




GRAMPAW PETTIBONE

For Lack of a Switch

A trio of ferry pilots, scheduled to deliver three brand-new T2J's, took off from the airfield at which the factory was located and headed South for a running join-up. Preflight had been a little hurried owing to an hour or so delay in the plane's being made available for flight, but it had included the items usually covered in a pilot's preflight—speed brakes, flaps, flight controls free and easy, fuel full up, all access doors locked, tires, etc.

Immediately after take-off, the third man found that he had no aileron boost, and a quick look at the hydraulic gauge showed him zero pressure. Since the aircraft had no other obvious discrepancies and he had no trouble controlling it, No. 3 man proceeded to join on the leader, switched radio channels to squadron common, and heard the No. 2 man telling the leader his plane was "flying like a truck." No. 3 now reported his own "boost out" condition. The leader switched channels again and told the factory tower of their troubles. He was requested to return to base.

Now at 13,000 feet, the flight made a 180-degree turn and headed back.



The No. 3 man overran the other two aircraft as they settled down on course and ended up approximately one-half mile ahead and 1000 feet above the others.

Looking back over his left shoulder to keep the flight in sight, he retarded

throttle, flicked the speed brakes out momentarily and then reclosed them. He was at 240 knots, using nose up trim as he slowed down.

Suddenly, although no movement could be detected, it felt to him as if the stick went to a full nose-down position! The T2J did a smooth, but rapid, nose-over and continued on over to an inverted position in an outside loop! The pilot pulled as much back stick as he could and rolled in back trim, but was floating off the seat, hanging in his integrated harness, his helmet scraping on the canopy.

Realizing it was out of control, he ejected. The T2J was at this time inverted with the nose about 30 degrees below the horizon on a reciprocal heading to his original course.


The seat functioned perfectly, but as the chute opened, the rocket jet fitting attached to the left parachute riser opened and released the riser, leaving him dangling by only one fitting! Since the risers are interconnected in the NB-7 chute, it remained inflated and took him safely down, uninjured. The other members of the flight landed without incident.



Grampaw Pettibone says:

Sufferin' catfish! The T2J boost on-off switch is located ONLY in the rear cockpit. With a pilot flying solo in the front seat, preflight MUST include a check on this switch! If this is overlooked on preflight, the boost system can be activated from the front cockpit by turning the DC power control switch (battery-generator switch) to battery only. This is on the check-off list and clearly stated in the handbook. The boost check prior to take-off is a simple one; it involves lookin' at the hydraulic pressure gauge. After take-off is too late! This man had only 5.6 hours in the T2J, although he had over 400 jet hours. He obviously wasn't ready to ferry the T2J, for he didn't know the airplane.

When you accept a plane for ferry: Look it over as though you were buyin' it! You are! For lack of at most an extra hour at one end, the home base maintenance crew might spend two



weeks workin' the gripes off a real dog at the other end, or unlike this lad, you might not ever make it at all.

Runaway trim tab caused this accident. Lack of boost made it impossible to overcome. Lack of a proper pre-flight started a real and mighty expensive "daisy chain."

Explosive Decompression

An F8U-1 *Crusader* was cruising at 45,000 feet. On this flight, the pilot was testing the flight capabilities at V-max speeds with yaw and roll stabilization systems inoperative.

Accelerating in burner to 1.05 indicated Mach, he pushed over a power-on descent to 37,000 feet, leveled off at 1.38 Mach and accelerated to 1.5 indicated Mach. Without warning, the canopy plexiglas failed, and explosive decompression occurred.

The pilot was momentarily confused by noise, change of pressure, and ram-blast air factors. His first assumption was engine disintegration. Following an instinctive reaction, he cut afterburner, retarded the throttle to idle, and ducked his head forward and down. Plexiglas fragments rained down on his hard hat and onto the cockpit floor. The wind noise was pitched in a shrill scream.

He decelerated rapidly, the front and side windshield panels offering considerable protection against the ram-air blast. He lowered his helmet visor and, for the first time, raised his head to glance at the instrument panel. The altimeter was unwinding through 24,000 feet. The pilot realized from his instrument scan that his engine was O.K. and no warning lights were showing. He extended his speed brakes to check further acceleration and began a controlled descent.

His greatest concern at this time was the dislodgement of the ejection seat face curtain from its housing. Until the airspeed was slowed to below 250 knots, the curtain was alternately flapping up and down, in and out of the wind stream. At one time, the up travel of the face curtain appeared to be eight or ten inches! The shrieking wind stream discouraged any attempt to catch hold of the curtain and secure it. Not letting the curtain distract him, he concentrated on let-down.

He leveled off at 3000 feet at 220 knots and headed for home, the wind noise pitch now reduced to a tremen-


dous but dull roar. Although the noise was disconcerting, landing was uneventful. Medical examination revealed the pilot had suffered no ill effects whatever.



Grampaw Pettibone says:

Brother!! This is the third case of explosive decompression in the F8U-1 since July. One took place at 48,000 and another at 40,000, but this is the first at over Mach 1. In one case, a loose connection between the static port and cabin pressure regulator allowed excessive cabin pressure to build up. The static sensing line for the air safety valve is tied into this same line.

You gotta watch that cabin altimeter! Too great a differential doesn't mean you've got a good cabin compressor, bub, you've got a downing gripe instead. This lad's trouble was suspected to be "aging" of the plexiglas canopy. He did an outstanding job, he's a "real pro." Ol' Gramps would be glad to have this kind of sharpie aboard any time.



Gear Check

Two AD-5W pilots took off one fine morning from a Pacific island base on a scheduled two hour instrument—GCA flight. The first 30 minutes of the flight were spent in routine formation work, carrier break-ups, and rendezvous, after which the section leader released his wingman for an island FAM and returned to base for a few practice GCA approaches.

For the next hour, he made five GCA's, each to a touch-and-go landing. On the last touch-and-go, he felt a severe shimmy during the landing roll and found he had "unsafe" indications on both main gears when he retracted his wheels. He also noted his air speed was low for the power setting. A quick check by another aircraft confirmed that the right main gear was trailing.

The pilot then lowered his gear and made a low pass for a control tower check. It appeared down and locked, so he received permission for a "hot touchdown" and a go-around. On the "hot pass" a noticeable shimmy was felt, but the gear indicated safe, so he tried another with the same results.

The tower now requested that he make a final landing, utilizing the runway arresting gear to shorten the roll-out.

The pilot complied and a smooth touchdown was made. After 1000 feet of roll-out, the port gear collapsed. The pilot cut the engine and used full right rudder to bring up the left wing. As the wings came level, the starboard gear collapsed. The AD-5W then slid another 600 feet on its radome and stopped 400 feet short of the arresting gear, substantially damaged but intact.



Grampaw Pettibone says:

Great balls of fire! Why so many young sprouts and old fuds insist on a "hot touch-down" to check their gear down and locked and even attempt to jar a jammed gear down with a hard bounce is beyond Ol' Gramps' comprehension.

On the AD-5W, if the gear folds, it folds quickly, and there isn't a man goin' who can catch it and wave off before the prop turns to a club. Then that man's C.O. is liable to be lookin' up the next-of-kin.

This type of maneuver is plumb foolishness! Go through your emergency procedures exactly as outlined in the flight handbook for your craft, alert the base and get all the emergency equipment set up, and then set it on as though it WAS going to fold. You'll live longer that way. Come to think of it, there's nothing sadder than the family of an unsuccessful wheel bouncer.