted in so many Sailors dying, and of course, sharks. But there is so much more, and I believe it especially important to the families of those lost at sea to know that your loved one isn’t just a hero because he died in the sinking. He is a hero because his courage played an important role in achieving final victory in the most costly war ever waged.

When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the USS Indianapolis was off at Johnston Island conducting gunnery drills (with several minesweepers). As she participated in the search for the Japanese attack force, she steamed through waters thick with Japanese submarines . . . the Japanese had deployed over 25 submarines to the waters around Pearl Harbor. It is likely only through pure chance that the USS Indianapolis did not suffer the same fate in the first days of the war as she did in the last days.

USS Indianapolis then provided critical protection to U.S. aircraft carriers that launched among the very first retaliatory offensive strikes against the Japanese, on New Guinea, in March 1942. These carriers then participated in the crucial Battle of the Coral Sea (May 1942)[17], which resulted in two Japanese carriers put out of action, so that at the decisive Battle of Midway a month later (June 1942)[18] the odds were four Japanese carriers against three U.S. carriers, instead of six to three, which probably changed the outcome of that most important battle of the war.

Meanwhile, the USS Indianapolis was sent to operate in the Aleutian Islands in brutally cold, foggy, and dangerous Alaskan waters, not even counting Japanese submarines. The USS Indianapolis sank a Japanese munitions ship (Akagane Maru) attempting to resupply the Japanese garrison on Attu, one of the islands they had captured, which exploded with the loss of all hands.[19] Japan’s inability to reliably resupply their troops on Attu and Kiska contributed significantly to their loss of Attu and decision to abandon Kiska, which no doubt resulted in saving many U.S. troops.

In numerous actions through the rest of the war, the USS Indianapolis not only served as the flagship but also conducted frequent close-in bombardments of Japanese-held islands to include Tarawa, Kwajalein, Guam, Iwo Jima and others, in range of Japanese return fire. Although there is no way to know for certain how many U.S. Marines survived these bloody battles thanks to USS Indianapolis’s fire support, the number is probably significant. During the battles for Tarawa and Makin Island, the USS Indianapolis operated in waters near the escort carrier USS Liscome Bay (CVE-56), which was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine with the loss of most of her crew, over 650 (Including Doris Miller, the first African-American to be awarded a Navy Cross, for his courage in action at Pearl Harbor.)[20] Once again, fate spared the USS Indianapolis, but she shared the danger.

And then, the epic battle of Okinawa in the spring of 1945, with USS Indianapolis once again serving as Admiral Spruance’s flagship right in the thick of it. Far more American Sailors were killed or injured, 9,000 casualties including almost 5,000 killed, than at Pearl Harbor. The number of U.S. ships sunk or seriously damaged by Japanese kamikaze suicide attacks numbered over 100. It is one thing to be willing to die for one’s country. It is quite another to face an enemy that intends to die for his, demonstrating an extraordinary and terrible resolve.

Over my desk, I have a painting of a kamikaze about to hit the aircraft carrier USS Hornet (CV-12), and I have carried a copy for many years.[21] It serves to remind me, and my staff, that whenever we start feeling sorry for ourselves about what a bad day we might be having . . . well, we can’t really even comprehend what a real bad day is. And frankly I intend to hang a copy of the USS Indianapolis being hit by two torpedoes in my conference room to serve the same purpose. But another thing about the painting, even though the kamikaze is about to hit, you can see that every gun on that ship is still blazing away. None of the gunners are running, even those who are going to die when that plane hits. They are showing a resolve every bit as great as that pilot. And it is exactly that same kind of courage that was exhibited repeatedly by the crew of the USS Indianapolis in that horrific battle.

The USS Indianapolis shot down six planes off Okinawa. In today’s environment of high-body count movies and video games, that might not seem like such a big deal. But one plane took the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CV-6)[22] out of the war. Two planes took the carrier USS Bunker Hill (CV-17)[23] out of the war. One plane with two bombs grievously damaged the carrier USS Franklin (CV-13)[24], and put her out of the war. So, every one of those planes shot down by the USS Indianapolis mattered.

And when USS Indianapolis’s time came on 31 March 1945, her gunners had less than 25 seconds to react to the kamikaze as it came out of the sun, and still they hit it, and the plane itself struck a glancing blow with minimum damage. But in his last instant of life, the pilot released a bomb which penetrated clean through the ship and out the bottom, exploding just underneath the ship. This by-the-way is how modern torpedoes are designed to work, exploding just underneath the ship, which maximizes the damage to the ship. Yet, through hours of heroic damage control efforts, the crew managed to save their ship.

This attack also demonstrates that there is no safe place on a warship in battle; the entire crew shares the danger. Many of the nine Sailors who died were deep in the ship, some drowned by fuel oil from a ruptured tank. The fact is that whether a Sailor lives or dies in a battle at sea is about as random an event as can be imagined. In order for a ship to be successful in battle, every Sailor must do his (and now, her) duty with the utmost efficiency and effectiveness, irrespective of the chance that at any instant a bomb, shell, mine, or torpedo could blow them to eternity.

The kamikaze attack set in motion a chain of destiny. Had it not been for the severe damage, the USS Indianapolis would not have been at Mare Island in July 1945. Had it not been for USS Pensacola’s (CA-24) engineering casualty, which prevented her from carrying the atomic bomb components to Tinian as planned, the USS Indianapolis would have still been at Mare Island when the war ended, and everyone would have survived, except those lost in the kamikaze attack.[25] Instead, the USS Indianapolis came out of the repair yard early, and still made the fastest transit to Pearl Harbor ever recorded and then to Tinian Island, playing a pivotal role in the execution of perhaps the most momentous decision ever made by a U.S. President. And as horrible as that bomb was, it would have been dwarfed by the carnage to Japanese and Americans that would have resulted from an invasion. Millions of descendants are alive today because the USS Indianapolis executed her mission to perfection.

My point in all of this is that all 1,196 men aboard the USS Indianapolis on 30 July 1945 were heroes long before the I-58 fired her six torpedoes, and all 1,196 deserve to be remembered that way.

Over the last couple of days, most of you have attended some superb presentations covering the events of the sinking and the struggle for survival. And frankly, there are those in the audience who know those events far better than I, because you, the survivors, lived it. So I am going to skip ahead to the controversial court-martial of Captain McVay.

In the entire history of the United States Navy, no commanding officer of a ship has ever been court-martialed for losing his ship as a result of enemy action, except for Captain McVay. Navy leadership, under Secretary James Forrestal and CNO Ernest King, had every legal authority to convene the court-martial, even though both Fleet Admiral Nimitz and Admiral Spruance recommended against it. And of the charge that stuck, failure to zigzag, the result was cut and dried since Captain McVay made no secret that the ship was not zigzagging at the time the torpedoes hit. So, the Navy did not even need to hold a trial to convict Captain McVay of that specific charge. But as Captain Bill Toti has eloquently written, the fact that something is legally correct does not necessarily make it just.[26]

What is certain is that the trial was a media circus, and with the end of wartime censorship, the Navy lost any ability to control the frenzy, and the result was a perfect storm of media, congressional, new administration, family, and public pressure to blame someone due to the sheer horror of the event. The publicity was what the Navy leadership wanted, to relieve the pressure by demonstrating that someone was being held to account, Captain McVay, but also diverting attention from the plethora of other mistakes made by numerous officers off the Indianapolis, some very senior. But the Navy was also in a box of its own making. Whether inadvertently or on purpose, the news of the sinking was withheld for almost two weeks until a couple hours before President Truman announced the end of the war. Note my use of the passive voice, which obfuscates responsibility, because I have yet to find record of anyone who owned up to that decision. It is difficult to imagine anything more cruel to the families of those lost than to experience the depth of grief as the entire rest of the nation erupts in euphoria, or worse, to have experienced the euphoria only then to learn that their loved one was dead. So when the court concluded that Captain McVay was guilty of negligently hazarding his ship by failure to zigzag, the anger and invective directed against him by some of the families of those lost was understandable and completely predictable, and in some cases, far less forgiving of the captain than were the survivors.

From a pure legal standpoint, the members of the court-martial board had no choice but to convict. The charge was failure to zigzag and he wasn’t zigzagging. Case closed. By the regulation, Captain McVay had the discretion to zigzag or not during periods of night and poor visibility. It was a judgment call. That his ship was torpedoed demonstrated that his judgment, in perfect hindsight, was in error. But even the members of the board recognized the fundamental unfairness by immediately and unanimously recommending clemency, that the sentence (loss of 100 numbers on his permanent rank of commander, and 100 on his temporary wartime rank of captain) be remitted, and that Captain McVay be restored to duty.

War itself is fundamentally a mistake. It doesn’t take too much digging into any battle in history to realize that each is a series of multiple errors in judgment. Whether victor or vanquished, both sides make mistakes, usually many. The side that makes the fewest mistakes usually wins, or the side that by good fortune is able to capitalize on the other’s mistake at the right time. The reason is that war is hell. War is chaos. Commanders must make split-second decisions based on uncertain information. To hesitate for better information can result in getting blown out of the water. The Pacific war is fraught with errors in judgment, so Captain McVay was actually in good company.

As examples, the Battle of Savo Island (August 1942) was a worse disaster than the USS Indianapolis; three U.S. heavy cruisers and one Australian cruiser caught by surprise and sunk, with the loss of almost 1,100 Sailors, with minimal damage to the Japanese.[27] It is easy for an armchair historian like me to point out all the mistakes made by Admirals Callaghan and Scott[28] at the first night battle of Guadalcanal (November 1942) but they paid with their lives and another 1,200 Sailors, including the five Sullivan brothers.[29] The Battle of Tassafaronga (November 1942) was another disaster where a few Japanese destroyers defeated a much larger U.S. force.[30] At the battle of Leyte Gulf (October 1944) the great Admirals Halsey and Kinkaid made a potentially catastrophic mistake by thinking the other had San Bernardino Strait covered, saved only by the heroic ultimate sacrifice of hundreds of U.S. Sailors.[31] One of the most iconic photos of the war, in almost every book, shows a plane falling in flames from the sky, almost always identified as Japanese. Actually it is one of ours, shot down by us.

Commanders make calculated risk decisions. Sometimes they pay off, sometimes they don’t. Admiral Marc Mitscher took a calculated risk at the Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 1944) when he ordered his carriers to turn on their lights, risking many thousands of Sailors to save a few hundred aviators trying to find their way back in the dark.[32] I mentioned the USS Franklin earlier. Her skipper took a calculated risk to give his men some rest after many hours at general quarters, which is exactly when one lone plane slipped through and hit the ship with two bombs. The crew of the USS Franklin saved their ship, at the cost of almost 800 lives.[33] Her skipper was not court-martialed, nor should he have been.

Even during the rescue of the survivors of the USS Indianapolis, there were numerous calculated risks taken. The pilot of the PBY, Lieutenant Adrian Marks, took a calculated risk when he violated standing orders and landed his plane in the open ocean to save 56 survivors. The landing broke his plane so it could not take off, the reason why such landings were forbidden. But he could have easily crashed his plane and instead of being a hero, he and his crew would be dead. The skipper of the USS Cecil J. Doyle, the first ship to arrive on the scene, took a calculated risk when he turned his searchlight to the sky, providing a literal beacon of hope that saved many lives, but also served as a possible “sink me” message to any Japanese submarines that might have been around. The USS Doyle’s skipper, Commander Graham Claytor, got away with it, and went on to be Secretary of the Navy in President Carter’s administration.[34]

Captain McVay, too, took a calculated risk. His decision to cease zigzagging was not an oversight, or negligence, or lack of proper training for the crew; it was a deliberate decision trying to balance two contradictory requirements. First, after the severe strain on his power plant from the previous high-speed transit, he did not want to risk breaking down in the middle of nowhere while transiting alone. Second he wanted to maximize the daylight training time when the ship was to arrive at Leyte in order to get his crew badly needed gunnery training. The first requirement necessitated slower speeds, and the second faster speeds. By ceasing zigzagging, Captain McVay could accomplish both. Standing orders gave him the discretion to cease zigzagging at night in low visibility. Visibility was poor when he gave the order. Unfortunately for the Indianapolis, the moon broke through the overcast at just the right time to give the submarine I-58 “good enough” visibility to take the shot.

The only person to blame for the loss of the Indianapolis was Commander Mochitsura Hashimoto, skipper of the I-58, and he was just doing his duty, with considerable skill in setting up and executing an almost perfect shot, and given the grievous losses suffered by the Japanese submarine force, with considerable courage. Which leads me to a key observation. The war with Japan was as brutal and vicious as any in history. It could be considered a near-miracle that Japan could then make such a rapid transition to a peaceful, democratic nation that has proved time and again to be a great friend and ally of the United States, with a highly capable navy that is now on our side. So perhaps the greatest lesson of that terrible war is that never again must the United States and Japan face each other on opposite sides of a field of battle.

So let me transition to what is going on today. I don’t really have a good segue for this so please bear with me. There is a new movie about the USS Indianapolis coming out, probably around Veteran’s Day, called Men of Courage starring Nicolas Cage.[35] I do not know if it will be a good movie or a bad movie. The trailers are out, and you can see them on YouTube. It certainly looks like an exciting movie, although many in this room will instantly recognize it was filmed on a battleship not a heavy cruiser. What I do know is that the Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy declined to provide support to the film production.

Regardless, I am using the movie as a forcing function for my command to review all documentation and to look for additional sources before the movie comes out. My intent is to ensure that the senior Navy leadership and the American public are provided with the most accurate and up-to-date account possible. You all know that it is not a pretty story, but my intent is to be truthful. I have had my staff reach out to researchers in Japan to glean more from Japanese language sources. Although most relevant Japanese documentation was destroyed just before the end of the war, we have found some interesting things, although most corroborates what we already know. Nevertheless, we have found that Commander Hashimoto initially reported three hits on the USS Indianapolis rather than just two, and he also reported that when he surfaced some time after the attack he sighted flotsam from the wreck, which differed from his testimony at the court-martial that he saw nothing.[36] He also testified at the trial that visibility was “good” at the time of the attack, which is how it is characterized in the trial documents and Navy press releases, but which differs from the recollection and testimony of USS Indianapolis survivors. In Japanese language sources, Commander Hashimoto reported that before the attack, visibility was so poor that he had to abort attempts to surface because he couldn’t see out of his periscope, which does match the recollections of USS Indianapolis survivors.

We have also been able to finally identify the LST that was the last ship to see the USS Indianapolis before she was sunk. Using LST-779’s logs, we have been able to determine that her course would not have enabled her to see the sinking or survivors, but it has helped us determine a more accurate position for the sinking.[37] We have also been working with the U.S. Naval Academy oceanography department on improved drift model analysis which we think, when coupled with the LST-779 data and Japanese-language information, will give us a more refined search area, which is about 30 miles off the official loss position. We believe this data will be useful in future expeditions to find the ship. At least one by Dr. Ballard is in the planning stage. I would caution that the bottom topography in the area is like the Himalayan Mountains turned upside down and inside out and filled with water, so the chances of finding the ship will be difficult at best. And, unfortunately, the Cayman-flagged research ship that reported itself in the last several days, to our surprise, to be searching in the area of the USS Indianapolis sinking, is probably not quite in the right area.

We have also been investigating some of the “conspiracy theories.” It is true that Captain McVay’s father, a Navy admiral, had once publicly admonished a young Ernest J. King for bringing women aboard his ship, and King never shook that reputation. But as CNO during World War II, King also personally selected every commander of large warships. If he were out for revenge, he could easily have denied Captain McVay the opportunity for the plum assignment as captain of the Fifth Fleet flagship. It is also plausible that political pressure was brought to bear on Forrestal and King on behalf of one of the officers lost in the sinking, however, intense political pressure came from many quarters, so it is not plausible that one bereaved congressman was responsible for Captain McVay’s court-martial.[38]

We also are looking at the intelligence reports that Captain McVay did not have access to, either prior to the attack or during the court-martial. I personally believe that the ULTRA intelligence was not precise enough to have made much difference, nor was the reporting of the sinking of the USS Underbill, which Captain McVay did not get, since Underbill was actually a considerable distance from the position of the Indianapolis sinking, farther than a submarine could go in that time. The intelligence reports that Captain McVay did receive, although vague, did include the potential for submarine attack in the vicinity of his track, and that threat was considered ever-present anyway. There is no evidence that the bridge watch or the lookouts were any less alert than they should have been, even if they had known for sure a submarine was in the area. The potential for submarine attack was reportedly on everyone’s mind, and there is no evidence that Captain McVay willfully disregarded the threat. He simply calculated that on a dark night in poor visibility in a huge expanse of ocean the odds of a submarine being in exactly the right spot were slim. Unfortunately Commander Hashimoto got lucky, and Captain McVay was not.

I have probably been overly long-winded, so let me conclude.

I have always viewed Captain McVay as a hero. Some accounts make it seem that Captain McVay was despondent that the sinking wrecked his career, since even though the sentence was remitted, he never served at sea again. From my reading of his character, I really doubt that his career prospects were very high in his mind. Captain McVay was Navy to his core, and I believe that he would have done anything possible to accomplish his assigned mission even at the risk of his ship and crew. But I also believe that he truly wanted to bring every man in his crew home alive. His failure to do so weighed very heavily on him for the rest of his life. He was imbued with the Navy principle of the absolute responsibility of command, whether his fault or not didn’t matter to him. Even if he did everything right, he still had to live with the responsibility that at best, his best wasn’t good enough. Yet he bore that responsibility with absolute dignity and professionalism throughout the aftermath.

But what I think really sets him apart as a hero was how he performed while adrift in the sea. He survived the sinking. He could have taken the time-honored tradition of going down with his ship. But I believe his sense of duty to his crew precluded that option. He wasn’t just a man in the water fighting for his personal survival. He never relinquished command even while floating on a raft. He remained in command of everything within view, maintaining military order, and making decisions that saved the lives of others. Any reasonable person could forgive him had he put his own survival first under the circumstances. But Captain McVay continued to exhibit extraordinary leadership throughout the entire ordeal. It is one thing to display great leadership when things are going good. It is quite another to do so during the most hellish conditions imaginable, when there was nothing in it for him, except an indomitable will to do the right thing. I submit that this is the epitome of command leadership and should serve as an inspiration to all future naval officers.

So in my opinion Captain McVay was a hero, and the survivors were heroes, although I believe they would all say that they were just doing their duty. But I think everyone would agree that the greatest heroes were those who were lost at sea, those who made the ultimate sacrifice on behalf of our nation.

At every memorial service for a Sailor fallen in battle or lost at sea, the Navy makes a solemn promise to their families that we will remember them, that we will not forget the sacrifice made by their loved one. As the Director of Naval History it is my duty to ensure that the Navy keeps that promise. And I can assure the survivors and the families of those lost at sea that I will do my utmost to ensure that the sacrifice of the USS Indianapolis and her brave crew is never forgotten.

Thank you.

Source: TD; “Remarks of Rear Admiral (Ret.) Samuel J. Cox, Director, Naval History and Heritage Command, at 71st Anniversary Reunion of USS Indianapolis Survivor’s Group,” 9 July 2016. Available at www.history.navy.mil.

POSTSCRIPT

On 19 August 2017, nearly 72 years to the day of the announcement of the sinking of Indianapolis and VJ Day, her wreckage was located over three miles below the surface of the Philippine Sea. The wreckage was found by a research crew on board Research Vessel (R/V) Petrel, owned by Microsoft co-founder and philanthropist Paul G. Allen.[1] The press release about the discovery indicates that data from LST-779 contributed to locating the ship and suggests that the wreckage was further west than the historic Navy position. Media interviews with Indianapolis survivors relay a sense of closure to their story. Undoubtedly, research will continue on the wreck, which rightfully remains protected as the final resting place of many of her brave Sailors.

NHHC Press Release Announcing Discovery of Indianapolis Wreckage, 19 August 2017

Researchers Announce Wreckage from USS Indianapolis Located

Story Number: NNS170819-02 Release Date: 8/19/2017 12:53:00 PM

From Naval History and Heritage Command, Communication and Outreach Division

WASHINGTON (NNS)—A team of civilian researchers led by entrepreneur and philanthropist Paul G. Allen has announced they have found the wreck of the World War II cruiser USS Indianapolis (CA 35), which was lost July 30, 1945.

This is a significant discovery considering the depth of the water in which the ship was lost—more than 18,000 feet. Around 800 of the ship’s 1,196 Sailors and Marines survived the sinking, but after four to five days in the water—suffering exposure, dehydration, drowning, and shark attacks—only 316 survived.[2]

The wreck was located by the expedition crew of Research Vessel (R/V) Petrel, which is owned by Allen, 5,500 meters below the surface, resting on the floor of the North Pacific Ocean.

“To be able to honor the brave men of the USS Indianapolis and their families through the discovery of a ship that played such a significant role in ending World War II is truly humbling,” said Allen. “As Americans, we all owe a debt of gratitude to the crew for their courage, persistence and sacrifice in the face of horrendous circumstances. While our search for the rest of the wreckage will continue, I hope everyone connected to this historic ship will feel some measure of closure at this discovery so long in coming.”

Indianapolis was lost in the final days of World War II when it was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine in the early morning hours of July 30, 1945. The Indianapolis sank in 12 minutes, making it impossible to send a distress signal or deploy much of its life-saving equipment. Prior to the attack, the Indianapolis had just completed a secret mission delivering components of the atomic bomb used in Hiroshima that would ultimately help end the war in the Pacific.

“Even in the worst defeats and disasters there is valor and sacrifice that deserves to never be forgotten,” said Sam Cox, director of the Naval History and Heritage Command. “They can serve as inspiration to current and future Sailors enduring situations of mortal peril. There are also lessons learned, and in the case of the Indianapolis, lessons re-learned, that need to be preserved and passed on, so the same mistakes can be prevented, and lives saved.”

Others have searched for Indianapolis in the past. Among the elements that made this effort different was Allen’s recent acquisition and retrofit of the 250-foot R/V Petrel with state-of-the-art subsea equipment capable of diving to 6,000 meters (or three and a half miles).

“The Petrel and its capabilities, the technology it has, and the research we’ve done, are the culmination years of dedication and hard work,” said Robert Kraft, director of subsea operations for Allen. “We’ve assembled and integrated this technology, assets, and unique capability into an operating platform, which is now one amongst very few on the planet.”

The other key factor in the discovery was information that surfaced in 2016 when Dr. Richard Hulver, historian with the Naval History and Heritage Command, conducted research that led to a new search area to the west of the original presumed position.

Hulver’s research identified a naval landing craft that had recorded a sighting of Indianapolis hours before it was torpedoed. Using that information, the research team developed a new position and estimated search, which was still a daunting 600 square miles of open ocean.

Allen-led expeditions have also resulted in the discovery of the Japanese battleship Musashi (March 2015) and the Italian WWII destroyer Artigliere (March 2017). His team was also responsible for retrieving and restoring the ship’s bell from HMS Hood for presentation to the British Navy in honor of its heroic service. Allen’s expedition team was recently transferred to the newly acquired and retrofitted R/V Petrel specifically for continuing exploration and research efforts.

The 13-person expedition team on the R/V Petrel is in the process of surveying the full site and will conduct a live tour of the wreckage in the next few weeks.

Their work is compliant with U.S. law, respecting the sunken ship as a war grave and not disturbing the site. USS Indianapolis remains the property of the U.S. Navy and its location will remain confidential and restricted by the Navy. The crew of the R/V Petrel has collaborated with Navy authorities throughout its search operations and will continue to work on plans to honor the 22 crew members still alive today,[3] as well as the families of all those who served on the highly decorated cruiser.

The Naval History and Heritage Command, located at the Washington Navy Yard, is responsible for the preservation, analysis, and dissemination of U.S. naval history and heritage. It provides the knowledge foundation for the Navy by maintaining historically relevant resources and products that reflect the Navy’s unique and enduring contributions through our nation’s history, and supports the fleet by assisting with and delivering professional research, analysis, and interpretive services. NHHC is composed of many activities including the Navy Department Library, the Navy Operational Archives, the Navy art and artifact collections, underwater archaeology, Navy histories, ten museums, USS Constitution repair facility and the historic ship Nautilus.

Source: TD; “NHHC Press Release Announcing Discovery of USS Indianapolis Wreckage,” 19 August 2017. Available at https://www.history.navy.mil/.

Figure P-1. An image taken by a remotely operated vehicle shows the bottom of an anchor clearly marked “U.S. Navy” and “Norfolk Navy Yard.” The anchor is consistent with the one visible in the front cover photo dated 10 July 1945 just weeks before the ship was lost.

Photo courtesy of Paul G. Allen

Figure P-2. An image taken by a remotely operated vehicle shows what appears to be the painted hull number “35.” Based on the curvature of the hull section, this seems to be the port side of the ship. Using Figure 2-1 as a reference (see page 45), the number is painted in the same font, and the “3” aligns with the circular feature above it in both photos.

Photo courtesy of Paul G. Allen

APPENDIX 1

Conditions of Readiness and Material Conditions

Indianapolis sailed in condition of readiness Three, material condition modified Yoke (all second deck doors and certain hatches to spaces below open to allow better air flow for comfort of crew) at the time of her sinking.

Conditions of Readiness for Action

*Pertains to personnel manning their stations.

There are modifications of these readiness conditions on different types of ships, or in different task forces, usually indicated by adding a letter to the readiness of the condition number. U.S. Naval Tactical Orders and Doctrine, 1944, stated that “responsible commanders, by striking a common sense balance between security and rest, shall strive to bring their commands into action at the peak of fighting effectiveness.”

Condition of Readiness

Description

ONE

Action imminent. General Quarters. All battle stations fully manned and alert.

TWO

Cruising. Night or day low visibility. Surface or submarine action possible, air attack improbable.

THREE

Cruising. Day or night high visibility. Danger of surprise air or submarine attack exists. Surprise attack by surface force improbable.

Material Conditions of Closure

*Pertains to states of closure of doors, hatches, valves, and other fittings and systems.

Defined in the Damage Control Instructions (FTP 170), ships are classified according to the number of progressive steps through which they may go in effecting complete closure for battle. There are generally two-material-condition ships and three-material-condition ships (larger ships, such as Indianapolis). Conditions of readiness influence the material condition. Commanding officers may establish modified material conditions of closure to suit varying readiness conditions for war cruising. This practice is more common in the case of large ships. Fittings, doors, hatches, valves, etc. are classified and marked X, Y, Z, and W to permit quick and accurate setting of proper material condition.

Three-Material-Condition Ship

Condition

Fittings Closed

X-Ray

X

Yoke

X and Y

Zebra

X, Y, and Z (W opened or operating)

Two-Material-Condition Ship

Condition

Fittings Closed

Baker

X and Y

Able

X, Y, and Z

Material conditions Able and Zebra are the final material conditions of closure for battle, attaining maximum material resistance to damage consistent with operating the ship offensively. Material conditions Baker, X-ray, and Yoke are considered minimum standards only.

APPENDIX 2

Crewmember Ratings

Abbrv.

Rating

ACMM

Aviation Chief Machinist’s Mate

AerM

Aerographer’s Mate

AM

Aviation Metalsmith

AMM

Aviation Machinist’s Mate

AOM

Aviation Ordnanceman

ART

Aviation Radio Technician

B

Boilermaker

BGM

Buglemaster

Bkr

Baker

BM

Boatswain’s Mate

Bug

Bugler

CBM

Chief Boatswain’s Mate

CCk

Chief Cook

CEM

Chief Electrician’s Mate

CFC

Chief Fire Controlman

CGM

Chief Gunner’s Mate

Ck

Cook

CM

Carpenter’s Mate

CMM

Chief Machinist’s Mate

Cox

Coxswain

CPhM

Chief Pharmacist’s Mate

CRM

Chief Radioman

CRT

Chief Radio Technician

CTC

Chief Turret Captain

CWT

Chief Water Tender

CY

Chief Yeoman

EM

Electrician’s Mate

FC

Fire Controlman

FCO

Fire Controlman Operator

F

Fireman

GM

Gunner’s Mate

HA

Hospital Apprentice

MaM

Mailman

M

Metalsmith

MM

Machinist’s Mate

MoMM

Motor Machinist’s Mate

PhM

Pharmacists’s Mate

PhoM

Photographer’s Mate

PR

Parachute Rigger

PTR

Painter

QM

Quartermaster

RdM

Radarman

RM

Radioman

RT

Radio Technician

SCB

Ship’s Cook Butcher

SC

Ship’s Cook

SF

Shipfitter

SKD

Dispersing Storekeeper

SK

Storekeeper

SKV

Aviation Storekeeper

SM

Signalman

S

Seaman

SSMB

Ship’s Service Man Barber

SSML

Ship’s Service Laundryman

SSMT

Ship’s Service Man Tailor

StM

Steward’s Mate

St

Steward

TC

Turret Captain

WT

Water Tender

Y

Yeoman

* The Aviation Detail consisted of three Curtiss SC-1 Seahawks and supporting crewman of Cruiser Scouting Squadron (VCS) 4.

APPENDIX 3

Indianapolis Casualties

The casualty lists below were compiled from the Navy’s 1945 lists that were submitted as evidence in the Court of Inquiry convened to investigate the loss of Indianapolis. The spelling of names were left as they appeared in the historic records. All personnel should be considered regular crew unless otherwise noted. The list of survivors is a compilation of the rosters created at Navy Hospital #114 Samar and Navy Hospital #20 Peleliu. These were the two hospitals that Indianapolis survivors were initially taken to prior to being moved to Guam. The only survivor to not appear on either of these lists was F2c Verne Foster. Foster did, however, appear on the list of those rescued by Bassett, and this ship was the only of the rescue ships to take survivors to Samar. Foster was listed as wounded on the other 1945 lists. Taken together, survivor lists give proof-of-life for 316 Sailors and Marines. The four Sailors who died post-rescue were clearly marked as deceased and not counted among the living. RT2c Clarence Donnor and Corp. Edgar Harrell were incorrectly listed as killed on Navy lists. Corporal Harrell survived and was taken to Peleliu, Clarence Donnor was incorrectly assumed to have been on the ship and thus appeared on Navy lists. These lists cumulatively represent the total onboard Indianapolis at the time of its sinking—1,195.

SURVIVORS (316)

*Denotes an officer

Last

First

Middle

Rank/Rate

Hospital

1

Adams

Leo

Harry

S2c

Samar

2

Akines

William

Roy

S2c

Peleliu

3

Allard

Vincent

Jerome

QM3c

Peleliu

4

Altschuler

Allan

Harry

S2c (RDM)

Peleliu

5

Anderson

Erick

Thorwold

S2c

Peleliu

6

Andrews

William

Robert

S2c

Samar

7

Anunti

John

Melvin

M2c

Samar

8

Armistead

John

Henry

S2c

Peleliu

9

Ashford

John

T (Jr.)

ART3c

Peleliu

Aviation Detail

10

Ault

William

Frazier

S2c (RDM)

Samar

11

Baldridge

Clovis

Rogers

EM1c

Samar

12

Barto

Lloyd

Peter

S1c

Peleliu

13

Bateman

Bernard

Byron

F2c (WT)

Peleliu

14

Beane

James

Albert

F2c

Samar

15

Beaty

Donald

Lee

S1c

Samar

16

Belcher

James

Robert

S1c (RM)

Peleliu

17

Bell

Maurice

Glenn

S1c

Samar

18

Benton

Clarence

Upton

CFC

Samar

19

Bernacil

Concepcion

Peralta

FC3c

Samar

20

Bitonti

Louis

Peter

S1c

Peleliu

21

Blanthorn

Bryan

S1c (GM)

Peleliu

22

Blum*

Donald

Joseph

Ensign

Samar

23

Booth

Sherman

Chester

S1c

Samar

24

Brandt

Russell

Lee

F2c

Samar

25

Bray

Harold

John (Jr.)

S2c

Samar

26

Brown

Edward

Joseph

S1c

Peleliu

27

Brundige

Robert

Henry

S1c (GM)

Peleliu

28

Buckett

Victor

Robert

Y2c

Peleliu

29

Bullard

John

Kenneth

S1c

Peleliu

30

Bunai

Robert

Peter

SM1c

Peleliu

31

Burdorf

Wilbert

John

Cox

Samar

32

Burton

Curtis

Henry

S2c

Peleliu

33

Campbell

Hamer

Edward (Jr.)

GM3c

Peleliu

34

Campbell

Louis

Dean

S1c

Peleliu

Aviation Detail

35

Carter

Grover

Clifford

S2c

Samar

36

Carter

Loyd

George

Cox

Samar

37

Carter

Lindsey

Linwell

S2c

Peleliu

38

Carver

Grover

Cleveland

S1c

Samar

39

Cassidy

John

Curran

S1c (RM)

Peleliu

40

Celaya

Adolfo

Valdo

F2c

Samar

41

Centazzo

Frank

Joseph

SM3c

Peleliu

42

Chamness

John

Desel

S2c

Samar

43

Clark

Orsen

S2c

Peleliu

44

Clinton

George

William

S1c

Peleliu

45

Coleman

Robert

Edward

F2c

Peleliu

46

Collier

Charles

Rives

RM2c

Samar

47

Costner

Homer

Jackson

Cox

Peleliu

48

Cowen

Donald

Rodney

FC3c

Samar

49

Cox

Loel

Dene

S2c

Samar

50

Crane

Granville

Shaw (Jr.)

MM3c

Samar

51

Daniel

Harold

William

CBM

Samar

52

DeBernardi

Louie

BM1c

Samar

53

Dewing

Ralph

Otto

S1c (FC)

Samar

54

Dezelske

William

Bruce

MM2c

Peleliu

55

Douglas

Gene

Dale

F2c

Samar

56

Drayton

William

Harry

EM2c

Samar

57

Dronet

Joseph

E J

S2c

Samar

58

Dryden

William

Howard

MM1c

Samar

59

Eck

Harold

Adam

S2c

Samar

60

Erickson

Theodore

Mentzer

S2c

Peleliu

61

Erwin

Louis

Harold

Cox

Peleliu

62

Ethier

Eugene

Edwin

EM3c

Samar

63

Evans

Claudus

GM3c

Peleliu

64

Farmer

Archie

Calvin

Cox

Peleliu

65

Farris

Eugene

Francis

S1c (RM)

Peleliu

66

Feakes

Fred

Atkinson

AOM1c

Samar

Aviation Detail

67

Fedorski

Nicholas

Walter

S1c

Peleliu

68

Felts

Donald

J

BM1c

Peleliu

69

Ferguson

Albert

E

CMM

Peleliu

70

Fitting

Johnny

Wayne

GM1c

Peleliu

71

Flaten

Harold

James

WT2c

Samar

72

Fortin

Verlin

Laverre

WT3c

Peleliu

73

Foster

Verne

Elmer

F2c

Samar

74

Fox

William

Henry (Jr.)

F2c

Samar

75

Francois

Norbert

Edward

F1c (MM)

Peleliu

76

Funkhouser

Robert

Morris

ART2c

Peleliu

Aviation Detail

77

Gabrillo

Juan

S2c

Samar

78

Galante

Angelo

S2c

Peleliu

79

Galbraith

Norman

S

MM2c

Peleliu

80

Gardner

Roscoe

Wallace

F2c

Peleliu

81

Gause

Robert

P

QM1c

Peleliu

82

Gemza

Rudolph

Arnold

FCO3c

Samar

83

George

Gabriel

Vincent

MM3c

Samar

84

Gettleman

Robert

Alfred

S2c (RDM)

Peleliu

85

Gibson

Buck

Warren

S1c

Samar

86

Gilcrease

James

S2c

Samar

87

Gladd

Millard

(Jr.)

MM2c

Samar

88

Glenn

Jay

Rollin

AMM3c

Peleliu

Aviation Detail

89

Goff

Thomas

Guy

S1c

Samar

90

Gooch

William

Leroy

F2c

Peleliu

91

Gray

Willis

Leroy

S1c

Peleliu

92

Green

Tolbert

(Jr.)

S1c

Samar

93

Greenlee

Charles

Ians

S2c

Peleliu

94

Greenwald

Jacob

lst Sergeant

Samar

USMC

95

Griffith

Robert

Lee

S2c

Peleliu

96

Hanson*

Harley

Clarence

Machinist

Peleliu

97

Harrell

Edgar

Alvin

Corporal

Peleliu

USMC

98

Harrison*

Cecil

Manly

Chief Gunner

Peleliu

99

Hart

Fred

Junior

RT2c

Peleliu

100

Hatfield

Willie

S2c

Peleliu

101

Havener

Harlan

Carl

F2c

Samar

102

Havins

Otha

Alton

Y3c

Peleliu

103

Haynes*

Lewis

Leavitt

Lt. Cmdr.

Peleliu

104

Heller

John

S2c

Peleliu

105

Hensch*

Erwin

Frederick

Lieutenant

Peleliu

106

Hershberger

C

Lamar

S1c (FC)

Samar

107

Hind

Lyle

Lewis

S2c

Samar

108

Hinken

John

Richard (Jr.)

F2c

Samar

109

Hodge

Howard

Henry

RM2c

Peleliu

110

Hoopes

Gordon

Herbert

S2c

Samar

111

Horner*

Duward

Richard

Gunner

Samar

112

Horvath

George

John

F1c (MoMM)

Samar

113

Hoskins

William

Orsond

Y3c

Peleliu

114

Houck

Richard

Eugene

EM3c

Peleliu

115

Howison*

John

Donald

Ensign

Samar

116

Hubeli

Joseph

Francis

S2c

Samar

117

Hughes

Max

Meredith

Pfc

Peleliu

USMC

118

Hupka

Clarence

Kilmer

Bkr1c

Peleliu

119

Hurley

Woodrow

GM2c

Samar

120

Jacob

Melvin

Carl

Pfc

Samar

USMC

121

Jacquemot

Joseph

Alexander

S2c

Peleliu

122

James

Woodie

Eugene

Cox

Peleliu

123

Jarvis

James

Kenneth

AM3c

Peleliu

Aviation Detail

124

Jensen

Eugene

Wenzel

S2c

Peleliu

125

Johnson

William

Albert

S1c

Peleliu

126

Jones

Clinton

Leroy

Cox

Samar

127

Jones

Sidney

S1c

Peleliu

128

Jurkiewicz

Raymond

Stanley

S1c

Peleliu

129

Justice

Robert

Eugene

S2c

Samar

130

Katsikas

Gust

Constantine

S1c

Samar

131

Kazmierski

Walter

S1c

Samar

132

Kees

Shalous

Eugene

EM2c

Peleliu

133

Kemp

David

Poole (Jr.)

SC3c

Peleliu

134

Kenly

Oliver

Wesley

RdM3c

Peleliu

135

Kerby

Deo

Earl

S1c

Samar

136

Keyes

Edward

Hiram

Cox

Peleliu

137

King

A

C

S1c (Y)

Peleliu

138

Kinzle

Raymond

Arthur

Bkr2c

Samar

139

Kirkland

Marvin

Faulk

S2c

Samar

140

Kiselica

Joseph

Frederick

AMM2c

Peleliu

Aviation Detail

141

Kittoe

James

William

F2c

Samar

142

Klappa

Ralph

Donald

S2c

Peleliu

143

Klaus

Joseph

Frank

S1c

Peleliu

144

Koch

Edward

Chris

F1c (EM)

Samar

145

Koziara

George

S2c

Peleliu

146

Kreis

Clifford

Eddy

S1c

Peleliu

147

Krueger

Norman

Frederick

S2c

Peleliu

148

Krueger

Dale

Frank

F2c

Samar

149

Kurlick

George

Robert

S1c

Peleliu

150

Kuryla

Michael

Nicholas (Jr.) Cox

Peleliu

151

Lane

Ralph

CMM

Samar

152

Lanter

Kenley

MacKendree

S1c (SM)

Peleliu

153

LaPaglia

Carlos

GM2c

Samar

154

Laws

George

Edward

S1c

Samar

155

LeBow

Cleatus

Archie

FCO3c

Samar

156

Leenerman

Arthur

Louis

RdM3c

Peleliu

157

Lockwood

Thomas

Homer

S2c

Peleliu

Aviation Detail

158

Loftis

James

Bryant (Jr.)

S1c

Peleliu

159

Lopetz

Sam

S1c

Samar

160

Lopez

Daniel

B

F2c

Peleliu

161

Lucas

Robert

Andrew

S2c

Peleliu

162

Lucca

Frank

John

F2c

Samar

163

Maas

Melvin

Adolph

S1c (SF)

Samar

164

Mace

Harold

A

S2c

Samar

165

Mack

Donald

Fleming

Bug1c

Peleliu

166

Maday

Anthony

Francis

AMM1c

Peleliu

Aviation Detail

167

Makaroff

Chester

John

S1c

Samar

168

Maldonado

Salvador

Bkr3c

Samar

169

Malena

Joseph

John (Jr.)

GM2c

Samar

170

Malski

Joseph

John

S1c

Samar

171

Matrulla

John

S1c (FCO)

Peleliu

172

Maxwell

Farrell

Jacob

S1c

Peleliu

173

McCall

Donald

Clifton

S2c

Samar

174

McClain

Raymond

Bryant

BM2c

Peleliu

175

McCoy

Giles

Gilbert

PFC

Peleliu

USMC

176

McCrory

Millard

Virgil (Jr.)

F1c

Samar

177

McElroy

Clarence

Ernest

S1c (GM)

Peleliu

178

McFall

Walter

Eugene

S2c

Peleliu

179

McGinnis

Paul

Wendell

SM3c

Peleliu

180

McGuiggan

Robert

Melvin

S1c

Peleliu

181

McHenry

Loren

Charles (Jr.)

S1c (RM)

Samar

182

McKenzie

Ernest

Eugene

S1c

Peleliu

Aviation Detail

183

McKissick*

Charles

Brite

Lieutenant (jg.)

Peleliu

184

McKlin

Henry

Theodore

S1c

Samar

185

McLain

Patrick

Joseph

S2c

Peleliu

186

McVay*

Charles

Butler III

Captain

Peleliu

187

McVay

Richard

Calvin

S2c

Samar

188

Meredith

Charles

Everett

S1c

Samar

189

Mestas

Nestor

A

WT3c

Peleliu

190

Meyer

Charles

Thomas

S2c

Samar

191

Mikolayek

Joseph

Cox

Samar

192

Milbrodt

Glen

LaVerne

S2c

Peleliu

193

Miner

Herbert

RT2c

Samar

194

Mitchell

James

Edward

S2c

Samar

195

Mitchell

Kenneth

Earl

S1c

Peleliu

196

Mitchell

Norval

Jerry (Jr.)

S2c

Peleliu

197

Mlady

Clarence

Charles

S1c

Peleliu

198

Modesitt

Carl

Elsworth

S2c

Samar

199

Modisher*

Melvin

Wayne

Lieutenant (jg.)

Peleliu

200

Moran

Joseph

John

RM1c

Peleliu

201

Morgan

Eugene

Stanley

BM2c

Samar

202

Morgan

Glenn

Grover

BGM3c

Peleliu

203

Morris

Albert

Oliver

S1c

Samar

204

Moseley

Morgan

Miller

SC1c

Samar

205

Mowrey

Ted

Eugene

S1c

Peleliu

206

Muldoon

John

James

S2c

Peleliu

207

Mulvey

William

Robert

BM1c

Peleliu

208

Murphy

Paul

James

FC3c

Samar

209

Myers

H

B

F2c

Samar

210

Naspini

Joseph

Anthony

F2c (WT)

Peleliu

211

Nelsen

Edward

John

GM1c

Samar

212

Nelson

Frank

Howard

S2c

Samar

213

Newhall

James

Franklin

S1c (GM)

Peleliu

214

Nichols

James

Clarence

S2c

Samar

215

Nightingale

William

Oliver

MM1c

Samar

216

Nixon

Daniel

Merrill

S2c

Peleliu

217

Norberg

James

Arthur

CBM

Samar

218

Nunley

Troy

Audie

S2c

Peleliu

219

Nuttall

Alexander

Carlyle

S1c

Samar

220

Obledo

Mike

Guerra

S2c

Peleliu

221

O’Donnell

James

Edward

WT3c

Samar

222

Olijar

John

S1c

Peleliu

223

Orsburn

Frank

Harold

SSML2c

Peleliu

224

Outland

Felton

James

S1c

Peleliu

225

Overman

Thurman

David

S2c

Samar

226

Owen

Keith

Nichols

S2c

Samar

227

Pace

Curtis

S2c

Peleliu

228

Pacheco

Jose

Cruz

S2c

Samar

229

Palmiter

Adelore

Aurthor

S2c

Peleliu

230

Paroubek

Richard

Anthony

Y1c

Peleliu

231

Pasket

Lyle

Matthew

S2c

Peleliu

232

Paulk

Luther

Doyle

S2c

Peleliu

233

Payne

Edward

Glenjoy

S2c

Peleliu

234

Pena

Santos

Alday

S2c

Samar

235

Perez

Basilio

S2c

Samar

236

Perkins

Edward

Charles

F2c

Samar

237

Peterson

Avery

Clarence

S2c (FC)

Samar

238

Phillips

Huie

Harold

S2c

Peleliu

239

Podish

Paul

S2c

Peleliu

240

Podschun

Clifford

Albert

S2c

Peleliu

241

Pogue

Herman

Crawford

S2c

Samar

242

Poor

Gerald

Melbourne

S2c

Samar

243

Potts

Dale

Floyd

S2c

Peleliu

244

Price

James

Denny

S1c

Peleliu

245

Quely

William

Charles (Jr.)

PR3c

Peleliu

Aviation Detail

246

Ramirez

Ricardo

S1c

Peleliu

247

Rathbone

Wilson

S2c

Samar

248

Rawdon

John

Herbert

EM3c

Peleliu

249

Redmayne*

Richard

Banks

Lieutenant

Samar

250

Reeves

Chester

O B

S1c

Peleliu

251

Rehner

Herbert

Adrian

S1c (SM)

Peleliu

252

Reid

Curtis

Franklin

S2c

Peleliu

253

Reid

James

Edgar

BM2c

Samar

254

Reid*

John

Lieutenant

Peleliu

255

Reid

Tommy

Lee

RdM3c

Samar

256

Reynolds

Afford

GM2c

Samar

257

Rich

Raymond

Anthony

Pfc

Peleliu

USMC

258

Riggins

Earl

Private

Samar

USMC

259

Rineay

Francis

Henry (Jr.)

S2c

Peleliu

260

Roberts

Norman

Harold

MM1c

Samar

261

Robison

John

Davis

Cox

Samar

262

Rogers

Ralph

Guy

RdM3c

Peleliu

263

Rogers*

Ross

(Jr.)

Ensign

Peleliu

264

Russell

Virgil

Miller

Cox

Samar

265

Saathoff

Don

William

S2c

Samar

266

Sanchez

Fernando

Sanchec

SC3c

Samar

267

Scanlan

Osceola

Carlisle

S2c

Samar

268

Schechterle

Harold

Joseph

RdM3c

Peleliu

269

Schmueck

John

Alton

CPhM

Peleliu

270

Seabert

Clarke

Wilson

S2c

Peleliu

271

Setchfield

Arthur

Lawrence

Cox

Peleliu

272

Shaffer

Robert

Patrick

S1c

Peleliu

273

Sharp

William

Hafford

S2c

Peleliu

274

Shearer

Harold

J

S2c

Peleliu

275

Shown

Donald

Herbert

CFC

Samar

276

Shows

Audie

Boyd

Cox

Samar

277

Simpson

William

Edward

Cox

Samar

278

Sinclair

James

Raymond

S2c

Samar

279

Sitek

Henry

Joseph

S2c

Samar

280

Sladek

Wayne

Lynn

BM2c

Samar

281

Slankard

Jack

Crocker

S1c

Samar

282

Smeltzer

Charles

H

S2c

Samar

283

Smith

Cozell

Lee (Jr.)

Cox

Peleliu

284

Smith

Frederick

Calyin

F2c

Samar

285

Smith

James

Wesley

S2c

Peleliu

286

Sospizio

Andre

F1c

Samar

287

Spencer

Daniel

Frederick

S1c

Peleliu

288

Spencer

Roger

S1c (RM)

Peleliu

289

Spinelli

John

Anthony

SC2c

Peleliu

290

Spooner

Miles

Lewis

Private

Peleliu

USMC

291

Stamm

Florian

Marian

S2c

Samar

292

Stephens

Richard

Park

S2c

Samar

293

Stevens

George

Golden

WT2c

Peleliu

294

Stewart

Glenn

Willard

CFC

Samar

295

Sturtevant

Elwyn

Lee

RM2c

Peleliu

296

Suter

Frank

Edward

S1c

Samar

297

Tawater

Charles

Hoyt

F1c

Samar

298

Thelen

Richard

Peter

S2c

Peleliu

299

Thomas

Ivan

Mervin

S2c

Samar

300

Thompson

David

Alvin

EM3c

Peleliu

301

Thurkettle

William

Clarence

S2c

Samar

302

Torretta

John

Mario

F2c

Samar

303

Turner

Charles

Morris

S2c

Peleliu

304

Twible*

Harlan

Malcom

Ensign

Samar

305

Uffelman

Paul

Roland

Pfc

Samar

USMC

306

Umenhoffer

Lyle

Edgar

S1c

Peleliu

307

Underwood

Ralph

Ellis

S1c (RDM)

Samar

308

Van Meter

Joseph

William

WT3c

Peleliu

309

Walker

Virgil

B

F2c

Samar

310

Wells

Charles

Orville

S1c (RDM)

Samar

311

Whiting

George

Albert

F2c

Samar

312

Wilcox

Lindsey

Zeb

WT2c

Samar

313

Wisniewski

Stanley

F2c

Peleliu

314

Witzig

Robert

Marin

FC3c

Samar

315

Woolston*

John

Ensign

Peleliu

316

Zink

Charles

William

EM3c

Peleliu

DECEASED POST-RESCUE (4)

Last

First

Middle

Rank/Rate

Hospital

1

Harrison

Fred

Elliott

S2c

Peleliu

2

Peterson

Ralph

Renny

S2c

Samar

3

Russell

Robert

A

S2c

Samar

4

Shipman

Robert

Lee

GM3c

Peleliu

OFFICERS LOST (67)

Last

First

Middle

Rank/Rate

1

Backus

T

H

Lieutenant (jg)

2

Barry

C

Lieutenant (jg)

3

Billings

R

B

Ensign

4

Brophy

T

D (Jr.)

Ensign

5

Candalino

P

L

Lieutenant (jg)

6

Christian

L

E (Jr.)

Electrician

7

Clinton

L

J

Lieutenant (jg)

8

Coleman

Cedric

Foster

Lieut. Commander (CD)

Flag Allowance

9

Connelly

D

F

Ensign

10

Conway

T

M

Lieutenant

11

Crews

H

C

Lieutenant (jg)

12

Davis

S

G

Lieutenant (jg)

13

Dowdy

L

S

Chief Carpenter

14

Driscoll

D

L

Lieutenant (jg)

15

Eames

P

H (Jr.)

Ensign

16

Flynn

J

A

Commander

17

Foell

C

D

Ensign

18

Freeze

H

B

Lieutenant (jg)

19

Fuchs

H

F

Machinist

20

Gauss

R

C (Jr.)

Ensign

21

Gerngross

F

J (Jr.)

Ensign

22

Goeckel

E

S

Lieutenant (jg)

23

Hale

R

B

Lieutenant

24

Hayes

C

D

Lieut. Commander

25

Haynes

R

A

Lieutenant

26

Henry

E

O

Lieut. Commander

27

Herstine

J

F

Ensign

28

Hill

N

P (Jr.)

Lieutenant

29

Hill

R

N

Ensign

30

Huntley

V

C

Chief Ship’s Clerk

31

Hurst

R

H

Lieutenant

32

Janney

J

H

Commander

33

Jenney

C

I

Lieutenant

34

Jump

D

A

Ensign

35

Keeney

R

A

Ensign

36

Koppang

R

I

Lieutenant (jg)

37

Lipski

S

W

Commander

38

MacFarland

K

I

Lieutenant (jg)

39

Malone

M

L (Jr.)

Lieutenant (jg)

40

Marple

P

T

Ensign

41

McGuirk

P

A

Lieutenant (jg)

42

Miles

T

K

Lieutenant

43

Moore

K

C

Lieut. Commander

44

Morgan

T

F

Ensign

45

Morse

K

H

Lieutenant (jg)

46

Moynelo

H

C (Jr.)

Ensign

47

Orr

J

I (Jr.)

Lieutenant

48

Park

D

E

Ensign

49

Parke

Edward

L

Captain

USMC

50

Pessolano

N

R

Lieutenant

51

Roche

J

M

Lieutenant

52

Sikes

T

A

Ensign

53

Spencer

J

D

Lieutenant

54

Spencer

S

A

Boatswain

55

Stauffer

Edward

H

lst Lieutenant

USMC

56

Stimson

D

Ensign

57

Stout

K

I

Lieut. Commander

58

Swart

R

L

Lieutenant (jg)

59

Teerlink

D

S

Chief Pay Clerk

60

Triemer

E

A

Ensign

61

Trudeau

E

A

Lieutenant

62

Ullmann

P

E

Lieutenant (jg)

63

Whallon

L

F (Jr.)

Lieutenant (jg)

64

Whitman

R

T

Lieutenant

65

Williams

R

L

Machinist

66

Woods

L

T

Chief Radio Electrician

67

Crouch

E

M

Captain

Passenger

ENLISTED LOST (808)

Last

First

Middle

Rank/Rate

1

Cromling

Charles

J (Jr.)

Sergeant

USMC

2

Tracy

Richard

I (Jr.)

Sergeant

USMC

3

Harrell

Edgard

A

Corporal

USMC

3

Kenworthy

Glenn

W

Corporal

USMC

4

Straughn

Howard

V (Jr.)

Corporal

USMC

5

Brinker

David

A

Pfc

USMC

6

Brown

Orlo

N

Pfc

USMC

7

Davis

William

H

Pfc

USMC

8

Dupeck

Pfc

USMC

9

Grimm

Loren

E

Pfc

USMC

10

Hancock

Thomas

A

Pfc

USMC

11

Holland

John

F (Jr.)

Pfc

USMC

12

Hubbard

Gordon

R

Pfc

USMC

13

Hubbard

Leland

R

Pfc

USMC

14

Larsen

Harlan

D

Pfc

USMC

15

Lees

Henry

W

Pfc

USMC

16

Messenger

Leonard

J (Jr.)

Pfc

USMC

17

Munson

Bryan

C

Pfc

USMC

18

Murphy

Charles

T

Pfc

USMC

19

Neal

William

F

Pfc

USMC

20

Reinold

George

H

Pfc

USMC

21

Rose

Pfc

USMC

22

Spino

Frank

J (Jr.)

Pfc

USMC

23

Thomsen

Arthur

A

Pfc

USMC

24

Wych

Robert

A

Pfc

USMC

25

Bush

Private

USMC

26

Kirchner

John

H

Private

USMC

27

Marttila

Howard

W

Private

USMC

28

Redd

Robert

F

Private

USMC

29

Adams

Pat

L

S2c (SM)

Flag Allowance

30

Barker

Robert

C (Jr.)

RT1c

Flag Allowance

31

Bradley

William

H

S2c (SM)

Flag Allowance

32

Telford

Arno

J

RT3c

Flag Allowance

33

Wenzel

Ray

G

RT3c

Flag Allowance

34

Abbott

George

S

S1c

35

Acosta

Charles

Mack

MM3c

36

Adorante

Dante

W

S2c

37

Albright

C

E (Jr.)

Cox

38

Allen

Paul

Franklin

S1c

39

Allmaras

Harold

D

F2c

40

Alvey

Edward

W (Jr.)

AerM2c

41

Amick

Homer

Irvin

S2c

42

Andersen

Lawrence

J

SKD2c

43

Anderson

Vincent

U

BM1c

44

Anderson

Sam

G

S2c

45

Anderson

Leonard

O

MM3c

46

Anderson

Richard

L

F2c

47

Annis

James

B (Jr.)

CEM

48

Anthony

Harold

R

PhM3c

49

Antonie

Charles

J

F2c

50

Armenta

Lorenzo

SC2c

51

Arnold

Carl

Loyd

S1c

Aviation Detail

52

Ashford

Chester

W

WT2c

53

Atkinson

J

P

Cox

54

Aull

Joseph

Harry

S2c

55

Ayotte

Lester

James

S2c

56

Baker

Daniel

Albert

S2c

57

Baker

Frederick

H

S2c (RdM)

58

Baker

William

M (Jr.)

EM2c

59

Ball

Emmet

Edwin

S2c

60

Ballard

Courtney

J

SSMB3c

61

Barenthin

Leonard

W

S1c (FC)

62

Barksdale

Thomas

L

FCO3c

63

Barnes

Paul

Clayton

F2c

64

Barnes

Willard

M

MM1c

65

Barra

Raymond

James

CGM

66

Barrett

James

B

S2c

67

Barton

George

S

Y3c

68

Batenhorst

W

J

MM3c

69

Batson

Eugene

C

S2c (RDM)

70

Batten

Robert

Edmon

S1c (GM)

71

Batts

Edward

Daniel

StM1c

72

Becker

Myron

Melvin

WT2c

73

Beddington

C

E

S1c

74

Bedsted

Leo

A K

F1c (MoMM)

75

Beister

Richard

J

WT3c

76

Bennett

Ernest

F

B3c

77

Bennett

Dean

R

HA1c

78

Bennett

Toney

Wade

St3c

79

Benning

Harry

S1c

80

Berry

Joseph

(Jr.)

StM1c

81

Berry

William

Henry

St3c

82

Beukema

Kenneth

Jay

S2c

83

Beuschlein

Joseph

C

S2c

84

Biddison

Charles

L

S1c

85

Billingsley

R

F

GM3c

86

Bilz

Robert

Eugene

S2c

87

Bishop

Arthur

(Jr.)

S2c

88

Blackwell

Fermon

M

SSML3c

89

Boege

Raynard

R

S2c

90

Bogan

Jack

Roberts

RM1c

91

Bollinger

Richard

H

S1c

92

Borton

Herbert

E

SCB2c

93

Boss

Norbert

George

S2c

94

Bott

Wilbur

Melvin

S2c

95

Bowles

Eldridge

W

S1c

96

Bowman

Charles

E

TC1c

97

Boyd

Troy

Howard

GM3c

98

Brake

John

(Jr.)

S2c

99

Braun

Neal

F

S2c

100

Brice

R

V

S2c

101

Bridge

Wayne

Aron

S2c

102

Bright

Chester

Lee

S2c

103

Briley

Harold

V

MaM3c

104

Brooks

Ulysses

Ray

CWT

105

Brown

Edward

A

WT3c

106

Bruce

Russell

W

S2c

107

Brule

Maurice

J

S2c

108

Bruneau

Charles

A

GM3c

109

Budish

David

S2c

110

Bunn

Horace

George

S2c

111

Burkhartsmeier

A

T

S1c

112

Burkholtz

Frank

(Jr.)

EM3c

113

Burleson

Martin

L

S1c

114

Burrs

John

William

S1c

115

Burt

William

G A

QM3c

116

Bushong

John

R

GM3c

117

Cadwallader

John

J

RT3c

118

Cain

Alfred

Brown

RT3c

119

Cairo

William

G

Bug1c

120

Call

James

Edward

RM3c

121

Cameron

John

Watson

GM2c

122

Camp

Garrison

StM2c

123

Campana

Paul

RDM3c

124

Campbell

Wayland

D

SF3c

125

Cantrell

Billy

G

F2c

126

Carnell

Lois

Wayne

S2c

127

Carpenter

Willard

A

SM3c

128

Carr

Harry

Leroy

S2c

129

Carroll

Rachel

W

Cox

130

Carroll

Gregory

K

S1c (FCO)

131

Carson

Clifford

F1c (WT)

132

Carstensen

Richard

S2c

133

Castaldo

Patrick

P

GM2c

134

Castiaux

Ray

Vernon

S2c

135

Casto

William

H

S1c

136

Cavil

Robert

Ralph

MM2c

137

Cavitt

Clinton

C

WT3c

138

Chandler

Lloyd

Nyle

S2c

139

Chart

Joseph

EM3c

140

Clark

Eugene

Ck3c

141

Clements

Harold

P

S2c

142

Cobb

William

Lester

MoMM3c

143

Cole

Walter

Henry

CRM

144

Collins

James

StM1c

145

Colvin

Frankie

Lee

SSMT2c

146

Condon

Barna

T

RdM1c

147

Conrad

James

P

EM3c

148

Conser

Donald

Lynn

SC2c

149

Consiglio

Joseph

W

FC2c

150

Cook

Floyd

Edward

SF3c

151

Cooper

Dale

(Jr.)

F2c

152

Copeland

Willard

J

S2c

153

Countryman

Robert

Edward

S2c

154

Cox

Alford

Edward

GM3c

155

Crabb

Donald

Calvin

RM2c

156

Crites

Orval

D

WT1c

157

Crum

Charles

Junior

S2c

158

Cruz

Jose

Santos

CCk

159

Curtis

Erwin

Eugene

CTC

160

Dagenhart

C

R (Jr.)

PhM2c

161

Dale

Elwood

Richard

F1c(B)

162

Daniello

Anthony

G

S1c (SM)

163

Davis

James

Clark

RM3c

164

Davis

Kenneth

G

F1c (EM)

165

Davis

Thomas

Edward

SM2c

166

Day

Richard

R (Jr.)

S2c

167

Dean

John

Thomas (Jr.)

S2c (RDM)

168

Defoor

Walton

RdM3c

169

Demars

Edgar

Joseph

CBM

170

Dement

Dayle

P

S1c

171

Denney

Lloyd

(Jr.)

S2c

172

Dimond

John

Nelson

S2c

173

Dollins

Paul

RM2c

174

Donald

Lyle

Herbert

EM1c

175

Doney

William

J

F2c

176

Donnor

Clarence

W

RT2c

Passenger

176

Dorman

William

B

S1c

Aviation Detail

177

Dornetto

Frank

Paul

WT1c

178

Doss

James

Monroe

S2c

179

Doucette

Roland

O

S2c

180

Dove

Bessil

Raymond

SKD2c

181

Drane

James

Anthony

GM3c

182

Drummond

James

J

F2c

183

Drury

Richard

E

S2c

184

Dufraine

Delbert

E

F1c (MM)

185

Dunbar

Jess

Lee

F2c

186

Durand

Ralph

J (Jr.)

S2c

187

Dycus

Donald

S2c

188

Eakins

Morris

B

F2c (WT)

189

Eastman

Chester

S

S2c

190

Eddinger

John

W

S1c

191

Eddy

Richard

Leroy

RM3c

192

Edwards

Roland

J

RM1c

193

Edwards

Alywin

C

F2c

194

Egolf

Harold

Wesley

S2c (RDM)

195

Elliot

Kenneth

Anthony

S1c

196

Elliott

Harry

W

S2c

197

Emery

William

F

S1c (QM)

198

Emsley

William

J

S1c

199

Engelsman

Ralph

S2c

200

Epperson

George

L

S1c

201

Epperson

Ewell

S1c

202

Ernst

Robert

Carl

F2c

203

Eubanks

James

H

S1c

204

Evans

Arthur

Jerome

PhM2c

205

Everett

Charles

Nelson

EM2c

206

Evers

Lawrence

Lee

CMM

207

Eyet

Donald

Archie

S1c

208

Fantasia

Frank

A

F2c (WT)

209

Farber

Sheldon

Lee

S2c (RDM)

210

Farley

James

W

S1c

211

Fasthorse

Vincent

S2c

212

Feeney

Paul

Ross

S2c (RM)

213

Ferguson

Russell

M

RT3c

214

Figgins

Harley

Dean

WT2c

215

Firestone

Kenneth

F

FC2c

216

Firmin

John

Alden H

S2c

217

Fleischauer

D

W

S1c (Y)

218

Fleshman

Vern

L

S2c

219

Flynn

James

M (Jr.)

S1c (FCO)

220

Frank

Rundolph

A

S2c

221

Franklin

Jack

Ray

RdM3c

222

French

Douglas

O

FC3c

223

French

Jimmy

Junior

QM3c

224

Fritz

Leonard

A

MM3c

225

Frontino

Vincent

F

MoMM3c

226

Frorath

Donald

H

S2c

227

Fuller

Arnold

A

F2c

228

Fulton

William

C

CRM

229

Gaither

Forest

M

FC2c

230

Gardner

Russell

T

F2c

231

Garner

Glenn

R

MM2c

232

Gibson

Curtis

W

S2c

233

Gibson

Ganola

F

MM3c

234

Gilbert

Warner

(Jr.)

S1c

235

Gill

Paul

Edward

WT2c

236

Gilmore

Wilbur

A

S2c

237

Gismondi

Michael

V

S1c

238

Glaub

Francis

A

GM2c

239

Glovka

Erwin

Samuel

S2c

240

Godfrey

Marlo

Roy

RM3c

241

Golden

Curry

StM1c

242

Golden

James

L

S1c

243

Gonzales

Ray

Adam

S2c

244

Good

Robert

Kenneth

MM3c

245

Goodwin

Oliver

A

CRT

246

Gore

Leonard

F

S2c

247

Gorecki

Joseph

W

SK3c

248

Gottman

Paul

James

S2c

249

Gove

Carroll

L

S2c

250

Greathouse

Bud

R

S1c

251

Green

Robert

Urban

S2c

252

Greene

Samuel

Gile

S1c

253

Greer

Bob

Eugene

S2c

254

Gregory

Garland

G

F1c

255

Greif

Matthias

D

WT3c

256

Gries

Richard

C

F2c

257

Griest

Frank

David

GM3c

258

Griffin

Jackie

Dale

S1c

259

Griffiths

Leonard

S

S2c

260

Griggs

Donald

Ray

F1c

261

Grimes

James

F

S2c

262

Grimes

David

Elimer

S2c

263

Groce

Floyd

Vernon

RdM2c

264

Groch

John

Thomas

MM3c

265

Guenther

Morgan

E

EM3c

266

Guerrero

John

Gomez

S1c

267

Guillot

Murphy

Urban

F1c (EM)

268

Guye

Ralph

Lee (Jr.)

QM3c

269

Guyon

Harold

Louis

F1c (WT)

270

Haberman

Bernard

S2c

S2c

271

Haduch

John

Martin

S1c

272

Hale

William

F

S2c

273

Hall

Pressie

F1c

274

Halloran

Edward

G

MM3c

275

Ham

Saul

Anthony

Cox

276

Hambo

William

P

PhM3c

277

Hammen

Robert

PhoM3c

278

Hamrick

James

J

S2c

279

Hancock

William

A

GM3c

280

Hankinson

C

W

F2c

281

Hansen

Henry

S2c

282

Harland

George

A

S2c

283

Harp

Charlie

Herdin

S1c

284

Harper

Vasco

StM1c

285

Harris

James

Davis

F2c

286

Harris

Willard

E

F2c

287

Harrison

James

M

S1c

288

Hartrick

Willis

B

MM1c

289

Haubrich

Cloud

D

S2c

290

Hauser

Jack

Isaac

SK2c

291

Hayles

Felix

Ck3c

292

Haynes

William

A

S1c (GM)

293

Heerdt

Raymond

E

F2c

294

Heggie

William

A

RdM3c

295

Heinz

Richard

A

HA1c

296

Heller

Robert

J (Jr.)

S2c

297

Helscher

Ralph

John

S1c

298

Helt

Jack

Edward

F2c

299

Henderson

Ralph

L

S1c

300

Hendron

James

R (Jr.)

F2c

301

Hensley

Clifford

SSMB2c

302

Herbert

Jack

Erwin

BM1c

303

Herndon

Duane

S2c

304

Hickey

Harry

Todd

RM3c

305

Hicks

Clarence

S1c (SC)

306

Hiebert

Lloyd

Henry

CM1c

307

Hill

Clarence

Max

CWT

308

Hill

Joe

Walker

StM1c

309

Hines

Lionel

Gordon

WT1c

310

Hobbs

Melvin

Dow

S1c

311

Hodgins

Lester

B

S2c

312

Hodshire

John

W

S2c

313

Hoerres

George

J

S2c

314

Holden

Punciano

A

St1c

315

Hollingsworth

J

L

StM2c

316

Holloway

Andrew

J

S2c

317

Holloway

Ralph

H

Cox

318

Hoogerwerf

John

(Jr.)

F1c (MoMM)

319

Horr

Wesley

Alan

F2c

320

Horrigan

John

G

F1c (EM)

321

Houston

Robert

G

F1c

322

Houston

William

H

PhM2c

323

Hov

Donald

Anthony

Sl (RM)

324

Huebner

Harry

H

S1c (GM)

325

Hughes

Lawrence

E

F2c (WT)

326

Hughes

Robert

A

FC3c

327

Hughes

William

E

SSML2c

328

Humphrey

Maynard

L

S2c

329

Hunter

Arthur

R (Jr.)

QM1c

330

Hurt

James

Edward

S2c

331

Hutchison

Merle

B

S2c

332

Igou

Floyd

(Jr.)

RM2c

333

Izor

Walter

Eugene

F1c

334

Jackson

Henry

StM1c

335

Jadloski

George

K

S2c

336

Jakubisin

Joseph

S

S2c

337

Jeffers

Wallace

M

Cox

338

Jensen

Chris

A

S2c

339

Jewell

Floyd

R

SKV1c

340

Johnson

Sidney

B

S1c (FC)

341

Johnson

Harold

B

S1c

342

Johnson

Walter

M (Jr.)

S1c

343

Johnson

George

Glen

S2c

344

Johnson

Elwood

W

S2c

345

Johnson

Bernard

J

S2c

346

Johnston

Earl

R

BM2c

347

Johnston

Lewis

E

S1c (RM)

348

Johnston

Ray

F

MM1c

349

Johnston

Scott

A

F2c

350

Jones

George

Edward

S2c

351

Jones

Jim

S2c

352

Jones

Kenneth

M

F1c (MoMM)

353

Jones

Stanley

F

S2c

354

Jordan

Henry

StM2c

355

Jordon

Thomas

H

S2c

356

Josey

Clifford

O

S2c

357

Jurgensmeyer

A

J

S2c

358

Karpal

Daniel

L

BM1c

359

Karter

Leo

C (Jr.)

S2c

360

Karsten

Stanley

Otto

HA1c

361

Kawa

Raymond

Philip

SK3c

362

Keith

Everett

E

S1c

363

Kelly

Albert

R

S2c

364

Kennedy

Andrew

J (Jr.)

S2c

365

Kennedy

Robert

A

S1c (Y)

366

Kenny

Francis

J P

S2c

367

Kephart

Paul

S1c

368

Kern

Harry

Gilbert

S1c

369

Key

S

T

EM2c

370

Kight

Audy

Carl

S1c

371

Kilgore

Archie

C

F2c

372

Killman

Robert

E

GM3c

373

Kinard

Nolan

Dave

S1c

374

Kincaid

Joseph

E

FC2c

375

King

Clarence

(Jr.)

StM2C

376

King

James

Thomas

S1c

377

King

Richard

Eugene

S2c

378

King

Robert

Harold

S2c

379

Kinnaman

Robert

L

S2c

380

Kirby

Harry

S1c

381

Kirk

James

Roy

SC3c

382

Kirkman

Walter

W

SF1c

383

Klein

Raymond

James

S1c

384

Klein

Thiel

Joseph

SK3c

385

Knernschield

A

N

S1c

386

Knoll

Paul

Edward

Cox

387

Knott

Elbern

Louis

S1c (FC)

388

Knudtson

Raymond

A

S1c

389

Knupke

Richard

R

MM3c

390

Koegler

Albert

S1c

391

Koegler

William

SC3c

392

Kolakowski

Ceslaus

SM3c

393

Kollinger

Robert

E

S1c

394

Konesny

John

Mathew

S1c

395

Koopman

Walter

F

F2c

396

Kouski

Fred

GM3c

397

Kovalick

George

R

S2c

398

Kozik

Raymond

S1c

399

Krawitz

Harry

J

MM3c

400

Kron

Herman

E (Jr.)

GM3c

401

Kronenberger

W

M

GM3c

402

Kruse

Darwin

Glen

S2c

403

Krzyzewski

John

M

S2c

404

Kuhn

Clair

Joseph

S1c

405

Kulovitz

Raymond

J

S2c

406

Kusiak

Alfred

M

S2c

407

Kwiatkowski

M

J

S2c

408

Labuda

Arthur

Al

QM3c

409

Lafontaine

Paul

S

S1c

410

Lakatos

Emil

Joseph

MM3c

411

Lake

Murl

Christy

S1c

412

Lamb

Robert

Clyde

EM3c

413

Lambert

Leonard

F

S1c

414

Landon

William

W (Jr.)

FCO2c

415

Laparl

L

E (Jr.)

S2c

416

Lapczynski

Edward

W

S1c

417

Larsen

Melvin

R

S2c

418

Latigue

Jackson

StM1c

419

Latimer

Billy

F

S1c (RM)

420

Latzer

Solomon

S2c

421

Laughlin

Fain

H

SK3c

422

Leathers

William

B

MM3c

423

Lebaron

Robert

W

S2c

424

Leluika

Paul

Peter

S2c

425

Lestina

Francis

J

S1c

426

Letizia

Vizencio

S2c

427

Letz

Wilbert

Joseph

SK1c

428

Levalley

William

D

EM2c

429

Leventon

Mervin

C

MM2c

430

Levieux

John

Joseph

F2c

431

Lewellen

Thomas

E

S2c

432

Lewis

James

Robert

F2c

433

Lewis

John

Robert

GM3c

434

Linden

Charles

G

WT2c

435

Lindsay

Norman

Lee

SF3c

436

Link

George

Charles

S1c

437

Linn

Roy

S1c

438

Linville

Harry

J

S1c

439

Linville

Cecil

H

SF2c

440

Lippert

Robert

G

S1c

441

Little

Frank

Edward

MM2c

442

Livermonre

Raymond

I

S2c

443

Loch

Edwin

Peter

S1c

444

Loeffler

Paul

E (Jr.)

S2c (QM)

445

Loftus

Ralph

Dennis

F2c

446

Lohr

Leo

William

S1c

447

Lombardi

Ralph

S1c

448

Long

Joseph

William

S1c

449

Longwell

Donald

J

Sl (Y)

450

Lorenc

Edward

R

S2c

451

Loyd

John

Francis

WT2c

452

Luhman

Emerson

D

MM3c

453

Lundgren

Albert

D

S1c (FCO)

454

Luttrull

Claud

A

Cox

455

Lutz

Charles

H

S1c

456

Mabee

Kenneth

C

F2c

457

Machado

Clarence

J

WT2c

458

Madigan

Harry

F

BM2c

459

Magdics

Steve

(Jr.)

F2c

460

Magray

Duwain

F

S2c

461

Makowski

Robert

T

CWT

462

Malone

Cecil

Edward

S2c

463

Malone

Elvin

C

S1c

464

Maness

Charles

F

F2c

465

Mankin

Howard

James

GM3c

466

Mann

Clifford

E

S1c

467

Mansker

Lavoice

S2c

468

Mantz

Keith

Hubert

S1c

469

Marciulaitis

C

S1c

470

Markmann

F

H

WT1c

471

Marshall

Robert

W

S2c

472

Marshall

John

Lucas

WT2c

473

Martin

Albert

S2c

474

Martin

Everett

G

S1c

475

Massier

George

A

S1c

476

Mastrecola

M

M

S2c

477

Matheson

Richard

R

PhM3c

478

Mauntel

Paul

John

S2c

479

McBride

Ronald

Gene

S1c

480

McBryde

Frank

E

S2c

481

McClary

Lester

Earl

S2c

482

McClure

David

Leroy

EM2c

483

McComb

Everett

A

F1c

484

McCord

Edward

F (Jr.)

EM3c

485

McCorkle

Ray

Ralph

S1c

486

McCormick

Earl

W

MoMM2c

487

McCoskey

Paul

F

S1c (RDM)

488

McCoy

John

S (Jr.)

M2c

489

McDaniel

Johnny

A

S1c

490

McDonald

F

G (Jr.)

F2c

491

McDonner

David

P (Jr.)

F1c (EM)

492

McDowell

Robert

E

S1c (SM)

493

McFee

Carl

Snyder

SC1c

494

McGinty

John

M

S1c

495

McGuire

Denis

S2c

496

McHone

Ollie

F1c

497

McKee

George

E (Jr.)

S1c

498

McKenna

Michael

J

S1c

Aviation Detail

499

McKinnon

Francis

M

Y3c

500

McLean

Dougald

B

EM3c

501

McNabb

Thomas

(Jr.)

F2c

502

McNickle

Arthur

S

F1c

503

McQuitty

Roy

Edward

Cox

504

Meade

Sidney

Howard

S1c

505

Mehlbaum

Raymond

A

S1c (SC)

506

Meier

Harold

Edward

S2c

507

Melichar

Charles

H

EM3c

508

Melvin

Carl

Lavern

F1c (EM)

509

Mencheff

Manual

A

S2c

510

Mergler

Charles

M

RdM2c

511

Metcalf

David

W

GM3c

512

Michael

Elmer

Orion

S1c

513

Michael

Bertrand

F

Bkr3c

514

Michno

Arthur

R

S2c

515

Mikeska

Willie

W

S2c

516

Miller

Artie

Ronald

GM2c

517

Miller

Glenn

Evert

S2c

518

Miller

George

Edwin

F1c (MM)

519

Miller

Samuel

G (Jr.)

FC3c

520

Miller

Walter

R

S2c

521

Miller

Walter

W

S1c

522

Miller

Wilbur

H

CMM

523

Mills

William

Harry

EM3c

524

Minor

Richard

Leon

S1c

525

Minor

Robert

Warren

S2c

526

Mires

Carl

Emerson

S2c

527

Mirich

Wally

Wayo

S1c

528

Miskowiec

Thomas

F

S1c

529

Mitchell

Paul

Boon

FC3c

530

Mitchell

Winston

C

SlC (FC)

531

Mitchell

James

H (Jr.)

SK1c

532

Mittler

Peter

J (Jr.)

GM3c

533

Mixon

Malcom

Lois

GM2c

534

Moncrief

Mack

D

S2c

535

Monks

Robert

Bruce

GM3c

536

Montoya

Frank

E

SlC

537

Moore

Donald

George

S2c

538

Moore

Elbert

S2c

539

Moore

Harley

Edward

S1c

540

Moore

Wyatt

Patton

Bkr1c

541

Morgan

Lewis

E

S2c

542

Morton

Charles

W

S2c

543

Morton

Marion

Ellis

SK2c

544

Moulton

Charles

C

S2c

545

Mroszak

Francis

A

S2c

546

Murillo

Sammy

S2c

547

Murphy

Allen

S2c

548

Musarra

Joe

S1c

549

Myers

Charles

L (Jr.)

S2c

550

Myers

Glenn

Alan

MM2c

551

Nabers

Neal

Adrian

S2c

552

Neal

Charles

Keith

S2c

553

Neal

George

M

S2c

554

Neale

Harlan

B

S2c

555

Neu

Hugh

Herbert

S2c

556

Neubauer

Richard

S2c

557

Neuman

Jerome

C

F1c

558

Neville

Bobby

Gene

S2c

559

Newcomer

Lewis

W

MM3c

560

Newell

James

Thomas

EM1c

561

Nichols

Joseph

L

BM2c

562

Nichols

Paul

Virgil

MM3c

563

Nielsen

Carl

A C (Jr.)

F1c

564

Nieto

Baltazar

P

GM3c

565

Niskanen

John

H

F2c

566

Norman

Theodore

R

GM2c

567

Nowak

George

Joseph

F2c

568

Nugent

William

G

S2c

569

Nunley

James

P

F1c

570

Nutt

Raymond

Albert

S2c

571

O’Brien

Arthur

J

S2c

572

O’Callaghan

Del

R

WT2c

573

Ochoa

Ernest

FC3c

574

Olderen

Bernhard

G

S1c

575

O’Neil

Eugene

Elbert

S1c

576

Orr

Homer

Lee

HA1c

577

Ortiz

Orlando

R

Y3c

578

Osburn

Charles

W

S2c

579

Ott

Theodore

Gene

Y1c

580

Owens

Robert

S (Jr.)

QM3c

581

Owensby

Clifford

C

F2c

582

Pagitt

Eldon

Ernest

F2c

583

Pait

Robert

Edward

BM2c

584

Pane

Francis

W

S2c

585

Parham

Fred

ST2c

586

Patterson

Kenneth

G

S1c

587

Patterson

Alfred

T

S2c

588

Patzer

Herman

Lantz

EM1c

589

Payne

George

David

S2c

590

Pender

Welburn

M

F2c

591

Perry

Robert

J

S2c

592

Peters

Earl

Jack

S2c

593

Peterson

Darrel

E

S1c (FC)

594

Peterson

F

A

MaM3c

595

Peterson

Glenn

H

S1c (RM)

596

Petrincic

John

N (Jr.)

FC3c

597

Peyton

Robert

C

StM1c

598

Phillips

A

N (Sr.)

F2c

599

Pierce

Clyde

Alton

CWT

600

Pierce

Robert

W

S2c

601

Piperata

Alfred

J

MM1c

602

Pitman

Robert

Fred

S2c

603

Pittman

Almire

(Jr.)

ST3c

604

Pleiss

Roger

David

F2c

605

Pohl

Theodore

F2c (MoMM)

606

Pokryfka

Donald

M

S2c

607

Poore

Albert

F

S2c

608

Potrykus

Frank

Paul

F2c

609

Powell

Howard

Wayne

F1c

610

Powers

R C

Ottis

S2c

611

Poynter

Raymond

Lee

S2c

612

Praay

William

Theo

S2c

613

Prather

Clarence

J

CMM

614

Pratt

George

Roy

F1c (EM)

615

Priestle

Ralph

A

S2c

616

Prior

Walter

Mathew

S2c

617

Puckett

William

C

S2c

618

Pupuis

John

Andrew

S1c (Bkr)

619

Purcel

Franklin

W

S2c

620

Pursel

Forest

V

WT3c

621

Pyron

Freddie

H

S1c

622

Rabb

John

Robert

SC1c

623

Ragsdale

Jean

Obert

S1c

624

Rahn

Alvin

Wilder

SK3c

625

Raines

Clifford

J

S2c

626

Rains

Rufus

Brady

S1c

627

Ramseyer

Raymond

C

RT3c

628

Randolph

Cleo

StM1c

629

Rathman

Frank

J

S1c (FC)

630

Realing

Lyle

Olan

FC2c

631

Reed

Thomas

William

EM3c

632

Reemts

Alvin

Thomas

S1c

633

Reese

Jesse

Edmund

S2c

634

Reeves

Robert

A

F2c

635

Regalado

Robert

H

S1c

636

Reilly

James

F

Y1c

637

Reinert

Leroy

F1c

638

Remondet

E J

(Jr.)

S2c

639

Reynolds

Andrew

Eli

S1c

640

Reynolds

Carleton

C

F1c

641

Rhea

Clifford

F2c

642

Rhodes

Vernon

Lee

F1c (WT)

643

Rhoten

Roy

Edward

F2c

644

Rice

Albert

StM1c

645

Rich

Garland

Lloyd

S1c

646

Richardson

John

R

S2c

647

Richardson

Joseph

G

S2c

648

Rider

Francis

Allan

RdM3c

649

Riley

Junior

Thomas

BM2c

650

Roberts

Charles

S1c

651

Roberts

Benjamin

E

WT1c

652

Robison

Marzie

Joe

S2c

653

Robison

Gerald

E

RT3c

654

Rockenbach

Earl

A

SC2c

655

Roesberry

Jack

R

S1c

656

Rogell

Henry

Tony

F1c

657

Roland

Jack

A

PhM1c

658

Rollins

Willard

E

RM3c

659

Romani

Frank

Joseph

HA1c

660

Roof

Charles

Walter

S2c

661

Rose

Berson

Horace

GM2c

662

Ross

Glen

Eugene

F2c

663

Rothman

Aaron

RdM3c

664

Rowden

Joseph

Geren

F1c

665

Rozzano

John

(Jr.)

S2c

666

Rudomanski

Eugene

W

RT2c

667

Rue

William

Goff

MM1c

668

Rust

Edwin

Leroy

S1c

669

Rutherford

Robert

A

RM2c

670

Rydzeski

Frank

W

F1c (EM)

671

Saenz

Jose

Antonio

SC3c

672

Sain

Albert

F

S1c

673

Salinas

Alfredo

A

S1c

674

Samano

Nuraldo

S2c

675

Sampson

Joseph

R

S2c

676

Sams

Robert

Carrol

StM2c

677

Sanchez

Alejandro

V

S2c

678

Sand

Cyrus

Harvey

BM1c

679

Sanders

Everett

R

MoMM1c

680

Sassman

Gordon

W

Cox

681

Scarbrough

Fred

R

Cox

682

Schaap

Marion

John

QM1c

683

Schaefer

Harry

W

S2c

684

Schaffer

Edward

J

S1c (GM)

685

Scharton

Elmer

D

S1c

686

Scheib

Albert

Eddie

F2c

687

Schewe

Alfred

Paul

S1c

688

Schlatter

Robert

L

AOM3c

Aviation Detail

689

Schlotter

James

R

RdM3c

690

Schnappauf

Harold

J

SK3c

691

Schooley

Dillard

A

Cox

692

Schumacher

A J

(Jr.)

CEM

693

Scoggins

Millard

SM2c

694

Scott

Burl

Down

StM2c

695

Scott

Curtis

Marvin

S1c

696

Scott

Hilliard

StM1c

697

Sebastian

C

H

RM2c

698

Sedivi

Alfred

J

PhoM2c

699

Selbach

Walter

H

WT3c

700

Sell

Ernest

F

EM2c

701

Sellers

Leonard

E

SF3c

702

Selman

Amos

S2c

703

Sewell

Loris

Eldon

S2c

704

Shand

Kenneth

W

WT2c

705

Shaw

Calvin

Patrick

GM2c

706

Shelton

W E

(Jr.)

SM2c

707

Shields

Cecil

N

SM2c

708

Silcox

Burnice

R

S1c

709

Silva

Phillip

Gomes

S1c

710

Simcox

Gordon

W

EM3c

711

Simcox

John

Allen

F1c (MMR)

712

Sims

Clarence

Ck2c

713

Singerman

David

SM3c

714

Sipes

John

Leland

S1c

715

Sitzlar

William

C

F1c

716

Smalley

Howard

Earl

S1c

717

Smeraglia

Michael

RM3c

718

Smith

Carl

Murphy

SM2c

719

Smith

Charles

Andy

S1c

720

Smith

Edwin

Lee

S2c

721

Smith

Eugene

Gordon

BM2c

722

Smith

George

Robert

S1c

723

Smith

Guy

Nephi

FCO2c

724

Smith

Henry

August

F1c

725

Smith

Homer

Leroy

F2c

726

Smith

Kenneth

Dean

F2c

727

Smith

Olen

Ellis

CM3c

728

Snyder

John

N

SF3c

729

Snyder

Richard

R

S1c (SM)

730

Solomon

William

(Jr.)

S2c

731

Sordia

Ralph

S2c

732

Sparks

Charles

Byrd

Cox

733

Speer

Lowell

Elvis

RT3c

734

Spindle

Orval

Audry

S1c

735

Spomer

Elmer

John

SF2c

736

Stadler

Robert

H

WT3c

737

Stanforth

David

E

F2c

738

Stankowski

Archie

J

S2c

739

Stanturf

F

R

MM2c

740

Steigerwald

Fred

GM2c

741

Stevens

Wayne

Allen

MM2c

742

Stewart

Thomas

A

S2c

743

Stickley

Charles

B

GM3c

744

Stier

William

G

S1c (FCO)

745

Stone

Dale

Eugene

S2c

746

Stone

Homer

Benton

Y1c

747

St. Pierre

Leslie

R

MM2c

748

Strain

Joseph

Mason

S2c (RDM)

749

Streich

Allen

C

RM2c

750

Strickland

George

T

S2c

751

Streiter

Robert

C

S2c

752

Stripe

William

S

S2c

753

Strom

Donald

Arthur

S2c

754

Stromko

Joseph

A

F2c (WT)

755

Stryffeler

Virgil

L

F2c

756

Stueckle

Robert

L

S2c

757

Sudano

Angelo

A

SSML3c

758

Suhr

Jerome

Richard

S2c

759

Sullivan

James

P

S2c

760

Sullivan

William

D

PTR2c

761

Swanson

Robert

H

MM2c

762

Swindell

Jerome

H

F2c

763

Taggart

Thomas

H

S1c (RDM)

764

Talley

Dewell

E

RM2c

765

Terry

Robert

Wayne

S2c

766

Thielscher

Robert

T

CRT

767

Thorpe

Everett

N

WT3c

768

Tidwell

James

F

S2c

769

Tisthammer

B

E

CGM

770

Toce

Nicolo

S2c

771

Todd

Harold

Orton

CM3c

772

Tosh

Bill

Hugh

RdM3c

773

Trotter

Arthur

C

RM2c

774

Truitt

Robert

E

RM2c

775

Tryon

Frederick

B

Bug2c

776

Tull

James

Albert

S1c (GM)

777

True

Roger

G

S2c

Aviation Detail

778

Turner

William

C

MM2c

779

Turner

William

H (Jr.)

ACMM

Aviation Detail

780

Ulibarri

Antonio

D

S2c

781

Underwood

Carey

Lee

S1c

Aviation Detail

782

Wakefield

James

N

S1c (QM)

783

Walker

A

W

StM1c

784

Walker

Jack

Edwin

RM2c

785

Wallace

Earl

John

RdM3c

786

Wallace

John

RdM3c

787

Walters

Donald

H

F1c (EM)

788

Warren

William

R

RT3c

789

Waters

Jack

Lee

CY

790

Watson

Winston

Harl

F2c

791

Wells

Gerald

Lloyd

EM3c

792

Wennerholm

Wayne

L

Cox

793

Whalen

Stuart

D

GM2c

794

White

Earl

Clarence

TC1c

795

White

Howard

McKean

CWT

796

Wileman

Roy

Weldon

PhM3c

797

Willard

Merriman

D

PhM2c

798

Williams

Billie

Joe

MM2c

799

Williams

Magellan

StM1c

800

Wilson

Frank

F2c

801

Wilson

Thomas

B

S1c

802

Wittmer

Milton

R

EM2c

803

Wojciechowski M

J

SM1c

804

Wolfe

Floyd

Ralph

GM3c

805

Yeaple

Jack

Thomas

Y3c

806

Zobal

Francis

John

S2c

807

Hopper

Prentice

W

S1c

Aviation Detail

808

Hopper

Ray

L

AM1c

Aviation Detail

LIST OF ACRONYMS, RANKS, AND RATINGS

Primarily taken from Glossary of U.S. Naval Abbreviations, OPNAV-29-P1000 (Revised April 1949)

35-S Specific group of security clearance holders for ULTRA channel

ABLE “A” in the joint Army and Navy phonetic alphabet

ADCOMPHIBSEAPAC Administrative Command, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet

ADM Admiral

ADVHED Advanced Headquarters

AKS General Stores Issue Ship

AP Armor Piercing (when in reference to ammunition or ordnance) or Transport (when in reference to vessels)

APD High Speed Transport

ARL Repair Ship, Landing Craft

ARS Salvage Vessel

ATCOM Atoll Commander

ATF Fleet Ocean Tug

B Indicates “bomber,” when used for United States aircraft

BB Battleship

BM Boatswain’s Mate

BuAir/BuAer Bureau of Aeronautics

BUAIR/BUAER Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics

BuMed Bureau of Medicine

BUMED Chief, Bureau of Medicine

BuOrd Bureau of Ordnance

BUORD Chief, Bureau of Ordnance

BuPers Bureau of Naval Personnel

BUPERS Chief, Bureau of Naval Personnel

BuSandA Bureau of Supplies and Accounts

BUSANDA Chief, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts

BuShips Bureau of Ships

BUSHIPS Chief, Bureau of Ships

C Indicates transport or cargo aircraft when used for United States aircraft

CA Heavy Cruiser

CAPT Captain

CDR Commander

CFAW Commander, Fleet Air Wing

CHOP Change of Operational Control

CIC Combat Information Center

CINCAFPAC Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific

CINCPAC Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

CNB Commander, Naval Base

CNO Chief of Naval Operations

COI Court of Inquiry

COM Commander of a military organization (e.g., Com5thFleet, ComAirPac [Commander Air Forces, Pacific])

COMAIRPACSUBCOMFWD Commander, Air Forces Pacific Submarine Command Forward

COMDESPAC Commander, Destroyers, Pacific Fleet

COMFAIRWING Commander Fleet Air

COMINCH Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet

COMMARIANAS Commander Marianas

COMNAVSECGRU Commander, Naval Security Group Command

COMPHIBSPAC Commander, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet

COMPHILSEAFRON Commander, Philippine Sea Frontier

COMSERON Commander, Service Squadron

COMWESCAROLINES Commander, Western Carolines

CTF Commander, Task Force

CTG Commander, Task Group

CTU Commander, Task Unit

CV Aircraft Carrier

DA Delayed Action or Direct Action (Bomb Fuze)

DD Destroyer

DE Destroyer Escort

DND Do Not Dispatch

ENS Ensign

ETA Estimated Time of Arrival

F Fireman

FRUPAC Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific

FS Feet per second (ordnance)

FTP Fleet Training Publication

GM Metacentric height

HTS High Tensile Steel

HYPO “H” in the Joint Army-Navy phonetic alphabet

I Incendiary, when used in reference to ammunition or ordnance

IC Interior Communications or Information Center

IFF Identification, Friend or Foe

INSGEN Inspector General (Navy)

ISCOM Island Commander

JAG Judge Advocate General

JICPOA Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Areas

LC Landing Craft

LCA Landing Craft, Assault

LCI Landing Craft, Infantry

LSM Landing Ship, Medium

LT Lieutenant

LT (j.g.) Lieutenant, Junior Grade

LVT Landing Vehicle, Tracked

M Metalsmith

MC Megacycles, or USN officer designation for Medical Corps

MN Very high frequency voice radio (FM)

MS Medium Steel plating

NARA National Archives and Records Administration

NHHC Naval History and Heritage Command

NIG Navy Inspector General

NOLA Navy Office of Legislative Affairs

NUC Navy unit Commendation

OINC Officer-in-Charge

OP Operational Priority

OTC Officer-in-Tactical Command

P. I. Philippine islands

PB Patrol bomber, when used to designate United States aircraft

PBY Catalina; twin-engine Navy patrol-bomber (VPB [MS]), manufactured by Consolidated-Vultee

PCE Patrol Vessel, Escort

PD Port Director

PhM Pharmacists Mate

PUC Presidential Unit Citation

PV-1 Ventura; twin-engine Navy patrol-bomber (VPB [ML]), landplane manufactured by Lockheed-Vega

RADM Rear Admiral

RATT Radio Teletypewriter

RDM Radarman

RDO Radio; Wireless

RM Radioman

RT Radio Technician

S Seaman

SC Seahawk; single-engine Navy observation-scout (VO/VS), manufactured by Curtiss

SC Ship’s Cook when in reference to a Sailor’s rating

SCOMA Shipping Control Officer, Marianas

SCR Summary Control Report

SERON Service Squadron

SIGTOT Signal Corps One-Time Tape

SOA Speed of Approach

SOC Seagull; single-engine Navy obs-scout (VOS), manufactured by Curtiss

SOPA Senior Officer Present Afloat

SOS Radio Distress Call

TARE Target firing runs

TCK A model of radio transmitting equipment for ship to shore transmissions

TNT A high explosive

TP Target Practice

UNCLE “U” in the Joint Army-Navy phonetic alphabet

USF United States Fleet

USMC United States Marines Corps

USN United States Navy

USNR United States Naval Reserve

USS United States Ship (commissioned Navy vessel)

VADM Vice Admiral

VCNO Vice Chief of Naval Operations

VPB Patrol-bombing plane

WNY Washington Navy Yard

WT Water Tender

Y Yeoman

YF Provision Store Lighter or Range Tender

YP District Patrol Vessel

NOTES

Chapter One

1. R. Adm. William Reynolds Purnell was the Navy representative on the Military Policy Committee, which oversaw the Manhattan Project. He was on Tinian coordinating preparations for the dropping of the atomic bombs with Navy and Army leadership. Capt. William Sterling “Deak” Parsons, USN, was head of Ordnance Division in Project Y of the Manhattan Project and officer-in-charge of the overseas technical group of the Los Alamos Laboratory. He was an innovator in ordnance and radar and worked directly under Dr. Robert Oppenheimer as his technical deputy. Parsons, temporarily promoted to commodore for the first atomic bomb mission, was the weaponeer and bomb commander aboard the Enola Gay for its 6 August 1945 mission over Hiroshima. Indianapolis delivered the atomic components used for the Hiroshima mission. The Hiroshima mission and Capt. Parsons are covered more fully in ch. 3 of this volume.

2. They did not carry the fully assembled atomic bomb Little Boy, but components for that bomb.

3. An extinct volcano on the Hawaiian island of Oahu; a prominent landmark from the sea.

4. 28 July.

5. LST-779.

6. 29 July.

7. Speed of Approach.

8. Nakajima Ki-43 Hayabusa.

9. Handwritten comment in margin, initialed H., “Japs don’t have one. Have 5 AP & G.P.”

10. Handwritten comment in margin, “Doubtful.”

11. 35-S refers to Cryptographic Channel 35-S, which was a more limited distribution channel for the CINCPAC Daily Intelligence Bulletin. It was first used in July 1944 when the CNO and CINCPAC Daily Intelligence Bulletin, used since the beginning of the war, was discontinued in favor of a more limited distribution system.

12. Blue Shipping refers to Allied shipping.

13. Declassified. Original classification: TOP SECRET DISPATCH/ TOP SECRET/ TOP SECRET-ULTRA/ From: CINCPAC PEARL/Released By:[blank]/Date 14 July 1945/TOR Coderoom: [blank]/Decoded by: Kennedy, Plumley; Paraphrased by: EXACT/Checked by: Martin/Routed by: Dodd/Dittoed by: [blank]/For Action: All Holders 35-S, COMINCH/ Information: CINCPAC ADV. HDQTRS., CTF 77, CINCAFPAC, COMSEVENTH-FLT/Precedence: OP OP OP/Originator fill in Date and Time Group: 140232, Page 1 of 2/ F-341 (6 Copies), OP-2[ ?]-3-[?]1-P (2 Copies).

14. The question that Haynes is directly responding to is “Did you make any stops on the way back [from Okinawa]?”

15. On 16 July, the Manhattan Project successfully detonated a test device at the Trinity Site, near Alamogordo, New Mexico. After the successful test, Indianapolis was sent on her way.

16. Declassified. Original classification: TOP SECRET DISPATCH/ TOP SECRET ULTRA/ From: CINCPAC Pearl/Released By: [blank]/Date 18 July 1945/TOR Code Room: [blank]/Decoded By: Pohly/ Paraphrased By: EXACT/Checked By: Martin/ Routed By: Dodd/ Dittoed By: [blank]/ For Action: All Holders 35 S, COMINCH/ Information: CINCPAC, CINCAFPAC, COM 7th FLEET, CTF 77/ Precedence: OP OP OP/ Originator till in Date and Time Group: 180209, Page One/OP-20-3-01 (2 Copies), F-341 (6 Copies).

17. Declassified. Copy, Court of Inquiry. Original classification: Secret. Document REF No: 260152; At foot of copy “CORRECTED COPY: Last Sentence Added, 260152, SENT/0624/EK.”

18. Declassified. Copy, Court of Inquiry. Original classification: Secret. Document REF No: 155073; Circ. No. JDS 75, JC 18772. CBO-JDF.

19. Declassified. Copy, Court of Inquiry. Original classification: Secret. Document REF No: 280032; NPM No JC 13709; Code Room No. 12469 (B). At foot of copy “A True Copy. Attest:/W. E. Hilbert,/Capt., U.S. Navy,/Judge Advocate.”

20. Other information on document: #298/BE V RE/ TOD 270452 Z ALB/ R JHD.

21. This is the referenced Enclosure (A).

22. Officer-in-Tactical Command.

23. Zig-Zag Diagrams for Single Ships and Convoys 1940 (London: Signal Department, Adm. ty, 1940).

24. Only included portion dealing with zigzag instruction.

25. Further details of the gunnery drills were provided on the columnar sheet: 1312 General Quarters, 1316 All guns manned and ready, 1324 Gunnery practice. Shot down five out of eight balloons released, 1353 Secured from gunnery practice, 1410 Secured from General Quarters.

26. Senior Officer Present Afloat.

27. Commander, Naval Operating Base.

Chapter Two

1. Johns Hopkins Janney, Cdr., USN. Janney did not survive.

2. Capt. Edward Crouch did not survive the sinking. He was awarded a Bronze Star for his service as Operations Officer on the staff of Commander Cruisers and Destroyers Pacific, and Commander Task Force 15 during the period 21 January 1943 to 2 January 1944. During this period he was involved with the planning and coordination of operations. Crouch also worked to prepare doctrine and fleet tactical publications, a job requiring him to work in the combat area to observe task force operations. He then served as Director, Maintenance Division, Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Department, Washington, DC. When Indianapolis was sunk, he was on his way to report for temporary additional duty at Advanced Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief Pacific. Because McVay was an old acquaintance of Crouch, he opted to travel by sea to his assignment instead of his originally planned air transport. McVay gave Crouch is own quarters on the voyage.

3. In the portion of the interview omitted here, Capt. McVay primarily discussed his experience with his group in the rafts—condition of the men, rationing of supplies, sense of isolation, and attempts to signal passing aircraft. He also described the circumstances of his rescue, which is included in ch. 3 of this volume.

4. McVay is referring to the largest group of survivors whose only supplies were the life vests or pneumatic life belts with which they entered the water.

5. Capt. Edward L. Parke, USMC.

6. For an example of what McVay talked about here see the Court of Inquiry document extracts within ch. 2.

7. Castellani’s Paint is a bright magenta red topical solution used to treat dermatological issues.

8. Capt. McVay goes on to describe the trouble that this shark caused their fishing attempts. Their raft had a fishing kit, and McVay, an experienced saltwater fisherman, led his men in catching small bait fish to use for catching bonita or mackerel from large schools swimming near their rafts. Every time they caught a bait fish and cast it out, the white finned shark would eat it. McVay was dismayed that no one in the raft had taken a sheaf knife into the water with them because he felt that they could have killed the shark, and caught fish, had they had one available.

9. Herbert Jay Miner, RT2, USNR was in Radio Room Two and he believed that transmitter TCK-3 was “putting out on the air” for several minutes because he saw the plate current meter jumping on each key and the antenna current meter jumping slightly. RT2 Miner testified on day one of the Court of Inquiry. No contemporary reports of any received messages from Indianapolis suggest that the transmitter had not been functioning as Miner believed. Multiple Navy investigations attempted to discover whether or not Indianapolis had successfully transmitted a distress signal, and if it had, whether any U.S. bases or units had received it. Investigations into multiple leads began, but ended quickly due to lack of evidence. No evidence indicating reception of a distress signal was brought forward in legal proceedings. Since the sinking, individuals have claimed that portions of distress signal had been received. Often these accounts appeared many years after the fact. To date, no contemporary evidence of a received distress signal has come to light. That is, while it is possible that Miner was correct, no independent corroboration beyond personal recollection has been presented. If a distress signal did not make it off the ship, it is by no fault of the radiomen and technicians who manned their stations until the last possible moment.

10. Another radioman from Radio Room One, Elwin Lee Sturtevant, RM2, described the death of Lt (j.g.) Howard Bruce Freeze in testimony at the Court of Inquiry on 14 August. Sturtevant described Lt. Freeze as being badly burned on his hands and face. Freeze died on a raft Tuesday evening, but was not buried at sea because of sharks following the raft at that time. The following morning, Freeze was buried quickly without services while most of the men still slept. Sturtevant’s experience around Lt. Freeze led him to recommend that the Navy include morphine in the medical kits on life rafts. He recalled Freeze stating that he would have preferred dying from morphine than from burns.

11. Opinion No. 17 of the Court read “That testimony of Lt. Richard B. Redmayne, U. S. Naval Reserve, regarding immoral conduct of unnamed man in the ‘sick bay raft’ was based on hearsay and, due to mental condition of that officer at that time, may have been imagined.”

12. Ens. James Franklin Herstine, USNR (did not survive).

13. BM2 Morgan passed away 27 June 2008. His grandson, a MM1 at the time, spread his grandfather’s ashes at the Navy coordinates for Indianapolis’s sinking from the deck of Ohio (SSBN-726) on 2 October 2008.

14. The portion of the trial dealing with Morgan was broken into two days, 15–16 August. Lt. Redmayne introduced accusations against BM2 Morgan in his testimony the afternoon of the 15th, Ens. Twible’s testimony at the end of that day supported Redmayne’s. On the following day, 16 August, scheduling issues required R. Adm. Lynde McCormick, USN, Commander Battleship Division Three, Commander TG-95.7 to testify about Indianapolis’s non-arrival for prearranged training. The early morning hours of the inquiry focused on this issue. Once witnesses had completed their testimony on this issue, the focus turned back to BM2 Morgan.

15. Prior to BM2 Simpson’s testimony, FM2 J.M. Torretta, USNR, M2 John Melvin Anunti, USNR, testified about Morgan. For concerns of space in this volume, testimony has been selected that presents perspectives from both sides.

16. Next witness called by Morgan was FM2c Harlan Havener, USNR, then COX Virgil Russell, USNR.

17. Harold Robert Anthony, PhM3, USNR (killed).

18. The interested party, Lt. Stewart B. Gibson, USNR, also made a motion to have his name withdrawn as an interested party on the ground that the evidence produced before the court in no way involved him. The court announced that the motion was denied at the present time, but that the court would give the motion further consideration and inform the interested party if it should reverse its present decision at a later time.

19. Opinion No. 18 of the Court stated “That certain testimony tending to incriminate Morgan, Eugene S., boatswain’s mate second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, regarding unauthorized use of water and rations which has been introduced is largely refuted by witnesses in Morgan’s behalf.” Furthermore, Court Recommendation No. 2 stated “That no further proceedings be had in the case of Morgan, Eugene S., boatswain’s mate second class, U. S. Naval Reserve.”

20. A destroyer.

21. Water fountain.

22. See extract from Helm (DD-388) After Action Report in ch. 3, Document 3.9.

23. All times are I-58 time (9 hr., not Indianapolis 9 1/2 hr.), for Indianapolis time add 30 minutes.

24. It is unknown what target Hashimoto is talking about here, as no reports of U.S. ships being attacked on this date by an enemy submarine have been located as of the printing of this volume.

25. They stayed under water to keep from being observed from the air.

26. It means “six torpedoes stand by.”

27. Declassified. Full Addressee and Filing Information on Dispatch: 30 July 0048/ JN-25-P-91/62/ From: SA TE KO 4/ To: NO FU TE 27 (RI KU O 0) (Navy Vice Minister); MA SO MA 01) (KO E YA 5) (COMBINED NAVAL FORCE Headquarters); SI U RI 14 (NE KI TA 1) (Commander ADVANCE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE)/ Page 41, 31 July P.M./ IMPORTANT: - The information contained herein is not to be reproduced or referred to in any manner which may disclose its source/TOP SECRET ULTRA. A revised version of this intercept from the same date added “obtained three torpedo hits,” however; the ship type and position of attack remained unrecovered.

28. Declassified. Full Addressee and Filing Information on Intercept: RE V BE/ NR 276/ 2 August 1945/ TOD 020625/ GWR ACK PLSE KK/ (retyped for purpose of clarity).

29. Declassified. Copy, Court of Inquiry. Original classification: Secret. Document REF No: 159838; NPO2 1101, CBO-HGW, Grp. Ct. 80, Circ. No. JC 22466.

Chapter Three

1. Declassified. Copy, Court of Inquiry. Original classification: Confidential. Document REF No: 161624; CBO-JHM, Circ. No. Opintel JC 884.

2. Declassified. Copy, Court of Inquiry. Original classification: Confidential. Code Room No: A-#565; DTG 020155, CKT No. JC NR 633.

3. Declassified. Copy, Court of Inquiry. Original classification: Confidential. Document REF No: 161668; CBO MGW, Grp.Ct. 26, Cric. No. Op Intel, JC 912. Red ramrod refers to an expendable sono-buoy.

4. Declassified. Copy, Court of Inquiry. Original classification: Secret. Document REF No: 161692; CBO-SMR, Circ. No. FA 43.

5. Declassified. Copy, Court of Inquiry. Original classification: Classified. Document REF No: 161843; CBO-SMR, Grp.Ct. 80, Circ. No. OpIntel. NPO 250, JC 1045.

6. Declassified. Copy, Court of Inquiry. Original classification: Confidential. TOR: 1130. (Corrected Copy). DTG 020737, CKT No. JC-874, Code Room No. #892-A.

7. Declassified. Copy, Court of Inquiry. Original classification: Confidential. Document REF No: 020744; GRP. CT. 24775, Originator-301, CWO-HLB, SENT/0758/CY/2.

8. Declassified. Copy, Court of Inquiry. Original classification: Secret. Document REF No: 161652; CBO-WJS, Grp.Ct. 156, Circ. No. GC 752.

9. Declassified. Copy, Court of Inquiry. Original classification: Confidential. Document REF No: 163181; NPO-334, CBO-MWS, Grp. Ct. 27, Circ. No. JC-1336.

10. Declassified. Copy, Court of Inquiry. Original classification: Secret. WU: ETB, CWO: BB, TOR: 2309, TOD 11-2316, DTG 020848, CKT No. JC NR 1101, C.R. No. 1029-A. Dispatch referenced as 280032 is among dispatches in ch. 1, Document 1.8 of this volume.

11. Declassified. Naval Message, Navy Department/From: CINCPAC ADV HQ/Date: 03 JULY [typo] 1945/TOR Code Room: 0119/Decoded by: HARTIGAN/Typed by: HAR-TIGAN/BECKMAN/For Action: COMINCH/Precedence: ROUTINE/Originator fill in date and time: 022208, NCR 4237/CINCPAC ADV HQ sends action COMINCH.

12. Declassified. Copy, Court of Inquiry. Original classification: Secret; TOR: 0552, DTG 030125, CKT No. JC 1240, C.DROOM No. A01181.

13. Declassified. Naval Message, Navy Department/From: CO VPB 23/Date: 3 AUGUST 45/TOR Code Room: 2136/3/Decoded by: HAMILTON/Typed by: HAMILTON/not readable/Addressees:/For Action: CNO (DCNO) AIR/Information: COMMARIANAS, CTG 94.11, COMAIRPAC, COMAIRPACSUBCOMFWD, CFAW 2, COMWESCAR-OLINES/Originator fill in time and date: 031120, NCR 4905.

14. Howard Bruce Freeze, Lt. (j.g.), USN.

15. Declassified. From: RINGNESS (APD-100)/Released By:/Date: 3 AUGUST 1945/ TOR Code Room: 2220/Decoded by: Hamilton/Typed by: Hamilton/Buckman/Routed by:/For Action: CINPAC ADV. HDQTRS/Information: CTU 95.7.5, COM THIRD FLEET, COM SEVENTH FLEET, COMPHILSEAFRON, COMSERVDIV 101 (SEE BELOW)/Precedence: OP OP OP OP Priority/Originator fill in Date and Time Group: 030855, NCR 4925.

16. Declassified. Naval Message, Navy Department/From: USS BASSETT/Date: 3 AUGUST 1945/TOR Code Room: 2313/Decoded by: Smith/Typed by: Smith/Hartig/For Action: COMPHILSEAFRON/Originator fill in date and time group: 022030, NCR 4954.

17. Ready for Sea.

18. Declassified. Copy, Court of Inquiry. Original classification: Confidential. Document REF No: 030150; SENT/AU/0551/3RD.

19. Declassified. Naval Message, Navy Department/Drafter: CNB SAMAR/Date: 4 AUGUST 1945 1626/TOR Code Room: GOODNIGHT/Decoded by: GOODNIGHT/not readable/For Action: COMPHILSEAFRON, COMMARIANAS, COM SW CAROLINA AREA, SUBCOM CAROLINA AREA, COMINCH, CTU 94.5.1, COMSERVDIV 101, CTG 95.7, CTF 95, CTU 95.7.5, CTG 94.5, COMSERVRON 10 CTU 94.5.3, CINCPAC/POA PEARL/Information: COMSERVPAC, 1 BAD CALL (BEING SERVICED)/Precedence: OP OP OP/Originator fill in date and time: 040753, NCR 5583.

20. Declassified. Naval Message, Navy Department/From: USS MADISON/Date: 4 AUGUST 45/TOR Code Room: 2348/3-/Decoded by: LANDO/Typed by: HAMILTON /not readable/For Action: COMPHILSEAFRON, COMWESCARSUBAREA, CTU 94.6.2/Precedence: OPOPOPOPOP PRIORITY/Originator fill in date and time group: 030250, NCR 4966.

21. Declassified. Copy, Court of Inquiry. Original classification: Secret. Originator-62, Release-62, Priority, 040758, Sent/0825/QU.

22. Declassified. Naval Message, Navy Department /From: COMWESCARSUBAREA/ Date: 5 AUGUST 45/TOR Code Room: 1112/Decoded by: HUGHES/Typed by: KULKA/not readable/For Action: CINCPAC BOTH COMMARIANAS, COM3RDFLT/Information: COMPHILSEAFRON/Priority: ROUTINE/Precedence: RRRRRR. ROUTINE/Originator fill in date and time group: 040741, NCR 6194.

23. Declassified. Copy, Court of Inquiry. Original classification: Secret. Document REF No: 164553; CBO-BJL, Grp. Ct. 76, Circ. No. JC-3229.

24. Declassified. Copy, Court of Inquiry. Original classification: Secret. Document REF No: 165803; DBO-CLF, Grp. Ct. 96, Cir. No. JC-4197.

25. Declassified. Copy, Court of Inquiry. Original classification: Secret. Document REF No: 1659494; Grp. Ct. 11, Circ. No. JC4305.

26. Declassified. Copy, Court of Inquiry. Original classification: Confidential; WU:RPV, CWO: JLG, OP, DTG 070115, CKT No. JC 3325, C. R. No. A-2955.

27. Declassified. Copy, Court of Inquiry. Original classification: Secret. Document REF No: 166809; CBO-GVB, Grp. Ct. 161, Circ. No. RGPT 468, JC 4958.

28. Declassified. Copy, Court of Inquiry. Original classification: Secret. Document REF No: 167628; CBO-ASD, Grp. Ct. 52, Circ. No. RGP-560, JC-5557.

29. Declassified. Copy, Court of Inquiry. Original classification: Secret; WU:RPV, CWO: FR, DTG 081027, CKT No. JC 4317, C. R. No. A-3739/TOR: 1458/ TOD: 11-1512.

30. Army crew involved in the rescue were from the 4th Emergency Rescue Squadron stationed in the Palau Islands.

31. Falsely inflating perceptions of war service by displaying service ribbons that one is not entitled to wear.

32. Omitted sections preceding extract are NIG recommendations, historical summary, and biographical sketches.

33. L. Peter Wren wrote Those in Peril on the Sea: USS Bassett Rescues 152 Survivors of the USS Indianapolis (Richmond, VA: L. Peter Wren, 1999). Included as an addendum in this book is a photocopy of Bassett’s deck log listing the survivors it rescued.

34. Analysis of allegations against Theriault of four-flushing, cowardice, malingering, and incompetency were covered after the overview of the Indianapolis rescue. The allegation of four-flushing was the only one that the NIG found to have backing. Cdr. Theriault wore the Commendation Ribbon and the Asiatic-Pacific Ribbon when he was not entitled to do so.

35. Declassified. Copy, Court of Inquiry. Original classification: Secret. Document REF No: 030231; 24891, Release-5, Shot to-53 502, SENT/AU/0330/3rd.

36. Declassified. Original classification: Top Secret ULTRA. CINCPAC Advanced HQ to JICPOPA Estimates Section. Other information on document: RE V BE/ NUMBER 277/3 August/ From: Capt. Layton/ To: Capt. Harper TOD: 022326/ INT ROGER KK/ R RMM.

37. Declassified. BE V RE/CIC NR 321/3 AUGUST 1945/ TOD: 300437/ WAJ AC PLS/ P JDS.

38. Omitted portions before and after describe Helm’s arrival to the scene and a list of bodies recovered and identifications that they were able to make.

39. All other sections of ULTRA Intelligence Summary have been excluded because they do not pertain to this volume.

Chapter Four

1. Capt. McVay’s first after-action report was submitted to the Secretary of Navy on 12 August 1945. This report was only two pages long and did not contain the detail of the 26 August report. The 12 August report most notably lacked the damage assessment and life-saving recommendations. One significant piece of information contained in the 12 August report that was not in the 26 August report was a position of the sinking— “2. The position of the ship at the time she was hit was Lat. 12° 02’ N, Long. 134° 48’ E. which position may be also considered as that where she sank since she remained afloat only about fifteen minutes after she was hit. The depth of the water was over 1200 fathoms.” These coordinates became the official Navy position for the sinking; however, they are most likely an estimate based on where the ship should have been if following its routing instructions exactly. New evidence has shown that the ship was likely southwest to this position.

2. Interior Communications room.

3. Capt. McVay’s description of the visibility here became a critical piece of the prosecution’s case against him in the 3–19 December 1945 general court-martial. McVay reported in his testimony at the court-martial that following the torpedo hits he could not assess the damage because there was no moonlight and it was so dark on the bridge that he could not see anything or anyone. The judge advocate inquired, if it was this dark, why he did not report this in his official after-action report. McVay responded that “at the time I made out that official report the matter—the question of visibility did not appear to me to be one of importance. I prepared the report under some duress. It had to be made in a hurry. In order to submit it, I said what the visibility was, as I remembered it, after I got in the water” (Court-Martial, 356). McVay then agreed that duress was an ill-chosen word, but instead he was “being pushed for time” to get ready for the Court of Inquiry. McVay also reported in his testimony that although multiple versions of his After Action Report were prepared, he changed the content of the original report very little, and only added enclosures from material received from rescue ships. Despite McVay’s clarification of his visibility statement, the presence of contradiction did not serve him well.

4. Metacentric height—the distance between a ship’s center of gravity and its metacenter. A higher GM figure represents greater stability.

5. The vulnerability of Portland-class cruisers to capsize if hit in the right place due to added wartime weight and a nearly nonexistent metacentric height was well known to Capt. McVay. Fifth Fleet Commander Adm. Spruance was aware of the weakness of his flagship as well. In the Court of Inquiry, the judge advocate questioned Capt. McVay about his ship being a “class of cruisers reported as being a soft ship.” Capt. McVay responded that “The Bureau of Ships is particularly concerned over their stability; they have a 1.56 GM in the light condition and a little over two feet plus in the fully loaded condition. They are not expected to right themselves when they list greater than 65 degrees. They are so tender there are strict orders not to add any weight that cannot be fully compensated for. I have heard high ranking officers state as their opinion that they feel certain this class of ship could hardly be expected to take more than one torpedo hit and remain afloat.” The judge advocate followed this, inquiring of McVay, “Did you add any material topside weight during your recent overhaul?” McVay replied affirmatively, “Yes, we did, but I was told it had been fully compensated by the removal of the starboard catapult, one gasoline tank, some splinter shields, and some minor changes. We received three SC planes in place of our SOCs, which added quite a bit of weight. They did not give me an 8,000 gallon emergency distilling plant because I could not find sufficient compensating weight to be removed (COI, 7-8).”

6. As it would be redundant, the “narrative” and a “ facts” section of the Court of Inquiry have been excluded here.

7. See testimony of Lt. Richard Redmayne, ch. 2: Document 2.4.

8. ITEM refers to the -9 time zone in the Pacific. Indianapolis was transiting between -9 1/2 KING and -9 ITEM.

9. Lockwood commanded Pacific Fleet Submarine Force during World War II and is credited for moving the U.S. submarine force from a lagging service into a highly effective one by war’s end.

10. Murray was Commander, Marianas Islands, at the end of World War II. He accepted the Japanese surrender of the Caroline Islands on board his flagship, the other Portland-class cruiser, Portland (CA-33).

11. Whiting commanded Cruiser Division 14.

12. Declassified. CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMINCH, 11 August 1945, ULTRA Extracts, Photocopies in USS INDIANAPOLIS file, Box 396B, Naval History and Heritage Command Archives, WNY. Originals from COMNAVSECGRU File 5830/114.

13. This recommendation refers to a revision of 10CL-45 to specify non-arrival reports. The first steps of action taken regarding this recommendation follow the noted line.

14. Document itself undated, 2 October 1945 handwritten on front page.

15. Other information in header: Section 424/Confidential.

16. Handwritten.

17. Booklet of marked-up plans is not included in archival copy.

18. Excluded from the 11-page report is the general narrative of the sinking, and discussion of damage (Points A–E).

19. Excluded here are GM calculations based on different conditions of flooding (Conditions A, B, C).

20. Term describing how fluid moves in the direction of the list or roll when inside a vessel; this effect therefore intensifies the roll or list.

21. Underlined in pencil on document.

22. This confirms Capt. McVay’s account of the weakness of the class given in the Court of Inquiry.

23. All letters written by Mrs. Neu were handwritten. Her spelling and phrasings were left as present in the originals.

24. Handwritten letter.

25. Hand signed.

26. Street address omitted.

27. In Capt. McVay’s oral history he described a potato crate bumping into him immediately after the ship went under and his using this as a flotation device until a life raft went by minutes later.

Chapter Five

1. Excluded is McVay’s testimony about the circumstances of his departure during the examination by the judge advocate, routing instructions, intelligence reports, visibility at the time of the sinking, the high quality of his officers, the attack, and his actions immediately after.

2. See Document 1.11, ch. 1. The zigzag doctrine outlined in USF 10 Baker was included in the updated version of USF10A provided.

3. No question 49 present.

4. See Bureau of Ships, 2 October 1945 Report in ch. 4, Document 4.5.

5. Because Sino-Japanese ideographs have multiple phonetic readings, the combination of characters for Hashimoto’s given name could be read as either “Iko” or “Mochitsura,” though Mochitsura is the proper reading.

6. 1945.

7. Naval Academy Etajima in Hiroshima.

8. Cdr. John R. Bromley translated on McVay’s behalf. The other Japanese translator present was Francis Royal Eastlake, Office of Naval Intelligence.

9. Secretary of Navy James Forrestal.

10. Enclosure is the letter below.

11. Handwritten on bottom of letter. Refers to Adm. Chester Nimitz (Chief of Naval Operations) and Adm. Louis E. Denfeld (Chief of Naval Personnel).

12. Stamped, Fiorello La Guardia.

13. Murrell commanded Gillette (DE-681).

14. Street address omitted.

15. Handwritten note taped on envelope.

16. Signed M. S. Barrett.

17. Adm. Charles Philip Snyder, Navy Inspector General (May 1942–April 1946).

18. Excluded here to prevent redundancy is Enclosure A of the NIG Report, “Facts and Discussion of Facts.” This section included findings on historical background, the routing instructions, testimony from survivors, and the delayed search for survivors. The essence of the discussion portion comes through in the conclusions extract above. STAMPED [Route to Sec Nav, 7 January 1946], 10 pp. Cover routing slip indicates that SECNAV copy was returned to S-C Files from Adm. Kemp’s office on 1 March 1946.

19. Adm. Louis Denfeld, Chief of Naval Personnel, submitted his concurrence with the members of the court and recommendation for sentence remittance to Secretary Forrestal on 22 January 1946.

20. Lt. Edward Hidalgo, USNR served as an air combat intelligence officer onboard Enterprise (CV-6) during World War II. The year after the war he was SECNAV Forrestal’s special assistant. President Jimmy Carter nominated Hidalgo to be his SECNAV. Hidalgo held that office from 24 October 1979–20 January 1981.

21. In a 2 February 1946 Memorandum to SECNAV Forrestal, Hidalgo remarked on Adm. King’s address that he felt strongly that “drawing the traditional line of demarcation [between regular Navy and the Reserves] should be omitted.” “Memo from Edward Hidalgo to James Forrestal Regarding Edits to Navy Press Release on McVay’s Conviction,” 2 February 1946. Photocopy of original from Indianapolis Ship Files, Box 396A, NHHC Archives, WNY. Originals in RG 80, NARA II, College Park, MD.

22. Hidalgo also recommended in his 2 February memo to Forrestal that specific references to Lt. Gibson and Lt. Cdr. Sancho be deleted and replaced with merely the title of their offices. Hidalgo opined that “there is a strong feeling among men who command our ships (friends of mine on DEs) in the South Pacific area that the failure to report the arrival of a ship not only was the accepted and common practice, but was a procedure entirely consistent with CINCPAC instructions. A further consideration with respect to the naming of these men is the fact that fairness would seem to require the naming of all or none. Other parties are involved in errors of judgment, etc., at Guam and elsewhere who appear to deserve no special claim to anonymity.”

23. Cdr. Roger D. Scott provides the following legal analysis of the McVay conviction: “Capt. McVay was tried and convicted under the Articles for the Government of the Navy. The Articles for the Government of the Navy did not provide for appeals. Power to reverse a Navy conviction remained with the convening authority, who could be reversed only by the Secretary of the Navy or the President. Accordingly, once Secretary Forrestal took final action on the court-martial and the President did not intervene, the judgment was final. Capt. McVay was not entitled to collateral review pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus because he was not sentenced to confinement. He was released and restored to duty. Nor was Capt. McVay entitled to review in the Court of Claims because the sentence, as approved by the Secretary, did not affect his pay. Congress has ‘no power whatever’ to revise or reverse a court-martial judgment. In 1983 Congress limited the power of the military boards for correction of records in court-martial cases to corrections that reflect clemency and actions taken by reviewing authorities. The Board for Correction of Naval Records, therefore, does not have authority to set aside a court-martial conviction. At this point in time, the only power possessed by military authorities over a final judgment 50 years old is the power of the Secretary of the Navy to remit or suspend any unexecuted part of Capt. McVay’s sentence—but Secretary Forrestal has already remitted the sentence in its entirety. As provided by law, then, the judgment of conviction is ‘final and conclusive’ and is ‘binding upon all departments, courts, agencies, and officers of the United States, subject only to ... the authority of the President.’ The President has constitutional power to grant pardon but, in the post-conviction setting, ‘a pardon is in no sense an overturning of a judgment of conviction . ; it is an executive action that mitigates or sets aside punishment for a crime.’ Capt. McVay received no punishment that may be set aside by pardon; moreover, the Pardon Attorney’s office at the Department of Justice related that applications for posthumous pardons are not accepted under current Executive policy. The President, however, has unlimited discretion to grant pardons and may make an exception from his own policy as he sees fit. Given the current legal understanding of the limited effects of a post-conviction pardon, however, Capt. McVay’s conviction is not subject to legal reversal by any recognized means. A Presidential pardon granted as an exception to policy would be chiefly ceremonial.” Roger D. Scott, “Kimmel, Short, McVay: Case Studies in Executive Authority, Law and the Individual Rights of Military Commanders,” Military Law Review, Vol. 156 (June 1998), 190–193.

24. Herman Struve Hensel was the Navy’s General Counsel from July 1941–January 1945, then held the office of Assistant Secretary of Navy until 28 February 1945.

25. Adm. John E. Gingrich served as then Under Secretary of Navy Forrestal’s aide from 1940–44. He then served as the first commanding officer of Pittsburgh (CA-72) for the final year of World War II. After the war, he was promoted to rear admiral and assigned to Chief of Personnel Adm. Louis Denfeld’s staff as director of the Naval Reserve. V. Adm. Oswald Symister Colclough served on submarine duty during World War II and also as captain of North Carolina (BB-55). Following the war, he was Judge Advocate General of the Navy and retired as Commander, Submarine Force Pacific, in 1949. V. Adm. Forrest Percival Sherman was Deputy Chief of Naval Operations. Adm. DeWitt Clinton Ramsey was Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Adm. Arthur Radford was Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air.

26. Edward Hidalgo noted his opinion to SECNAV Forrestal on 16 February that in the upcoming press conference, “we must squarely face a seemingly inevitable question as to whether the Navy is to conduct additional investigations and, if not, what disciplinary action has been taken in addition to the McVay trial. My present understanding is that our investigations are at an end. If true, we should say so frankly. In this connection a decision will have to be made as to our position with respect to the letters of reprimand to Gibson, Drago or any other which may presently be contemplated. Obviously, great care will be required to be persuasive as to our impartiality and over-all fairness in this respect.” Copy in Indianapolis Files, Box 396A, NHHC Archives, WNY. Original in RG 80 NARA II, College Park, MD.

27. A memorandum to Secretary Forrestal from Edward Hidalgo dated 21 February showed the rush to notify Gillette and Granum of their pending public reprimands. Hidalgo wrote “it is important that the letters to Gillette and Granum be delivered as much in advance of the press release as possible. Granum is in Washington; Gillette on the west coast. The goal of the press release on Saturday is still being contemplated.” Copy of Memorandum in Box 396A, NHHC Archives, WNY.

28. V. Adm. Louis Denfeld (Chief of Naval Personnel).

29. Street address omitted.

30. Cdr. Hashimoto was asked to plot the position of his attack on a chart during the court-martial. He did so from memory and qualified the point as an estimate.

31. Not included were criticisms and addressed solutions for life rafts, emergency fresh water supply, emergency medical supplies, and emergency food supplies.

32. CC: INSGEN, BUMED, BUSANDA, BUAIR, BUORD, 645, 980, 633, 660, 429, 5805, 5803, 309.

Chapter Six

1. Scott later became a naval aviator.

2. Committee members present: Sen. John Warner (R–VA), Chairman; Sen. Robert Clinton “Bob” Smith (R–NH); and Sen. Max Cleland (D–GA).

3. Copies of the letter to Sens. Thurmond and John Warner with Navy Office of Legislative Affairs cover letters are dated 11 May 1998 and 12 August 1998.

4. Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-SC).

5. Sen. Rupert Vance Hartke (R-IN) and Sen. Thomas Eagleton (R-MO).

6. Sen. Richard “Dick” Lugar (R-IN).

7. Rep. Floyd Spence (R-SC).

8. Rep. Charles Joseph Scarborough (R-FL).

9. Adm. Donald L. Pilling, VCNO October 1997–October 2000.

10. R. Adm. John Dudley Hutson, Judge Advocate General of the Navy 1997–2000.

11. 26 July 1945.

12. R. Adm. Samuel J. Cox, USN (Ret.) graduated with distinction from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1980 and had a distinguished 37-year naval career as an intelligence officer. He became the 14th Director and Curator of the Navy (office established in 1944 and renamed Naval History and Heritage Command in 2009) on 29 December 2014. Director Cox’s remarks were transcribed from memory shortly after they were delivered, with only minimal changes for clarification purposes. He also noted that he refers to McVay as “captain” throughout his remarks, in spite of the fact that he received a “tombstone” promotion to rear admiral upon his retirement (which was given to those who distinguished themselves through valor or merit during World War II, until the program was ended in 1959) because McVay preferred to be referred to as captain throughout his retirement.

13. Essay prizes are given at the event each year. The two essays referenced were written by Holly Evans and Kathryn Palmer, descendants of Indianapolis and Lost at Sea families for the Gwinn “Angel” Scholarship, named for the pilot who first sighted the survivors, Lt. (j.g.) Chuck Gwinn, and presented by his widow in attendance.

14. Victory at Sea was a 26 episode documentary television series about the Navy during World War II that aired on the NBC network from 1952–1953.

15. Adm. John Richardson began serving as the 31st Chief of Naval Operations on 18 September 2015.

16. Relatives of Adm. Spruance were also in attendance, which is apparently the case at every Indianapolis reunion.

17. 4–8 May 1942, see Robert J. Cressman, The Official Chronology of the U.S. Navy in World War II (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 91–93.

18. 4–6 June 1942, see Cressman, Official Chronology, 100–102.

19. 19 February 1943.

20. Sunk by Japanese submarine I-175 on 24 November 1943, southeast of Makin Island, Gilberts.

21. The painting depicts a near miss while Hornet supported operations on Okinawa through April 1945.

22. Damaged by a kamikaze plane on 14 May 1945, during Okinawa operations.

23. Damaged by two kamikaze planes on 11 May 1945, providing support for the invasion of Okinawa, 346 of crew killed.

24. The attack took place on 19 March 1945, see Cressman, Official Chronology, 303.

25. Nine Sailors killed, see ch. 1. Pensacola’s deselection for the mission is described in Katherine Moore, Goodbye Indy Maru: A Navy Wife Remembers (Lori Publications, 1991), 138. Moore recounts a scene in which her husband, Lt. Cdr. Kasey Moore, USNR (killed in the sinking), told her that Pensacola had failed sea trials and Indianapolis had thus been selected to deliver a “weapon to end the war.” This recounting, in part, seems to be the origin of several citations of Pensacola’s disqualification from the mission. Some questions exist about the accuracy of the conversation Moore recalls, however. It is highly unlikely that Moore would have known what was being delivered, as Capt. McVay was not even aware until he was told after the bomb had been dropped. Pensacola’s war diary from the period indicated that she did have some trouble getting to full speed in rough seas in her initial trials, but full speed was obtained and no other difficulties were reported in the subsequent trials.

26. William J. Toti, “The Sinking of the Indy & Responsibility of Command.” Proceedings (Naval Institute Press, October 1999), 34–38. In his article, Toti finds that the Navy followed the letter of the law, but in doing so they committed a grave injustice against an honored career naval officer.

27. This was the first major naval engagement of the Guadalcanal campaign and took place on 9 August 1942. The ships sunk were Astoria (CA-34), Quincy (CA-39), Vincennes (CA-44), and HMAS Canberra. See Cressman, Official Chronology, 113–114.

28. R. Adm. Daniel Judson Callaghan, commander of TG 67.4, was killed on the bridge of his flagship San Francisco (CA-38) by enemy fire on 13 November 1942. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. R. Adm. Norman Scott died in the same engagement on board his flagship Atlanta (CL-51). Scott was also posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. See Cressman, Official Chronology, 131.

29. The five Sullivan brothers were all on board Juneau (CL-52). The cruiser was sunk in the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal on 13 November 1942, when torpedoes fired from Japanese submarine I-26 struck the already battle- damaged ship causing a massive explosion that sank the ship in less than a minute. Thinking that there were no survivors, and in dangerous waters, U.S. ships sailing with Juneau departed the scene without searching for survivors (of which there were more than 100). The survivors were left at sea for eight days before being rescued—only ten survived—687 of the 697 crew died. The tragedy of Juneau is a worthy comparison to Indianapolis—while the loss of life was not as great, nearly all hands died on Juneau, the loss of life worsened by the delayed rescue. See Dan Kurzman, Left to Die: The Tragedy of the USS Juneau (New York: Pocket Books, 1994).

30. 30 November 1942, off Tassafaronga Point, Guadalcanal. TF 67 under command of R. Adm. Carlton H. Wright comprised of four heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and six destroyers surprised and engaged eight Japanese destroyers—heavy damage was taken by Pensacola (CA-24), New Orleans (CA-32), and Minneapolis (CA-36). Northampton (CA-26) was sunk, but with light loss of life. Only one Japanese destroyer was sunk. See Cressman, Official Chronology, 135. The battle was a tactical defeat for the United States, but it did prevent the Japan from reinforcing its land forces.

31. Adm. William F. Halsey Jr. and Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid. For a description of Battle of Leyte Gulf see Cressman, Official Chronology, 265–69 and Samuel Eliot Morison, Leyte, June 1944–January 1945, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 12 (1958); John Prados, Storm Over Leyte: The Philippine Invasion and the Destruction of the Japanese Navy (2016).

32. 19–20 June 1944, see Cressman, Official Chronology, 237.

33. The attack took place 19 March 1945, see Cressman, Official Chronology, 303.

34. Secretary of Navy, 14 February 1977–24 August 1979.

35. Limited U.S. release on 14 October 2016.

36. In the process of researching for this book, NHHC historians encountered varied translations and accounts of Hashimoto’s attack. Some indicated that he saw flotsam upon surfacing after the attack, others that he relied on his crew’s observations to confirm that their target had sunk.

37. Richard Hulver, “Where Was the Indianapolis When She Sank?,” Surface Warfare (Fall 2016, Issue 52).

38. The lifting of wartime censorship meant that the Indianapolis loss was very much in the public spotlight and a topic that congressmen addressed on behalf of their interested constituents. The most vocal congressional responses were directed toward the Navy’s treatment of McVay and its decision to bring an enemy combatant to the United States to testify against a U.S. captain. See Doug Stanton, In Harm’s Way, 248.

Postscript

1. At the time of writing the location of the wreck site had not been announced, nor had any type of complete survey of the site. Thus, we were unaware of the disposition of the wreckage. Only a small selection of photographs have been released.

2. The Navy based its figures on official paperwork, which is the standard procedure. The 316 number of survivors was correct. The numbers of missing/killed and total onboard were each one off due to the incorrect inclusion of RT2c Clarence W. Donnor. NHHC updated the Indianapolis casualty numbers during the preparation of this volume.

3. As coverage of the story developed, it was announced that the number of living survivors was actually 19.

SELECTED READINGS

Boyd, Carl. “Attacking the Indianapolis: A Re-examination.” Warship International 13, no.1 (1976): 15–25.

Brown, Chip. “Terror of Shark and Sea, 35 Years After.” Washington Post (6 August 1980): E1–E3.

Burlingame, Burl. “Historian: McVay Didn’t Have Spy Data.” Honolulu Star Bulletin (4 November 1993).

Christenson, S. Scott. “The Tragic Indy’s Enduring Fascination.” Naval History Magazine (June 2016, volume 30, no. 3). Available at http://www.usni.org/node/86624.

Cressman, Robert J. The Official Chronology of the U.S. Navy in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000.

Ethridge, Kenneth E. “The Agony of the Indianapolis,” American Heritage 33, no.5 (August-September 1982): 81–96.

Harrell, Edgar, and David Harrell. Out of the Depths: An Unforgettable WWII Story of Survival, Courage, and the Sinking of the USS Indianapolis. Bloomington, MN: Bethany House, 2014.

Hashimoto, Mochitsura. Sunk; The Story of the Japanese Submarine Fleet, 1941–1945. New York, NY: Holt, 1954.

Haynes, Lewis L. and George W. Campbell. “We Prayed While 883 Died.” Saturday Evening Post (6 August 1955): 28–29, 76, 78, 80. Helm, Thomas. Ordeal By Sea: The Tragedy of the U.S.S. Indianapolis. New York, NY: Dodd, Mead, 1963.

Holmes, W. J. Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific During World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979.

Hulver, Richard. “Where was Indianapolis when she Sank?” Surface Warfare (Fall 2016, Issue 52).

Jones, Vincent C. United States Army in World War II. Special Studies, Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1985.

Kurzman, Dan. Fatal Voyage: The Sinking of the USS Indianapolis. New York, NY: Atheneum, 1990.

Kurzman, Dan. Left to Die: The Tragedy of the USS Juneau. New York, NY: Pocket Books, 1994.

Lech, Raymond B. All the Drowned Sailors. New York: Stein and Day, 1982.

Moore, Katherine D. Goodbye, Indy Maru: A Navy Wife Remembers. Knoxville, TN: Lori Publications, 1991.

Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. XII, Leyte, June 1944–January 1945. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1958.

Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol XIV, Victory in the Pacific, 1945. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1960.

Mueller, Michael “Lost at Sea.” American History Illustrated 20, no. 4 (June 1985): 28–35.

Murphy, Marylou. Only 317 Survived!: USS Indianapolis (CA-35): Navy’s Worst Tragedy at Sea—880 Men Died. Broomfield, CO: USS Indianapolis Survivors Organization, 2006.

“Navy Reports on Court Martial and Gives Account of Indianapolis’ Loss.” Army and Navy Journal 83, no. 27 (2 March 1946): 815, 828, 831.

Nelson, Peter. Leftfor Dead: A YoungMan’s Search for Justice for the USS Indianapolis. New York, N.Y.: Delacorte Press, 2002.

Newcomb, Richard F. Abandon ship! Death of the U.S.S. Indianapolis. New York, NY: Holt, 1958.

——. “Four Nights of Terror.” American Legion 111, no. 2 (August 1981): 16–17, 40–41.

Norwitz, Steven. “Remembering the Hunger and Thirst, the Sharks and the Screams.” Washington Post (5 August 1975): B1–B2.

Prados, John. Storm Over Leyte: The Philippine Invasion and the Destruction of the Japanese Navy. New York, NY: Dutton, 2016.

Scott, Roghanger D. “Kimmel, Short, McVay: Case Studies in Executive Authority, Law and the Individual Rights of Military Commanders.” Military Law Review, Vol. 156 (June 1998): 52–199.

Stanton, Doug. In Harm’s Way: The Sinking of the USS Indianapolis and the Extraordinary Story of Its Survivors. New York, NY: H. Holt, 2003.

Toti, William J. “The Sinking of the Indy & Responsibility of Command.” Naval Institute, Proceedings (October 1999), 34–38. Naval Institute Press.

United States. The Sinking of the U.S.S. Indianapolis and the Subsequent Court Martial of Rear Adm. Charles B. McVay III, USN: Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, September 14, 1999. Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O., 2000.

Vladic, Sara. “Lost Survivor of USS Indianapolis (CA-35) Found.” Naval Institute, Proceedings (September 2017).

Wren, L. Peter. Those in Peril on the Sea: USS Bassett Rescues 152 Survivors of the USS Indianapolis. Richmond, VA: L. Peter Wren, 1999.

Archival Sources

National Archives

RG 19, Bureau of Ships

RG 24, Bureau of Naval Personnel

RG 38, Office of Chief of Naval Operations

RG 80, General Records of the Department of Navy, 1798–1947

RG 125, Judge Advocate General (Navy)

Navy Retain File

Library of Congress

Papers of Ernest J. King

Veterans History Project

Naval History and Heritage Command

Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine U.S. Fleet, USF 10A. U.S. Fleet: HQ of COMINCH, 1994. Navy Department Library.

Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Areas. United States Navy File of SIGTOT Messages From JICPOA Estimates Section to CINCPAC Advanced Headquarters, March–August 1945 [SRMD-005]. Located in Navy Department Library Special Collections.

Microfiche 73: WWII War Diary of Indianapolis. Set of 15 fiche.

Microfilm reel NRS 461 for IBM casualty list of 30 July 1945, for losses in Philippine Sea area. Microfilm reel.

Modern Officer Biography Files, NHHC Archives.

Papers of Admiral Louis Denfeld.

Papers of Captain William “Deak” Sterling Parsons.

Papers of Samuel Eliot Morison. Ships Histories Files, USS Indianapolis.

“ULTRA Extracts,” Photocopies in USS INDIANAPOLIS file, Box 396B, Naval History and Heritage Command Archives, WNY. Originals from COMNAVSECGRU File 5830/114.

Zig-Zag Diagrams for Single Ships and Convoys 1940. London: Signal Department, Admiralty, 1940. Navy Department Library.

National Institute for Defense Studies, Military History Research Center, Tokyo, Japan

Records relating to submarine I-58.

INDEX

Illustrations appear in bold text.

Aircraft

American

attack Japanese submarines, 21, 93, 212

Enola Gay. See under Manhattan Project

overlook Indianapolis survivors, 100

and rescue of Indianapolis survivors, 42, 54–55, 75, 100, 102, 104–106, 108–109, 111, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 123–125, 161, 167

American Types

Boeing B-29, 49

Douglas C-54 Skymaster, xxix, 95–96

Consolidated PBY Catalina, xxx, 104, 106, 108–109, 111, 114, 116–120, 122, 123–126

Lockheed PV Ventura, xxx, 49, 106, 109, 114–117, 121, 161

Japanese Types

Nakajima B6N Tenzan (“Jill”), 9

Nakajima Ki-43 Hayabusa (“Oscar”), 3, 355n

Akagane Maru, 290

Alamogordo, New Mexico. See under Manhattan Project Aleutian Islands, 290, 366n

Allen, Paul G., 301–303

Antares (AKS-3), 93

Anthony, Harold Robert, 73, 358n

Anunti, John Melvin, 358n

Anzio (ARL-9), 93

Army and Army Air Force, 95–97, 114, 360n

Astoria (CA-34), 294, 367n

Atlanta (CL-51), 367n

Atomic Bomb. See under Manhattan Project

Atteberry, George, 106, 114–121, 123–124

Attu. See Aleutian Islands

Axtell, Reginald D., 138–139

Baker, Wilder D., 208, 217, 234

Ballard, Robert, 297

Barker, Mary Lou, 190–192

Barker, Robert C., Jr., 55, 190–191

Bassett (APD-73)

departs for Philippines, 110

and rescue of Indianapolis survivors, 55, 105, 110, 125, 136–141, 161

takes Indianapolis survivors to Philippines, 111, 141, 161

Bell, Maurice Glenn, 273

Benton, Clarence U., 62–64, 70

Blum, Donald J., xv, 64

Bollman, Frank E., 61

Bromley, John R., 213–215, 363n

Broser, Jack, 140

Bungo Straits, Japan, 9, 17, 18, 21, 145

Bunker Hill (CV-17), 291, 367n

Cady, John P., 211, 218

Cage, Nicolas, 296

Callaghan, Daniel Judson, 294, 367n

Campbell, Alph, 192–193

Campbell, Mrs. Alph, 192–193

Campbell, Wayland Dee, 192–193

Canberra, Australia, 141–142

HMAS Canberra, 294, 367n

Carter, J. B., 225

Carter, James “Jimmy,” 295

Castellani’s Paint, 43, 357n

Cecil J. Doyle (DE-368)

After-Action Report, 123–128

departs for Peleliu, 123

directed to search for Indianapolis survivors, 123–124

ordered to Peleliu, 127

reports location of bodies of Indianapolis crew to Madison, 127

and rescue of Indianapolis survivors, xxx, 124–125, 294–295

rescues Indianapolis survivors, 107, 119–120, 161

scuttles damaged PBY, 120, 122

sights bodies of Indianapolis crew, 127

takes Indianapolis survivors to Peleliu, 111, 123, 161

uses searchlights to look for survivors, 125

Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, 271

Chester (CA-27), 178

Christensen, Charles Monroe, 157

Clamp (ARS-33), 4–5, 8

Claytor, Graham, Jr., xxx, 107, 123–128, 294–295

Cleland, Max, 366n

Colclough, Oswald Symister, 244, 365n

Congress

Defense Authorization Act (2001), 281, 282–286

exonerates McVay, 286, 288

Senate, 272, 274–275, 366n

sense of, on McVay and crew of Indianapolis, 283–286

sense of on McVay, xxxiii

and unit citation for Indianapolis, xxxiii, 286

Connelly, E., 247

Conway, Thomas

career of, 193

conducts funeral services, 7, 83

death of, 193–194

delivers sermon aboard Indianapolis, 197

dies, 83

McVay on, 195–196

Purple Heart for, 196

Conway, William J., 194–195

Coral Sea, Battle of the, 289, 366n

Cottrell, Lee B., xv

Court of Inquiry

Transcripts, 46–74, 165–173

criticism of McVay, 170–171

investigates Indianapolis and radio test, 94

investigates Eugene Morgan, 60–74, 358n

on Eugene Morgan, 167, 358n

Nimitz on, 173–175

on rescue efforts, 167

on sinking of Indianapolis, 169

Recommendations, Findings, and Opinions

Finding of Facts, 165–171

Opinions and Recommendations, 165–173

and discipline of Stewart Gibson, 172

and discipline of Lynde McCormick, 172

on failures of CTG 95.7, 168, 170, 171

finds that McVay failed to zigzag, 165

recommends court martial of McVay, 165, 171–172

recommends disciplinary letter for CTG 95.7, 165

recommends further proceedings, 171

recommends no proceedings against Eugene Morgan, 358n

Testimony at

by John Anunti, 358n

by Harlan Havener, 358n

by Lynde McCormick, 358n

by Herbert Miner, 357n

by John Moran, 46–51

by Eugene Morgan, 71–74

by Richard Redmayne, 53–59, 167, 358n

by Virgil Russell, 358n

by William Simpson, 67–71

by Elwin Sturtevant, 357n

by J. M. Torretta, 358n

by Harlan Twible, 60–67, 358n

on zigzagging, 169, 172

Cox, Samuel J., 287–299, 302, 366n

Crouch, Edward, xv, 39, 356n

Decatur (DD-5), 258

DeGrave, Glen F., 52, 157

Denfeld, Louis, 219, 245–265, 364n, 365n

Denham, C. D., 129

Deyo, Morton Lyndholm, xiii

Diamond Head, Hawaii, 2, 355n

Dohoney, Jim, 278

Donaho, Glynn, 201

Donnor, Charles, 179, 180

Donnor, Clarence W., 179, 180–182

Donnor, Ruth, 179, 180–181

Driscoll, David L., 50

Dufilho (DE-423), 105, 110, 125–126

Dyer, Thomas H., 142–144

Eagleton, Thomas, 276, 366n

Eastlake, Francis Royal, 363n

Endymion (ARL-9), 92

England, Gordon R., xxxiii, 281–282, 288

Enola Gay. See under Manhattan Project

Enterprise (CV-6), 291, 364n, 367n

Evans, Holly, 366n

Farallon Islands, 15

Ferriter, Charles Arthur, xiii

Fleshman, Alva L., 198–200

Fleshman, Mae, 198–200

Fleshman, Vernon, 198–200

Flynn, Joseph A.

aboard Indianapolis, 157

during attack on Indianapolis, 38, 99, 160, 203

as executive officer, 12

Forrestal, James

King drafts statement on loss of Indianapolis for, 235–239

Navy Inspector General report on sinking of Indianapolis sent to, 224

regarding McVay Court Martial, xxxi, 217, 242, 263–264, 285, 292

regarding McVay sentence, 219, 222–223, 240–241

removes letters of reprimand from disciplined officers’ files, 246

as Secretary of the Navy, 241

Franklin (CV-13), 291, 294, 367n

Freeze, Howard Bruce, 50, 109, 357n

French (DE-367), 112, 113, 123

Furman, Robert R., 12, 13–14

Gibson, Stewart B. [Port Director Operations Officer, NOB Leyte]

disciplinary action against, 165, 174, 239, 246, 254–255, 264

fails to report nonarrival of Indianapolis, 170, 171, 229, 230, 238, 364n

Forrestal removes letter of reprimand from file, 246

and involvement in Court of Inquiry, 358n

Gillette, Norman C. [ComPhilSeaFron]

disciplinary action against, 171, 246, 254–255, 264, 365n

duty of, 256

and failures as commander Philippine Sea Frontier, 230–231

Forrestal removes letter of reprimand from file, 246

Nimitz on, 174

as witness in Inspector General investigation into loss of Indianapolis, 225

Gillette (DE-681), 363n

Gingrich, John E., 244, 365n

Golden Gate Bridge, 2

Granum, Alfred M. [Operations Officer PhilSeaFron]

assignment of, 262

disciplinary action against, 171, 231, 246, 254–255, 264, 365n

and diversion of shipping, 231

Forrestal removes letter of reprimand from file, 246

Nimitz on, 174

Greenwald, Jacob, 63, 64

Grosskopf, Homer L., 234

Guadalcanal, Battle of, 294, 367n

Guam

Court of Inquiry for loss of Indianapolis held at, xxxi

crew of Indianapolis arrives at, 132, 133

Indianapolis at, 2, 5, 16, 19, 20, 108, 290

intelligence flown to, 21, 22

McVay at, 158

Naval Base Hospital No. 18, 52, 134, 135

reports receiving no distress signal from Indianapolis, 141–142

Gwinn, Wilbur “Chuck”

Interview with, 114–121

drops aid to Indianapolis survivors, 115

pilots Ventura, 121

scholarship named after, 366n

sights Indianapolis survivors, xxx, 104, 114–115

Halsey, William F., 294, 368n

Hanson, Edward W., xiii

Harper, John S., 142–144

Harrison, Cecil M., 11

Harrison, Fred E., 129, 129

Hart, F. J., 99

Hartke, Rupert V., 276, 366n

Hashimoto, Mochitsura

career of, 212

commands I-58, 211, 212

describes attack on Indianapolis, 89

interrogated, 84–85

Navy press release on, 211–212

oath of, at Court Martial of McVay, 211, 216

objections to his testifying at McVay Court Martial, 210, 211

personal life of, 212

Samuel Cox on, 295, 296

on sinking of Indianapolis, xxvii–xxviii, 86–88, 213–214, 265, 365n

spelling of name, 211, 363n

testifies at McVay Court Martial, xxxi, 201, 210–211, 213–215, 265

Hatfield, Willie, 76

Havener, Harlan, 358n

Havins, Otha, 43–45

Hayes, Charles D., 157

Haynes, Lewis L.

Oral History of, 13–16, 77–83

on aid to survivors, 80–82

career of, 16

on Thomas Conway, 83

describes sinking of Indianapolis, 77–79

at Guam, 14, 134

on hallucinations, 82, 100

and Indianapolis survivors in water, 78, 100, 119, 196

injuries of, 81

on Stanley Lipski, 80–81

as medical officer aboard Indianapolis, 12, 13, 14–15, 15–16, 157

on Edward Parke, 83

on sharks, 83

spots possible Japanese submarine, 100

Helm (DD-388), 146–147

Henry, Earl O., 157

Hensel, Herman S., 243, 365n

Herstine, James F., 55, 357n

Hewitt, Henry K., xiii

Hidalgo, Edward, 235, 242–244, 364n, 365n

Hiroshima, Japan

Eta Jima, 212, 363n

See also Manhattan Project

Hollandia (CVE-97), 148

Holtzworth, E. C., 84–85, 177–178

Hornet (CV-12), 290, 367n

Howison, John D., 64

Hulver, Richard, xxi, 303

Hunt, Charles B., 234

Hunters Point, 2, 13–14

Hutson, John D., 282, 366n

I-13, 93

I-36, 92, 93

I-47

carries kaiten, 145

departs Japan, 18

orders of, 17

patrol area of, 145–146

U.S. intelligence on, 9, 18, 21, 91, 93, 145

I-53

American intelligence on, 91, 93, 143, 145

carries kaiten, 145

kaiten aboard, 91

orders of, 17

patrol area of, 145–146

sinks Underhill, 91, 145, 284, 297

I-58

American intelligence on, 91, 92, 93, 143, 145–146

attack on Indianapolis, 84–85, 86–88, 87, 89

attacks destroyer, 86

attacks oiler, 86

bombed at Kure, 212

carries kaiten, 145

commanded by Hashimoto, 211, 212

departs Japan, 17, 18

description of, 212

equipped with kaiten, 18

kaiten aboard, xxvii, xxxiii, 84, 85, 88

orders of, 17

patrol area of, 145–146

reported sunk, 21

report of intercepted, 90, 91, 92

reports sinking enemy vessel, 88

reports sinking of Indianapolis, 146, 248–249

at Sasebo, 10

scuttled, 10

sights American plane, 88

sinks Indianapolis, xxvii–xxviii, 292

torpedoes Indianapolis, 45

torpedo room of, 90

uses kaiten, 86

U.S. intelligence on, 9, 18, 21–22

I-165, 92, 93

I-175, 290, 367n

I-361, 92, 93

I-363, 92, 93

I-366, 93

I-367

American intelligence on, 93, 145

carries kaiten, 93, 145

departs Japan, 18

orders of, 17

patrol area of, 145–146

U.S. intelligence on, 9, 18, 91

I-400, 18, 22

I-401, 18, 22

Idaho (BB-42), 19

Indianapolis (CA-35), xiv

Aftermath of Loss, xxxi

Court of Inquiry, xxxi

Inspector General Investigation of, 223–232

Atomic Bomb Mission

Plan of the Day July 16, 10–12

and carriage of atomic bomb components, xxv, 2, 10, 12–13, 13–14, 16, 355n

departs Guam, 2

departs Pearl Harbor, 15

departs San Francisco, 2

departs Tinian, 2, 16

at Hunters Point, 13

leaves Hunters Point, 14

leaves Mare Island, 13

at Mare Island Navy Yard, 1, 3, 45, 46, 291–292

sails to Guam, xxvi, 2, 16

sails to Pearl Harbor, xxv–xxvi, 2, 15, 292

sails to Tinian, xxv–xxvi, 2, 16, 292

at San Francisco, 1–2

sets speed record, xxv–xxvi, 2, 15, 280, 292

Attack On

condition at time of sinking, 166, 177, 206

course of at time of sinking, 98

damage suffered during, 38–40, 45, 47, 52–53, 53–54, 55–59, 98–99, 162–163, 177–178, 206

description of attack on, 84–85, 86–88, 89

number of explosions during attack, 50, 58, 61, 98–99

and possible use of kaiten against, 84, 85

torpedoed by I-58, xxvii–xxviii, 38, 45, 84, 85, 87, 109, 161, 292

visibility during, xxvii, 57, 60–61, 65, 85, 86, 88, 98, 160, 166, 169, 202, 209, 214, 218, 227, 250, 284, 295, 296, 361n–362n

and zigzagging, 30, 37, 98, 109, 159, 165, 169, 170, 171, 201, 213–214, 218, 237

Commendations for, xiv, xxxiii, 272, 275–280

Awarded Navy Unit Commendation, 279–280

Sense of Congress on, 283–286

Crew, After Sinking (see also Life Saving Equipment)

and aid from aircraft, 104–105, 106, 108–109, 111, 114, 115, 116

aircraft search for, 113

attacked by sharks, 43, 75, 76, 83, 117

conditions of, 50, 51, 54–55, 56, 60

conditions of survivors of sinking, 100

described, 40–43, 79–83, 160, 357n

groups of after sinking, 75

and hallucinations, 41, 82, 100

and lack of rations, 41, 60, 83, 160

and lack of water, 41, 79–80, 81, 82, 83, 120, 160

numbers of, 42

and rations for, 42, 50, 55, 62, 65, 66, 68–69, 72, 102

search and rescue effort ordered for, 123

ships sent to aid, 105–106

sight aircraft, 49, 54–55, 102, 161

spotted by aircraft, 96–97, 114–115, 116, 117

in water, xxix–xxx

water of, 42, 50, 54, 57, 62–63, 65, 66, 68–69, 72–73

Crew, Deceased

buried, 129, 147

located, 127

recovered, 112, 139–140, 146, 147

and sharks, 117

Crew, Survivors

aboard Bassett, 140–141

aboard Ringness, 111

aboard Talbot, 111

aboard Tranquility, 131, 132

arrive at Fleet Hospital No. 114, 110–111

arrive at Guam, 132, 133

brought aboard Cecil J. Doyle, 123–124

conclude Charles B. McVay not at fault for sinking, 285

condition of, 118–119

found by Ringness, 101

and hospital at Peleliu, xxx–xxxi, 111, 128, 130, 148, 161

and hospital at Samar, xxx–xxxi, 110–111, 141, 148, 161

picked up by Ringness, 49

receive medical treatment, 129

report on, 111

rescued by Bassett, 55, 110, 125, 136–141, 161

rescued by Cecil J. Doyle, 107, 119, 120, 161

rescued by Dufilho, 110, 125–126

rescued by Madison, 110

rescued by PBY-5 A, 109

rescued by Register, 109, 161

rescued by Ringness, 109, 161

rescue of, xxx, 294–295

rescue of reported, 108

return home, 148

tabulations of, xxiv, 179

and Tranquility, 110, 130

Crew of, xv, xxv, 157, 226, 289–290, 291

Summary of Final Crew of, xv

Damaged at Okinawa, xxiv–xxv, 1, 6, 8, 291, 367n

Report of War Damage to, off Okinawa, 3–5

Design weaknesses of, 164, 177–178, 362n, 363n

Final Voyage of

course of, 97

departure from Guam, 108

expected at Leyte, 34, 36, 229

and failure to arrive at Leyte, 251–254

and failure to report non-arrival, 238

intelligence report for, 22, 25–26

Leyte as destination of, 2

non-arrival reported, 108

ordered to Philippines, 16

passes LST-779, 2, 31, 98

receives orders at Guam, 16

to report to Task Force 95, 19, 20

routing of, 2, 18, 19, 22, 23–24, 27, 226

speed to Leyte, 22

voyage to Leyte, xxvi

Lessons Learned, xxiii, 266–269

Life Saving Equipment

aboard, 40, 46, 50, 51, 54, 227, 239

deficiencies in, 167

See also Life Saving Equipment

Loss of

announced, 193, 196, 293

Samuel Cox on, 288

failures of CTG 95.7 in, 165

McVay on, 183

reported, 108

role of intelligence in, 142–144

Pre-World War II Service, xvi, xxiii

Repairs to, xxv, 4, 5

Sinking of, 87–88, 162, 214

Bureau of Ships on, 176–178

McVay describes damage to, 159–160

Commander, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet attempts to contact, 94–95

described, 44, 74–75

and distress message, xxviii–xxix, 38, 39, 46, 99, 161, 162, 166, 228, 259–260, 357n

evacuation of, 38–40, 99, 162, 206–207

I-58 reports, 146

list of, 38, 39, 44, 47, 99–100, 160

radio rooms during, 47–49, 267–269, 357n

summary of, of from Commander, Peleliu Island, 98–100

World War II Service before Sinking, xiv, xvii, xxiii–xxv, 7, 289–290

Wreck of, xxxiv, 265, 296–297, 301–303, 305, 365n

Intelligence, American

ULTRA Extracts, 9, 17–22, 91–94, 143–146, 148–149

intercepts report that I-58 sank Indianapolis, 248–249

on Japanese submarine activity, 226

and mistake of Indianapolis sinking for naval engagement, 96–97

report for Indianapolis, 25–26

on sinking of Indianapolis, 228–229

Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Oceans Area (JICPOA)

estimates of Japanese submarine operations, 21–22

on I-58, 143

intercepts report from I-58, 90, 91

investigates role in loss of Indianapolis, 142–144

reports I-58 sunk, 21

Special Submarine Summary, 92–93

ULTRA

distribution of, 8–9, 22, 355n

on Japanese submarine operations, 9, 17–18, 18–19, 91–92, 93, 145–146

relating to atomic bombing of Hiroshima, 148–149

and release of, xxvi

and role in sinking of Indianapolis, 297

and sinking of Indianapolis, xxxii–xxxiii

summary of intelligence regarding loss of Indianapolis, 144–146

Iwo Jima, xiv, 33, 141–142, 290

Jacobs, Randall, 180

Jacobson, Jacob H., 171

Jacquemont, Joseph, 132

Janney, Johns H.

aboard Indianapolis, 157

casualty of Indianapolis sinking, 356n

and Indianapolis distress message, 38–39, 202–203

as navigator of Indianapolis, 22

receives intelligence report, 22, 25–26

and routing instructions for Indianapolis, 22, 23–24, 204–205

Jaws, xxxii, 272, 273, 282

Jenney, Charles, 11

Johnson, Einar R., xiii

Juneau (CL-52), 367n

Kaiten

aboard I-36, 92

aboard I-53, 91

aboard I-58, xxxiii, 17, 18, 84, 85, 86, 88

aboard I-363, 93

aboard I-366, 93

aboard I-367, 93

launched, 92

U.S. intelligence on, 9, 18, 91, 92, 93, 145

Kamikaze, 290, 291, 367n

Kaufmann, James L., 230, 231

Kenly, Oliver W., 98

Kerama Retto, 4, 8

Kimmel, Husband E., 257

King, Ernest J.

admonished by Charles B. McVay, Jr., 297

as Chief of Naval Operations, 144, 241

and court martial of McVay, xxxi, 208, 233, 239, 240–241, 245, 285

criticism of emergency equipment, 239

drafts statement on loss of Indianapolis for Forrestal, 235–239

on failure to report non-arrival of Indianapolis, 238

on loss of Indianapolis, 236–239

Navy Inspector General report on sinking of Indianapolis sent to, 224

on Navy Reserves, 235, 236, 364n

orders court martial of McVay, 208, 292

orders Inspector General investigation into loss of Indianapolis, 208, 248

relieved as Chief of Naval Operations, 235

on rescue of Indianapolis survivors, 238–239

Kinkaid, Thomas C., xiii, 294, 368n

Kiska. See Aleutian Islands

Kraft, Robert, 302–303

Kure, Hiroshima Prefecture, Japan, 93, 212

Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands, xiv, 290

La Guardia, Fiorello, 219, 220

Layton, Edwin T., 94, 142–144, 144, 229

LCT-1414, 8

Lee, Willis A., Jr. “Ching,” 176

LeFrancis, Richard G., 95, 96–97

Leyte, Philippines

Expected Arrivals at, 34–36

Bassett departs to, 110

Bassett takes Indianapolis survivors to, 111

as destination of Indianapolis, 2

Indianapolis non-arrival at reported, 108

and Indianapolis routing, 19, 20, 229

Indianapolis survivors sent to, 111

and routing of LST-779, 2, 34, 36

Leyte Gulf, Battle of, 294, 368n

Life Saving Equipment, xxiii

Fishing gear, 55, 357n

Flares, xxix, xxx, xxxii, 49, 57, 95, 100, 119, 124–125, 140, 161, 164

Floater nets, 3, 39, 46, 50, 54, 68, 72, 79, 160, 163

Fresh water, 73, 227

Life belts (Pneumatic), xxix, 39, 44, 64, 75, 147, 160, 357n

Life jackets (Kapoks), xxix, 39–42, 54, 79–82, 100, 105, 117, 121, 127, 147, 160, 357n

limitations of, 40, 167

oversupply of, 40

recommendations to discontinue use of, 163

superiority to life belts, 42

Life rafts, xxvi–xxvii, xxix, xxx, xxxii, 37, 39, 43–46, 46, 50–51, 54–57, 60, 62–66, 68–70, 72–73, 75–76, 79, 83, 95, 100–102, 104, 106, 109, 111, 113, 115–120, 124–125, 127, 137, 140, 156, 160, 161, 164, 167, 172, 227, 231, 239, 266, 269, 272, 298, 356n–357n, 363n, 365n

McVay recommends improvements to, 163–164

Medical Supplies, 51, 357n

Navy Inspector General on inadequacies of, 227

Rations, xxix, 55, 60, 62–64, 66, 68, 70–73, 83, 102, 115, 160, 167, 198, 363n

Signaling mirrors, 100, 161, 164

Smoke pots, 164

Water Breakers, xxxii, 54, 57, 160, 164, 167, 227

Lipski, Stanley, 81

Lipski, Stanley, Mrs., 81

Liscome Bay (CVE-56), 290, 367n

Little Boy (Atomic Bomb). See under Manhattan Project: Atomic Bomb

Lockwood, Charles A., Jr., 172, 362n

Los Alamos Laboratory. See under Manhattan Project

LST-779

Deck Log, 31–33

conducts firing exercises, 2, 31

identified, 296

at Iwo Jima, 33

and location of Indianapolis, xxxiv

passed by Indianapolis, 2, 31

records of assist in discovery of wreck of Indianapolis, 301

and routing to Leyte, 2, 34, 36

voyage from Guam to Samar, 31–33

Lugar, Richard “Dick,” 276, 366n

MacArthur, Douglas, 261

McClintic, William S., xiii

McCormick, Lynde D. [Commander, Task Group 95.7]

as Commander, Task Group 95.7, 19, 172

Court of Inquiry recommends disciplinary letter for, 165

Court of Inquiry recommends proceedings against, 171

failures of, 168, 170, 171

at Leyte, 19

Nimitz on, 174, 175

receives incomplete information on Indianapolis, 228

testifies at Indianapolis court of inquiry, 19, 358n

as witness in Inspector General investigation into loss of Indianapolis, 225

McElroy, Clarence E., 135

McKissick, Charles B., 201, 203–205, 207

McMorris, Charles H., 225, 230, 231

McVay, Charles Butler, III

Oral History, 1–3, 37–43, 101–103, 155–156

After Action Report

Text of, 159–164

discusses with reporters, 158

identifies lessons learned, 163–164

on life preservers, 40

recommendations of, xxxii, 163–164

reports of, 361n

submits, 158, 361n

Career

aboard Indianapolis, 157

advanced to rear admiral, xxxii, 240, 281

assigned to staff of Stanton Merrill, 240

and career after Court Martial, 260

Samuel Cox on, 298–299

decorations of, 240–241

description of, 285–286

and kamikaze attack at Okinawa, 7

retires, xxxii

Correspondence with families of Indianapolis crew

Letters, 182–183, 184–189, 190–193, 194–197, 198–200

on Thomas Conway, 195–197

on loss of Indianapolis, 183

on Navy announcement of loss of Indianapolis, 193, 196

Court Martial

Charges of, 208–209

Samuel Cox on, 292–293

Forrestal supports, xxxi

held at Washington Navy Yard, xxxi, 208, 210

King orders, 208

Fiorello La Guardia writes to regarding, 220

Navy press release on, 242, 244–245

Nimitz on, 173, 174

Nimitz recommends against, 208

recommended for, xxxi

Hunter Scott on, 273–274

Secretary of the Navy recommends, 263–264

Court Martial, Conviction, and Sentence

acquitted of culpable inefficiency, 240

convicted, 233, 240, 243, 244, 281, 293

Court Martial of found sound, 276

fails to zigzag, xxiv

and Forrestal on, 217, 222, 240–241

Edward Hidalgo on, 242–244

King on, xxxi, 208, 233, 234, 239, 240–241

legal analysis of, 364n–365n

loses 100 numbers, 281

Thomas G. Murrell on, 221–222

Nimitz recommends letter of reprimand for, 263–264

reactions to, 219–220, 221–222

results announced, 216–217

results reported, 217–218

sentence of, xxxi–xxxii, 233, 240, 244–245, 257–258, 293

sentence remitted, 233, 245, 293

Court Martial, Proceedings of

Testimony, 201–207, 213–215, 216, 234

John P. Cady as counsel at, 211

on condition YOKE, 206

Glynn Donaho testifies at, 201

Hashimoto’s oath at, 211, 216

Hashimoto testifies at, xxxi, 201, 210–211, 265, 365n

officers on board, 234

and orders for zigzagging, 202–203, 204–205, 207

press conference on, 245–265, 365n

and question of zigzagging, 201

service record read at, 218

translators at, 363n

Court of Inquiry

findings and recommendations, 165, 170–171, 171–172, 263–264

testimony at, 58

Death of

Obituary, 271–272

commits suicide, xxxii, 271, 285

dogtag of, 274

Exoneration of, xxxiii, 281, 282–286

Regarding attack and sinking

Samuel Cox’s evaluation of, 295

on damage to Indianapolis, 206

describes attack on Indianapolis, 98–99

describes damage to Indianapolis, 38–40, 98–99, 159–160, 162–163

describes explosions, 37–38

describes Indianapolis sinking, 37–43

describes visibility at time of sinking, 160, 218, 361n–362n

and distress message, 38–39, 202–203

and evacuation of Indianapolis, xxviii, 38, 79, 99, 160, 206–207

on list of Indianapolis, 38, 39

opinion of Joseph Flynn, 38

orders distress message sent, 159

and zigzagging, xxvi–xxvii, 28, 159, 218, 237, 242, 243, 244, 283–284, 292, 295

Regarding final voyage of Indianapolis

on delivery of atomic bomb components, 1–2

on departure from Guam, 2

discusses delivery of atomic bomb components, 14, 15

discusses routing instructions with navigator, 22

instructions for, 2

and instructions on zigzagging, 24

meets with William Parsons, 2

meets with William Purnell, 2

recalls sighting LST, 31

routing instructions for, 23–24

Regarding his survival

arrives in Palau, 103

condition of, 111

on conditions in water, 101–102

Samuel Cox on, 298–299

describes attempts to attract aircraft, 161

on experience in water after sinking, 40–43

on experience of survivors, 60

feelings on loss of Indianapolis, 155–156

at Guam, 134, 158

on rations for survivors, 42–43

on rescue, 102–103

rescued, xxx, 103, 109

on sharks, 37, 43, 357n

spots aircraft, 102

takes charge of group of survivors, 44–45

thoughts on, 156

and time in water, xxix–xxx

on water for survivors, 42–43

whereabouts unknown, 108

Regarding survivors

attends reunion of, 271

checks roster of Indianapolis crew, 196

corrects Indianapolis final roster, xv

describes groups of survivors, 160

on number of survivors of sinking, 42

survivors conclude not at fault for sinking, 285

McVay, Charles B., Jr., 210, 297

Madison (DD-425)

orders Cecil J. Doyle to Peleliu, 127

reports on search for Indianapolis survivors, 111, 112

and search and rescue effort for Indianapolis crew, 105–106, 110, 124, 126–127

Manhattan Project

Atomic Bombs and Bombings

components delivered by Indianapolis, 355n

components loaded aboard Indianapolis, 2, 10, 12–13

components loaded on Indianapolis, 12–14

components offloaded from Indianapolis, 16

description of components, 14

Hiroshima bombing, xxx, 148, 149, 150–152

Little Boy, 14, 17, 153, 355n

Nagasaki bombing, 148

tested at Trinity, Alamogordo, New Mexico, 14, 148, 355n

Enola Gay

atomic bomb loaded onto, 153

bombs Hiroshima, 355n

William Parsons as weaponeer of, 148, 355n

Los Alamos Laboratory, 12, 148, 150–151, 355n

Ordnance Division of, 355n

overseen by Military Policy Committee, 355n

Manila, Philippines, 261

Mare Island Navy Yard, California, xxv, 1, 5, 13, 291–292

Marks, Robert A.

aboard Cecil J. Doyle, 120, 125

aircraft of damaged, 118, 125

aircraft of scuttled, 120, 122, 123, 126

arrives at Indianapolis survivors, 116, 117

drops aid to Indianapolis survivors, 116, 117

lands to assist Indianapolis survivors, 117–120, 124–125, 294

pilots PBY-5 A, 122

and rescue of Indianapolis survivors, xxx, 114

on sharks, 117

sights Cecil J. Doyle, 119

Medal of Honor, 367n

Men of Courage, 295–296, 368n

Merrill, Stanton, 240

Midway, Battle of, 289, 366n

Milbrodt, Glenn L., 128

Miller, Doris, 290

Miner, Herbert J., 357n

Minneapolis (CA-36), 178

Mitscher, Marc, 176, 294

Modisher, Melvin W., 15

Moore, Kyle C. “Casey,” 38, 157

Moran, John J., 46–51, 52, 99

Morgan, Eugene S.

accusations against, 55, 56, 60, 62–63, 65, 66, 358n

allegations against refuted, 167

condition of, 64

Court of Inquiry recommends no proceedings against, 358n

not convicted of immoral conduct, 60, 357n

receives orders regarding food and water, 63

testifies at Court of Inquiry, 71–74

testimony regarding, 64, 65, 67–70, 68–69, 70, 167

Murray, George D., 172, 362n

Murray, J. D., 225

Murrell, Thomas G., 221–222, 222–223, 363n

Musashi, 303

Nagasaki, Nagasaki Prefecture, Japan, 148

Naquin, Oliver F., 226

Navy

Conditions of Readiness and Material Conditions, 307–308

Rescue Dispatches, 104–113

Aircraft Squadrons

VPB-23, 109, 122

VPB-152, 104, 105, 106, 108, 113, 123–124

Bureau of Ships, 84–85, 176–178, 206, 266–269, 362n

Chief of Legislative Affairs, 275–277

Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 275–277 (see King, Ernest J.; Nimitz, Chester W.; Richardson, John M.)

Commander Peleliu Island, 98–100

Commander Philippine Sea Frontier, 105, 106, 229–231

Commander Western Carolines Sub Area, 108–109, 111, 113, 123–124

Hospitals

Fleet Hospital No. 114 [Samar], xxx–xxxi, 110–111, 161

Naval Base Hospital No. 18 [Guam], 52

Naval Base Hospital No. 20 [Peleliu], xxx–xxxi, 104, 128, 161

Inspector General

investigates Harold J. Theriault, 136–141

investigation on sinking of Indianapolis, 208, 223–232, 248, 264

on Charles Butler McVay III, 227

conclusions of, 226–231

on deficiencies of emergency equipment, 227

on failures of Philippine Sea Frontier command, 229–231

recommendations of, 231–232

sends report on to James Forrestal, 224

submits report of to Ernest King, 224

witnesses in, 225–226

Naval Academy, 296

Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC)

Samuel Cox on mission of, 288

description of, 303–304

and history of Indianapolis, xxxiii–xxxiv

location of, 208, 210

Press Release Announcing Discovery of Indianapolis Wreckage, 301–303

and review of materials related to sinking of Indianapolis, 296–297, 368n

role of, 299

Navy Reserves, 235, 236, 364n

Pacific Fleet

Commander, Amphibious Forces, 94–95

directive 10CL-45, xxix, 167–170, 172, 173, 175

and Indianapolis rescue, 110, 111

and information on Japanese submarines, 92, 94

intelligence units, 143, 228–229

Task Forces and Groups

Task Group 75, 108

Task Group 95, 19, 20, 228

Task Group 95.7, 19, 165, 168, 170, 171, 228 (see also McCormick, Lynde)

5th Fleet, xvii, 289, 290

7th Fleet, 142

Secretary of the Navy, 244–245, 275–277, 279–280, 281–282

Navy, Japanese, Submarines

American intelligence on, 8, 17–18, 18–19, 21–22, 25, 91–92, 93, 248–249

sink Liscome Bay, 290, 367n

See also I-13; I-36; I-47; I-53; I-58; I-165; I-175; I-361; I-363; I-366; I-367; I-400; I-401; Kaiten

Navy Cross, 290

Navy Unit Commendation, 279–280

Neu, Carmellia, 184–189

Neu, Hugh H., 184–189

New Guinea, Melanesia, 289

New Mexico (BB-40), 8

New Orleans (CA-32), 178, 367n

Nightingale, William C., 54

Nimitz, Chester W.

holds press conference on McVay Court Martial, 245–265

aboard Indianapolis, xvii, 176

as Chief of Naval Operations, 241

court martialed as skipper of Decatur, 258

on Court of Inquiry, 247–248

criticism of Stewart Gibson, 174

criticism of Jules Sancho, 174

disagreements with Court of Inquiry findings, xxxi, 173–175, 208, 284–285, 292

on Norman Gillette, 174

on Alfred Granum, 174

on Inspector General investigation, 249

investigates receipt of distress signal from Indianapolis, 141–142

on loss of Indianapolis, 247–248

on Lynde McCormick, 174

on McVay, 173, 174

orders disciplinary action, 175

revises 10CL-45, 175

on TG 95.7, 175

on zigzagging, 174, 208

Nolan, James F., 12, 13–14

Northampton (CA-26), 367n

North Carolina (BB-55), 365n

Okinawa, xxiv–xxv, 290

See also Indianapolis: Damage at Okinawa

Oldendorf, Jesse B., 19, 225, 228

Oligar, John, 128

Omaha (CL-4), 2

Ominato, Aomori Prefecture, Japan, 9, 18, 22, 93

Oppenheimer, Robert J., 150, 355n

Orr, John I., Jr., 38

Own, Eugene, 134

Palmer, Kathryn, 366n

Parke, Edward L., 41, 80, 83, 357n

Parshall, Joe, 96–97

Parsons, William “Deak”

interviewed on atomic bombing of Hiroshima, 150–152

at Guam, 150

meets with McVay, 2

as weaponeer aboard Enola Gay, 148, 153, 355n

witnesses Trinity Test, 148

and work on Manhattan Project, 148, 150, 355n

Patterson, Alfred T., 182–183

Patterson, Alfred Thompson, 182–183

Patterson, Mrs. Alfred T., 182–183

PCE-898, 26

Pearl Harbor, Hawaii

American casualties at, 290

description of, 15

Indianapolis arrives at, 2, 15

Indianapolis travels to, 292

Japanese attack on, 289

Peleliu, Palau Islands

Cecil J. Doyle ordered to, 127

Cecil J. Doyle takes Indianapolis survivors to, 111

French returns to, 113

Indianapolis crew at, 148

Indianapolis crew buried at, 129

Indianapolis survivors at, 130

Indianapolis survivors hospitalized at, 111

Naval Base Hospital No. 20, xxx–xxxi, 76, 128, 161

reports receiving no distress signal from Indianapolis, 141–142

Tranquility dispatched to, 104, 110

war correspondents to interview Indianapolis survivors at, 111

Pensacola (CA-24), 178, 291–292, 367n

Research Vessel (R/V) Petrel, 301–302, 303

Philippine Sea, Battle of, 294, 368n

Philippine Sea Frontier Command, 261

Phillips, Huie H., 128

Pilling, Donald L., 282, 366n

Pirie, Robert B., Jr., 279–280

Pittsburgh (CA-72), 365n

Popham, William S., 234

Port Director, Guam, 2

Portland (CA-33), 178, 362n

Portland-class cruisers, 362n

Presidential Unit Citation, 272, 275–277, 278

Press and News Agencies, 111, 150–152, 220, 245–265

Purnell, William R., 2, 355n

Quincy (CA-39), 294, 367n

Radford, Arthur, 244, 365n

Ralph Talbot (DD-390), 105–106, 111, 124, 126–127

Ramsey, DeWitt C., 244, 245–265, 365n

Redfield, Heman J., 234

Redmayne, Richard

abandons ship, 54

accusations against Eugene Morgan, 55, 56, 62, 64, 358n

and actions during sinking of Indianapolis, xxviii

on damage to Indianapolis, 53–54, 55–59

at Fleet Hospital No. 114, 111

as Indianapolis chief engineer, 52–53

places Clarence Benton in charge of food, 62

on sinking of Indianapolis, 53–54

on state of moon at sinking of Indianapolis, 57

testifies at Court of Inquiry, 53–59

and testimony at Court of Inquiry, 167

Register (APD-92), 102, 106, 109, 161

Requa, Harold, 111

Richardson, John M., 288

Ringness (APD-100)

homeward bound, 103

Indianapolis survivors aboard, 111

participates in search and rescue of Indianapolis crew, 101, 106, 127

reports rescue of Indianapolis survivors, 109

rescues Indianapolis survivors, 49, 101, 102–103, 109, 161

takes survivors to Peleliu, 109, 161

Rives, D. B., 177–178

Rogers, Ross, Jr., 109

Roosevelt, Franklin D., xvi, xxiii

Rue, William, 55

Russell, Virgil, 358n

Ryan, Thomas J., Jr., 208, 211, 216–217, 218

Salt Lake City (CA-25), 3

Samar, Philippines, xxx–xxxi, 110–111, 148, 161

San Bernardino Strait, 294

Sancho, Jules C. [Port Director, NOB Leyte]

as Acting Port Director, Tacloban, 229

Court of Inquiry on, 165, 171

criticism of, 174, 238, 364n

dereliction of duty of, 230

fails to report non arrival of Indianapolis, 170, 171, 229–230

Forrestal removes letter of reprimand from file, 246

reprimanded, 239, 246, 254–255, 264

San Francisco. See Hunters Point; Mare Island

San Francisco (CA-38), 367n

Sasebo, Nagasaki Prefecture, Japan, 10, 90

Savo Island, Battle of, 294, 367n

Scarborough, Charles J., 278, 366n

Schechterle, Harold J., 15–16

Scott, Hunter, xxxiii, 272–275, 277, 278

Scott, Norman, 294, 367n

Secretary of the Navy. See under Navy

Shafroth, John F., Jr., xiii

Sharks

accounts of, xxx, xxxiii, xxxiv, 43, 55, 75, 76, 83, 117, 121, 161, 357n

and bodies of Indianapolis crew, 146, 147

Samuel Cox on, 289

McVay dismisses reports of, 37

Sherman, Forrest P.

asked about Alfred Granum, 262

attends press conference on McVay Court Martial, 245–265

on failure of Indianapolis to send distress message, 259–260

on intelligence of Japanese submarine activities, 248–249

on nonarrival of Indianapolis at Leyte, 251–254

on zigzagging, 250

Shipman, Robert, 129

Simpson, William E., 67–71

Smeallie, John M., xiii

Smedberg, William III, 144, 145–146

Smith, Cozell Lee, 76

Smith, Robert C. “Bob,” 278, 366n

Snyder, Charles P., 224, 364n

Spence, Floyd, 276, 366n

Spruance, Raymond A.

aboard Indianapolis, xvii, 176

awards Purple Hearts, 52

at Base Hospital No. 18, Guam, 135

flag cabin aboard Indianapolis, 14

makes Indianapolis flagship, xxiii, 289

opposes court martial of McVay, 284–285, 292

and weakness of Portland-class cruisers, 362n

Stark, Harold R., 257

Stevens, George G., 74–75

Stone, Earl E., 225

Sturtevant, Elwin L., 357n

Sullivan, John R., 234

Sullivan Brothers, 294, 367n

Tacloban, 229–230, 261

Tarawa, Gilbert Islands, xiv, 290

Tassafaronga, Battle of, 290, 367n–368n

Theriault, Harold J., 136–141, 361n

Theiss, Paul S., 234

Thurmond, J. Strom [Chairman], 272, 275

Tinian, Northern Marianas Islands, 16, 141–142, 148, 153, 292

Torretta, J.M., 358n

Toti, William J., 292, 367n

Tranquility (AH-14), 104, 110, 130–133

Trinity Site. See Manhattan Project

Truman, Harry S., 293

Twible, Harlan M., 60–67, 358n

Twiggs (DD-591), 8

Ulithi, Caroline Islands, 18, 105–106, 110, 141–142

Ullman, Paul E., 11

ULTRA. See under Intelligence, American

Underhill (DE-682), 91, 145, 284, 297

Very flares, xxix, xxx, xxxii, 49, 54–55, 57, 95, 100, 119, 124–125, 140, 161, 164

Vessels

American

Antares (AKS-3), 93

Anzio (ARL-9), 93

Astoria (CA-34), 294, 367n

Atlanta (CL-51), 367n

Bassett (APD-73), 55, 105, 110, 111, 125, 136–141, 161

Bunker Hill (CV-17), 290, 367n

Chester (CA-27), 178

Clamp (ARS-33), 4, 5, 8

Decatur (DD-5), 258

Dufilho (DE-423), 105, 110, 125–126

Endymion (ARL-9), 92

Enterprise (CV-6), 290, 364n, 367n

Franklin (CV-13), 290, 294, 367n

French (DE-367), 112, 113, 123

Gillette (DE-681), 363n

Helm (DD-388), 146–147

Hollandia (CVE-97), 148

Hornet (CV-12), 290, 367n

Idaho (BB-42), 19

Juneau (CL-52), 367n

LCT-1414, 8

Liscome Bay (CVE-56), 290, 367n

LST-779, xxxiv, 2, 31–33, 33, 34, 36, 296, 301

Madison (DD-425), 105–106, 110, 111, 112, 126–127

Minneapolis (CA-36), 178

New Mexico (BB-40), 8

New Orleans (CA-32), 178, 367n

Northampton (CA-26), 367n

North Carolina (BB-55), 365n

Omaha (CL-4), 2

PCE-898, 26

Pensacola (CA-24), 178, 291–292, 367n

Pittsburgh (CA-72), 365n

Portland (CA-33), 178

Quincy (CA-39), 294, 367n

Ralph Talbot (DD-390), 105–106, 111, 124, 126–127

Ringness (APD-100), 49, 101, 102–103, 103, 106, 109, 111, 127, 161

Salt Lake City (CA-25), 3

San Francisco (CA-38), 367n

Tranquility (AH-14), 104, 110, 130, 131, 132, 133

Twiggs (DD-591), 8

Underhill (DE-682), 91, 145, 284, 297

Vincennes (CA-44), 294, 367n

YMS-327, 8

See Indianapolis (CA-35)

Australian

HMAS Canberra, 294, 367n

Japanese

Akagane Maru, 290

I-13, 93

I-36, 92, 93

I-47, 17, 18, 21, 91, 93, 145–146

I-53, 17, 91, 93, 143, 145–146, 284, 297

I-165, 92, 93

I-175, 290, 367n

I-361, 92, 93

I-363, 92

I-366, 93

I-367, 9, 17, 18, 91, 93, 145–146

I-400, 18, 22

I-401, 18, 22

Musashi, 303

See I-58

Victory at Sea, 288, 366n

Vincennes (CA-44), 294, 367n

Vytlacil, Nicholas, xiii

Warner, John, 277, 366n

Washington Navy Yard, xxxi, 208, 210

Whiting, Francis E. M., 173, 362n

Wilkinson, Theodore S., xiii

Woods, Leonard T., 99

Wren, Peter L., 138–139, 361n

YMS-327, 8

Zamami Jima, 7

Zigzagging

Court of Inquiry on, 169, 170, 171, 172

at discretion of commanding officers, 24

Forrest Sherman on, 250

of Indianapolis, 37, 98, 159

Indianapolis not at time of attack, 109

and loss of Indianapolis, 244

McVay and, xxiv, xxvi–xxvii, 28, 165, 242, 243, 292, 295

Murrell on, 221

Nimitz on, 174, 208

and sinking of Indianapolis, 201, 202–203, 204–205, 207, 213–214

U.S. Navy doctrine on, xxxi, xxxii, 28–29, 30, 202, 205, 218, 237, 243, 244, 284, 363n