



# grampaw pettibone

## It's an Old Story

An instructor and his student were scheduled for a practice night instrument training flight in a TS-2A Tracker. The IP had considerable experience in the S-2 with over 1,000 hours in model. The weather was forecast to be clear with visibility greater than 15 miles. Briefing, pre-flight, start and departure were uneventful.

The first portion of the flight was conducted as briefed and the instructor entered the night GCA pattern. Following some practice GCAs, he requested a simulated minimum fuel state precision approach. GCA acknowledged the request while the aircraft was on the downwind leg. On the crosswind leg, GCA informed the pilots that the precision radar was down and to expect a surveillance approach.

The student, complying with the normal procedures, called for the landing checklist which was then completed. While approaching the glide path, the pilots were given a ten-second gear warning in compliance with the minimum fuel state approach originally requested. The instructor pilot did not expect this because of the previous change from a precision to a surveillance approach. On final, four miles from touchdown, the instructor simulated an engine failure by closing the starboard throttle. The



student raised the gear and reset the flaps to one-third. After some delay, he called for the inflight secure checklist. It was completed at two miles.

The IP noticed that the aircraft was lined up considerably left of course and so informed the controller. The instructor told the student to take over visually, and the student corrected toward the center line. The IP became concerned with a rapid sink rate which had developed and the maneuvering required to align the aircraft for landing. The tail wheel struck the runway first, followed by the prop tips and fuselage as the aircraft landed *wheels-up*. The barrier-hook-assembly mounting pad engaged the arresting gear. The aircraft came to rest slightly off center line, approximately 1,800 feet

from the runway threshold. The surprised pilots secured the cockpit switches and evacuated the aircraft through the overhead hatches. There was no fire.



Grampaw Pettibone says:

Again! Again! Again! What an old story. We can print stories over and over again and still they occur!

A break in the habit pattern coupled with some distraction and you got it—*wheels up!*

This instructor, a dedicated lad, was burnin' the candle at both ends, including graduate school. All the more reason to be attuned to anything which tends to distract from the primary duty of safely flyin' your machine. I've written volumes on wheels-up landings, but I predict we'll have another.

Don't let it be you!

## Starved S-2


Two young TS-2A pilots on a cross-country training flight departed a Gulf Coast NAS late one afternoon for the return flight to their home air station. Things progressed uneventfully for nearly two and one-half hours and then the port engine began backfiring.

Things evidently became pretty confused about this time, because neither pilot remembers exactly the steps he took for the next few minutes. They do know that a portion of the engine exploded through the cowling before they could get it feathered.

The pilot reported his trouble to the center and received a clearance and vector for a GCA at a nearby Air Force base.

Just after turning to the assigned heading inbound to the AFB, the copilot noted the power on the starboard engine to be 2,000 turns and 32 inches. After the pilots checked the prop control and throttle and found them both full forward, they felt they were losing that engine too.

The pilot-in-command advised ap-



proach control that he had lost both engines. After being told that he was still 15 miles from the AFB, he started looking for a place to put the S-2 down. He was aware he was near a city by the lights he could see. After lining up to one side of a highway, he selected a darkened area that he figured was a plowed field. Actually it was the city reservoir.

At an airspeed of about 95 knots and an altitude of 100 feet, the landing gear was lowered. On impact the aircraft immediately flipped inverted and water rushed in. With mud and water rapidly filling the cockpit, both pilots released their lap belts and shoulder straps, then made their way to the main entrance hatch. They both stepped out on the wing uninjured and were soon picked up by a helicopter from the AFB.

 Grampaw Pettibone says:

**Sufferin' catfish!** These lads worked like beavers to booby-trap themselves and did a darn good job of it. Material failure of the number 3 cylinder in the port engine caused the emergency, but it sure didn't cause the accident.

Things must have been awfully confused in that cockpit for both lads to ignore the checklist completely and trust everything to memory. With 6,000 feet to play with and the bad engine safely secured, just what was so pressing that the emergency checklist couldn't be used to ensure that things were squared away as they should have been?

These little airplanes are pretty trustworthy beasts, but they'll rebel everytime you shut off that supply of go juice to the power pack. I'll just bet there were a couple of red faces when the accident investigators found the starboard fuel selector in the OFF position. Just wonder if these fellows ever heard this one: "The hurrier I go, the behinder I get." (July 1965)

### Ace-leroo on Final

An instructor and his student were scheduled for a familiarization flight in a T-28 Trojan. The instructor had 1,000 total hours, 600 in the T-28. The weather was forecast to be excellent. Briefing of the student was thorough.

The preflight, start and takeoff were uneventful. The flight was completed but the instructor, who had opened the canopy for awhile, was unable to



close it. Returning to home field, in view of his canopy problem, he was going to conduct a practice precautionary emergency landing (PEEL).

Meanwhile, the instructor made several attempts to recycle the canopy without success, while forgetting to close the cowl and oil cooler doors. The approach to the high key position and the PEEL pattern checkpoints seemed to be normal to both pilots and observers on the ground.

The instructor was aware that his sink rate would be increased due to the open canopy. However, he did not notice that his cowl flaps and oil cooler doors were open until reaching the 90-degree position in the pattern. At this point, he closed them.

As the aircraft rolled on to final, both pilots noted that altitude and airspeed were normal. The runway duty officer (RDO) and tower observer also confirmed this. Feeling comfortable in the approach, the instructor tried to signal the RDO and point out his canopy difficulties. As the RDO was on the right side, the instructor put his left hand on the control column and pointed to the canopy with his right.

He made no attempt to slow the rate of descent. The student pilot in front did not become involved until just prior to the landing, at which time he grabbed the stick and pulled back in an effort to slow the rate of descent. Although the student's actions were too late to appreciably affect descent rate, they did alter the

T-28's attitude from a nose-low to a nose-high position. This allowed the stresses to be concentrated through the main landing gear rather than through the nose gear as the aircraft struck the runway.

The plane bounced into the air and settled back onto the runway. Both the tower and the RDO made transmissions to the aircraft. The instructor pilot responded that everything seemed normal and that assistance was not required. Roll out and taxi back to the squadron line were normal. Both front and rear accelerometers showed ten Gs, the maximum indication for the gauge. Inspection revealed substantial damage, placing the mishap in the major accident category.

 Grampaw Pettibone says:

**Great gallopin' gremlins!** What a maneuver. This driver was so "hot" that he wanted to do a little flying "lefty." If it weren't for the student, I believe the impact would have been much worse. What's the big concern over a canopy malfunction, anyhow? Seems to me that I would be more bothered about not being able to "open" one instead of closin' one.

At any rate, with no other problems, this gent allowed himself to become preoccupied and didn't mind the store. You gotta fly your machine — **First!** What good is it for the RDO to know about your problem when you are in landing transition, or should I say — landing crash!