



grampaw pettibone

Right Day, Wrong Field


Two Naval Aviators were on a scheduled logistic flight in a T-39. The flight was to deliver some additional pilots for pickup of another aircraft at a civilian field where an overhaul activity was located. The departure and en route segment of the flight were uneventful. The pilot-in-command was occupying the right seat with the copilot in the left seat.

Upon arrival in the vicinity of the field, the T-39 was cleared to descend to 2,000 feet. Vectors were given and the pilot was told to expect a visual approach to the runway. The pilot called the field in sight and was cleared to switch to the tower. Tower contact was established and the tower operator sighted the T-39 and issued landing clearance.

The pilot then queried the tower regarding a light aircraft on the runway. The tower replied, "No traffic in the air between you and the runway." The pilot answered, "OK, the Cessna is lifting." Tower tapes indicate the tower then transmitted, "Are you sure you're lined up for our runway?" Further transmissions from the tower yielded no response from the pilot.

The T-39 touched down 350 feet from the approach end, six feet left of center line, and commenced braking. Number one engine was secured in accordance with normal procedure on the initial portion of the rollout. The pilot then realized that he had landed at the wrong airport which had a single runway 3,000 feet by 30 feet instead of the intended runway which was 7,200 feet by 100 feet. At approximately 1,000 feet from the approach end, the pilot-in-command directed go around and advanced power on the #2 engine. Realizing that #1 engine had been secured, he directed the pilot at the controls to "ride it out" and simultaneously secured #2 engine.

The aircraft had commenced a



gramps not only hits the ceiling! He makes pocket shots!

slight left drift at touchdown and the port mainmount left the runway, followed shortly by the starboard mainmount. The aircraft departed the runway at a slight angle and was guided


toward a gap in a line of trees. The aircraft impacted a 30-inch earthen embankment with the left wing striking a tree and the right wing striking fence posts and wire fencing. The nose landing gear sheared during this evolution. The T-39 continued into a plowed field, coming to rest 320 feet from the departure end of the runway.

The pilot-in-command ensured that the cockpit was secured and ordered evacuation. All personnel exited via the normal egress route. No injuries were sustained. Civil authorities were on the scene within a short period and safeguarded the aircraft.



Grampaw Pettibone says:

Jumpin' Jehoshaphat! Someone could have got kilt! Boy, the fog count was high in that cockpit. Would you believe that the following comments were made in the cockpit? Copilot: "The runway sure looks narrow." Crew chief (who was in the cockpit during the landing contrary to procedures but who was observant): "I don't think this is the right field." Both comments were made on final approach before touchdown! How much warning does a pilot need? Then to really get my dander up, the "investigators" laid it on the copilot and crew chief for not more strongly voicing their convictions!!! Baloney! This pilot-in-command got more than his share of clues — and blew it.



ILLUSTRATED BY *Osborn*

Concerned Natops User

We aircrews here at a major test center need your learned advice concerning a new (local) Natops program rumored to be just around the corner. The program about to be implemented is apparently the result of problems encountered in controlling Natops updates for some 50 aircrews.

Staff's solution is to take all manuals from aircrew members and issue two or three to controlled libraries in each of several sections. The result would be a centralized control that would allow an AX1 to go around to the sections and incorporate changes in all manuals as they come in.

The consensus is that the staff is creating more problems than are being solved. What can we do? Availability of Natops manuals will be one to every five to ten flyers. The obvious tendency will be to not look it up in Natops when it is not at our fingertips or, perhaps, not even in the library.

Rumor also has it that the pocket checklist will be assigned to and left in applicable aircraft. The aircrew member will have no PCL.

Jeezers, creepers, Gramps. Is this the way to run an airline? Or has wise ole staff got a great idea?

Please, ancient mentor, lend us your advice.

Grampaw Pettibone says:




Great horned toadies! I have to say that "limiting distribution of Natops manuals" is not a good idea. It seems to me that having to go to the "library" every time a pilot wants to look up something can only discourage the use of Natops.

There must be some other solution. Think!

Gross Flight Planning

The pilot and copilot of an E-2B were returning to NAS Coast following an RON at NAS Opposite Coast. The first portion of the flight was scheduled for two stops to pick up a crew member and passenger prior to a refueling stop. The crew planned a mid-morning takeoff. The pilot-in-command (PIC) was going to occupy the right seat to allow the copilot to gain additional experience.

The copilot had only a minimal amount of experience in the E-2B. At altitude, headwinds of 35 to 40 knots



were forecast. These were depicted on the weather map held by the crew. The pilot and copilot were alone on the first leg. The two intermediate stops were uneventful.

Takeoff from the last pickup point was also uneventful. The flight climbed to 10,000 feet in intermittent IFR conditions. During this climbout, the port low fuel warning light illuminated and the PIC instructed the pilot at the controls to actuate the tank interconnect to balance the fuel load. That action caused the light to go out.

The flight continued and the aircraft leveled off at 10,000 feet. Between 50 and 60 nautical miles from their intended fuel stop, both low fuel warning lights illuminated and the PIC declared "minimum fuel" to the center. He elected to continue the flight to his final stop. The E-2 was cleared direct to a VORTAC and switched to local approach control.

The crew was informed that the duty runway had been changed and was asked if a short final GCA was desired. It was and they were vectored to a three-mile final. After the E-2 was turned to the final approach heading, visual contact with the runway was made and at around two miles the pilot at the controls felt the engines start to run intermittently. At approximately 1,000 feet, both generator lights illuminated as engine rpm decayed.

The PIC took control of the aircraft, announced double engine failure and attempted an engine relight. That being unsuccessful, he tried to raise the gear handle, but could not due to loss of electrical power. He then instructed the copilot (in the left seat) to raise the gear handle. The co-

pilot did, utilizing the landing gear solenoid override. The PIC then instructed the copilot to attempt a relight, which was also unsuccessful. This was immediately followed by the order to prepare for impact.

The aircraft struck the ground in a slightly right wing down, little nose-high attitude with gear down, approximately $\frac{3}{4}$ mile from the end of the runway. The aircraft was destroyed. Both pilots sustained injuries; however, the passengers were unhurt.

Grampaw Pettibone says:



Sufferin' catfish! This is one of those accidents that make everyone comment, "I can't believe it." This pilot had a great reputation in his community. Words like "really knows the machine, a good stick, etc." were used to describe him.

Why is it, then, that a young feller would allow himself to be involved in the most primitive type of accident — "running out of go-juice?"

What bothers me is that this driver may have been pulling things like this in the past and they finally caught up!

Let me offer some advice to what is probably a very small percentage of our aviators. If you enjoy a good reputation in your squadron, a good reputation in your community, a good reputation for knowing your machine, and have been in one community and one aircraft for a long time — beware of the next ingredient which could get you eventually.

If, because of all the above, you have a tendency to violate sound procedures and be complacent about flight planning and other flight duties, you are a candidate for a mishap. Think about it!!!